India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

Donald Trump’s 2025 inauguration marks a pivotal moment in the retreat from rule-based globalism. It signals a move towards neo-mercantilist bilateralism, where ‘Make America Great Again’ replaces multilateral norms with transactional bargaining. In this, the strategic competition of inordinately large-sized economies of the United States and China threatens to further erode the power of rule-based multilateralism, overtaking it with transnationalism. Their shared negation of various time-tested international arrangements—that undergirded global stability since the Second World War—has led the Trump administration to resurrect the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ and reiterate American retreat from much of its global responsibilities. India, as a result, faces intensifying asymmetry with China and a growing US unpredictability, as also likely US retreat from the Indo-Pacific where India stands heavily invested. Amidst these blurring distinctions between partner and competitor identities in India’s engagement with Beijing and Washington DC, as also in US–China ties, this article examines the sustainability of India’s strategic autonomy posture. It examines how, in the face of competing frameworks of US-led AUKUS or China-led RCEP, India must operationalise an inclusive and non-militarised Quadrilateral Security Framework (Quad) and broaden its engagements with all other stakeholders in search of alternatives to any excessive dependence on the US or Chinese preponderance in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s strategic responses to cross-border terrorism have historically oscillated between restraint and limited retaliation. On the one hand, these episodic measures, such as the surgical strikes of 2016 and the Balakot airstrikes of 2019, demonstrated India’s willingness to escalate, yet their capacity to generate sustained coercive effects on Pakistan appears to have been limited. The May 2025 Operation Sindoor may be interpreted as reflecting elements of graduated doctrinal adjustment; nevertheless, the continued absence of institutionalised and publicly verifiable attribution mechanisms left significant scope for contestation within the international information environment. Against this background, the article argues that the systematic integration of open-source intelligence (OSINT) into India’s existing coercive toolkit may incrementally enhance the credibility and continuity of both episodic retaliation and longer-term cumulative pressure by narrowing attribution gaps and shaping external perceptions. This analysis is derived from classic theories of coercion (George, 1991, Forceful persuasion: Coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, United States Institute of Peace Press; Pape, 1996, Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war, Cornell University Press; Schelling, 1966, Arms and influence, Yale University Press) and contemporary debates on information warfare and intelligence (Betts, 1978, World Politics, 31[1], 61–89; Byman & Waxman, 2002, The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might, Cambridge University Press; Zegart, 2007, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11, Princeton University Press). The article also suggests a practical framework for integrating OSINT into India’s security architecture. The cases of Balakot and Operation Sindoor are analysed to explore the effects of delayed attribution and contested imagery on information narratives, while also considering the possible role of timely and verifiable OSINT in addressing such dynamics. The article proposes an ‘OSINT-enabled compellence triad’ of demand dossiers, synchronised visual proof and time-bound assurances that could strengthen India’s bargaining leverage under the nuclear shadow, while enhancing its credibility in multilateral forums and domestically. The integration of traditional prudence and modern transparency enables OSINT to function as an important mechanism for the furtherance of cumulative compellence against terrorism originating from Pakistan.

The formation logic and development trend of the China–US–India triangular relationship can be revealed through three dimensions: theoretical origin, historical analysis and realistic assessment. It is further found that under the background of new globalisation, this relationship will influence the global pattern in a way that combines cooperation and competition. From a historical perspective, after going through three stages: the Cold War period, the post-Cold War period and the period since the USA put forward the Indo-Pacific Strategy—the China–US–India relationship has formed close interactive ties. Economically, China, the USA and India are the world’s three major economies with high interdependence. Strategically, the USA is in a period of contraction, China is consolidating its regional influence, and India is becoming more active and proactive in the Indian Ocean and on the global stage. In terms of comprehensive national strength, the USA has advantages in science, technology and maritime security; China holds an advantage in manufacturing; and India has advantages in the service industry and demographic dividend. The emerging China–US–India triangular relationship presents important characteristics such as inclusiveness, multi-hub nature, overlapping and being driven by new globalisation. Especially in the field of artificial intelligence, the three countries have complementary advantages while remaining independent of each other. In short, the China–US–India ‘weak triangle’ is different from the highly confrontational pattern during the Cold War. It emphasises an inclusive and multi-hub model and is expected to avoid traditional power traps through interdependence and strategic flexibility and jointly shape the future international order.

Over the past two decades, Turkish domestic and foreign policy have undergone a profound transformation under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Historically, the Turkish Republic was anchored by the Kemalist secular establishment—a powerful, military-backed elite that enforced a strict, Western-oriented nationalism, systematically marginalising the country’s pious and conservative majority. By politically mobilising this disenfranchised demographic against the traditional secular elite, Erdoğan has successfully redefined the Turkish state and its global posture. Broadly divided into two parts, this article first examines this domestic political transformation, contrasting the economic upliftment and democratic consolidation of his first decade in power with his subsequent passage towards populist authoritarianism and the subjugation of political opponents. Rather than viewing his tenure strictly through the lens of competitive authoritarianism or rigid ideological Islamism, this article assesses Erdoğan’s political longevity through his reliance on strategic hedging. The second part of the article focuses on the shifting contours of Türkiye’s regional foreign policy, with a special emphasis on the Arab world. While his early attempts to project an ambitious ‘Neo-Ottoman’ ideological model during the Arab Spring resulted in regional isolation, Erdoğan demonstrated considerable adaptability. When this Islamist-leaning foreign policy failed in the Middle East, he did not hesitate to abandon ideological purity to salvage the national economy. He pragmatically mended ties with former rivals like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. These status-quo regimes had viewed Erdoğan’s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood—a transnational Islamist movement seeking to overthrow established governments—as a direct existential threat to their own survival. By exploiting Türkiye’s geopolitical centrality and unique diplomatic access to conflicting global blocs, he transformed regional volatility into domestic leverage, cementing Türkiye’s status as an autonomous and consequential middle power.

This article analyses the evolutionary recalibration of India’s national security doctrine vis-à-vis Pakistan, examining how the state navigates the complex tension between sub-conventional provocation and nuclear deterrence. It explores the challenge posed by the adversary’s asymmetric warfare strategy, which sought to exploit the ‘stability–instability paradox’—where strategic nuclear stability is leveraged to foment tactical instability—thereby constraining India’s conventional options. Rather than positing a radical rupture, the study argues that India’s transition from ‘strategic restraint’ to the current ‘new normal’ represents a sophisticated adjustment within the framework of defensive realism. By reflecting on a series of punitive measures culminating in Operation Sindoor, the article demonstrates how the Indian state has matured in its ability to manage the escalation ladder. The central argument posits that this calibrated posture aims to restore credible deterrence through limited punitive strikes, validating indigenous defence capabilities while exercising the strategic maturity necessary to prevent conflict from spiralling into a nuclear exchange.