From Episodic Retaliation to Enhancing Cumulative Compellence: By Leveraging OSINT in India–Pakistan Security Dynamics

Abstract

India’s strategic responses to cross-border terrorism have historically oscillated between restraint and limited retaliation. On the one hand, these episodic measures, such as the surgical strikes of 2016 and the Balakot airstrikes of 2019, demonstrated India’s willingness to escalate, yet their capacity to generate sustained coercive effects on Pakistan appears to have been limited. The May 2025 Operation Sindoor may be interpreted as reflecting elements of graduated doctrinal adjustment; nevertheless, the continued absence of institutionalised and publicly verifiable attribution mechanisms left significant scope for contestation within the international information environment. Against this background, the article argues that the systematic integration of open-source intelligence (OSINT) into India’s existing coercive toolkit may incrementally enhance the credibility and continuity of both episodic retaliation and longer-term cumulative pressure by narrowing attribution gaps and shaping external perceptions. This analysis is derived from classic theories of coercion (George, 1991, Forceful persuasion: Coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war, United States Institute of Peace Press; Pape, 1996, Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war, Cornell University Press; Schelling, 1966, Arms and influence, Yale University Press) and contemporary debates on information warfare and intelligence (Betts, 1978, World Politics, 31[1], 61–89; Byman & Waxman, 2002, The dynamics of coercion: American foreign policy and the limits of military might, Cambridge University Press; Zegart, 2007, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11, Princeton University Press). The article also suggests a practical framework for integrating OSINT into India’s security architecture. The cases of Balakot and Operation Sindoor are analysed to explore the effects of delayed attribution and contested imagery on information narratives, while also considering the possible role of timely and verifiable OSINT in addressing such dynamics. The article proposes an ‘OSINT-enabled compellence triad’ of demand dossiers, synchronised visual proof and time-bound assurances that could strengthen India’s bargaining leverage under the nuclear shadow, while enhancing its credibility in multilateral forums and domestically. The integration of traditional prudence and modern transparency enables OSINT to function as an important mechanism for the furtherance of cumulative compellence against terrorism originating from Pakistan.