Abstract
Over the past two decades, Turkish domestic and foreign policy have undergone a profound transformation under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Historically, the Turkish Republic was anchored by the Kemalist secular establishment—a powerful, military-backed elite that enforced a strict, Western-oriented nationalism, systematically marginalising the country’s pious and conservative majority. By politically mobilising this disenfranchised demographic against the traditional secular elite, Erdoğan has successfully redefined the Turkish state and its global posture. Broadly divided into two parts, this article first examines this domestic political transformation, contrasting the economic upliftment and democratic consolidation of his first decade in power with his subsequent passage towards populist authoritarianism and the subjugation of political opponents. Rather than viewing his tenure strictly through the lens of competitive authoritarianism or rigid ideological Islamism, this article assesses Erdoğan’s political longevity through his reliance on strategic hedging. The second part of the article focuses on the shifting contours of Türkiye’s regional foreign policy, with a special emphasis on the Arab world. While his early attempts to project an ambitious ‘Neo-Ottoman’ ideological model during the Arab Spring resulted in regional isolation, Erdoğan demonstrated considerable adaptability. When this Islamist-leaning foreign policy failed in the Middle East, he did not hesitate to abandon ideological purity to salvage the national economy. He pragmatically mended ties with former rivals like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. These status-quo regimes had viewed Erdoğan’s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood—a transnational Islamist movement seeking to overthrow established governments—as a direct existential threat to their own survival. By exploiting Türkiye’s geopolitical centrality and unique diplomatic access to conflicting global blocs, he transformed regional volatility into domestic leverage, cementing Türkiye’s status as an autonomous and consequential middle power.
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