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Abstract

Having goals such as gaining reputation and obtaining a promotion motivates grassroots cadres in China to innovate, resulting in better local governance-related performance. However, perceived personal risk related to accountability systems fosters a mentality of blame avoidance among these cadres, hindering their willingness to innovate. This study applied a cross-sectional questionnaire survey and explored the relationship between goals (including egoistic and altruistic goals) and innovation motivation as well as the moderating effects of blame avoidance. To this end, an online investigation was conducted of 464 grassroots cadres (32% women) aged 20 to 62 years from a region in central China. The results showed that having goals overall, as well as having egoistic and altruistic goals, is significantly positively associated with innovation motivation. Blame avoidance orientation weakened the association between altruistic goals and innovation motivation. Based on the study results, we consider that institutional optimization requires greater fault tolerance to prompt innovation among grassroots cadres and greater rewards for altruistic-oriented innovation to improve innovation motivation.

Plain Language Summary

How Different Priorities Drive Innovation Among Public Servants: Evidence from a Chinese City Study

This study, using questionnaire survey data obtained from 464 grassroots cadres in a region in central China, aimed to explore the relationship between various diverse goals and innovative behavior among Chinese grass-roots cadres, as well as the influence of a blame avoidance orientation on this relationship. We believe that our study makes a significant contribution to the literature because it showed that having goals overall (and goals subdivided into altruistic and egotistic goals) was positively associated with innovation motivation. A blame avoidance orientation was also found to negatively moderate the relationship between altruistic goals and innovation motivation, which means that a high blame avoidance orientation weakens the positive relationship between goals and innovation motivation. Further, we believe that this paper will be of interest to the readership of your journal because it provides evidence-based research confirming the importance of individual goals in positively influencing innovation behavior among Chinese grassroots cadres, and that a blame avoidance orientation weakens innovation motivation among those with altruistic goals. The study’s findings provide a reference for designing governance systems that appropriately consider the influence of egotistic and altruistic goals as a driving mechanism on public service innovation motivation among grassroots cadres and in guiding further research.

Keywords

innovation motivation goals blame avoidance orientation grassroots cadres Chinese local governance

Introduction

Governance-related innovation in the grassroots public sector has been regarded as a source of renewal and has significantly contributed to the improvement of governance and creation of public value (Moore & Hartley, 2008). Currently, Chinese society is undergoing a significant transformation in terms of growing demands for greater grassroots public sector innovation to enhance performance and meet the public’s significantly heightened expectations. Chinese grassroots cadres—such as frontline officials, elected leaders, and public servants exercising authority at the community, village, and township levels—are critical participants in grassroots governance innovation (Jing, 2016). The innovation motivation of these cadres in China directly determines the level of grassroots governance innovation in the country (Zheng et al., 2021). This has led many studies to explore the mechanism of innovation motivation among grassroots cadres in China to explain the phenomenon and propose policy suggestions for improving innovation.

Currently, although the theories established by scholars from an institutional perspective to explain the innovation of grassroots cadres in China still dominate (J. Wu et al., 2013; N. Zhang et al., 2017), they are facing increasing criticism. For instance, some research suggests that the incentive system is the key institution driving innovation among grassroots cadres in China. These researchers advocate that innovative practices can often make it easier to obtain better performance in key areas and win promotion. Thus, grassroots cadres could be motivated to embrace innovation motivation under a tournament system to improve performance, thereby seeking promotion and development (L. C. Wu & Liu, 2018; Z. C. Li & Liu, 2019). Other studies suggest that strict work accountability and assessment systems can drive grassroots officials to innovate (Lin & Xu, 2017). This stance suggests that the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres in China stems from the need to improve performance in response to an assessment by higher-level departments under the pressure of the system. The main criticism of innovation motivation based on an institutional perspective is that it considers cadres appendages of the system who merely pursue promotion while neglecting their diverse needs. For instance, some researchers regard innovative behavior among Chinese grassroots cadres as an external manifestation of a public service motivation, and emphasize that the motivation for innovation emerges from their own self-realization and internal needs to serve society (Chen et al., 2023; J. Liu et al., 2022). This contrasts the assumption that cadres are only motivated to innovate because of their desire for promotion.

Inspired by future time perspective theory and planned behavior theory, this establishes a model for analyzing the innovation of grassroots cadres from the perspective of their individual goals and needs to respond to the limitations of current mainstream theories. Future time perspective theory stresses that goals that reflect planning for the future directly influence individuals’ cognition and behavior by shaping future goal setting (Lennings et al., 1998; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Chinese grassroots cadres’ multi-future goals that reflect their expectations regarding future objectives might be direct predictors of innovation motivation (Podger & Chan, 2015; Tan, 2021a). Furthermore, planned behavior theory emphasizes that an individual’s behavior is a rational consequence following an evaluation of goals and external environmental factors (Ajzen, 1991; Tan, 2021b). According to this theory, environmental risk factors may cause individuals to reformulate plans for future actions to avoid potential losses. Considering the potential impact of the accountability system on the innovative decision-making of grassroots cadres in China (Ran, 2017), this study proposes that a blame avoidance orientation could manifest as awareness of the accountability risk, which may make them more likely to perceive risks in relation to innovation and reconsider their goals, and thereby reduce their motivation to innovate.

Accordingly, this study proposed and examined a goal-oriented innovation model for grassroots cadres in China. In the framework, grassroots’ goals were classified as either egoistic or altruistic, which were regarded as direct predictors of innovation motivation. A blame-avoidance orientation was seen as hindering cadres from engaging in innovation as a way of achieving their goals. Based on data from a questionnaire survey, this study established a regression effect model among the variables and tested the research hypotheses and variable relationships they encompassed. In the discussion section of our article, we expound on the value of the theoretical model we have proposed to existing research, and based on the results of this study, provide policy suggestions for enhancing the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres.

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Goals and Innovation Motivation

The innovation motivation of employees in the public sector has been defined as the generation of novel and useful ideas in work-related fields, including policy implications, public service improvement, and organizational optimization (Scott & Bruce, 1994). The generation of innovation motivation is characterized by contingency (Walker, 2014), with progress dependent on the environment in which participants work. Chinese grassroots cadres are capable of perceiving both the potential problems in the operation of grassroots governance organizations and the public’s urgent public service needs (Thomas et al., 2013). Furthermore, their innovation motivation has mainly focused on optimizing organizational operation processes and improving public service. In general, the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres is self-motivated, stable, and driven directly by individual perceptions rather than by external factors such as those arising in their working environments.

As one intrinsic driver of individual behavior, goals concern individuals’ perceptions regarding expected future events derived from reflections on experiences and evaluations of current conditions (Lennings et al., 1998). The diverse goals of Chinese grassroots cadres reflect their expectations regarding a positive future, which can be divided into two categories. First, considerations concerning acquiring family recognition, reputation, income stability, and career development closely correlate to egoistic future events, which can be defined as egoistic goals (Podger & Chan, 2015). Second, considerations concerning how to better serve society and the country closely correlate to altruistic future events, which can be defined as altruistic goals (Tan, 2021a). It has been suggested that egoistic and altruistic goals directly and significantly influence employees’ workplace-related cognition and behavior (Bal et al., 2010; Baltes et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2011). Similarly, in the Chinese context, the workplace behavior of grassroots cadres has been found to be closely associated with both egoistic and altruistic goals (Ge, 2015; Zhao, 2013), which aligns with the self-benefits hypothesis emphasized in agency theory (Van Slyke, 2006) and altruism hypothesis in theory related to public service motivation (Brewer et al., 2000; Perry & Wise, 1990).

Since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) in 2012, China’s central government has increasingly emphasized grassroots governance innovation and published specific policy to stimulate a willingness to innovate among cadres in grassroots public authorities and self-governing organizations. In 2018, the general office of the CPC Central Committee issued an official document entitled “Guidance for further motivating officials to take on new responsibilities and make new achievements in the new era,” which highlighted the positive effects of promoting incentives that foster individual benefits and innovation. Furthermore, local governments have commended Chinese grassroots cadres who played an important role in grassroots innovation and given them support to further develop innovation for better governance. These cadres experience the link between their personal goals and innovative practices in their daily work, official reports, and policy documents (Y. Zhang et al., 2023). As a result, innovation becomes closely connected with both the egoistic and altruistic goals of grassroots cadres, leading them to perceive a bright and hopeful future and generating a strong innovation motivation to achieve these goals, in alignment with the future time perspective theory.

Although this process can be influenced by a blame avoidance mentality, several studies suggest it can still operate effectively in such a context. First, cadres who pursue the egoistic goal of promotion have a stronger motivation to participate in innovation related to organizational optimization and technology-oriented organizational transformation (Ma et al., 2015; Wong, 2017). Second, when confronting obstacles from a higher authority that threaten achievement of the egoistic goal of improving reputation, grassroots cadres are likely to try to build their reputation through innovation to enhance their prestige and ensure their high-quality performance and attainment of personal goals (Fu, 2012). Third, a study on anti-poverty governance in China indicated that to achieve the egoistic goal of stable career development and altruistic goal of helping the poor, Chinese grassroots cadres will seek to innovate their working methods to improve their performance under the pressure of administrative tasks (G. M. Li, 2021). Finally, a study of Chinese civil servants showed a positive correlation between the altruistic goals of serving the country and society and innovation motivation (Q. Liu & Li, 2021). Overall, previous studies suggest a positive relationship between goals and innovation motivation. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:

H1: Grassroots cadres’ goals are positively associated with innovation motivation.

H1a: Grassroots cadres’ egoistic goals are positively associated with innovation motivation.

H1b: Grassroots cadres’ altruistic goals are positively associated with innovation motivation.

Moderating Role of a Blame Avoidance Orientation

In China, the blame avoidance orientation of grassroots cadres refers to a tendency to minimize behavior perceived as involving risk and to blame others for personal faults due to a fear of being held accountable (X. F. Li, 2019). This tendency manifests in various forms such as diverting and hindering policy implementation, manipulating administrative procedures for one’s own gain, and looking for scapegoats (Z. Z. Liu, 2021). Globally, individuals in the public sector are increasingly motivated to avoid blame rather than take the opportunity to receive praise, particularly in relation to work perceived as involving risk (Weaver, 1986). Blame avoidance theorizes that individuals in the public sector prefer to follow the rules at work rather than participate in organizational change, governance innovation, and other actions that involve accountability risks (Hood, 2007; McGraw, 1990). Chinese cadres are also held accountable for their failings in grassroots governance by the public, media, and higher levels of government, which can involve penalties such as salary reduction and demotion; thus, there is a strong motivation to avoid blame (Q. Liu & Li, 2021). Considering that innovation in grassroots governance typically involves risk (Tan, 2021a), a blame avoidance orientation is likely to seriously inhibit grassroots cadres’ willingness to innovate.

Planned behavior theory suggests that individuals’ next course of action is influenced by their perception of potential loss, a perception shaped by environmental factors (Ajzen, 1991; Tan, 2021b). Furthermore, when an individual is afraid of the risks associated with their next goal-related course of action, the driving role of goals on individual behavior is likely to weaken, as evidenced in previous research on risk behavior (Richard et al., 1996; Zimbardo et al., 1997). We believe that while blame avoidance cannot completely eliminate the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres, a blame avoidance orientation can weaken the influence of goals on motivation for potentially innovative actions involving risk because of a fear of losing out. Although clear and consistent evidence is lacking, some studies argue that a blame avoidance orientation affects the relationship between goals and innovation motivation. First, resource conservation theory proposes that individuals will actively acquire external resources to deal with potential resource loss risks (Clarke & Higgs, 2020); however, when the possible losses are greater than expected during implementation, grassroots cadres may stop acting in this direction. Second, successful goal-oriented innovation practice reportedly enhances the efficacy of innovation and subsequently increases innovation motivation (Berman & Kim, 2010; Kim, 2010). However, a blame avoidance orientation has been found to significantly reduce innovation motivation (Q. Liu & Li, 2021). Third, grassroots cadres who strive to achieve the goal of improving their performance in pursuit of promotion will only dare to innovate when the fault-tolerance mechanism in their workplace is considered appropriate; otherwise, they will abandon their attempts for fear of punishment (Xue, 2017). Fourth, research has shown that when empowered Chinese grassroots cadres work in an environment that lacks fault tolerance, they may be unwilling to use their power for innovation in achieving egoistic and altruistic goals for fear of being held accountable (Figure 1; C. B. Wu, 2021). Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:

H2: A blame avoidance orientation negatively moderates the relationship between grassroots cadres’ goals and innovation motivation. The higher the blame avoidance orientation, the weaker the positive association between goals and innovation motivation.

H2a: A blame avoidance orientation negatively moderates the relationship between grassroots cadres’ egoistic goals and innovation motivation. The higher the blame avoidance orientation, the weaker the positive association between egoistic goals and innovation motivation.

H2b: A blame avoidance orientation negatively moderates the relationship between grassroots cadres’ altruistic goals and innovation motivation. The higher the blame avoidance orientation, the weaker the positive association between altruistic goals and innovation motivation.

Figure 1.

Overall research model.

Research Design

This research is based on positivist epistemology and holds that through structured measurement and statistical analysis, the objective laws of the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres can be revealed. To verify the research hypotheses proposed and test the theory and model, this study, based on convenience sampling, utilized standardized measurement tools and questionnaire survey data, and employed regression analysis models.

Data Collection and Procedure

This research selected Puyang City, Henan Province as the survey site. Puyang City in Henan Province has established a complete system for grassroots cadres, ensuring the typicality of the survey site. During the survey, different types of cadres in townships, communities, and villages were included to ensure the representativeness of the sample. We distributed questionnaires to township cadres from three towns in Puyang City and to village and community cadres from 995 communities around Puyang City. The total research population was 300 township cadres and 2,000 village or community cadres.

Online questionnaires were sent to participants via a website developed by Shanghai Zhongyan Network Technology Co., Ltd. (Shanghai, China; https://www.wenjuan.com/list/). After obtaining sufficient data to undertake the study, the researchers screened the data to confirm its usability. The researchers then completed the study based on the valid data collected. Participants were able to access the results of the study. They were instructed on how to complete the online questionnaire, including the provision of demographic information (gender, age, education level, and position) and completing study variable-related scales. Questionnaire responses were excluded where the same answers were given for almost all items, answers were completed too quickly, more than five items did not have answers, or the same answers were provided alternatively. In total, we received 625 questionnaires, but only those from 464 participants aged from 20 to 62 years (average age: 40.6; standard deviation [SD] = 9.69) were considered valid. Furthermore, 32% of those providing valid responses were women (n = 150) and 68% men (n = 314). These included 117 community cadres (25%), 228 village cadres (49%), and 119 township cadres (26%).

Measures

The measurement tools for the variables in this study were developed or revised based on mature scales and demonstrated a good fit with the research data in the confirmatory factor analysis. The measurement tools for the variables and results of the validity tests are described below.

Dependent Variables

An innovation motivation scale was modified from Tierney et al.’s (1999) intrinsic motivation scale. In a previous study, a scale with five items was used to measure the general innovation motivation of individuals (Tierney et al., 1999). This study adapts the original scale to describe innovation motivation from the two aspects of organizational optimization and public service improvement. Thus, the innovation motivation scale used in this study included 10 items and 2 sub-dimensions: organizational optimization innovation motivation and public service improvement innovation motivation.

Organizational optimization innovation motivation consisted of five items (e.g., “I have a lot of new ideas on how to make my department more efficient”); similarly, public service improvement innovation motivation (e.g., “I have many new ideas about grassroots social governance improvement”) also comprised five items. A 5-point Likert scale was used, with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Higher scores indicate a higher level of innovation motivation. The sum of the two dimensions provides the overall innovation motivation score. In Tierney et al.’s (1999) study, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for innovation motivation was .86; in this study, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for organizational optimization, public service improvement, and the total scale were .88, .91, and .94, respectively. The confirmatory factor analysis indexes showed an adequate fit for the construct validity of the innovative behavior scale (χ² = 146.86, χ²/df = 4.45, comparative fit index [CFI] = 0.905, Tucker-Lewis index [TLI] = 0.902, standardized root mean residual [SRMR] = 0.049, root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = 0.049).

Independent Variables

The cadres’ goals scale was modified based on two dimensions, egoistic and altruistic values, drawing from a short version of Schwartz’s universal values scale (Schwartz, 1992; Steg et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2022). Each of the original scale’s two sub-dimensions contained four items. We revised this values scale to create a goals scale based on the life events of grassroots cadres. The modified scale for this study therefore consisted of 11 items and 2 subscales (egoistic and altruistic goals). There were six egoistic goals (e.g., “Compliments from family and friends are important to me”) and five altruistic goals (e.g., “I want to help the disadvantaged”). Again, a 5-point Likert scale was used, with responses ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5).Higher scores indicate a higher level of commitment to goals. The sum of the two dimensions provided the overall goal score. In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for egoistic goals, altruistic goals, and the total scale were .70, .89, and .79, respectively. The confirmatory factor analysis indexes showed an adequate fit for the construct validity of the goals scale (χ² = 174.74, χ²/df = 4.16, CFI = 0.966, TLI = 0.953, SRMR = 0.030, RMSEA = 0.086). The scale is presented in Appendix A.

Moderating and Control Variables

The blame avoidance orientation scale used in this study was modified from an eight-item shifting blame sub-scale modified by Sutton et al. (2000). The latter is based on Powell’s avoidance of responsibility scale (Powell & Rosén, 1999; Powell et al., 1997; Sutton et al., 2000). Our study identified the important characteristics of a blame avoidance orientation, namely attributing responsibility to others and justifying mistakes, based on the following revised measurement tools. Two of the eight items in Sutton et al.’s (2000) version of the scale, “People are always making me mad” and “I think authority figures (parents, teachers, police) are too rigid and uptight,” were removed as they were not applicable to our research scenarios. Six items from the original scale were finally used to measure cadres’ blame avoidance orientation.

Responses were provided on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicating a higher level of blame avoidance orientation. The sum of the six items provided the overall blame avoidance orientation score. In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the scale was .69. The confirmatory factor analysis indexes showed an adequate fit for the construct validity of the blame avoidance orientation scale (χ² = 18.35, χ²/df = 3.06, CFI = 0.977, TLI = 0.943, SRMR = 0.032, RMSEA = 0.067).

Furthermore, factors such as political status, education level, and position may influence innovation motivation. Such variables were set as control variables in our model and encoded as follows: political status was coded as a dummy variable (0 = not a member of the Communist Party of China, 1 = is a member of the Communist Party of China). Level of education was divided into five categories (1 = primary school level and below; 2 = junior middle school; 3 = senior middle school; 4 = college and undergraduate degree; 5 = postgraduate degree). Position was delineated into four categories according to ranking (1 = general community and village cadres; 2 = village branch or community branch secretary; 3 = township cadres; 4 = cadres above the township level).

Table 1 shows the dependent, independent, and moderating variables along with the references used to measure the three variables above, and the type of scale used.

Table 1.

Main Operational Variables.

Variable	Variable type	Type of scale	References
Innovative motivation	Dependent variable	5-point Likert scale	Tierney et al. (1999)
Goal orientation	Independent variable		Schwartz (1992), Steg et al. (2005), and Wei et al. (2022)
Blame avoidance orientation	Moderating variable		Powell and Rosén (1999), Powell et al. (1997), and Sutton et al. (2000)

IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 26.0 and the process procedure written for SPSS version software by Andrew F. Hayes, PhD were used in the analysis. R.3.6.1 software was also used to visualize the research results. In the first step, we used SPSS and performed a Pearson correlation to examine the associations between all research variables. The results are reported in Table 2. Furthermore, R.3.6.1 software was employed to draw heat maps to show the results of the Pearson’s correlation analysis. Because the Pearson’s test showed a significant correlation between the variables, in the second step, we used SPSS 26 software and conducted six rounds of an ordinary least square regression. The purpose was to test the correlation between each independent variable and the dependent variable of innovation motivation individually, as well as the potential impact of the moderating variable of a blame avoidance orientation. Table 3 reports the coefficient, significance, standard error, and R² of each model. In addition, R.3.6.1 software was used to present the results of the multiple regressions on two sets of forest maps. In the final step, because the model demonstrated a significant moderating effect, we adopted the process procedure to calculate the potential impact of the moderating variable. The result is presented as a J-N slope test figure.

Table 2.

Pearson Correlations of the Study Variables (Two-Tailed Test).

Variable	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Egoistic goal orientation	3.90	—
2. Altruistic goal orientation	4.72	.37**	—
3. Goal orientation	4.27	.90**	.74**	—
4. Organizational optimization	4.05	.19**	.38**	.31**	—
5. Public service improvement	4.21	.22**	.43**	.36**	.79**	—
6. Innovative motivation	4.13	.21**	.42**	.36**	.95**	.94**	—
7. Blame avoidance orientation	2.61	0.19**	−.14**	.08	.02	−.02	.004	—

Note. Organizational optimization refers to innovative motivation in the area of organizational optimization, and public service improvement to innovative motivation in the area of public service improvement.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 3.

Regression Results on Innovative Motivation (Two-Tailed Test).

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Control variables
Position	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Political status	−0.07 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.09)	−0.06 (0.09)	−0.07 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.09)	−0.06 (0.09)
Education level	−0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.06)	0.003 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.06)
Independent variables
Blame avoidance				−0.04 (0.05)	.06 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.05)
Egoistic	0.23*** (0.05)			0.23*** (0.06)
Altruistic		0.42*** (0.06)			0.45*** (0.07)
Goal orientation			0.36*** (0.07)			0.36*** (0.07)
Interact 1				−0.01 (0.07)
Interact 2					−0.09* (0.09)
Interact 3						−0.01 (0.10)
Adjusted R ²	.05	.17	.12	.05	.18	.12

Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Interact 1 refers to egoistic goals × blame avoidance orientation, interact 2 to altruistic goals × blame avoidance orientation, and interact 3 to goals × blame avoidance orientation.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Results

Table 2 and Figure 2 show the correlations among the variables. Overall, goals were moderately positively associated with innovation motivation (r = .36, p < .01). Both egoistic and altruistic goals were moderately positively associated with innovation motivation (r = .21, p < .01 and r = .42, p < .01).

Figure 2.

Heat map of Pearson correlations of the study variables.

Considering that the correlation between goals and innovation motivation was significant and above a moderate level, we conducted a regression analysis, as shown in Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 3.

Forest plot of regression results on innovation motivation (part 1).

Figure 4.

Forest plot of regression results on innovation motivation (part 2).

Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4 display the ordinary least squares regression results concerning the variables. When participants’ position, political status, and education level were controlled for, goals were positively associated with innovation motivation (β = .36, p < .01). Both egoistic and altruistic goals were positively associated with innovation motivation (β = .23, p < .01 and β = .42, p < .01). Therefore, H1, H1a, H1b were supported.

The adjusted R ² of model 2 was larger than that of model 1. Thus, the standard coefficient of altruistic goals was larger than that of egoistic goals, indicating that altruistic goals might have a stronger and more robust influence on innovation intention. The interaction between altruistic goals and a blame avoidance orientation was negatively associated with innovation motivation (β = −.09, p < .05). However, the interaction between egoistic goals and a blame avoidance orientation was not significantly associated with innovation motivation, nor was the interaction between goals overall and innovation motivation. Thus, H2 and H2a were not supported.

We therefore applied the J-N slope test to examine the interaction between altruistic goals and a blame avoidance orientation in relation to innovation motivation to further examine H2b. Figure 5 shows the J-N slope test results. In the range of a blame avoidance orientation [1, 5], the simple slope was significantly not 0: the higher the blame avoidance orientation, the weaker the relationship between altruistic goals and innovation motivation. In other words, the potential influence of altruistic goals on innovation motivation showed a decreasing trend with an increase in blame avoidance orientation. The negative effect of blame avoidance orientation on altruistic goals and innovation motivation was confirmed. Therefore, H2b was supported.

Figure 5.

J-N slope test result.

In summary, H1, H1a, H1b, and H2b were supported, but H2 and H2a were not. Goals and their sub-dimensions were positively associated with innovation motivation. A blame avoidance orientation was also found to negatively moderate the relationship between altruistic goals and innovation motivation, which means that a high blame avoidance orientation weakens the positive relationship between goals and innovation motivation.

Discussion

The positive relationship between goals and innovation motivation provide a new understanding of Chinese grassroots cadres’ innovation motivation mechanism. As mentioned, current studies focus on analyzing the connection between institutions and the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres in China and on establishing a corresponding theory. For instance, some research highlights the horizontal competition system (Ye & Zeng, 2024), incentive system (L. C. Wu & Liu, 2018; Z. C. Li & Liu, 2019), and assessment system (Lin & Xu, 2017) as positive predictors of innovation motivation. Furthermore, numerous studies have provided empirical evidence for the correlation between institutions and innovation motivation, for instance, based on an analysis of the Chinese Local Governance (IECLG) awards program between 2001 and 2008. Others examined the positive relationship between incentive systems and innovation (He, 2016; J. Wu et al., 2013).

However, these studies have limited explanatory power for the motives of innovation because they ignore the demands of grassroots cadres in China and complexity of the system itself. Current research has not yet clarified which elements in the system and in what form affect individual cognition and thereby influence individual innovation motivation. Thus, this research breaks through the limitations of existing research constraints and constructs a theory to explain the innovation motivation of grassroots cadres in China from the perspective of their demands and goals. This study, through the “needs-goals-innovation” mechanism, reveals grassroots cadres as “active actors.” As such, their innovation is not only a tool to cope with assessment, but also a process of achieving synergy between personal values such as the altruistic goal of “serving the people” and organizational goals such as the short-term goal of a “promotion competition.” It holds that the complex and diverse goals of cadres, including immediate and altruistic goals, are the direct driving force for their innovation. This avoids the problems of the institutional-driven innovation motivation theory—such as the ambiguity in explaining the intermediate mechanism and neglect of cadres’ initiative—and forms a new explanation for the issue of grassroots governance innovation in China. The significant relationship between goals and the motivation for innovation in data analysis also provides evidence for the mechanism proposed in this study, filling an empirical gap in related research.

The potential influence of a blame avoidance orientation on the relationship between goals and innovation motivation, as found in this study, not only refines the goal-oriented innovation motivation mechanism promoted here, but also expands current understanding of the mechanism of blame avoidance behaviors. Note though that the direct negative impact of a blame avoidance orientation on the behavior of Chinese grassroots cadres is elaborated in many studies. For instance, it has been found that a blame avoidance orientation may lead Chinese grassroots cadres to imitate others’ behaviors in their work to avoid the risk of being held accountable (Liang, 2021). However, research and evidence on the potential impact of a blame avoidance orientation on the complex behavioral decision-making mechanism of grassroots cadres in China is relatively rare, making it difficult for us to understand how the fear of accountability drives the behavior of these officials to become increasingly conservative. Based on the theory of planned behavior, this study introduced the blame avoidance orientation into the formation mechanism of the innovation motivation of Chinese grassroots cadres driven by goal. This revealed the complexity of the formation of this type of motivation. Finally, the negative moderating effect of a blame avoidance orientation on the relationship between the goal and innovation motivation also provides evidence of the negative impact of this orientation on the positive behavior of grassroots cadres in China.

Conclusion

Theoretical Implications

This study proposes and empirically examines the goal-driven mechanism of innovation motivation among grassroots cadres in China, providing new ideas for future research in this field. This study breaks through the limitations of existing research that analyzes the motivation for innovation from an institutional perspective. By introducing goals as explanatory factors for the motivation of innovation, this study clarifies the issue the existing theory of institutional innovation motivation has difficulty in addressing, namely how external factors influence individuals’ decision-making process in innovation. By establishing the connection between goals and innovation motivation, this study explains how innovation is generated and related behavioral practices implemented as the result of the autonomous choices of grassroots cadres in China rather than as the result of institutional constraints. in addition, this study incorporates a blame avoidance orientation into the goal-driven innovation motivation model of Chinese grassroots cadres, which explains the potential impact of the accountability pressure they facing in their innovation decision-making. This imbues the innovation motivation mechanism established in this study with better explanatory power than the increasingly questioned incentive system innovation motivation theory.

Based on our study, the establishment of a theory of innovation for grassroots cadres in China in the future could follow two paths. The first is starting from the institutional perspective to explore the connection between the system and innovation motivation, and incorporating elements such as the goals and demands of grassroots cadres into the model. Furthermore, the correlation between system-related factors—goals or demands—and innovation motivation should be determined to improve the existing system-driven innovation motivation theory. The second path starts from the perspective of the individual behavior choices of Chinese grassroots cadres to analyze the formation process of innovation motivation in different scenarios, and thereby establish a theory of innovation motivation driven by individual needs or goals.

Managerial and Policy Implications

This study highlights actionable pathways to enhance grassroots cadres’ innovation motivation and governance efficiency. Below are refined policy recommendations grounded in empirical insights and institutional practices. First, a hybrid incentive framework should be established and a dual-track incentive system designed according to grassroots cadres diversity goals and needs. In addition, performance-linked bonuses for innovation outcomes such as solving local governance challenges like poverty alleviation and environmental protection should be introduced. Finally, non-material recognition to publicly commend grassroots cadres for innovative practices outside their formal job duties should be extended.

Second, to mitigate the blame avoidance orientation that stifles innovation, local governments need to institutionalize a tolerance of errors through clear “innovation safe zones.” To this end, low-risk governance focus areas should be specified, like rural revitalization, where experimental failures are exempt from rigid accountability and third-party evaluations that involve external experts and community representatives to ensure impartial assessments. The aim is to reduce cadres’ fear of punitive measures. Third, strengthening career development pathways—such as dual-track promotion systems like separating administrative and technical advancement and cross-regional rotations—can enhance long-term motivation by aligning individual aspirations with organizational needs.

Ideas for Future Research

This study offers initial insights into the relationship between goals and innovation motivation among grassroots cadres, but several key directions remain to address its limitations and broaden understanding. First, establishing causal relationships between goals and innovation motivation requires deeper exploration. The cross-sectional design of this study limits causal inference—current evidence does not clarify whether goals drive motivation or vice versa. Future research could use quasi-experimental methods or longitudinal tracking to better disentangle these bidirectional dynamics. Second, regional variability in governance should be addressed. While China’s local governance varies significantly in resources and culture, this study relied on a single regional sample. Thus, future work should collect multi-regional data to examine how contextual factors moderate the goals-motivation relationship. Third, expanding the scope of research subjects beyond grassroots cadres would test the broader relevance of findings. Innovation motivation applies to diverse public actors, and comparing these groups could reveal whether current conclusions hold across administrative levels. Finally, uncovering additional motivational mechanisms is essential. While a blame avoidance orientation was explored, innovation may be driven by other factors (e.g., personal passion, organizational support). Here, mixed-methods studies could identify these understudied mechanisms and their interactions with goals, enriching theoretical frameworks.

Footnotes

Appendix A

ORCID iD

Sun Baiying

Ethics Statements

This cross-sectional study involving human participants was reviewed and granted an exemption from formal ethical review by Ethics Committee of the co-author on September 30, 2022. This research was conducted ethically in accordance with the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and China’s “Ethical Review Measures for Life Sciences and Medical Research Involving Humans.”

Informed Consent

Participants were provided with a detailed information sheet outlining the study purpose, voluntary participation, and data handling procedures and provided informed consent prior to enrolment in the study.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Research Funds of Renmin University of China: Project No.22XNH034 and Project No.YG220102.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

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The Innovation Motivation Mechanism of Chinese Grassroots Cadres Driven by Multi-Faceted Goals: Evidence from an Online Survey in a Central Chinese City

Abstract

Plain Language Summary

Keywords

Introduction

Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Goals and Innovation Motivation

Moderating Role of a Blame Avoidance Orientation

Research Design

Data Collection and Procedure

Measures

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables

Moderating and Control Variables

Results

Discussion

Conclusion

Theoretical Implications

Managerial and Policy Implications

Ideas for Future Research

Footnotes

Appendix A

ORCID iD

Ethics Statements

Informed Consent

Funding

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Data Availability Statement

References