Middle Power Norm Entrepreneur: Indonesia’s Advocacy of the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook

Abstract

This article seeks to decipher Indonesia’s role as a norm entrepreneur for the norms of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region by employing the conceptual framework of the “norm life cycle” developed by Finnemore and Sikkink and Holbraad’s avail of regional initiatives for middle powers. It argues that in contrast to existing literature that construed Indonesia’s role in ASEAN as a form of leadership, Indonesia is merely introducing emerging norms that coincide with its administration’s national interests and priorities. Jokowi initially wielded the regional platform of ASEAN to echo the norm of amity and cooperation, which are introduced through motives of altruism, empathy, and emotional commitment. The norm continued to the norm cascade stage, as the norm became institutionalized in the form of ASEAN Outlook in the Indo-Pacific and provided “peer pressure among states” to eliminate initial opposition to the proposal. Lastly, this article argues that the emerging norm is internalized among ASEAN member states and critical regional actors that contributed to the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific.

Keywords

Indo-Pacific ASEAN Indonesian foreign policy amity

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific region continues to become a region of economic clout for littoral states to the Pacific and Indian Oceans and as a strategic sea lane of communication for global trade. A challenging contingency in the past decade pertains to the geopolitical shifts that occur, leading to possible gains and disputes. On the one hand, the growing significance has helped alleviate poverty and pioneered new economic opportunities for those in the region. On the contrary, the rise of regional powers and the ever increasing presence of military operations make the Indo-Pacific region vulnerable to mistrust and miscalculations of state behaviors. For years, the United States (U.S.) and China’s bilateral relations in the Indo-Pacific have continued to become hostile in many cases. China views the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as retaliatory and assertive maneuvers, especially those conducted in the disputed areas of the South China Sea (Putra, 2021). As both the U.S. and China continue to exert their influence in the Indo-Pacific region, we have recently seen strong gestures rising from other regional actors, including India and Japan, which further adds complexity to the regional dynamics of the Indo-Pacific (Choong, 2019; Medcalf, 2019). It has thus become a strenuous paradox for countries in the region to formulate foreign policies to engage in the Indo-Pacific without agitating any of the aforementioned regional powers of the Indo-Pacific.

A part of the growing noteworthiness of the Indo-Pacific region relates to the construct of the Indo-Pacific itself. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe echoed the need to establish a “free and open” Indo-Pacific region for international goods (Abe, 2007). The U.S. Pivot to Asia that started in 2011 also paved the way for a rising need to be critical of the geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific, echoed in Hillary Clinton’s article “America’s Pacific Century” (Clinton, 2011). Furthermore, Donald Trump in 2017 continued to be vocal about the Indo-Pacific by reverberating the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific (Stokes, 2018). The shift to the terminology of the Indo-Pacific came about at the same time as the ascending China but also contributed to the enlarged power of India and rising concerns over maritime security (Guilfoyle, 2019). The intersection of various security concerns (traditional and non-traditional) and the continued importance of the Indo-Pacific region for international trade makes the region attain greater noticeability among policymakers (Tertia & Perwita, 2018).

Nevertheless, the regional polarization can be attributed to China’s rise. At the outset, it is worth noting that China tends to view the region with suspicion (Hui & Hussain, 2018). China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and assertiveness over the South China Seas have led to pessimistic projections over a truly peaceful Indo-Pacific region. Whether it be the US FONOPs or the “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), China has only translated such actions as an attempt to contain China (Saha, 2018).

Southeast Asia lies at the center of the Indo-Pacific, positioned as a strategic hub between the two major oceans. It is arduous to neglect Southeast Asia’s vital geostrategic position, which, in this case, raises the question of how the dominant regional organization in Southeast Asia, ASEAN, can continue to become relevant amid the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific. As a strategic hub between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ASEAN perceives that it needs to forge ASEAN-relevant security and economic architecture to promote closer cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Besides the norm of cooperation, upholding the values of amity, as stipulated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), has become an eminent concern in ASEAN’s 21st-century agenda. As seen in the preceding years, ASEAN has embarked on developing an inclusive regional architecture within Southeast Asia and neighboring areas. ASEAN wants to forge closer cooperation among regional powers through consultation and dialogue mechanisms. Furthermore, it has included an intention to be at the center of evolving regional architecture, a status it hopes to also embrace in the case of the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN-led mechanisms have proven to establish critical norms in Asia-Pacific, including cooperation, integration, the interconnectedness of regions, and the promotion of dialogue for greater openness and transparency.

ASEAN’s role in shaping regional architecture continued in the case of the Indo-Pacific, with the adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) on 23 June 2019. Amid the disparate visions adopted by countries, Indonesia did not diverge from its traditional foreign policy course. Indonesia reiterated the “free and active” (bebas aktif) foreign policy and vouched to bind the Indo-Pacific region in an ASEAN rule-based regional architecture. Indonesia is identified as the de facto leader of ASEAN and is responsible for introducing new regional norms to be implemented in Southeast Asia through ASEAN. In recent times, Indonesia has indeed diminished its leadership role in ASEAN, though this, in reality, should not be overstated. Indonesia continues to promote norms that coincide with Indonesia’s national interest to be adopted by ASEAN and encompass states beyond the Southeast Asian region.

This article employs Finnemore and Sikkink’s 1998“norm life cycle” to illustrate how Indonesia embraced the norm entrepreneur role to disseminate the norms of cooperation and amity in the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, it will examine the three stages of the norm life cycle: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization. In the last stage of norm internalization, this article scrutinizes the institutionalization of the amity and cooperation norms among ASEAN member states and in extra-regional forums of ASEAN between 2019 and 2021. Furthermore, this qualitative research will attempt to decipher Indonesia’s role in promoting emerging norms, considering its role as a middle power that wishes to contribute to international society via regional initiatives, as extensively argued by Holbraad in 1971. This research will specifically address the following research questions:

1. How has Indonesia embraced the norm entrepreneur role in formulating the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook?

2. Why have the norms associated with the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook been internalized among ASEAN and its extra-regional forums?

Revisiting Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: Middle Power Status and Norm Life Cycle

A common discourse in the discussion of Indonesia’s role in ASEAN is Indonesia’s leadership role in the regional organization. Past studies have cemented the notion of Indonesia’s de facto leadership role based on its geographical features, strategic position, and unique demography. Indonesia’s leadership characterization is well accepted in policy and academic literature (Acharya, 2009; Caballero-Anthony, 2005; Emmers, 2005, 2014; Haacke, 2003; Leifer, 1989). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this perspective shifted approaching the end of the 20th century, marked by Indonesia’s reorientation of its foreign policy due to the Asian financial crisis 1997 to 1998. An alteration of policy focus on Indonesia’s domestic politics also occurred during the fall of Suharto in 1998. Despite this, the discourse on Indonesia’s leadership role revived during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration (Sukma, 2012). Past studies have also highlighted how Indonesia’s leadership role is characterized by an incomplete and sectorial form of leadership, considering how Jakarta merely focuses on political and security dimensions (Emmers, 2014).

It is thus inevitable to argue that Indonesia’s position in ASEAN exceeds that of an ordinary member state. Jakarta’s physical attributes made it a dominant natural leader that other state members of ASEAN could abide by. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s stance has shifted in a number of cases. As mentioned, the domestic political turmoil caused a significant shift that led to Indonesia’s considerable decline from its leadership position. In continuance of the past dynamic, a growing literature has argued for Indonesia’s declining leadership role in ASEAN during Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) administration (Agastia & Perwita, 2015; Bagus et al., 2015; Parameswaran, 2014). Unlike Jokowi’s predecessor, SBY, past Indonesian actions in offering international public goods in security and politics, conflict management roles, and promotion of institutional building in ASEAN have slowly vanished with time (Anugrah et al., 2020). Once Jokowi assumed office, his priorities were immediately domestic-oriented, despite the pre-eminent “Global Maritime Fulcrum” (GMF) grand strategy he introduced (Putra, 2020). This article embraces the idea that Indonesia’s past actions in ASEAN are a form of introducing new norms that correlate directly to Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities (elaborated in the next section).

This article echoes past assumptions that interpret a lack of complete or even missing leadership roles in several instances. Emmers (2014) argues that Indonesia’s leadership role is partial, as it hesitates to lead in sectors such as the economy (a role led primarily by Singapore). In addition, Darwis and Putra (2022) argued that Indonesia’s leadership role was somewhat faded during Jokowi’s rule, considering Jokowi’s priority over economic diplomacy and inward-oriented development. As one of the founders of ASEAN and having the physical attributes superior to its other Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia is supposed to display its leadership role in any circumstance. However, as facts have shown, this role diminished during the domestic turmoil of the late 20th century and Jokowi’s administration. The declining Indonesian leadership role can only be deciphered by recalling Indonesia’s position as a middle power and its ability to introduce relevant and aligned norms to Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities.

In comprehending Indonesia’s stance toward ASEAN, it is critical to consider Indonesia’s current status as a middle power and its capacity to introduce norms in the regional organization. This would directly contribute to understanding Indonesia’s position in ASEAN, besides the traditional view of becoming a natural leader of the organization. Nevertheless, understanding Indonesia’s role as a middle power will require scrutinizing prior discussions on middle powers. There are countless academic works on middle power, with subjective prominence on behaviors, norms, capacities, and a number of other variables (Swielande, 2018). Thies and Sari (2018) provided a well-accepted characterization based on the role theory approach to middle powers, marked by their roles as abiding international citizens, sustaining multilateral initiatives, and initiating coalitions. Middle powers strive to find a perfect balance in their contribution to the global world order and, based on observations by Holbraad (1984), can be made at the regional level. In the discourse of Indonesia’s position as a middle power in ASEAN, Anwar (2020) provided a compelling analysis by characterizing Indonesia’s middle power role in forming the AOIP as a Kantian middle-power approach in response to the contemporary geostrategic and geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific. The Kantian middle-power approach referenced refers to Swielande’s categorization of distinct middle powers, with “Kantian middle powers” categorized as middle power states that perceive world politics positively and stress the conduct of low politics, leading them to be more engaged in cooperative and mediation roles (Swielande, 2018).

Holbraad argues that middle powers may contribute to the regional level if they can balance their interests and provide justice and order to the international society. The eventual goal at the regional level, as argued by Holbraad, is to “maintain a diplomatic concert” (Holbraad, 1984, p. 211). Let’s analyze Indonesia’s position in ASEAN after being aligned with the arguments of Holbraad. It does not conclude that Indonesia is willing to take a leadership role to drive Indonesian-based preferences to regional norms. On the contrary, Indonesia’s role can be translated as a “norm entrepreneur,” as it is willing to introduce norms that would benefit Jakarta and its Southeast Asian neighbors. In deciphering this dynamic, this article references the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) entitled “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that International and regional norms are subject to what is commonly known as the “norm life cycle.” This cycle consists of a three-stage process known as “norm emergence,”“norm cascade,” and “norm internalization” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Steans et al., 2010; Wendt, 1999).

In the process of norm emergence, this phase consists of persuading other states to incorporate the new norm through an organizational platform. At this stage, the state or actor that initiates the norm emergence is termed “norm entrepreneur.” The decision to become a norm entrepreneur may vary in several different study cases, but generally, it will be caused by the variables of altruism, empathy, or emotional commitment (Berger, 1996; Burchill et al., 2009). The second stage attempts to observe patterns of norm imitations as the norm cascade stage surfaces. This phase is characterized by the socialization and institutionalization of the emerging norm in other states, with considerations of legitimacy, reputation, and esteem as the primary motives. The last phase is norm internalization, in which state actors adopt the norm due to conformity and conduct a process of institutionalization. In this case, state actors may implement specific domestic laws or regional regulations, which are manifestations of norm internalization.

This article attempts to contribute to the discourse on Indonesia’s foreign policy in ASEAN. It will dissociate with existing literature highlighting Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN and focus on its norm entrepreneurial capacity as a middle power. In doing so, this article employs Holbraad’s (1984) argument on how middle powers maximize their contribution to the international society on a regional level and explains this process through the lens of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle. Indonesia is keen on embracing the role of a norm entrepreneur to disseminate the norm of amity and cooperation to be implemented in the Indo-Pacific region amid geopolitical uncertainties. This qualitative research is analyzed as deductive research, using primary and secondary data related to the article. Primary data is attained from reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and ASEAN from 2015 to 2022, and secondary data is gained from relevant news articles.

Norm Life Cycle of Indonesia’s Amity and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region

Norm Emergence: Indonesia and the Emerging Norm of Amity and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

In understanding Indonesia’s role as a norm entrepreneur in the context of amity and cooperative norms in the Indo-Pacific region, it is paramount first to address how norms disseminate within several states in a regional setting. Agents introduce norms with strong views about a particular desirable behavior. In this case, norm entrepreneurs conduct a “call for attention” towards the urgency to respond to an evolving crisis by implementing a specific norm. Not a single norm in regional affairs is embedded as critical from the outset, as state actors are introducing the norm that slowly constructs this perspective. It is, however, not an easy task for norm entrepreneurs, as new norms compete with existing norms and interests in the status quo (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Furthermore, difficulties are added if a certain “logic of appropriateness” exists, and the new norm introduced goes against it. Therefore, if new norms contest the logic of appropriateness, norm entrepreneurs will fail to introduce a new norm.

As elaborated by Finnemore and Sikkink, norm entrepreneurs can be better understood by classifying the norm emergence actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms. In the case of the actors, norm entrepreneurs avail themselves of organizational platforms to disperse their new norms. Past studies have mainly focused on how NGOs, including Greenpeace, Red Cross, and Transafrica, employed their transnational network to disseminate emerging norms on environmentalism and human rights (Kapitonenko, 2022; Weber, 2010). It is worth highlighting at this point that the type of norms set forth will be subject to the nature of the organization used. For example, if norm entrepreneurs use regional organizations such as ASEAN, the norms introduced will be related to existing ASEAN norms rather than the opposite.

In understanding the motives of norm entrepreneurs, particular reference is given to empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment. It is well understood that all three of the elements above represent acts that think of the benefit of others and may exceptionally have no effect on the well-being of the norm entrepreneur. Empathy, for example, is when a norm entrepreneur is attentive to the welfare of others despite not having any effect on their well-being. Altruism also focuses on the benefits of others despite the possibility of risking the norm entrepreneur. Lastly, ideational commitment echoes the point that norm entrepreneurs believe in the ideals and values embedded in the norm despite, again, not having any effects on the well-being of the norm entrepreneur.

Lastly, an emerging norm must be institutionalized to proceed to the following stages in the norm cycle. But before this phase occurs, the norm must reach a certain threshold or tipping point. The adoption of the norm becoming a regulation, for example, marks a strong threshold point that indicates the high potential of a norm to clear the first phase. There are debates over how many countries need to endorse the norm to pass this threshold, but in the case of ASEAN, once it has been implemented, all states agree with its institutionalization.

This section argues that Indonesia embraced its role as a norm entrepreneur in the norm of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Before the endorsement of the AOIP, Indonesia conducted intensive lobbying for approximately 18 months (Anwar, 2020). A significant factor in why Indonesia would push this norm into effect relates directly to Jokowi’s first-term grand strategy, the GMF. Jokowi altered Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities to one that became maritime-oriented (Sambhi, 2015). Indonesia is located in the strategic chokepoint between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and Jokowi elevated any maritime-related affairs to realize his GMF.

Nevertheless, Jokowi still strategically converged with Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy, bebas aktif (Bagus et al., 2015). In his quest to bear Indonesia’s maritime-related affairs, Indonesia must remain neutral in world affairs and not favor a global hegemon over the other. This view manifests as Jokowi’s presidential decree on the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) of 2014 (Anwar, 2018). The IOP mandates Indonesia to be proactive in the pace and security of the region and consider its strategic geopolitical position. It must take initiatives to establish maritime cooperation at regional and multilateral levels (Suherman et al., 2020).

Indonesia started to be explicit about a peaceful Indo-Pacific amid the regional power contestations in the region. It is worth noting that despite the bebas aktif tradition, Indonesia has signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with the U.S., China, Japan, and India (Priyandita, 2019). The move does not violate Indonesia’s neutral stance, as the non-alignment policy only forces Indonesia to avoid joining any military alliance. Indonesia became wary of the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts that started with China’s introduction of the BRI. Massive investments in infrastructures for littoral states of the Indo-Pacific have made regional powers attempt to adapt to the maneuver (Hasegawa, 2018). With growing forced dependence on China, many have labeled this as a “predatory investment” (Banks, 2020; Goodman, 2017). Soon after, Japan intensified its regional investments, and India adopted the “Act East” policy, intensifying its connections with the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, tensions in the Indo-Pacific have been high with the South China Sea dispute and the ongoing FONOPs since 2011. The recent resurfacing of the Quad has also expedited Beijing’s discontent over the U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

In 2018, Indonesia started to become vocal in adopting an Indo-Pacific region where the norms that apply are ASEAN-led and contain values of amity and cooperation. From the outset, Indonesia’s IOP stipulates that Indonesia, through ASEAN, needs to synergize with various regional initiatives that have prevailed in the past decade. In a visit to India in May 2018, Luhut Panjaitan, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs, also expressed the urgency to sustain a power balance in the Indo-Pacific and how the emergence of a single global hegemon may create vulnerability to the stability (Agustiyanti, 2018). In the same year, Jokowi and Modi also signed a statement to maintain a rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, and transparent (MOEA India, 2018). Indonesia made sure to steer clear of any excessive dependence on any Indo-Pacific power.

Throughout the past decades, academics have perceived Indonesia’s activeness as a leadership role in the regional organization. However, this article argues that it is solely a norm emergence propagated by a norm entrepreneur, in this case, Indonesia. Studies on Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN have never been conclusive and are still open to debate. Thus, such a case is why Emmers argued that Indonesia’s offering of international public goods is designated to the sectors of security, politics, and institutions only while neglecting other vital aspects, including economics. Indonesia’s active role in ASEAN is better understood by placing Indonesia as a norm entrepreneur, using the ASEAN organizational platform to disseminate new norms that align with Indonesia’s foreign policy, and considering the benefits and well-being of other ASEAN member states.

In 1976, a regional norm manifestation of Indonesia’s bebas aktif took the form of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Indonesia established an autonomous security environment with external actors respecting the norms of sovereignty and equality of Southeast Asian states. In contemporary times, Indonesia aspired to become autonomous and unaffected by external intervention, leading to Indonesia pushing the norms of political and security integration, which took the form of the ASEAN Political and Security Community. Lastly, as an attempt to promote Indonesia’s success in practicing human rights protection and democracy to an external audience, Indonesia was at the forefront of establishing the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Past scholars interpreted Indonesia’s activeness in the study as mentioned earlier cases as a form of leadership. However, this section argues that in all of the mentioned cases, Indonesia deliberately constructed discussions on the importance of those norms and became a norm entrepreneur during the phase of norm emergence. Furthermore, it correlates to Holbraad’s argumentation on middle powers, stating that state actors will contribute most to the international society through regional levels, including the intention to establish stability. Holbraad continues that if the context is in regional associations, the primary goal is maintaining a diplomatic concert. In this case, it is understandable that Indonesia pursues a foreign policy of introducing new norms aligned with Indonesia’s national interests through ASEAN-led mechanisms.

Indonesia has always played an active role in shaping the geopolitical environment related to ASEAN. As a complex regional environment occurred in the Indo-Pacific region, it was pivotal for Indonesia to re-embrace its norm entrepreneur role to place the values of amity and cooperation at the core of the Indo-Pacific regional affairs. In doing so, Indonesia started to commence norms of peace and stability for the Indo-Pacific region, driven by ASEAN centrality (Marsudi, 2018). Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Retno Marsudi, also echoed the need to establish an “Indo-Pacific umbrella” to advance mutually beneficial partnerships among regional states (Anwar, 2020). Jokowi, in the 32nd ASEAN Summit in April 2018 in Singapore, also became vocal on the need to establish ASEAN-based norms, which include peaceful resolution of conflicts, dialogue, and non-coercive maneuvers in the Indo-pacific region (Sani, 2018). Furthermore, Indonesia’s Defense Minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu, also reiterated the importance of constructing a security architecture for the Indo-Pacific region during the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, considering the traditional and non-traditional security threats that the region is vulnerable to (Dwinanda, 2018). The series of Indonesia’s introduction of enmeshing ASEAN in the middle of the Indo-Pacific affairs followed Indonesia’s need to gain the ASEAN members’ support for the Indonesian-drafted AOIP. However, it reveals Indonesia’s intentions to pioneer the norm of amity and cooperation, with consideration for altruism, empathy, and emotional commitment, as well as the other nine members of ASEAN. Indonesia’s argumentation in this process of norm emergence has never been selfish, as it always references the interests of Southeast Asian states and states located in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Ryacudu, for example, vocalized the importance of maintaining stronger peaceful relations among the Indo-Pacific region, mainly because of the inter-regional networks that terrorism creates and the difficulty of resolving the issue if cooperation seizes to exist among the Indo-Pacific countries (Dwinanda, 2018).

Considering Indonesia’s past role as a norm entrepreneur for most of ASEAN’s political and security norms, Indonesia was tasked to construct the Indo-Pacific concept of ASEAN leaders. As seen in past study cases, Indonesia’s role in ASEAN is sectorial, as it is only willing to promote norms aligned with an administration’s primary foreign policy concern. Suharto echoed the need to implement a norm that would free Southeast Asian countries from external pressures, which manifested in becoming the TAC. SBY’s success in democratization and human rights led his administration to push the agenda of protective human rights norms for ASEAN, which eventually was institutionalized in the form of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Jokowi came to power by reiterating the importance of maritime affairs, which coincides with the issues that emerge in the Indo-Pacific region.

Through the Policy Analysis and Planning Agency of Siswo Pramono, Indonesia then constructed the “Indonesia’s Perspective for an ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Inclusive Region” (Septiari, 2018). ASEAN endorsed the document in June 2019, officially named “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” The five-page document reiterated a number of critical values that ASEAN wishes to exert among states in the Indo-Pacific region. At the core of those values is the norm of amity and cooperation, including cooperation, regional integration, fostering dialogue, peace, freedom, and prosperity. It acts more like an extension of the past adopted TAC and attempts to implant its values in the core of Indo-Pacific regional affairs. Indonesia made sure to be careful with the wording in the document, as it does not reference specific bilateral or multilateral tensions currently taking place in the status quo, and further reiterated that peaceful relations are for the benefit of all states (ASEAN, 2019). In doing so, it outlines several areas of cooperation that ASEAN will undertake: maritime cooperation, connectivity, and U.N. Sustainable Development Goals 2030. Indonesia placed the well-being of Southeast Asian states and the broader Indo-Pacific region as its top priority during the formulation of the document. However, it ensured that the Indonesian national interest of bebas aktif was still relevant in its conduct.

The last aspect to consider in norm emergence is whether the norm exceeds the threshold/tipping point. This point is critical as, for an emerging norm to continue to the norm cascade phase, it must become institutionalized in specific regional rules. Only if the norm is accepted by a critical mass of states and adopted then a norm can be evident in this last phase. The AOIP was accepted with only minor revisions in Bangkok in June 2019. All norms and regulations adopted by ASEAN must be accepted by consensus, meaning that as ASEAN passes the document, it automatically fulfills the required threshold.

Norm Cascade: “Peer Pressure Among States” in Eliminating Initial Oppositions

This section argues that the norm of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region has reached the tipping point and continues to the second stage of the norm cascade. State actors become unhesitant to adopting norms as international influences precede domestic politics. In deciphering this process, we will look closely at the process of socialization as the dominant mechanism in this second stage. It entails persuading other leaders to adhere to the emerging norm, heavily constituted by “peer pressure” among countries. State actors will act based on several possible motivations amid this peer pressure. The first is legitimation, in which states are prompted to act to avoid becoming a “rogue state,” as it bashes state reputation. Becoming a rogue state would also heavily affect perceptions of domestic legitimacy, a factor determining the ability of the government to stay in power. Furthermore, conformity is a major motivational thrust for actors to act. At this point, states act in accordance with their willingness to comply and show that it properly belongs. Meanwhile, the last motivation, esteem, is deciphering state motivations based on external perceptions of the state (following others so they will think well of them). Nevertheless, state actors approve of “avoiding deviating from group judgments” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904).

The peer pressure process in the norm cascade context is well present in the amity and cooperation norm socialized within Southeast Asian states as the basis of regional interaction in the Indo-Pacific. The process, however, is different from, for example, norm cascade through the U.N. organizational platform. Adopting a norm becoming a regulation in ASEAN means that all countries agree to its implementation, considering the voting by consensus system adopted. Therefore, this peer pressure on states can be better understood prior to adopting the AOIP. As stated in past sections, the Indo-Pacific region is a place of significant geopolitical and geostrategic shifts. Consequently, Southeast Asian countries initially were not eager to establish an ASEAN-centrality norm to manage the Indo-Pacific regional relations. A state that initially displayed its hesitancy was Singapore in 2018, as it conveyed its skepticism for a free and open Indo-Pacific (Kausikan, 2018).

The hesitancy displayed by Singapore can be understood by the intensive bilateral relations of global powers with their allies in the Southeast Asian region. Throughout history, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore have associated their regional vision with the involvement of external parties. For example, in the realm of security, they have depended on the U.S. through their tacit to guarantee their security (Emmers, 2014). Such a consideration is critical, as China recently exhibited coercive maneuvers to solidify its claims in the South China Sea. On the other hand, Indonesia embraces the regional vision of ASEAN-centrality and non-alignment to a significant power for security reassurance. Indonesia’s discernment, though, has not sat well among ASEAN members, as this reliance on external ties is much embedded among the states mentioned above.

Nevertheless, ASEAN members have always been diverged in determining the role of external powers in Southeast Asia. It has been present in the study case of security reassurance provided by the U.S. bilaterally and in key allies of China based on close economic ties. A heavily referenced study case for this is Cambodia as the acting ASEAN chair in 2012 that rejected specific mentions of the South China Sea issue in 2012, resulting in the absence of a joint communique, the first-ever in ASEAN history (Ririhena, 2012). Such a dynamic shows Southeast Asia is still vulnerable in its unity and can easily be persuaded off from multilateral and ASEAN-centrality initiatives if preceding national interests emerge. Nevertheless, ASEAN members have always prevailed in socializing and adopting proper regional norms. Despite having bilateral closeness with the U.S. on security affairs, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore were able to sideline their national interests to establish the norm of regional security cooperation through the ASEAN Political-Security Community. And despite economic ties with China, ASEAN members concluded the norms of stability and cooperation in the South China Sea by implementing the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Despite this, the process of norm socialization has not always been fruitful, especially for a norm entrepreneur such as Indonesia. For instance, when Indonesia attempted to push the norms of democracy and human rights protection for Southeast Asia, ASEAN members did not take the suggestions lightly. For example, in the ASEAN Charter 2007, much of what Indonesia vocalized was not accommodated in the ASEAN Charter, perhaps due to the rooted political differences among ASEAN states. The diluted ASEAN Charter would again be the same case during Indonesia’s effort to promote the norm of human rights protection through adopting the AICHR. The AICHR body is supposed to undergo two significant mandates: protecting and promoting human rights. In its very application, however, ASEAN members could only accept the norm of human rights promotion, not protection. Myanmar, for example, was a huge detractor in this, considering the dreadful human rights record in the country (Arendshorst, 2009; Guilloux, 2010). Indonesia’s difficulty in exerting the norms of democracy and human rights protection is not due to its inability to become a leader in the regional organization but because not all norms will be aligned with the national beliefs and priorities of ASEAN members. Human rights, for example, is always a topic of extreme divergence, considering the different systems adopted by Southeast Asian states.

Despite the historical downfalls of becoming a norm entrepreneur, Indonesia can prevail in the context of the amity and cooperation norm in ASEAN. ASEAN members have never been straightforward in supporting Indonesia’s political and security norm proposals, but in most cases, they have been adopted eventually. The construction of the AOIP was entrusted to Indonesia, and minor revisions were made with no rejections. It shows that Indonesia gained ascendancy as a norm entrepreneur, and the socialization process to ensure all states adhere to the emerging norm succeeded. Peer pressure predominated, as Singapore, a country that initially expressed skepticism over the outlook, eventually showed its support. In this case, legitimation, conformity, and esteem became the priority drivers of Singapore’s adherence to the amity and cooperation norm in the Indo-Pacific region. Singapore may have different views on regional security. Still, it was not willing to risk becoming a rogue state and becoming the only ASEAN member against peaceful norms as the basis of relations in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, as a founding member of ASEAN, it was pivotal for Singapore to cooperate in perpetuating the trust among Southeast Asian states eventually.

Norm Internalization: Internal and External Norm Institutionalization of the Emerging Norm

The last stage of the norm life cycle is norm internalization. At this stage, conformance with a norm is nearly automatic, as state actors commonly accept and internalize the norm. Unlike in the previous stages in which incongruence is highly possible, norm internalization entails a lack of discussion about whether a norm should be conformed to. As a result, states embrace new responsibilities. They are displayed through repeated actions that act as a habit and behavior to align with the values embedded in the emerging norm. As a result, a dominant mechanism in this phase includes further institutionalization.

The AOIP and Indonesia’s vision to promote the norms of amity and cooperation proved to be a norm with immense importance for ASEAN. On the argument of legitimation, Southeast Asian states were eager to adopt and embrace the emerging norm due to the insecurity of being part of the minority of states arguing against the norm. In the aspect of prominence, the norm successfully diffused due to the prominent quality of the norm and how it introduced a desirable regional interaction model in the Indo-Pacific region. And last, based on its intrinsic characteristics, no complexity or ambiguity can be identified in the AOIP. Furthermore, Indonesia’s success in promoting the norm correlates to Indonesia’s ability to link existing norms constructively and proves that there is a vivid connection to ASEAN’s status quo norms.

Indonesia’s promotion of the amity and cooperation norm in the Indo-Pacific region has reached a taken-for-granted quality. The manifestation of norm internalization is adopting the norm among ASEAN member states, with the values being respected by ASEAN external partners. In the context of ASEAN member states, all ASEAN Summit statements since 2020 have referenced continuous commitment to the principles enshrined in the AOIP (ASEAN, 2020d). During the 37th ASEAN Summit in Vietnam in 2010, all significant statements recited the need for amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. For example, during the mid-term review of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint 2025, ASEAN reiterated the issues found in the Indo-Pacific region among the issues that will be integrated into the formulation of the APSC concerning cooperative and capacity-building measures to resolve them in the future (ASEAN, 2020d). In the ASEAN Chairman’s statement during the summit, ASEAN member states also placed the AOIP among the ASEAN-centered regional architectural mechanisms that need to be upheld internally in ASEAN and with external partners of ASEAN, indicating the start of a call to impose peaceful regional relations in the Indo-Pacific. The call for an Indo-Pacific region that upheld amity and cooperation was also mentioned at the 38th ASEAN Summit 2021 in Brunei Darussalam, as ASEAN leaders declared to uphold multilateralism, with the norms of AOIP to guide ASEAN engagement in the wider Asia-Pacific region (ASEAN, 2021a). It was also in this summit that, through the Chairman’s statement of the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits, 26 October 2021, ASEAN placed the importance of the AOIP principles alongside the principles of ASEAN centrality and TAC (ASEAN, 2021d).

Nevertheless, a vital dynamic to the norm life cycle is internalizing the norm to external partners of ASEAN. Specifically, ASEAN Summits with Japan, India, the U.S., and the East Asia Summit have all implemented the rhetoric of an Indo-Pacific region of amity and cooperation, emphasizing inclusivity, openness, respect for international law, and peaceful relations. This should not come as a surprise, considering that upon the adoption of the AOIP, states such as Japan and the U.S., which have been wary of past coercive maneuvers of China in the Indo-Pacific region, have expressed their utter support for the implementation of the peaceful norms in the Indo-Pacific region through the AOIP (Ortagus, 2019).

A notable dynamic to the internalization of the amity and cooperation norm in the Indo-Pacific can be seen in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) extra-regional forum of ASEAN. These extra-regional forums have pioneered ASEAN’s active role in the wider Asian region. Thus, having the internalization process occur in those forums is a significant development of the norm internalization process. The EAS comprises 18 members, 10 ASEAN members, and eight regional and global powers, including the U.S. and China. Meanwhile, the ASEAN+3 consists of ASEAN’s East Asian external partners, namely China, Japan, and South Korea. During the 15th EAS Summit, the amity and cooperation norms were warmly embraced by the 18 members, recognizing that the AOIP provides guidelines for regional interaction in the Indo-Pacific, bearing peace, stability, freedom, and prosperity (ASEAN, 2020d). To a greater extent, EAS members acknowledged the mutual benefits and interests that ASEAN-led platforms provide in the context of partnership in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the 25th ASEAN+3 Summit on 27 October 2021 drew attention to the importance of multilateralism and abidance to international law and viewed that the values embedded in the AOIP provided an excellent guideline for engagements in the wider Asia-Pacific (ASEAN, 2021b).

Nonetheless, no external party is more enthusiastic about internalizing the norm than the U.S. From the outset, the U.S. assured ASEAN that it would embrace the newly accepted norm of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Despite having a polarized reaction among ASEAN states on the US FONOPs, the U.S. generally echoed the rhetoric of the need to cooperate and establish friendly relations in the wider Asia-Pacific. Such a stance was well displayed in the 8th US-ASEAN Summit of 2020, in which the U.S. expressed its commitment to a peaceful Indo-Pacific (ASEAN, 2020c). The U.S. has made it a habit to promote cooperation aligned with what has been outlined in the AOIP, reiterating the success of the third Indo-Pacific Business Forum, inviting government and business stakeholders to collaborate and innovate together (ASEAN, 2020c). The U.S. also reassured ASEAN of its program for energy security and access in the Indo-Pacific, the ASIA EDGE initiative. The U.S. stance on adopting the norms of amity and cooperation was also recited in the following year during the 9th US-ASEAN Summit 2021 (Brunei Darussalam). It echoed the U.S.’s continued devotion to accelerating partnerships in the wider Indo-Pacific region together (ASEAN, 2021c).

As stated in the early sections of this article, several regional powers have contributed to the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. This section will assess Japan and its efforts to internalize the norm. Besides the U.S., Japan has exhibited great enthusiasm for the Indonesian-introduced norm of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. In the 23rd ASEAN-Japan Summit in 2020, both ASEAN and Japan noted the alignment of the AOIP principles to Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific, as they both promote the norms of peace and cooperation (ASEAN, 2020b). Furthermore, norm internalization has specifically discussed how Japan can contribute to the four key areas of partnership identified under the AOIP. Japan’s internalization of the emerging norm became a habit, as they continued to echo the same substantive on Indo-Pacific during the 24th ASEAN-Japan summit by reinforcing the ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership (ASEAN, 2021e).

Besides China, India has contributed most to the geopolitical shifts in the Indian Ocean. In the 17th and 18th ASEAN-India Summit, India noted that the principles expressed under the AOIP are aligned with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, as they both promote the norms of peace and cooperation (ASEAN, 2020a). Meanwhile, at the 1st ASEAN Australia Summit on 27 October 2021, Australia, as a state that connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans, made sure to dive into the ASEAN emerging norm as an external partner to the regional organization. Similar to the U.S., Australia has longed for a peaceful Indo-Pacific region and has attempted several initiatives to achieve this. Australia contributed AUD 124 million to the ASEAN Futures Initiative, entailing Australia’s commitment to the AOIP through assistance in crucial areas of cooperation (ASEAN, 2021f).

All major regional powers that have made the most maneuvers abided by the principle of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific despite not signing any agreements to do so. This form of norm internalization shows that state actors within ASEAN and the external partners of ASEAN have normalized the norms as core aspects in regional affairs through the citation of the norm in ASEAN Summits in 2020 and 2021. Due to the success of the norm internalization and acts of conformity to the standards of the AOIP in this stage, the norm life cycle of amity and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly considered a success.

Conclusions

This article seeks to decipher Indonesia’s role as a norm entrepreneur for the amity and cooperation norms in the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, it attempts to view Indonesia in contrast to the existing literature as a leader of ASEAN. Alternatively, it perceives Indonesia as characterized by Holbraad, a middle power that wishes to contribute to the international society through regional initiatives. By employing the “norm life cycle” framework of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), this article elaborates on Indonesia’s role as a norm entrepreneur in norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internalization stages.

Indonesia’s role as a norm entrepreneur is not newly discovered, considering their active role in promoting norms in the past, which coincides with Indonesia’s national interest priorities during an administration. Through ZOPFAN and TAC, Indonesia echoed the norm of peace, neutrality, and cooperation and became an autonomous security environment. During SBY’s term, he exerted the norms of democratization and human rights, which manifested in Indonesia’s stance to promote the emerging norms of human rights promotion protection through the AICHR and democratization through the APSC. When Jokowi assumed office in 2014, he was sure to disseminate a norm aligned with his maritime visions. Amid the geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific, Jokowi was determined to associate Indonesia with formulating a norm that defines and regulates regional relations in the Indo-Pacific region. Jokowi attempted to introduce the norms of amity and cooperation through the regional ASEAN platform, as Indonesia was entrusted with forming the AOIP. Through motives of altruism, empathy, and emotional commitment, Indonesia persuaded ASEAN members to officially adopt the AOIP on 23 June 2019, after 18 months of intensive lobbying.

After being adopted by consensus in ASEAN, Indonesia continued to socialize and institutionalize the amity and cooperation norms in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia attempted to make all states unhesitant to adopt the norm, and through persuasion, the norms were well embraced by states in ASEAN. A major contributor to this dynamic is the state’s motives in legitimacy, reputation, and esteem, which made initial oppositions, such as from Singapore, decide to agree to the norm considering the presence of “peer pressure” among states in ASEAN to implement the emerging norm. Lastly, the norm underwent a norm internalization phase, which entails that Indo-Pacific’s amity and cooperative norms become implemented at the levels of internal ASEAN and towards ASEAN’s external partners.

In the last stage of the norm life cycle, the amity and cooperation norms in the Indo-Pacific are embedded in the ASEAN Summit and extra-regional forums of ASEAN. Through the chairman statements of the 36th, 37th, and 38th ASEAN Summit (2020 and 2021), ASEAN continued to place the emerging norms of the AOIP at the same level as Indonesia’s past introduced norms, including amity and cooperation through the TAC, and human rights protection through the AICHR. Furthermore, a unique trend was found in the EAS, ASEAN+3, and ASEAN summits with the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia. All of the states that matter to the geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific reiterated the importance of friendly relations and cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific, as stated in the AOIP. Not only have the regional powers displayed their commitment to abide by the norms, but the U.S. and Australia have also contributed directly to the emerging norms by constructing separate forums. Thus, as a middle power, Indonesia exerted its influence through ASEAN to become a norm entrepreneur of the amity and cooperation norm in the Indo-Pacific region.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Bama Andika Putra

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

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