Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Mining projects in mineral-rich countries have been justified as contributing to economic growth and social well-being. There are environmental, economic, and social problems resulting from mining; therefore, the need for society to pool institutions to form environmental governance systems to manage these effects. It is within these institutions that power is prescribed, legitimated, and controlled. This study examines the roles of traditional authorities in environmental governance in mining in the Asutifi North District of Ghana. A qualitative case study design combining purposive and convenience sampling was used to select 52 respondents from traditional, state, and business institutions and 29 household respondents. The traditional institutions mostly played the role of development agents in their communities. Even though they have not been entirely successful in substituting for the state, they have complemented the state structures by holding the societies together despite daunting economic, political, and environmental challenges they faced.

Keywords

environmental governance traditional authority traditional institutions modern institutions roles

Introduction

Mining projects in mineral-rich countries have been justified as creating local jobs, sometimes transfer technology and provides mining royalties and taxes that can potentially be invested in infrastructure and social services leading to economic growth, domestic security, and social well-being. Mining has, therefore, been promoted especially in resource-rich developing countries (Ericsson & Löf, 2019). The potential of mining revenue to contribute to development notwithstanding, mining revenues are wasted through corruption and financial mismanagement in many countries (Knutsen et al., 2017; Schiffrin & Rodrigues, 2013). There are also, major environmental problems including pollution of water sources by sediments, chemicals, and heavy metal oxides formed from mining (Mancini & Sala, 2018). Owing to the potential for mining to either positively contribute to development or negatively to environmental degradation and conflict, the need for a conscious effort by society to ensure the preponderance of the positives is imperative.

Social, economic, political, judicial, and religious structures referred to as institutions (North, 1991), are developed by societies to govern and coordinate the interactions between social actors and the environment in order to manage, for example, the risks of social upheaval and environmental harm associated with mining (Whittington, 2015). It is within institutions that power is prescribed, legitimated, and controlled. Gahlawat (2020) discusses that institutions regulate social behavior to ensure compliance with rules. The state is one such political and economic institution (Whittington, 2015).

Within the geographical jurisdiction of the state, other institutions at different levels of formalization and of various origins which often perform roles the state is unwilling or unable to do for the society exist. Of these institutions, those that pre-date the modern state are referred to as traditional institutions. They include chieftaincy, norms, taboos, practices, and informal local organizations (Crook, 2005; Knierzinger, 2011). Traditional institutions embody cultural values and are bound to the society through social contract in the process of building resilient societies. The social contract is premised on two pillars: leaders are held accountable for their trusteeship and that citizens have a right to natural resources entrusted to the control of leadership (Zahar & McCandless, 2020).

Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2017) consider the system that mediates the interaction between human actions and biophysical processes as governance. Governance is bigger than the actions of government, since decisions about resources are shaped by a wide range of public and private actors (Davis et al., 2013). The Institute of Governance (2002) explains that though the institutions, processes, and conventions in a community are important indicators of governance, how power is exercised, critical decisions made and varied interest parties included, are also very important. When the exercise of this power affects environmental resources, then this is environmental governance. Environmental governance is key to peace and development in countries where mining is a major economic activity because it has the potential of controlling upheavals as a result of environmental harm and financial mismanagement. Fairness in the distribution of revenues from mining would ensure more equitable distribution of development which minimizes social conflicts.

The very nature of environmental governance is to embrace all existing forms of collective regulation of societal environmental matters (Mayntz, 2004, cited in Draude, 2007). The effective integration of traditional institutions cannot be overemphasized. State attempts to build good environmental governance systems would not meet societal expectations and legitimation without the inclusion of traditional and informal institutions that can access and use local knowledge (Ndinga-Kanga et al., 2020).

The economic, environmental, and social consequences of mining for communities often lead to tensions over issues as compensation, employment of locals and environmental, and health impacts, thereby undermining traditional livelihoods (Mancini & Sala, 2018). One of the districts in Ghana where large scale mining has been extended to, with its attendant social, economic and environmental effects, is the Asutifi North district. The Newmont Ghana Gold Limited’s (NGGL) Ahafo project affected 9,575 individuals directly (Newmont, 2005). Over 95% of households that were displaced were primarily subsistence and small scale cash crop farmers (Newmont, 2005).

Social safety nets are critical to people whose livelihoods are displaced by these mining activities. And especially in this largely rural area, traditional institutions become relevant. Mengisteab (2008) sees traditional institutions as being indispensible to the people as they are an embodiment of the traditions, norms, and beliefs of the culturally identified group and they perform certain prescribed functions, including ensuring that their people earn livelihoods.

The authority of this institution derives directly from the legitimacy it has from within its society and its apparent neglect in governance is what writers like Myers and Fridy (2017) and Bergdall (1988, cited in Kendie & Guri, 2007) have explained as being responsible for the in-effectiveness of the state in bringing about development. Yeboah-Assiamah et al. (2017) note that traditional authorities are custodians of the collective interests of communities and they embody conservation values in their belief systems, but the roles they play in environmental governance in mining in the district is not much researched.

Questions are therefore raised about the role of traditional institutions in the environmental governance structure and their interaction with other institutions. This study examined the roles of traditional authorities in environmental governance in mining in the Asutifi North District. The next section of the paper reviews literature on the issues of interest to the paper, followed by the methodology, the findings, and discussion and conclusion.

Literature Review

History of Gold Mining in Ghana

Allen (1958) traces the source of recorded history of gold mining in the general area now called Ghana to the tenth century A.D., when the Saracens penetrated the Sahara desert and established overland trade between the territories bordering the Gulf of Guinea (covering the area of modern day Ghana) and Mediterranean countries. However, it was not until 1471 that the first authentic record of gold being obtained directly from the Gold Coast was made, when the Portuguese started trading in gold dust at the mouth of the Pra River.

The period before 1880 was characterized by the predominant participation of African miners using traditional mining technologies to mine alluvial free gold. Dumett (1998) notes that, in this period, traditional authorities managed mining within a traditional mining regime of rites, norms, benefits sharing, and technology.

The period between 1880 and 1901 was the pioneering period of the “modernization” of mining in the Gold Coast when heavier machines like excavators, crushers, and drills were introduced to allow for mining hard rock formations and advanced extractive technology to extract gold from compounds (Ayensu, 1997). Between 1881 and 1888, the Gold Coast gold industry was so vibrant that the British government created a separate section on the London Stock Exchange called the “jungle department” in 1900 to trade in shares of Gold Coast mining companies (The Economist, 1900 cited in Tsamenyi et al., n.d.). It has to be noted that this period was marked by the predominance of traditional mining and extraction technologies in the industry.

The Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (now AngloGold Ashanti) started working at Obuasi in 1897. Ayensu (1997) reported that in 1895, E. A. Cade, J. E. Ellis and J. E. Biney traveled to Obuasi to obtain approval for their proposed transaction from the Chiefs of Bekwai and Adansi, acting for and on behalf of the Asantehene. The colonial state was only allowed to take a more active part in the regulation of concessions and mining when in 1896, the Asante king Nana Sir Agyemang Prempeh I, was destooled and deported from the Gold Coast. This brought the Asante Protectorate more directly under British rule and Cade requested a ratification of the gold mining rights to Ashanti Goldfields Corporation. In April 1896, the concession agreement was ratified by the Governor (AngloGold Ashanti, 2005). The direct involvement of the colonial and post-colonial state in mining had begun.

When the Gold Coast gained independence and became Ghana in 1957, the government nationalized mineral resources and the sub-sector (Hilson, 2002). There was a general decline in the mining sub sector from there on in consonance with a general decline of the Ghanaian economy (Balassa, 1982).

In 1983 Ghana liberalized its economy and the liberalization of the mining sub-sector resulted in a market-driven pressure on land in mineral rich areas which translated into higher values for land. Also, the neoliberal ideology of private ownership of productive forces including land as against public and communal property also put a lot of pressure on land tenure, especially in mineral endowed areas (Manji, 2003, cited in Yankson et al., 2009).

Customary Land Management in Ghana

Customary lands are lands owned by stools, skins, tribes, clans, families, and, in some instances, individuals (Yeboah & Shaw, 2013). These lands are therefore regulated by customary tenure practices, influenced by communal ownership of the resources (Ministry of Lands and Forestry, 2003). Though customary lands are mostly owned collectively, their management are often vested in a designated person mostly the chief, or the family head. . The customary tenets of inter-generational ownership, land being held in trust by the appointed leader for the entire group on behalf of the dead, living, and those yet unborn and title to the land residing in the owning group and usually non-transferable, are the basic principles underlying customary land management in Ghana.

Lands that were not used for farming were the only lands allowed to be mined (Tsuma, 2010). In areas where minerals were mined, an amount, either in mineral or cash, was sent to the chieftaincy institution under whose jurisdiction the mining was occurring, partly to keep the institution in a respectable status and for the residual rights chieftaincy had in mineral resources found in the land (McQuilken, & Hilson, 2016). When the gold mining business was regulated and organized by traditional authority, the Gold Coast accounted for about 35.5% of total world gold output between 1493 and 1600 (World Bank, 1992, cited in Akabzaa & Darimani, 2001).

The performance of the gold mining business in the Gold Coast prompted the Legislative Council of the colonial state to draft the Crown Lands Ordinance in 1894 and the Land Bill of 1897 (Ofosu-Mensah, 2011; Ubink & Amanor, 2009). These marked the beginning of the attempt by the modern state (colonial) to exert control over land tenure in the Gold Coast to align it to the demands of the modern economy. These legislations were opposed successfully by local elites. In 1900, the colonial legislature passed the Concessions Ordinance which then only required that all concessions granted by the chiefs should be validated by the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast (Bourret, 1960). Botchway (1998) notes that the Ordinance then recognized the ownership of the land of the colony as that of the indigenous people and that they were free to contract the lands out to concessionaires for mining.

The Concessions Ordinance of 1939 was passed to repeal that of 1900 with a new requirement excluding any lease, concession, or assignment of rights or title or interest in minerals within a town or village (Concessions Ordinance of 1939, Cap. 136, § 2). In 1962, the Concessions Act of 1962 of the parliament of the newly independent Ghana was passed to repeal the 1939 Ordinance. The Concessions Act of 1962 empowered the Minister responsible for mines to vary or cancel all existing concessions.

In order for the government of Ghana to get around the problems inherent in traditional authority giving out lands for mining concessions and to bring the control of this access under government, the Administration of Lands Act, Act 123 of 1962 and State Lands Act, Act 125 of 1962 were passed to authorize the state to grant lands for any activity deemed to be in the public interest, including mining. These Acts authorized the President of Ghana to declare any land owned by stools, families, or individuals as state lands once its use was deemed to be in the public interest. In this situation, the previous owners of the land lost all their rights to the land except that which was given by the state. The only right guaranteed in the law for the original owners was to be paid adequate and prompt compensation for losing their right to the land.

To streamline the granting of concessions, the social effects, the actual mining and its impact on the environment and also to consolidate all the regulations on mining into one law, the Minerals and Mining law of 1986 was passed. One of the major departures of this law from the earlier ordinances on concessions was that concessions for mines were to be applied for from, and given out by, the government, not the chiefs. Twenty years after the passage of the Minerals and Mining Law of 1986, a new Minerals and Mining Law was passed in 2006 to replace that of 1986 with no modifications in the conditions under which lands are released for mining.

Environmental Governance

Environmental governance is a concept that discusses decisions that have an impact on the environment and how these decisions are made. It is also about how authority in making decisions affecting the environment is exercised, who is responsible, how they wield power, whether resultant policies and processes lead to environmental sustainability and how duty bearers are held accountable (Bennet & Satterfield, 2018; World Resources Institute, 2003). Environmental governance, made up of institutional frameworks and arrangements to moderate the society and environment interface, has evolved in response to environmental changes and has been put forth as a solution to problems emanating from environmental resource extraction (Schiffrin & Rodrigues, 2013).

Human activities and environmental changes are interlinked through complex cause-and-effect relationships embedded in both biophysical and social processes. These processes are complex and often nested as sets of linkages that persist in the activities of the people. Natural capital, made up of all the bio- physical resources, is usually transformed by people into other forms of capital, such as infrastructure, machines, and a network of friends so that these people can exercise freedoms of choice and satisfy needs (Department for International Development, 1999).

When the usage rights of any natural resource is to be re-allocated to another entity for large scale exploitation, a systematic process of negotiations and compensation for livelihood lost is required. This process can be achieved through environmental governance. Environmental governance requires society to focus both on the technical details of how to manage and on the social dimensions of natural resource use and ecosystem management (Bennet & Satterfield, 2018) to avoid conflicts.

The spate of conflicts and community agitation against mining in Ghana suggests that environmental governance did not fully address the concerns of all the stakeholders (Obara & Jenkins, 2006; Singh et al., 2007); therefore, a study to highlight the role of especially traditional institutions who are an embodiment of community aspirations is germane. This is because if the environmental governance structure were that responsive, most of the underlying causes of these conflicts would have been resolved earlier. This brings to the fore questions about the way the costs and benefits of the mining projects were determined. Most of the appraisal procedures adopted to inform decisions on mining approvals and conditions are influenced by economic and financial considerations generally for the mining companies and government revenue with minimal attention paid to people whose livelihoods and health are directly affected by the extraction.

It was to secure livelihoods and health of communities that in several parts of Africa, one major function of traditional authorities before colonialism was to allocate land (Beall, 2006; Lutz & Linder, 2004). Since land has been conceptualized to be the physical land and all natural resources attached to it (Aggarwal & Elbow, 2006), the people’s access to other environmental products were regulated by the traditional authorities.

Mwalukomo (2008) notes that environmental governance roles of chiefs are also expressed in spiritual beliefs attached to their positions in many parts of Africa. The declaration of some forests as sacred groves and the belief that spirit beings reside in specific natural resources like rivers and precious minerals, are all very important environmentally related roles of chiefs. Among the Akans of Ghana and in fact, among virtually every major tribe across Africa, these beliefs are not uncommon. The colonial and the post-colonial state’s influence has, however, weakened the environmental governance roles played by these traditional authorities, though they still remain relevant in the current times in these regards.

Methodology

This study was carried out in the Asutifi North District of the Ahafo Region of Ghana where historically, artisanal mining has gone on. Large-scale mining began in 2007 with the first pouring of gold by the Newmont Gold Ghana Limited’s Ahafo Project in Kenyasi and Ntotroso (Asutifi North District Assembly, 2013). The district has a total land surface area of 900 km² and 66 settlements with two of these settlements classified as urban (Asutifi North District Assembly, 2013). The gold mining project with an expected mine life of 15 years commenced commercial mining in August 2006 (Newmont, 2006). This project has developed gold reserves located along a mineralized zone that extends approximately 70 km. This mine is a surface mine. Its development involved the resettling of individuals and communities impacted by the mining-related activities.

The district is traditionally administered by two paramountcies and three divisional areas. The paramountcies are Kenyasi No.1 and Kenyasi No. 2. The three divisional areas are Ntotroso, Gyedu, and Wamahinso. Each of these paramountcies is headed by a paramount chief. Akans constitute the majority of the population, along with other ethnic groups from Ghana. Subsistence agriculture engages 66.7% of the economically active labor force in the district (Ghana Districts, 2011), which means that agriculture growth depends on expanding the acreage of fields under cultivation but with the advent of large scale mining accompanied by concessions granted, arable lands have become increasingly scarce and expensive (Newmont, 2006).

The research was designed as a qualitative case study design to allow for interpretation of human actions within the context of culturally specific meaningful arrangements (Audi, 1995). As Hall and Harvey (2018) and Yin (2011) discuss, the greater flexibility offered by qualitative research made it possible to explore the experiences of respondents, and for them to discuss reality from their perspectives.

The population for the study comprised two categories of respondents. The first category consisted of institutions related to mining in the district. There were generally three institutions selected for the study: traditional, state, and business institutions. The Ntotroso and OLA resettlement communities and, from affected communities, Kenyasi Numbers One and Two, Ntotroso, Tutuka, and Gyedu were purposively selected. Purposive sampling, was used to select traditional leaders and, in combination with convenience sampling, used to select respondents from the state and business institutions. In total, 52 institutional respondents were sampled for the study. The second category of respondents was made up of households living within the district. In total, twenty nine (29) households were sampled conveniently because the interviews with further households were not producing any newer information, meaning the saturation of issues (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Information was gathered on less formal institutions like rites, arrangements, and practices that were often overlooked in field research (Marsh, 2003) and data collection techniques were triangulated in capturing the interactions among people, institutions, and development in this mining area. This is in view of the observation made by Dietz et al. (2003) that highly aggregated information often times ignores or averages out local information important in understanding development issues for the purpose of prescribing solutions. Interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and documentary review were the main data collection methods used.

Responses from interviews, focus group discussions, and content analysis were transcribed, reduced, and discussed to draw out the qualitative information in them. NVivo version 8 was used to code and analyze the data. Discourse analysis was the main tool used for the analysis of the narratives because as Gee (2010) asserts, language, and practices reinforce each other in a reciprocal process and one cannot exist without the other. In the discourse analysis, the relationships among texts, interactions, and social practices were described and interpretation of the configuration of practices and an explanation of why and how these social practices were constituted, changed, and transformed in the society was done to form the basis of the findings (Rogers et al., 2005). The study analyzed the social contexts in which narratives were given to bring out the meanings behind the language given.

Findings and Discussion

Background Characteristics of Respondents

Twenty heads of households, three spouses of heads of households, and six members of households constituted the household respondents. Household respondents were mostly engaged in farming, teaching, and other occupations. The predominance of farming in the occupation is consistent with the occupational activity of Ghanaians with agriculture being the most predominant occupation (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012).

The concession area of Newmont Ahafo South project, where active mining was going on, falls within the Ahafo traditional area. The traditional authorities within the Ahafo area are subjects of the Golden Stool and therefore belong to the court of the Asantehene. The traditional leaders sampled had served in their positions between 8 and 20 years.

The state institutions sampled were those that were given specific roles by various legislations in mining governance and who were either directly present in the district or which had direct responsibility for the district. In total, six state officials were interviewed for the study. The mean number of years these officials had worked with the institution was 10 years. This means that these respondents had been in their institutional system long enough to be able to provide information that reflects the informal position of their institutions on their interaction with traditional authorities and the mining governance structure. Different personalities in three main business entities were also interviewed for the study. These business entities were small-scale miners, the Ghana Chamber of Mines and Newmont Gold Ghana Limited as shown in Table 1.

Table 1.

Business Institutions Sampled.^a

Institution	Location	Designation
Small-scale miners (Galamsey operators)	Kenyasi No 1 Ntotroso	Ghetto owners (2) Machine owners (2) Machine owners (2)
Ghana Chamber of Mines	Accra	Director of Research Senior Administrative Officer
Newmont Ghana Gold Limited	Kenyasi	Development Specialist Senior Communications Officer Public Affairs Coordinator

Quotations of responses from the modern institution respondents have not been ascribed to any specific position because of the ethical issue of anonymity of respondents.

Legitimacy of Development Roles of Chiefs

This subsection discusses how the respondents perceived the legitimacy of traditional institutions engaged in development. The state develops its own institutions to implement its policies. One of the most important objectives of the State is to bring development to the people in all communities especially within its geographic jurisdiction. The constitution also mandates the State to be responsible for development. Odotei (2010) writes that in the pre-colonial and colonial eras, chiefs led their people to war to defend, protect, and extend their territories but the nature of warfare in the modern era has changed with the enemies now poverty, hunger, disease, squalor, illiteracy, crime, injustice, environmental degradation, depletion of resources, greed, covetousness, ignorance, and conflicts. It is these that the modern traditional leader is supposed to fight. Since the effort to reduce all these variables result in development, it therefore stands to reason that chiefs are agents of development.

The legitimacy of traditional institutions in providing development for the society was determined from the respondents. Most of the respondents said it was legitimate for traditional authorities to play development roles in society. From the perspective of the traditional authorities, development activities of a chief were a social responsibility. They intimated that if chiefs were up to the task, communities would not even need government to come to their aid. The efforts of the state to help develop communities were seen as an addition to what the chiefs had to do. The over reliance of communities on government was seen as a recipe for failure. One chief said it was legitimate for chiefs to engage in development activities because:

The traditional authorities cannot just sit back and expect the state to bring every development. Even if the state decides to provide development projects and the chief is not proactive, nothing may get to you. Of late, the state would mostly come to the aid of people who have begun something; therefore traditional authorities have to initiate development activities to increase the chance that the state will come in. It is the chief who should show the leadership.

An issue emerging from the narrative is that the state was more eager to support projects communities have initiated. This enhances completion, active participation of the people, and sustainability of projects. However, these projects can be initiated with the activism of a community actor and the chiefs are required to play this leadership role. Englebert (2000) argues that the legitimacy of traditional authorities is independent of the state; it is resilient, and rooted in historical continuity of tradition and its moral claim to rule. It is therefore the state that rather depends on the traditional structures to enhance the legitimacy of public policies, development plans, and decisions, which require people’s participation at the grass-roots (Sharma, n.d.).

Another justification was that traditional authorities predated all the modern institutions and therefore they had to contribute to development. This suggestion was derived from the fact that development did not originate with the colonizers or state. It was the basis upon which the traditional institutions were even formed. Therefore the emergence of the state should not be seen as invalidating the development relevance of traditional institutions. It was rather to complement it.

The relationship between chiefs and subjects is a highly interdependent one in which the chief’s welfare depends upon his/her subjects’ well-being (Firman-Sellers, 2000). The traditional authorities extract revenue from subjects, which is used to enhance the authority’s own wealth and status. It is recognized that subjects would engage in revenue generating behavior (and remain in the traditional area) only if they, too, are allowed to enjoy the fruits of their labor, which includes their personal, familial, and community development.

Development therefore had to be pursued with the active involvement of, and the blessing of, traditional authorities. One respondent in the FGD asked:

If the mandated institutions will not bring development, what then will the chief do? Chiefs just have to do their bit and if the state comes in to help, fine, if not the people still deserve to develop.

The comment places the responsibility of providing development at the doorstep of chiefs and even suggests that the essence of traditional institutions is to provide development. Because the traditional institutions are an enduring indigenous institution, they would exist in the communities even after the mining company leaves. The traditional institutions would still manage the affairs of the communities therefore they had to contribute to development.

The case of the continued involvement of chiefs in the development of their areas was made the more justified because of perceived competition between Members of Parliament and their Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives for political authority and recognition in local government. Some respondents saw the bickering among political elites at the local level as drawing the attention of these people from development of the local areas and it was for chiefs to step in and fill this gap so that the people were not denied the right to development.

A few household respondents felt it was not legitimate for traditional institutions to be involved in development activities. Their main justification for this position was that traditional institutions were corrupt and would keep most of the resources meant for the people for themselves. They therefore intimated that the state institutions should be allowed to lead development, however since traditional authorities are leaders in their communities they could be involved to a minimal extent. One respondent stated:

Sometimes when resources had been given to traditional authorities by the company to implement particular policies, there was poor accountability resulting in unsuccessful projects, but they cannot also be left out entirely. There should be people who are appointed by the system to monitor the use of resources by the traditional authorities.

The narrative suggesting that chiefs were not accountable to their subjects is what Mamdani (1996) describes as the elimination of any vestiges of downward accountability as a result of the roles the colonial administration assigned to chiefs using their indirect rule concept.

A major function of chieftaincy was that of development agents. They usually initiated development projects because they understood the needs of their subjects and organized all possible resources to provide these needs. These development projects included sanitation, school, health, and library facilities. A household participant said this of the development roles of chiefs:

They are also responsible for ensuring that all facilities and services needed by the town are provided even if it means they have to go to different offices in this area or outside of this area.

It is inferred from the narrative that chiefs were expected by their people to take responsibility for the provision of facilities and services that their citizens required to have meaningful lives. The communities looked up to the chiefs to ensure these were available. It was therefore incumbent on the chiefs to either provide them or facilitate the provision of these facilities and services. The different offices referred to in the quotation meant both state and non-state actors including the mining company itself, NGOs or other benevolent organizations or individuals.

Chiefs were also seen by the District Assembly, mining company, and Ghana Chamber of Mines respondents as a partner with the District Assembly to plan and implement development programs for communities under their jurisdiction. These projects were usually funded with proceeds from the mining company. The Sustainable Development Committees (SDCs) were the lowest level of decision making of the Newmont Ahafo Development Fund (NADeF). The SDCs were formed in each of the ten towns within the NGGL Ahafo concession. These committees made the decisions on what development projects the money realized from NADeF were to be used for, each planning year. A prominent example of such a project is the Community Health Nurses training school built in Ntotroso from the NADeF funds.

In the SDCs, chiefs or their representatives were very active in organization and deliberations. They usually organized the community for deliberations on community development projects. The technical staff of the District Assembly, including civil engineers, quantity surveyors, and budget officers, provided all the technical support needed by the SDCs in implementing projects like libraries, schools, and clinics.

Another situation in which chiefs partnered the District Assembly was when upon deliberations at unit committee levels, some issues were referred to chiefs for their attention and action. Sometimes, the Assembly men and women sent issues of local development to the unit committees which after discussions would then send the matter for action to the traditional authority. In other instances, the chief and elders would brief the Assembly man or woman who then referred the matter to the unit committee for attention by the DA. This was possible because of the more informalized interaction between the traditional authorities and the DA regarding local development.

The provision of peace and security within the traditional areas was the next function of chiefs. Household and traditional authority respondents noted that chiefs were responsible for peace and security in their jurisdictions. This was possible because chiefs had the tendency and responsibility to provide social cohesion and maintain traditional values, which have issues of socializing the youth and prevention of crime embedded in them (Ray & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1996). In these activities, the chiefs were said to protect their communities from any form of incursion that had the tendency to negatively affect the peace in their communities. This is because they were perceived as the guardians of their communities’ culture, playing important roles in cultural events and rituals (Logan, 2009). One of such incursions was the expansion of the mining company.

One head of household said that some functions of traditional authorities were:

They ensure that the rights of the local people are respected at all times by both the foreigners and other Ghanaians who do not come from here. In addition, they ensure that the company, in its activities, respects the rights of the local people. For instance, if there is going to be blasting in the pit, the company has to inform the people of the time of the blast ahead of time and the chiefs ensure that this is done. Sometimes in the social interaction of the workers with the local people, the chiefs ensure that there is fairness and peace and they settle disputes arising from these interactions.

The role played by chiefs in moderating the interactions between communities and external agents is noted in the quotation (Economic Commission for Africa, 2007). Chiefs are called upon by both community members and modern institutions to play this role because of the institutional structure they have which allows for the counsel of elders and the legitimacy they possess in the communities. Their major duty is to their constituents and the ancestors and less to themselves. They therefore are expected by both sides to be fair and equitable in their dealings. Though the chiefs moderated the interaction between the state and citizenry, their moderating role in the governance of mining was limited to ensuring that decisions that were taken by the state and business institutions were complied with by the citizens. From the narrative, all that the chiefs were reported to be doing did not really concern decisions on the mining and the conditions governing these.

Settlement of disputes and also coordination in resolving disputes in their areas were some of the functions chiefs performed. This function was consistent with what traditional institutions performed in Botswana, where Beall and Ngonyama (2009) found that over 70% of cases were reported to the traditional institutions for arbitration because they were less expensive compared to the judiciary, used customary law and the local language in the interactions.

Even though the traditional authorities played a lesser role in development compared to the state, these development activities however, had to be funded. There were two major sources of funding that chiefs used in paying for development activities. These were mining and stumpage royalties and farms on stool lands. The mining and stumpage royalties usually went to the paramount or divisional chief who was then expected to redistribute between the Asantehene and among all the chiefs in the paramountcy or division. The chief of Ntotroso explained that there were traditional mechanisms used to achieve this redistribution which was time tested and fair. But in the interview with a village chief in the Kenyasi No 2 paramount area, he said he did not receive any such money from his paramount chief.

However, there were other sources available to the chiefs, albeit lesser in amount and frequency of availability. These include the chiefs lobbying NGOs, philanthropists, and sometimes, government to either initiate projects or complete already initiated ones. Sometimes too, they received sponsorship packages or donations from various people and organizations. Locally, the use of communal labor and revenue from the sale of land to individuals and organizations constituted another source of funding for development projects initiated by traditional authorities.

Roles of Traditional Institutions in Environmental Governance

Traditional institutions are socially embedded in the lives and culture of people. The people still engage with these institutions in their day to day social life. Even in urban areas of Ghana, where the influence of modern institutions are the strongest, there is resurgence in the number of people who consider traditional institutions as relevant to society (Logan, 2009). The traditional institutions are able to play roles in the governance structure because of the legitimacy and authority they possess. The most prevalent function of chiefs from the discussions was their leadership role. Chieftaincy was the institution that represented their communities in giving the social permit for mining companies to start mining, to resettle people, and to compensate people for the loss of access to land. In their social permitting of the mining, they coordinated with the EPA to organize public hearings as part of the EIA permit process.

Part of their leadership role required chiefs to mediate the interaction between the communities and the state or the mining company. In the provision of jobs by the mining company to local people, anytime the company advertised for a vacancy, local applicants were to present a job card endorsed by the chief of their respective towns to be employed preferentially. This had two justifications: the first was to ensure preferential employment of qualified applicants from the local areas and the second was that it was a way through which the veracity of the claim by applicants to be from the local area was established. This arrangement worked well until abuses were reported on the part of the traditional authority endorsement. It was claimed by most of the household respondents that the chiefs were taking bribes from non-indigenes and endorsing application forms for them to be employed in the mining and allied companies. The chiefs who were interviewed responded that they were not taking any bribes but the young ladies in the area were presenting their husbands, who were non locals originally, but locals by marriage, for the endorsement. When these supposed husbands secured the jobs, they would usually divorce the women. That was how non locals got the endorsement from the chiefs.

The last function of chiefs was that they were the custodians of the lands, customs, the natural resources, and the people on the land. Chiefs were the representatives of the community to the ancestors and the ancestors to the community. However, the power that the state had in vesting any land for prescribed purposes, including with minerals determined in them, and also to declare any land as public land was a source of conflict between the state and chieftaincy. In 1958, the newly elected CPP government passed the Ashanti Stool Lands Act (No.28 of 58) which transferred the trusteeship and management of all lands vested in the Golden Stool and its occupant, the Asantehene, to the Governor–General (Kwarteng, 2012). The Ahafo area, part of the Asante Kingdom was affected by this Act. In view of this situation, one of the sub chiefs of the Kenyasi No. 1 traditional area commented:

The issue of vested lands and the rights of traditional authorities should be amended to allow us more say in what happens on the land instead of just being informed of decisions taken by government.

This had created confusion among the chiefs of the extent of their power over allocation of lands for different economic activities and the responsibilities they bore from the consequences of the allocation of the land by the state. These also led to other conflicts within the societies, and enhanced consultation about the allocation of land and its use between chiefs and the state has been advocated for (Bugri & Yuonayel, 2015; Ray & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1996). This is because, traditional authorities are key in the communication link between societies and state institutions and their relevance in smoothing out misunderstandings in this interaction reduces tensions and helps to avert conflicts as a result. The community includes the humans, their resources, their traditions, and customs. In this wise, the chief with support from the elders, other traditional institutions, and the people had to deal with everything that happened in their communities with the potential to cause harm. Respondents acknowledged the very important role that traditional institutions, especially chieftaincy, played in the district.

Conclusions

Though the state was present in the area, its effectiveness was constrained by the sheer mass of issues to be addressed and the limited resources and capacity to deal with all the needs of the people. Traditional authorities had complemented the state structures and while they have not been entirely successful in substituting for the state, they played an important role in holding the societies together despite the daunting economic, political, and environmental challenges amidst the constrained resources available to them (Meagher, 2007; Renders, 2007). Traditional actors combined elements of self-organization and socially embedded authority and legitimacy, to address the needs of the area when state functions were either non-existent or deficient (Neubert, 2007).

Traditional institutions are a resilient and enduring form of social organization that continues to be relevant to most communities in Ghana. However, their apparent ineffective participation in governing commercial mineral resources characterized by public statements by some traditional leaders and conflicts in several mining areas has not augured well for local development in mining areas.

If the state allows traditional authorities to participate in the processes of licensing of mining, beginning at the reconnaissance license stage to the final mining license phase, they would be more engaged in regular environmental resource decision making which would enhance their governance roles. This participation is envisaged to be designed such that the chiefs can only contribute to the decisions about how the mining can affect their communities, thereby reducing the perceived possibility of them becoming corrupt with enhanced authority over the mineral resources.

Limitations

The study did not analyze the gender dimensions of the roles of traditional authorities in the study area. The study treated traditional institutions as gender neutral and this limits the study in its ability to highlight the nuances within the roles played by various gendered positions within the institution.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Emmanuel Yamoah Tenkorang

References

Aggarwal

Elbow

(2006). The role of property rights in natural resource management, good governance and empowerment of the rural poor. ARD, Inc.

Akabzaa

Darimani

(2001). Impact of mining sector investment in Ghana: A study of the Tarkwa mining region. SAPRI.

Allen

K. G.

(1958). Gold mining in Ghana. African Affairs, 57, 221–240.

AngloGold Ashanti. (2005). History of the Ashanti Goldfields company. Retrieved November 23, 2011, from http://www.anglogold.co.za/NR/rdonlyres/BDB5B570-C236-4C5B-9F53-1B5ED83F7E0C/0/Ashanti_CompanyHistory.pdf

Asutifi North District Assembly. (2013). Medium term development plan and budget 2014 – 2017. Asutifi North District Assembly.

Audi

(Ed.). (1995). The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Ayensu

(1997). Ashanti gold: The African legacy of the world’s most precious metal. Marshal Edition Development Ltd.

Balassa

(1982). Structural adjustment policies in developing economies. World Development, 10(1), 23–38.

Beall

(2006). Cultural weapons: Traditions, inventions and the transition to democratic governance in Metropolitan Durban. Urban Studies, 43(2), 457–473.

10.

Beall

Ngonyama

(2009). Indigenous institutions, traditional leaders and elite coalitions for development: The case of Greater Durban, South Africa (Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2). Crisis States Research Centre.

11.

Bennet

Satterfield

(2018). Environmental governance: A practical framework to guide design, evaluation, and analysis. Conservation Letters, 11(6), e126000.

12.

Botchway

F. N.

(1998). Land ownership and responsibility for the mining environment in Ghana. Natural Resources Journal, 38, 509–536.

13.

Bourret

F. M.

(1960). Ghana: The road to independence, 1919-1957. Stanford University Press.

14.

Bugri

J. T.

Yuonayel

E. M.

(2015). Traditional authorities and peri-urban land management in Ghana: Evidence from Wa. Journal of Resources Development and Management, 13, 68–79.

15.

Crook

(2005). The role of traditional institutions in political change and development (CDD/ODI Policy Brief, No. 4). CDD.

16.

Davis

Williams

Lupberger

Daviet

(2013). Assessing forest governance: The governance of forests initiative indicator framework. World Resources Institute.

17.

Department for International Development. (1999). Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets.

18.

Dietz

Ostrom

Stern

P. C.

(2003). Struggling to govern the Commons. Science, 302, 1907–1912.

19.

Draude

(2007, February 8–9). Focus non-western forms of governance: In favour of an equivalence functionalist observation of governance in areas of limited statehood [Conference session]. Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion of the Public- Private Divide, Basel, Switzerland.

20.

Dumett

R. E.

(1998). El Dorado in West Africa: The gold-mining frontier, Africa labour and colonial capitalism in the Gold Coast, 1875-1990. Ohio University Press.

21.

Economic Commission for Africa. (2007). Relevance of African traditional institutions of governance.

22.

Englebert

(2000). State Legitimacy and development in Africa. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

23.

Ericsson

Löf

(2019). Mining’s contribution to national economies between 1996 and 2016. Mineral Economics, 32, 223–250.

24.

Firman-Sellers

(2000). Institutions, context, and outcomes: Explaining French and British rule in West Africa. Comparative Politics, 32(3), 253–272.

25.

Gahlawat

S. C.

(2020). Anthropology solved papers: Civil Services mains (2010- 2019) (Anthropology Papers Book 2019, p. 422). MyARSu.

26.

Gee

J. P.

(2010). An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method (3rd ed.). Routledge.

27.

Ghana Districts. (2011). Brong Ahafo: Asutifi. Retrieved December 5, 2013, from http://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?news&r=10&_=32

28.

Ghana Statistical Service. (2012). 2010 population and housing census: Summary report of final results. Ghana Statistical Service.

29.

Hall

Harvey

L. A.

(2018). Qualitative research provides insights into the experiences and perspectives of people with spinal cord injuries and those involved in their care. Spinal Cord, 56, 527.

30.

Hilson

(2002). Harvesting mineral riches: 1000 years of gold mining in Ghana. Resources Policy, 28, 13–26.

31.

Institute of Governance. (2002). Governance principles for protected areas in the 21st Century. (Discussion paper for Parks Canada). Parks Canada.

32.

Kendie

S. B.

Guri

B. Y.

(2007). Indigenous institutions, governance and development: Community mobilisation and natural resources management in Ghana. Bio- diversity and Endogenous Development, Compas Series on Worldviews and Sciences 6, ETC COMPAS.

33.

Knierzinger

(2011). Chieftaincy and development in Ghana: From political intermediaries to neotraditional development brokers (Working Paper 124 of the Department of Anthropology and African Studies of the Johannes Gutenberg University). Johannes Gutenberg University.

34.

Knutsen

C. H.

Kotsadam

Olsen

E. H.

Wig

(2017). Mining and local corruption in Africa. American Journal of Political Science, 61(2), 320–334.

35.

Kwarteng

K. O.

(2012). Ahafo: Big men, small boys and the politics of regionalism in Ghana from 1896 -1986. Journal of History and Cultures, 2012(1), 37–50.

36.

Logan

(2009). Selected chiefs, elected councillors and hybrid democrats: Popular perspectives on the co-existence of democracy and traditional authority. Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1), 101–128.

37.

Lutz

Linder

(2004). Traditional structures in local governance for local development. University of Berne, Switzerland Institute of Political Science.

38.

Mamdani

(1996). Citizens and subjects: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism. Princeton University Press.

39.

Mancini

Sala

(2018). Social impact assessment in the mining sector: Review and comparison of indicators frameworks. Resources Policy, 57, 98–111.

40.

Marsh

(2003). Working with local institutions to support sustainable livelihoods. Rural Development Division, Food and Agriculture Organisation.

41.

McQuilken

Hilson

(2016). Artisanal and small-scale gold mining in Ghana: Evidence to inform an ‘action dialogue’. International Institute for Environment and Development.

42.

Meagher

(2007). Introduction: Special issue on informal institutions and development in Africa. Africa Spectrum, 42(3), 405–418.

43.

Mengisteab

(2008, October 17–19). Governance: Is Somaliland charting a new path? Faith, citizenship, democracy and peace in the Horn of Africa [Conference session]. 7th Annual Conference on the Horn of Africa, Lund, Sweden.

44.

Ministry of Lands and Forestry. (2003). Emerging land tenure issues. Government of Ghana.

45.

Mwalukomo

(2008). The role of traditional leaders in environmental governance in the context of decentralization: A case study of grass utilization in QwaQwa, Eastern Free State [MSc Thesis]. School of Geography Archaeology and Environmental Studies, University of Witwatersrand.

46.

Myers

W. M.

Fridy

K. S.

(2017). Formal versus traditional institutions: Evidence from Ghana. Democratization, 24(2), 367–382.

47.

Ndinga-Kanga

van der Merwe

Hartford

(2020). Forging a resilient social contract in South Africa: States and societies sustaining peace in the post-apartheid era. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 14(1), 22–41.

48.

Neubert

(2007, February 8–9). What’s new? Local and regional non-state actors on the margins of public policy in Africa [Conference session]. Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion of the Public-Private Divide, Basel, Switzerland.

49.

Newmont. (2006). Ahafo south project external/independent social, environmental, health, and safety compliance monitoring. General terms of reference. Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd.

50.

Newmont. (2005). Social and community development of the Ahafo Region: Collaboration to promote project benefits, vision and commitments. Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd.

51.

North

D. C.

(1991). Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–112.

52.

Obara

L. J.

Jenkins

(2006). Land use disputes in Ghana’s mining communities: Developing sustainable strategies. The Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society, University of Cardiff.

53.

Odotei

I. K.

(2010, March 20). Chieftaincy in Ghana [Paper presentation]. German students on the Go Africa Go Germany Programme, Noda Hotel, Fumesua-Kumasi. Retrieved June 6, 2014. https://www.irenekodotei.org/content/chieftaincy-ghana

54.

Ofosu-Mensah

(2011). Historical overview of traditional and modern gold mining in Ghana. International Research Journal of Library, Information and Archival Studies, 1(1), 6–22.

55.

Ray

D. I.

van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal

E. A. B.

(1996). The new relevance of traditional authorities in Africa: The conference; major themes; reflections of chieftaincy in Africa; future directions’. Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law: Special Issue on The New Relevance of Traditional Authorities to Africa’s Future, 37–38, 1–38.

56.

Renders

(2007). Appropriate governance-technology? Somali clan elders and institutions in the making of the Republic of Somaliland. Africa Spectrum, 42(3), 439–459.

57.

Rogers

Malamcharuvil-Berkes

Mosley

Hui

O’Garro

J. G.

(2005). Critical discourse analysis in education: A review of the literature. Sage.

58.

Schiffrin

Rodrigues

(2013, October). Covering the extractives industry: Big data, new tools, and journalism [Conference session]. Global Investigative Journalism Conference, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil.

59.

Sharma

K. C.

(n.d.). Role of traditional structures in local governance for local development: The case of Botswana. Word Bank Institute.

60.

Singh

Koku

J. E.

Balfors

(2007). Resolving water conflicts in mining areas of Ghana through public participation: A communication perspective. Journal of Creative Communications, 2(3), 361–382.

61.

Strauss

Corbin

(1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. Sage.

62.

Tsamenyi

Maltby

Poku

(n.d.). Jungle boom: The role of financial and other administrative controls in the mining industry in colonial Ghana. Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham. Retrieved December 7, 2011, from http://www.schulich.yorku.ca/SSBextra/AcctSubalt.nsf/db2703cf4bd7f64d85256fb1005b2de4/faf6f65c7aba0a5a8525729c0054b38b/$FILE/Tsamenyi.pdf

63.

Tsuma

(2010). Gold mining in Ghana – Actors, alliances and power. ZEF Development Studies.

64.

Ubink

J. M.

Amanor

(2009). Contesting land and custom in Ghana: State, chief and the citizen. University of Amsterdam Press.

65.

Whittington

(2015). Giddens, structuration theory and strategy as practice. In Golsorkhi

Rouleau

Seidl

Vaara

(Eds.), Cambridge handbook of strategy as practice (pp. 109–126). Cambridge University Press.

66.

World Resources Institute. (2003). World resources 2002-2004: Decisions for the earth: Balance, voice, and power. United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, World Bank and World Resources Institute.

67.

Yankson

P. W. K.

Asiedu

A. B.

Yaro

J. A.

(2009). Land rights and vulnerabilities in the Kete Krachi pilot Customary Land Secretariat area (Final report). Department of Geography and Resource Management, University of Ghana.

68.

Yeboah

Shaw

D. P.

(2013). Customary land tenure practices in Ghana: Examining the relationship with land-use planning delivery. International Development Planning Review, 35(1), 21–39. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2013.3

69.

Yeboah-Assiamah

Muller

Domfeh

K. A.

(2017). Institutional assessment in natural resource governance: A conceptual overview. Forest Policy and Economics, 74, 1–12.

70.

Yin

R. K.

(2011). Qualitative research from start to finish. The Guilford Press.

71.

Zahar

McCandless

(2020). Sustaining peace one day at a time: Inclusion, transition crises, and the resilience of social contracts. Journal of Intervention and State Building, 14(1), 119–138.

Environmental Governance in Gold Mining: The Role of Traditional Institutions in Asutifi North District of Ghana