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Abstract

The tribal Pashtuns of Pakistan, based in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border region, have historically been portrayed as “violent” and “warrior-like,” both in the colonial and contemporary literature. However, a brief review of archival literature suggests that oriental representation of tribal Pashtuns is based on various generalizations that were formed and propagated during the British military expeditions against the tribal Pashtuns. Moreover, these generalizations and stereotypes against the tribal Pashtuns have persisted since Pakistan’s independence in 1947. Recent developments in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal belt, with various tribes convening Jirga meetings, condemning and countering militant activities and protesting against the state’s injustices explain the importance and desire for peace among the tribal Pashtuns. Finally, a brief analysis of the recently started Pashtun Tahafuz (protection) movement (PTM), an indigenous peace and human rights movement involving both men and women, and its nonviolent nature also reinforces the importance of peace for the tribal Pashtuns.

Keywords

tribes Pashtuns colonial-literature ethnicity peace and conflict

Pashtuns are an ethnic group based in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, with exonyms such as Afghan, Pashtoon, Pushtoon, Pathan, and Pukhtoon,¹ also used for the group (A. S. Ahmed, 2013; Siddique, 2014). In Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, along with tribal areas on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, the Pashtuns make up the second largest ethnic group, with 15% of the population, in the country (“Ethnic Groups in Pakistan,” 2018; Hadid & Sattar, 2018). The tribal Pashtuns, based in the Afghanistan–Pakistan border region in the north-west, have historically been described as “warrior-like” and “savages,” with a tendency of being violent, in colonial literature, with contemporary literature describing them as “sympathisers of militants” (see Afsar, Samples, & Wood, 2008; Beattie, 2011; Behuria, 2007; Caroe, 1958; Coughlin, 2013; Elphinstone, 1842; Kilcullen, 2009; Nichols, 2008; Oliver, 1890; Wylly, 1912). However, these stereotypes have resulted from Pashtuns insurgencies against the British Raj in the Indian subcontinent, and more recently, because of the Pashtun Mujahedeen’s role in the Afghan Soviet War (1979-1989) in Afghanistan (Hanifi, 2016; Johansen, 1997).

In recent times, the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban, especially in the tribal areas, and the strengthening of the anti-U.S. Haqqani Network (Afghan Taliban) has further propagated the violent image of the Pashtuns. However, the loss of thousands of Pashtun lives in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas—along with targeted killings of tribal elders at the hands of the militants—suggests that the Pashtuns in the former-FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) region have mostly been victims, rather than perpetrators of violence (Z. Ali, 2010; South Asia Terrorism Portal [SATP], 2017). Hence, due to the rise of militancy in the tribal areas, Pakistani military operations, and the U.S. drone strikes, the tribal Pashtuns have been both directly and indirectly affected, losing lives and living in fear along with their properties being destroyed (Z. S. Ahmed, Yousaf, & Zeb, 2018; Amnesty International, 2010; Siddique, 2008; Tahir, 2015; Yousaf, 2017a). Therefore, this essay, while focusing on the Pashtuns living in the former-FATA² region of Pakistan, seeks to discuss historical and contemporary “violent” representation of the tribal Pashtuns. In addition, the essay briefly discusses the Pashtun culture, along with situating the association of violence with Pashtunwali. The essay then discusses various peace initiatives taken by the tribal Pashtuns toward peace and conflict resolution, and how these initiatives express the tribal Pashtuns’ desire for peace and conflict resolution in the region. In its final section, the essay briefly discusses the recently evolved Pashtun Tahafuz (protection) movement (PTM), an indigenous nonviolent human rights movement of young tribal Pashtuns, both men and women, and argues how this movement further dispels the violent representation of Pashtuns.

The author of this essay acknowledges various drawbacks in the Pashtun culture, especially lack of basic rights afforded to women, however, discussion of such critique is limited due to the nature and scope of the essay. Also, the word “tribal” is used in the essay to indicate the Pashtuns living in the former-FATA region, and not used in its anthropological, and sometimes negative, connotation (see Mafeje, 1971 for negative connotations surrounding the word “tribal”). Moreover, the essay does not intend to present new knowledge, rather it analyzes the past and present knowledge on the tribal Pashtuns and argues why there is a further need to study Pashtuns and Pashtunwali to critically analyze and deconstruct their “violent” representations. Finally, because of its current and recent nature, the essay mostly relies on newspaper stories and opinion articles, while discussing and analyzing the PTM.

Does Pashtun Culture Promote Violence?

Pashtunwali, literally translated as the way of the Pashtuns, is a set of customs, cultural codes, and values that regulate the Pashtun society and its way of life and has been previously discussed in detail by various authors (see Alley, 2012; Benson & Siddiqui, 2014; Hawkins, 2009; P. Kakar, 2004; Spain, 1972; Yousufzai & Gohar, 2005). Even with the advent of globalization and economic development, studies show that Pashtunwali still holds importance for Pashtuns living in the tribal areas (Khayyam, Ullah, & Shah, 2018). Some of the major Pashtun cultural codes include Badal (revenge and reciprocity), Badragga (safe conduct), Hujrah (Pashtun common sitting place), Jirga (Pashtun tribal councils), Lashkar (militias), Melmastya (hospitality), Nanawatay (law of refuge/forgiveness), Nang (honor), and Tiga (truce), among others. A major tenet of Pashtunwali, among these, worth noting in the context of Pashtuns and peace is the Pashtun Jirga.

A Jirga, a council of elders (known as the masharan), is by far the most important tenet of Pashtunwali, which focuses on conflict resolution, negotiation, and mediation among the Pashtun communities (Gohar, 2014; Yousufzai & Gohar, 2005). The term Jirga refers to an indigenous dispute resolution and deliberation mechanism followed by the Pashtun tribes for centuries, and also adopted as a political institution by Afghanistan (Z. S. Ahmed & Yousaf, 2018; Wardak, 2003). It is said that the Jirga regulates the way of life for the tribal Pashtuns where decisions range from smaller issues of mutual conflict and interest to major issues pertaining to foreign affairs and national politics (Oberson, 2002). A Jirga functions when a conflict arises on local, tribal, or regional level, with tribal elders coming together, sitting in a circle, and discussing and deciding on the matter (Yousufzai & Gohar, 2005).

A Jirga can often sanction the formation of Lashkars (tribal militia) for maintenance of law and order, self-defense, along with the enforcement of the Jirga’s decisions. The word Lashkar is roughly translated into troops, whereas it has also been referred to as a raiding party or a militia (Taj, 2011). In terms of self-defense, a Lashkar can be defined as an armed group organized by the Pashtun tribes to defend their territory (Siddique, 2014). The purpose of a Lashkar, traditionally, revolves around temporary formation of a force that implements a Jirga decision against a tribe or an individual (Taj, 2011). Hence, once a Lashkar fulfills its duties, it instantly disbands. A Lashkar is headed by a subcommander called the Mir, who is directly answerable to the tribal Jirga. Even though a tenet of “force,” the tribal Lashkars have played a major role in countering militants in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas along with defending their territories since 2002.

Pashtunwali, even with aspects of hospitality and peace, has come under criticism for a number of reasons. First and foremost, because of the patriarchal and male-dominated dynamics of the Pashtun tribal society in Pakistan, women are given little or no representation in the decision-making process (P. Kakar, 2004). This means that men in the society hold more, and even unassailable rights, compared with women (Ginsburg, 2011). In many cases, decisions of Jirga are enforced upon women without their consent or will. In this regard, in certain areas, according to the Pashtun tradition of Swara, women are given to the aggrieved party, as property, to settle disputes and, therefore, result in forced marriages (Naseer, 2016; Qadeer, 2014). In some cases, even underage girls have been given under Swara to settle long-term disputes between families and tribes (I. Ali, 2018). Another aspect of gender rights violations in Pashtun culture is witnessed through honor killings, where women, punished by Jirgas, are almost never allowed to defend themselves (I. Ali, 2018).

Moreover, under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)³—the colonial set of laws that governed the former FATA region until recently—the tribal women were also not given access to state Jirgas conducted by the state-appointed political agent, therefore, discriminating against women (Tameez, 2014). In addition, even when the state of Pakistan engaged with terrorists politically and negotiated peace deals through tribal Jirgas, it completely ignored the role and rights of women in the former FATA region (Shah, 2009). Hence, the state has also been complicit in violation of basic rights, especially women rights, through Pashtunwali in the tribal areas (Naseer, 2018b).

Another criticism on the tenets of Pashtunwali is based on Badal, or revenge. This tenet deals with both revenge as well as reciprocity, and hence regarded as one of the tenets that has resulted in the association of “violence” with Pashtuns. It is argued that Badal was a major factor that prompted the Pashtuns in Afghanistan to take up arms against the Soviet Union during the Afghan Jihad (1979-1989), to avenge the collateral damage caused by the Soviet army (R. G. Hussain, 2008). Moreover, under the customs of Melmastya (hospitality) and Panah (refuge) some tribal Pashtuns, though in a minority, have also given refuge to “guests” belonging to local and foreign militant groups (Gul, 2012). Hence, even with some positive customs, there are other customs that suggest problems still exist when it comes to the Pashtun culture and its compatibility with the modern world and universal human rights. This duality has also resulted in confusions surrounding Pashtunwali for the outside world, and has, therefore, contributed to the persistence of simplified generalizations toward tribal Pashtuns.

In this regard, the following section discusses this representation and generalization of Pashtun tribes both in colonial archives as well as contemporary literature.

Why Are Tribal Pashtuns Generalized as Violent?

It is argued that the “violent” representation of Pashtuns has persisted mainly due to the absence of Pashtun voices in literature, and, therefore, limited or no counternarratives are present on colonial representation of Pashtuns (Hanifi, 2016). Hanifi (2016), in this regard, argues that it was Mountstuart Elphinstone and Louis Dupree, whose works played a major role in persistence of the “Orientalist representation” of the Pashtuns. Manchanda (2017, p. 173) also believes that Elphinstone’s “high spirited republics [. . . ] ready to defend their country against a tyrant” have since become widely acknowledged as the basis of Afghan “tribal culture.” Hanifi (2016), on why Elphinstone’s “colonial knowledge” creation of Pashtuns was shaped in a certain way, writes,

Colonial knowledge formations are geared for political utility. Similar to other forms of knowledge, colonialism generated some new and important lines of inquiry, in historical linguistics for example. However, because of the political expediencies demanded of colonialism, it tends to be built on simplifications and limited, sometimes inconsistent and contradictory data. (p. 395)

Therefore, in colonial literature, Pashtuns have been simplistically described as “warriors” or “semi savages,” with the following accounts reflecting some of this discourse creation.

One such account that creates an oriental picture of the tribal Pashtuns, especially the Afridi tribes, is by Edward Oliver (1890). According to him, the Afridi tribes on the border were the “most lawless and savage of Pathans (Pashtuns)” (Oliver, 1890, p. 183). In another account, Warburton (1900) also talking about the Afridi tribes says that they are “brought up as kids to distrust all mankind” (p. 342). He further quotes Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Mackeson saying that the Afridis were the “most avaricious race desperately fond of money” (Warburton, 1900, p. 342). He also quotes Lord Lytton’s experience of dealing and relations with the Pashtun tribes, calling them “Semi-savages” (Warburton, 1900, pp. 7-8). Moreover, Warburton (1900) himself describes the tribal Pashtuns as “savages of the independent hill” (p. 205). Similarly, Sir Richard Temple, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Punjab, in his communications with the British government described the Pashtun tribes as “noble savages. . . who were absolutely barbarian nevertheless” (Wylly, 1912, pp. 5-6).

Mills (1897), while describing and classifying the Pashtun tribes, writes that the tribes living on the Khyber-Kabul route were the “most savage and warlike of the frontier tribesmen” (p. 8). Even though such colonial and orientalist narratives in literature were criticized by Enriquez (1921), he still committed a similar mistake by comparing tribal Pashtuns with early English tribes arguing that they might still be living in the “tenth century” (p. 94). Moreover, it was not only the colonial writers, rather various British politicians and military officers as well who informed their opinion on the Pashtuns based on the colonial literature. For Winston Churchill, the Pashtun tribes were “animal-like”; for George Curzon, they were “child-like species of cat”; and for Denzil Ibbetson, these tribes were “most barbaric of all races, blood-thirsty, vindictive and bigoted” (Tahir, 2017, pp. 7-8). Such a representation can be further attributed to over 100 British military expeditions against the Pashtuns and the latter’s reactions and resistance to such expeditions (Johansen, 1997). Hence, in that respect, Johansen (1997) argues,

In characterizing the Pashtuns as subhuman savages, uncivilized brutes, and treacherous murderers, the British no doubt expressed negative stereotypes commonplace in British imperial thinking, overlooking both positive Pashtun qualities and the likely causes of the pervasive violence. (p. 57)

Such negative stereotypes and dichotomies toward the tribal Pashtuns in the colonial literature have been criticized by Charles Lindholm, who believes that such narratives were “a norm rather than an exception,” where the Pashtuns were viewed in binaries such as “brave and honourable” or “treacherous scoundrels” (Lindholm, 1980, p. 350). Moreover, excessive reliance on colonial literature for understanding the tribal Pashtuns has resulted in these tribes being lookup upon as conservative and inward (Zahab, 2016). In this regard, Malik (2016, p. 29) argues that it was a major “intellectual polarization” among the British colonial writers that perceived Pashtuns “having propensity for violence.” However, this “intellectual polarization” has existed, in some way, even after the British Raj left the Indian subcontinent in 1947.

Since the U.S. war on terror began in Afghanistan in 2001, various military strategists also focused on the colonial literature, while researching the Pashtun tribes. This, as Bashir and Crews (2012) argue, further homogenized the Pashtuns, who were considered as the “wild tribes” (p. 4). In doing so, these researchers committed a similar mistake to that of the orientalist writers under the British Raj. Such generalizations can also been observed in recent works on Pashtuns especially in one of the works by David Kilcullen (2009), who describes the Pashtun tribes similar to how they were represented in the colonial literature. Furthermore, because Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas have recently been a center of militancy and violence, various works have used such historical accounts to connect Pashtuns with violence (B. S. Kakar, 2012). In one such instance, a news story, from 2001, on Pakistan’s former-FATA region published in the Irish Times, describes Pashtun tribes being “steeped in a political culture of guns and violence” (“Meet the Pashtuns,” 2001). In another instance, Kronstadt (2003), in a report for the U.S. Congress in 2003, generalizes the whole FATA region, arguing that “majority of the Pashtuns sympathised with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.”

However, it is not only the foreign academia and media often persisting with these stereotypes. The state of Pakistan has been no different in its colonial-like treatment of the tribal Pashtuns, excluding the region from the country’s mainstream and hence contributing toward growing extremism and instability in the region (Haroon, 2017; Yousaf, 2019). Even with the fact that the Afghan Jihad and militant sanctuaries were based in the former-FATA region, it was not only Pashtuns and Arabs, but also the Punjabi Taliban who took part in violent activities. However, the Pakistani media carefully omitted them in the national discourse on terrorism (D. S. G. Khattak, 2017). In addition, the equation of Taliban with Pashtun nationalism has also become far too common among Western scholars and the Pakistani ruling establishment (Saigol, 2012). Such discourses against the Pashtuns and their likening to the Taliban have also been negated in the past, when retired Pakistani military officers have admitted to creating the Taliban in Afghanistan (Siddique, 2018b; Taj, 2012). This is why Pashtun politicians and the tribal elders from the FATA region, since 2001, have argued that not only did they stand against various militant and terrorist groups, but were also wrongly branded as “terrorists” (Rashid, 2006).

However, lack of counternarratives on Pashtuns has resulted in persistence of these colonial stereotypes. Therefore, the association of terrorism with tribal Pashtuns and the Afghan refugees and their ethnic profiling in other provinces of Pakistan still persists (D. S. G. Khattak, 2017; Mir, 2018; Yousaf, 2017b). Dr. Saba Gul Khattak believes that such profiling, in some cases resulting in blocking of their National Identity cards, is also setting a dangerous trend in the country and further isolating the tribal Pashtuns (D. S. G. Khattak, 2017). Moreover, even though the tribal Pashtuns were profiled in this manner, progressive Pashtuns and tribal elders have historically stood against the Taliban and Al Qaeda since their influx in the tribal areas, especially because the radical Islamic values were not compatible with the Pashtun culture (Ashraf, 2011). More recently, even though the government has introduced reforms to mainstream the tribal areas and merge them with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the state machinery has not introduced concrete measures to ensure national inclusion of the Pashtuns belonging to erstwhile-FATA (Naseer, 2018a). Hence, where on one hand, Pakistan’s state and media narrative has associated the tribal Pashtuns with “violence,” on the other hand, the same state has done little in introducing socioeconomic and legal reforms afforded to the rest of the country.

The forthcoming section discusses various dynamics of peace in the Pashtun culture along with major initiatives that the tribal Pashtuns took to counter militants in the region.

Pashtuns and Their Efforts Toward Peace

Unlike the colonial representation, Raj Wali Shah Khattak—a Pashtun poet, critic, and scholar—believes that Pashtunwali’s tenets of Melmastya, Nanawatay, Tiga, and Nang play a major role toward maintaining peace among the Pashtuns (R. W. S. Khattak, 2010). Even during the times of Anglo-Afghan wars, when the anti-Pashtun literature was being written on the tribal Pashtuns, Raj Wali Shah Khattak (2010) argues that Pashtun poetry and folk literature reflected the Pashtuns’ longing for peace. Also, recently, with the post-9/11 situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, terrorism and lack of peace have become the focus of contemporary Pashto literature and longing for peace (Khalil, 2012). Muqtader Shah, a poet from FATA’s Khyber Agency, expresses his anger and frustration toward war and militancy in the Pashtun areas in the following words in his poem:

(Enemies have set fire of jealousy and malice which burns my brother of lower and upper regions . . . Though Kabul is in peace, but the air is stinky with previous fire and fight) (translated by Khalil, 2012, p. 53)

Another excerpt from a poem written by Pashtun poet Saif ur Rehman Saleem, makes a direct reference to terrorism, Taliban, and Osama bin Laden,

(Alas! My country, my homeland could welcome colors, flowers and serene breeze of spring, and we could enjoy friendship and company of each other without any worries and peace and serenity could prevail throughout the country. . . O! Saleem be quite your neighbour is not ignorant about the arrival of Osama and the coming of the Taliban into being) (translated by Khalil, 2012, pp. 49-50)

In terms of taking concrete action and expressing their rejection of militant groups in the region, the tribal Pashtuns, through Jirga meetings, have tried countering these groups in the region. The tribal elders have mostly cooperated with the state in handing over militants, and therefore, playing a major role toward peace in the region (Khayyam, 2016). Hence, over the years, various Jirga meetings have been convened by tribal elders not only to show their support toward the state of Pakistan, but also form Lashkars to fight and expel militants in their region (Yousaf & Poncian, 2018). One might argue that Lashkars, or militias, might be looked up as “a tool of violence,” however, this tool was mostly used for self-defense or protection of their territory by the tribal Pashtuns. In one of many such instances, in 2009, the Stori Khel tribe from the Orakzai Agency, after the influx of the Tehrik e Taliban (TTP), formed a tribal Lashkar to counter the armed Taliban militants in their region (Jan, 2010). The Lashkar’s efforts and success later helped the Pakistani army to deploy troops and target the militants with gunship helicopters. The Stori Khel Lashkar’s efforts under the leadership of Malik Waris Khan were recognized by the government, as Waris Khan was conferred with the Tamgha e Imtiaz, the fourth highest civilian award, by the Government of Pakistan for his efforts toward peace (“TTP Claim Killing of Decorated,” 2012).

In other examples, Salarzai tribe from the Bajaur Agency of former-FATA, has convened various Jirga meetings to form Lashkars against the militant groups in the region (“Salarzai Tribe to Revive Qaumi Lashkar in Bajaur Agency,” 2015). When militancy was at its peak between 2006 and 2010, the tribes were also encouraged by the state to form Lashkars to fight various groups in the area. However, the locals also argued at the time that they were entangled in a war by “the US, Pakistan, and the Taliban,” and the same (Pakistani) government that had asked them to fight alongside the “Mujahedeen” in the 1980s was now asking them to fight against them (Wilkinson, 2008). However, even with this confusion regarding the state policies toward various militant groups, the Salarzai tribes successfully fought and defended their region against local and foreign militant groups (Taj, 2011). In Khyber Agency, various tribes, such as the Mullagori, Zakakhel, and Kalakhel, have also formed Lashkars against both local and transnational groups (Samdani, 2011; Yusufzai, 2008). However, tribes from the Agency also believe that their success, against militants, was limited mainly due to the lack of state support and action against the Lashkar e Islam (Army of Islam), a local militant group, headed by Mangal Bagh (Taj, 2011).

Also, tribal Jirgas and Lashkars in the Kurram Agency, a center of sectarian conflict for decades, have also played a major role in establishing and maintaining peace between Shia and Sunni tribes (Chaudhry & Wazir, 2012). Since 2007, when conflict escalated in the region, tribal elders from both the sects have maintained active communication through Jirgas to discuss peace and conflict resolution. In 2008, elders from both the sects signed the Murree Accord and agreed that the situation in the region would be restored to that of pre-2007 situation (N. Hussain, 2011; Siddique, 2014). The accord could not be implemented in its true spirit because various Sunni groups, such as the TTP and Haqqani network, constantly attacked the Shia tribes. However, in 2011, elders from both the sects held another major Jirga meeting and not only vowed to fight against all militants in the region, but also agreed that a “useless conflict” had resulted in deaths of thousands of innocent lives over the years (Butt, 2011; Siddique, 2014, p. 103). This active communication between tribal elders, through the Jirga, and their resolve to fight militants was one of the major reasons that no militant group was able to take full control of the Kurram Agency (Taj, 2011). In recent months, as peace has been mostly restored in the region, tribal elders have held regular Jirga meetings with the military and the state to assure the state of their support for durable peace in the region (Din, Mahsud, Mahsud, & Bukhari, 2017).

Because of such efforts toward peace and conflict resolution, the tribal Pashtuns and elders have also remained active targets for militant attacks, in addition to becoming victims to collateral damage in various military operations and airstrikes (Khayyam, 2016). Even though the South Asia Terrorism Portal reports that around 150 tribal elders have been killed by the militants since 2005 in various attacks, this number could be much higher due to the lack of media access to the tribal areas (SATP, 2018). In one of many such attacks in 2008, a suicide bomber attacked a Jirga gathering, which was discussing the formation of a Lashkar to drive out militants from the Khyber Agency, killing 42 tribal elders and injuring dozens (“Tribal Peace Jirga Attacked,” 2008). Hence, even with peace somewhat achieved in the tribal areas, lack of state protection for the Jirga and Lashkar members still makes them vulnerable to militant attacks. According to a recent security report, out of the total militant attacks in 2017 in the tribal areas, around 5% (seven attacks) targeted members of the tribal Lashkars (Din, Bukhari, Mahsud, & Mahsud, 2018).

Voluntary formation of these Lashkars in the tribal areas and convening of Jirga meetings also reflects the tribal Pashtuns’ desire for long-lasting peace in the region (Khayyam, 2016). However, the state’s limited support for the tribes, along with questions raised on its counterterror military operations in the region, has also resulted in discord among the tribal Pashtuns against the army (Amnesty International, 2010). These operations, the tribal Pashtuns argue, have resulted in destruction of not only their properties, but also their “dignity” resulting from mass displacement of the tribal Pashtuns and unfair treatment on military checkpoints (D. Khattak, 2018; Kugelman, 2018). This treatment of the tribal Pashtuns, at the hands of the state, especially the military, has recently resulted in the evolution of the PTM; an indigenous peace and rights movement from the tribal areas, comprising of young tribal Pashtuns, both men and women.

How the PTM Affects FATA’s Future

Pashtuns from the former-FATA are currently witnessing a watershed moment with the formation of the “secular” PTM (Shams, 2018). Foundations for the formation of the PTM were laid when a movement was started by tribal Pashtuns to protest the extrajudicial murder of young resident from the tribal areas, named Naqeebullah Mehsud, by the local police in city of Karachi (Mirza, 2018). This protest also provided a vent to the young tribal Pashtuns, both men and women, to express the injustices that they had faced since 2001. Moreover, the murder of Naqeebullah became symbolic to how the tribal Pashtuns had been treated by the state in recent years. Mehsud had left FATA in 2008 after a military operation forced a mass exodus from the region. Mehsud, who ran a small business and aspired to become a model, was picked up on January 9, 2018, by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) in Karachi, with his dead body later dumped with a gun to portray him as a suspected terrorist (Mirza, 2018). Naqeeb’s murder, and subsequent sharing of his social media photos showing his aspirations to become a model, helped unite the tribal Pashtuns against his extrajudicial killing (Husain, 2018). To protest his murder, young Pashtuns from the former-FATA region held a 10-day sit-in in Islamabad in February 2018, demanding justice for Mehsud and for the people of FATA on the whole (Siddique, 2018a).

This sit-in then morphed into a nationwide movement for Pashtuns now known as the PTM, asking the state to afford basic human rights to tribal Pashtuns and release “missing persons” who were illegally arrested or detained by the security forces in the tribal areas during various military operations (Siddique, 2018a). It is argued that the peaceful nature of the PTM has helped in bringing tribal Pashtun grievances, especially forced disappearances, to the national and global focus (Yousafzai, 2018). The movement has also asked the state to take stringent measures against the “Pakistani Taliban,” operating under the garb of “peace committees,” along with demanding an end to a series of curfews in the tribal areas (Hayat, 2018). Manzoor Pashteen, the movement’s young leader, also accuses the military of destroying the tribal areas, in various military operations, and is, therefore, demanding justice for the locals (Hadid & Sattar, 2018).

The leaders of the movement have repeatedly underscored that neither is the PTM carrying an antistate agenda, nor would it let us violent means to have its demands accepted. This was highlighted in one of the rallies of the PTM where the leadership said, “All our demands and activities are in accordance with the philosophy on non-violence. We have so far not disturbed the lives and occupations of ordinary citizens during all our previous rallies” (Shinwari, 2018, para 5). Ali Wazir, another leader of the PTM, has said that the PTM “wants the state to recognize us as equal citizens and grant us everything that goes with that” (Siddique, 2018a, para 13). However, both Wazir and Manzoor Pashteen have been criticized for giving strong antimilitary statements that could incite violence against the state and the Pakistani army (Gul, 2018). These statements have resulted in strong criticism against Pashteen and the PTM, especially in the Punjab province. Therefore, in June 2018, after meeting with various provincial government representatives from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PTM assured that they would avoid raising antiarmy slogans (Farooq, 2018).

However, because of the validity of the demands and the nonviolent nature of the protests, a significant section of the civil society in Pakistan, including both Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, have supported the PTM demands (Hadid & Sattar, 2018). However, the Pakistani state apparatus has treated the PTM with suspicion, similar to how tribal Pashtuns have been perceived or portrayed in the past. The state and military discourse on the movement is that the PTM is allegedly funded and supported by “foreign” powers, who seek to destabilize Pakistan (Kapoor, 2018). Moreover, a retired military officer in the Swat region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was also accused of organizing an anti-PTM rally in April 2018, under the slogan of Pakistan Zindabad (Long Live Pakistan) Movement, where the participants delivered anti-PTM speeches and called PTM members “foreign agents” (D. Khattak, 2018). Then in June 2018, a PTM rally was attacked by a “Peace Committee,” who were allegedly the Pakistani Taliban, killing three PTM members (Khan, 2018). On the contrary, the military has also been accused of using coercive measures by arresting PTM members and barring them from attending university talks in the country, and hence trying to discredit the movement (Ramachandran, Hariharan, & Mehta, 2018).

There has also been a countrywide ban on electronic media coverage of PTM activities. In one such instance, when, on April 8, 2018, thousands of Pashtuns gathered to hold a peaceful rally in city of Peshawar, none of the major electronic media networks gave coverage to the event (Hayat, 2018). Moreover, later, the military chief implied that the PTM was a “suspicious movement” (“Gen Qamar Questions Motive Behind,” 2018). The military’s spokesperson has also said that the popularity of PTM in Afghanistan “was problematic,” casting further doubt over the agenda of the PTM and attempting to indirectly malign it (Siddique, 2018a). These suspicions were fuelled because the movement has attracted support especially from Afghanistan, and therefore, Pakistan, being a “praetorian” security state, sees such support “suspicious” (Rizvi, 2005). More recently, the current Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf (PTI) government in the Punjab province also tried to discredit not only the PTM but also Manzoor Pashteen. Pashteen’s face was used in Punjab government’s–sponsored public service advertisement, where it was implied that Pashteen was a “symbol of hate speech and sectarianism” (Niazi, 2018; Rehman, 2018). However, after strong social media backlash, the advertisement was later retracted by the government (Niazi, 2018).

However, even with such measures, for some, the PTM and its leader Manzoor Pashteen have been likened to Abdul Gaffar Khan’s (commonly known as Bacha Khan) Khudai Khidmatgar (Servant of God) movement against the British Raj in the Indian subcontinent (Mir, 2018). Khan organized a nonviolent army of young Pashtuns to engage in civil resistance against the British rule in Indian subcontinent (Kurtz, 2011). The PTM is somewhat similar to Khan’s movement as not only has it mobilized young Pashtuns, both men and women, but is also using nonviolent means and demanding rights for the tribal Pashtuns (I. Ahmed, 2018). It is also argued that it was due to this mobilization and the pressure exerted by the PTM that the state and the military had to “expedite” the FATA reforms process, abolishing the FCR and allowing for FATA’s merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Jamal, 2018). Moreover, many young tribal Pashtuns, after living in the urban cities of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and getting access to the basic health and education facilities, are now, through the PTM, asking the state for similar facilities to be introduced in the tribal areas (Akins, 2018). These demands suggested why the Pashtuns from the tribal areas were more open to “change and development” (Khayyam et al., 2018), unlike what the historical narrative against them suggested. In addition, the increasing role of women in the movement was also challenging the centuries-old patriarchal nature of the Pashtun tribal society, and therefore, challenging the maliks who were part of the state-backed status quo in the region.

The evolution and the nonviolent nature of the PTM, along with other initiatives discussed above, dispels some stereotypes on the violent representation of the tribal Pashtuns. Moreover, the PTM has also played a major role in not only questioning the role of the state, especially the military, in the Pashtun tribal areas and its “securitising,” but also highlighted how the state narrative has unfairly associated the tribal Pashtuns with terrorists (Mir, 2018). However, with the limited scope of this essay, there is a further need for analysis of Pashtun culture and in what ways it promotes peace and reconciliation. Without such analyses, scholars of Pashtun culture risk falling into the trap of “Orientalist discourse” that stereotypes the tribal Pashtuns as brutal and violent (Bala, 2013).

Conclusion

As discussed in the first half of the essay above, the tribal Pashtuns have historically carried a negative perception, both in colonial and contemporary literature. This perception is not to be blamed on the activities of the Pashtun militant group and jihadi fighters alone, rather is a culmination of a number of factors, mainly the British occupation of the Pashtun tribal frontier, Pakistan’s use of former-FATA for the anti-Soviet Jihad, and some sections of tribal Pashtuns joining militant organizations. As discussed above, various major tenets of Pashtunwali are based on peace, conciliation, and protection of guests, and thus an overrepresentation of tenets related to war have further added to the negative stereotypes of tribal Pashtuns. However, with the Pashtun tribal elders convening various Jirga meetings and forming antimilitant Lashkars suggests that a majority of these Pashtuns were against militant activities in their region. More recently, the evolution of the nonviolent PTM highlights that such stereotypes, against the tribal Pashtuns, are based on persistence of colonial representations and generalizations. Therefore, the study of Pashtuns and their quest for peace also warrants further research, especially how the Pashtun cultural tenets played a role toward peace and conflict resolution in the former-FATA region.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

ORCID iD

Farooq Yousaf

Author Biography

Farooq Yousaf is a PhD (Politics) Candiate (2015-2019) at the University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia. He has previoulsy completed his masters in Public Policy from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. His PhD focuses on Pashtuns in Pakistan’s “tribal” areas, postcolonialism, militancy and indigenous conflict resolution.

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Pakistan’s “Tribal” Pashtuns,Their “Violent” Representation,and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement

Abstract

Keywords

Does Pashtun Culture Promote Violence?

Why Are Tribal Pashtuns Generalized as Violent?

Pashtuns and Their Efforts Toward Peace

How the PTM Affects FATA’s Future

Conclusion

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Notes

ORCID iD

Author Biography

References