Building an “Asia-Pacific Community With a Shared Future”: Transformational Regionalism With Chinese Characteristics?

Abstract

Chinese President Xi Jinping has since 2013 advocated for an “Asia-Pacific Community with a Shared Future” (APCSF). This concept has rekindled debates on regional integration. The article begins by critiquing conventional Eurocentric theories of community-building while highlighting fundamental features of the Asia-Pacific approach. It recounts erstwhile proposals put forward by Japan, Australia, and America, drawing comparisons with the emerging Chinese vision. The APCSF envisions an inclusive intergovernmental society of cooperative yet interdependent economies in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike the notion of Indo-Pacific, the idea of Asia-Pacific countries belonging to a community has deeper economic and psychological roots. Furthermore, what sets the APCSF apart from previous proposals is its solid foundation that aligns with its ambitious goals. It can draw upon existing initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for Trade Liberalisation and the Belt and Road Initiative for enhancing connectivity. Consequently, the APCSF stands a better chance of eventual realisation.

Introduction

The hallmark of Chinese foreign policy under the presidency of Xi Jinping since 2013 has been an aspiration to build a “community with a shared future for humanity,” a phrase canonically written into the constitutions of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China (Nathan and Zhang, 2022). This proclamation of China's overarching diplomatic objectives signals Beijing's intention to undertake cooperative, win–win initiatives in partnership with foreign nations to develop “an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity” (CICG and ACCWS, 2021). In recent years, a series of partially overlapping sub-concepts have emerged under this pivotal guiding slogan. Notable examples include the China–Africa Community with a Shared Future, China–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Community with a Shared Future, a Neighbourhood Community with a Shared Future, a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace, China–Latin America Community with a Shared Future and, more recently, the Global Community of Development with a Shared Future, the rise and proliferation of which attest to policy and narrative centrality of the umbrella term of “community with a shared future” in relation to China's conduct of foreign policy in the new era.

Adding to that list was a Chinese proposition of working towards an Asia-Pacific Community with a Shared Future (APCSF). President Xi firstly raised this concept, initially framed as the “Asia-Pacific Community of Common Destiny,” at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in October 2013 where he urged countries of the Asia-Pacific to establish a pro-growth pattern of collaborative economic interactions and coordinated development. Amidst the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and amidst restructuring regional supply chains and production networks given the unabating Sino-American trade confrontations (Di et al., 2019), President Xi reiterated the APCSF proposal consecutively at APEC meetings from 2020 to 2022, reaffirming China's enthusiasm for and commitment to community-building endeavours in the Asia-Pacific. Broadly defined, China's vision for the APCSF revolves around a comprehensive and cooperative regional framework that includes countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This geographical scope encompasses nations around the Pacific Ocean, covering East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and parts of North and South America with interests and engagements in the region. The APCSF proposal has gained increasing importance in recent years, as it is seen as part of China's foreign policy strategy to reshape the regional order and respond to the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision promoted by the United States (US) and its allies (Bishnoi, 2023). While the FOIP seeks to contain China's rising influence in the region (Swaine, 2018; Palit and Sano, 2018), China's concept of APCSF promotes a cooperative and interconnected approach, aiming for mutual benefits and collective prosperity. Therefore, examining the APCSF's historical foundations, comparative aspects, institutional underpinnings and policy implications in the context of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region provides valuable insights into China's approach to regional cooperation, its economic ambitions, and its efforts to counterbalance the US-led initiatives. It also offers a deeper understanding of how China seeks to engage with neighbouring countries and advance its long-term interests through a collaborative and community-oriented framework.

Diplomatic rhetoric and geopolitics aside, the concept of “community” is a contested, complex, and adaptable notion, intricately linked to the specific context in which it is referred to. In the realm of international political economy, it has conventionally been associated with European regionalism and the experiences of regional integration and institution-building within the European Union (EU) over the past seven decades (Acharya, 2016; Söderbaum, 2012). However, when we turn our attention to the Asia-Pacific region and, more specifically, China's articulated vision of the APCSF, we must first explore how the term is understood and interpreted. Does “community with Chinese characteristics” carry nuanced meanings and connotations, different from those commonly attributed to the historical trajectory of the EU? Clearly, the APCSF represents one of China's significant attempts to delineate its vision and imagination for Asia-Pacific integration and cooperation. Nevertheless, it is not the first of its kind in the long history of Asia-Pacific regionalism. Governments of countries such as Japan, Australia, and the US have, since the 1960s to the present day, put forward various blueprints aimed at creating community-like structures among countries along the Pacific Rim, in whole or in part. Despite their efforts contributing to the transformation of the “Asia-Pacific” from an abstract geographic concept into a geo-economic space increasingly taken for granted by regional capitals and multi-national corporations shaping economic policies and business plans, these earlier endeavours have not achieved the level of deep integration envisaged by their original intellectual architects and adherents. The key question arises: Will the Chinese idea of the APCSF have a better chance of success compared to comparable proposals from the past, and if so, why?

In this article, I aim to provide preliminary answers to academically important and policy-relevant research questions, thereby seeking to provide the first systematic examination of the APCSF. In this study, various methods and sources of information have been employed. The primary approach involves a comprehensive discourse analysis of Chinese official speeches, statements, and policy documents. These sources provide valuable insights into China's diplomatic objectives, intentions, and vision for regional cooperation. Furthermore, scholarly literature and academic analyses on China's foreign policy, regionalism, and international economic relations have been reviewed to contextualise the APCSF within broader theoretical frameworks and historical perspectives. By engaging with these sources, the study aims to uncover the nuances and complexities of the APCSF as a concept and its potential implications for the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, a comparative approach is utilised to assess the APCSF in relation to previous initiatives of Asia-Pacific regionalism. This comparative analysis helps identify unique features, strengths, and potential challenges of the APCSF, shedding light on its prospects for success and its distinctiveness within the regional landscape. Lastly, the study draws on insights from economic and policy analyses, particularly examining the synergy between the APCSF, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By analysing how these economic and trade initiatives intersect with the APCSF, the study aims to highlight the practical feasibility and potential pathways for achieving the vision of a cooperative and interconnected Asia-Pacific community.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section re-evaluates the concept of community, aiming to reduce Eurocentric biases and make it more applicable when analysing Asia-Pacific community-building. The subsequent section compares the APCSF with pre-existing initiatives of Asia-Pacific regionalism. The subsequent section explores reasons why the APCSF, while not flawless, is more likely to achieve success and make a difference than other earlier proposals. One key argument is that by building upon the foundation of RCEP and BRI, the APCSF becomes more than just a theoretical concept; it gains practical feasibility. The final section concludes the article, summarising the key findings and implications of the study along with some of the challenges potentially confronting the development of the APCSF.

Revisiting Theories of Community

Addressing Eurocentrism in Conceptualising “Community”

The World Trade Organization's Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms defines community as “any group of countries sharing common characteristics or working towards greater integration, usually under a framework agreement setting out its aims and likely shape” (Goode, 2020: 111). The term's prevalence in academia and policy circles is often attributed to the construction and evolution of the EU to the extent that the afore-cited dictionary entry states that community “often refers to the European Community, now the European Union” (Goode, 2020: 111).

At the risk of oversimplification given the diverse and plural regionalism theoretical landscape, conceptual approaches to the European-style community are usually taken to have their roots in two dominating “standard” theoretical paradigms: analytical neofunctionalism of combing “the method of functionalism with the ultimate objective of federalism” (Söderbaum, 2012: 12) and new regionalism that internalises as its own the core presumption and arguments of liberal institutionalism (Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003). Analytical neofunctionalists focus on a dynamic and supposedly one-way process through which a group of countries voluntarily and consciously moves along an imagined continuum, starting from thematic economic cooperation and progressing towards full political consolidation and ultimately unification. Critically, integration, according to this perspective, is considered a self-reinforcing and potentially self-fulfilling phenomenon. As integration takes place in one policy domain, it creates momentum and generates integrative impulses in other related policy areas, triggering a chain reaction that culminates in political integration across the board, resulting in a political unit larger than the individual nation-states.

The empirical salience of such analytical neofunctionalism-leaning perspectives becomes evident when one sorts out the major milestones of the European community-building journey in chronological order. The experimental effort of pooling management authorities over coal and steel, leading to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, laid the groundwork for broader economic cooperation, culminating in the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The EEC dismantled mutual trade barriers (free trade area) and implemented common external tariffs (customs union). As internal trade cooperation evolved, the need for coordinated trade policy with countries outside the EEC led to the formation of the common commercial policy in 1968. With the facilitation of the free movement of goods came demands for similar freedoms for people, services, and capital within the confines of the EEC. Responding to this renewed functional demand for a more closely integrated community, the Single European Act of 1986 brought forth the European Single Market (common market) in 1993. Save for a few intermittent periods of Eurosclerosis, the progression towards a federal state of Europe advanced steadily, marked by the adoption of a common currency symbolising European monetary unification in 1995. Since 2009, varying degrees of integration have been achieved in an ever-growing array of policy areas, including transport, energy, security and justice, agriculture, public health, and research and development.

Unlike analytical neofunctionalists, who view spill-over effects as the primary driver of the gradual “EU-nisation” of Europe, new regionalism theorists argue that it is supranational institutions and international law that bind otherwise fragmented countries in an anarchic international environment (see, e.g. Pollack, 2009). In line with this perspective, the establishment and subsequent operation, maintenance, and reform of robust European institutions and institution-like bureaucratic bodies are considered crucial in providing both the institutional framework and the physical embodiment of the European community. Consequently, as the “institutional regionalism” argument goes (Yeo, 2010), the absence of such institutions would render the idea of a European community virtually non-existent. These EU institutions play a significant role in shaping the European community by upholding the ideology of international hard law. The plethora of EU institutions, often rooted in legalistic frameworks, leads to the development of a European legal community in which member states adhere to a codified set of common legislation, rules, and norms. These regulations delineate and prescribe the acceptable boundaries of state behaviour and intracommunity interstate relations.

It follows from the institutional and legal “biases” of new regionalist thinking that the geographic extent of a community coincides with, and is perhaps dictated by, the outer borders of countries falling within the jurisdictions of institutions overseeing and injecting order through international law to the community in question. As a result, the enlargement of the EU can be characterised as an institutionalisation process, where countries converge towards membership in the European Community by ceding sovereignty to the supranational EU institutions and adhering to EU law. Beyond the scope, the depth of “communitiness” is necessarily proportional to the degree of institutionalisation and formalisation of governance in a region. Following European Community standards, ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are considered “pre-regionalist” modes of community (Payne, 2000) due to their reliance on informal regionalism and an intergovernmental code of conduct. Regarding international influence and the geopolitical significance of a community, analogies of community to state and community-building to nation-building are invoked. Fry (2019: 24–25) eloquently argues, though not entirely agreeing, that regions or communities “begin to matter when they start to resemble states – with centralised authority, effective policy instruments, the capacity for coercive sanctions if necessary, and clearly defined and acknowledged boundaries within a given territory.” This line of argument is often used by Europhiles to advocate for greater European integration and stronger EU capabilities in the face of geopolitical turbulence and global disorder caused by systematic great power competition (Lavery and Schmid, 2021). One further implication drawn from Eurocentric community theories is that regional intervention under certain circumstances can be justified against its own states for the advancement or protection of the interests of individuals (Simma and Paulus, 1998) or the community as a whole. The EU's (threatened) financial sanctions against Poland based on Warsaw's alleged rule of law deficiency and paternalistic austerity measures to address sovereign debt crises, as seen in countries such as Greece, highlight some unique legalistic features of the European Community that are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere.

Understanding Contextual Variations Between European and Asia-Pacific Communities

Based on the discussion so far, it can be concluded that the European Community, prominently represented by the EU, has been developed through the pooling of sovereignty, delegation of authority to regional institutions, and adherence to international law. However, this European way of community-building and regionalism does not directly translate to other regions, including the Asia-Pacific region (Börzel and Risse, 2019). Dichotomies such as formality versus informality, supranationalism versus inter-governmentalism, and post-nationalism versus state-centralism differentiate the European-style community from community-building initiatives in the Asia-Pacific. The informality of Asia-Pacific regionalism is best illustrated by scholars who carefully distinguish between (state-led) regionalism and (market-driven) regionalisation concepts when describing the process of economic integration, especially in the western Pacific region (Kim, 2004). Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific gained momentum after supply chains, transnational production networks, foreign direct investment, and other forms of international commercial regionalisation took hold in much of East Asia. However, Asia-Pacific regionalism remains relatively nascent and exhibits a discernibly low level of institutionalisation, leading one veteran scholar to label it as “soft regionalism” (Zhao, 2013) compared to the more structured regionalism approach adopted and promoted by the European Community. Political and economic entities in the Asia-Pacific (Beeson, 2009) are typically intergovernmental in form, consultative in practice, consensual in procedure, and discretionary in commitment implementation, without any compulsion for sovereignty pooling, let alone surrendering. Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific often involves acceptance of an enlarged domain of policy coordination in exchange for promises of non-interference in domestic affairs. The region maintains a strong attachment to nationalism and globalism, with the belief that regional community-building should not compromise national identities or hinder the process of globalisation (Pizarro, 1999). On this account, the presumption of “ever closer union” that characterises the EU is absent in the Asia-Pacific, and the institutional arrangements, including trade deals, spearheaded by Asia-Pacific countries aim to be compliant with multi-lateralism ideals to support globalism. The emerging Asia-Pacific community can be viewed as a communal society of states with greater normative underpinnings, rather than an international legal community of states characteristic of the EU. In the Asia-Pacific community, pragmatism takes precedence over legalism, economic cooperation outweighs political integration, harmony prevails over hierarchy, consultation prevails over intervention, persuasion prevails over enforcement, openness prevails over protectionism, effectuating cooperation is prioritised over deepening integration, and respect for diversity is prioritised over cultural assimilation.

Recognising the fundamental characteristics of Asia-Pacific regionalism vis-à-vis European regionalism opens ways for understanding and assessing the APCSF. But in the course of Asia-Pacific regionalism, there has been no shortage of proposals, official, semi-official, and scholarly, that attempt to build, develop, and organise a variably defined and contemplated Asia-Pacific community (or rather society) of states. Several inventive and representative ones ascribing importance to the somewhat idealised Asia-Pacific values – different from the values and norms at work and endemic in the context of European Community-building as sketched above – will be cursorily introduced and comparatively evaluated in the next section.

Varieties of Asia-Pacific “Communities”

If told as the development of a “society of economies,” the story of community-building in the Asia-Pacific would begin with the post-war proposals put forward by Japan. Japan strategically positioned itself as the bridge between developed and developing countries and as a link between Asia and countries bordering the eastern Pacific.

In Japan, the concept of an Asia-Pacific community first gained public and political attention in the early 1960s (Morris-Suzuki, 1981). The primary advocate for this idea was Morinosuke Kajima (Hirakawa, 2011; Kajima, 1970), a conservative politician, diplomat, businessman, and scholar. Kajima proposed the formation of an “Asia-Pacific Community” consisting of Free World nations. Additionally, he suggested a collective security arrangement between China, Japan, the US, and the Soviet Union. Inspired by the progress of European regionalism, Kajima raised the question of whether it was feasible to create an “Asia-Pacific Common Market,” modelled after the EEC, in the Japanese Diet between 1960 and 1964. He even envisioned Japan's “international function” as being central to organising an “economic community of Asia-Pacific which should consist of Japan, [S]outheast Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand, and adding America and Canada” (Hirakawa, 2011). Crucially, as a pro-American politician who adhered to the balance of power thesis in international politics, Kajima believed that a lasting US–Japan security alliance would be the foundation of such a community, designed to contain the rise of China. In his view, the establishment of the Asian Development Bank marked the initial step in realising his proposal, to be followed by subsequent economic integration and political convergence.

The flame of the Asia-Pacific community ignited by Kajima was carried forward by Japanese scholars and politicians such as Saburo Ōkita (1991), Kiyoshi Kojima (1966), Takeo Miki (Terada, 2000), Masayoshi Ōhira, Zenkō Suzuki, and Tsuneo Lida throughout the late 1960s to the 1980s. Their efforts resulted in the establishment of mechanisms such as the Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation Council, which proposed the concept of a Pacific Economic Community, catering to regional industrialists, and the Pacific Trade and Development Conference, fostering collaboration among academics. They also introduced pathfinding concepts such as the Pacific Free Trade Area, the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, and the Pan-Pacific Association. During this period, as Australia rose to a middle-power status with intellectual and institutional leadership aspirations, an Australia–Japan partnership became a driving force behind the quest for an Asia-Pacific community. Notably, the first significant achievement of Japanese–Australian joint Asia-Pacific diplomacy was the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), a loose and non-governmental network comprising politicians, academics, diplomats, and business leaders. Initially known as “the Pacific Community Seminar,” the PECC was convened in September 1980 by Prime Ministers Masayoshi Ōhira and Malcolm Fraser. The PECC facilitated informal economic dialogues and cooperation between ASEAN countries, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, the US, Canada, and select Pacific Island states, such as Fiji. However, not content with the non-governmental nature of the PECC, then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, during his January 1989 visit to South Korea, proposed the establishment of an intergovernmental mechanism. After some Australian economic and diplomatic lobbying, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was inaugurated later that year. The PECC then assumed the role of the outreach, information-gathering, and analytical arm of APEC.

Australia (like Japan to some extent) is a country that is psychologically and culturally distant from Asia but whose geographical and geopolitical destiny is closely tied to the region (Gorjão, 2003). The country's economic success was attributed to unilateral trade liberalisation in the 1970s, which ended the domestic protectionist economic regime and the ensuing economic stagnation that had persisted for decades. Reflecting the unique position of Australia, Canberra's vision for an Asia-Pacific community emerging through APEC comprised three core pillars: open regionalism, trans-Pacificism, and economic liberalism. First, according to Australia's vision, APEC members should engage in trade and investment liberalisation and other forms of economic cooperation without creating new barriers that discriminate against non-APEC countries in the global economy. Second, Australia advocated for APEC to be trans-Pacific and include representatives from all subregions on the Pacific Rim, encompassing East and Southeast Asia, Oceania, North America, and Latin America. This approach contrasted with past regionalism proposals that often favoured an incomplete subset of subregional components within the Asia-Pacific. APEC's inclusive approach helped lessen the institutional bifurcation and the East–West divide of the Pacific. Third, the Bogor Declaration, articulated by economic leaders of APEC in Indonesia in 1994, set an indicative deadline of 2020 for the region to achieve barrier-free trade and investment. This declaration emphasised Australia's commitment to liberalising the community's path towards common prosperity. However, Australia's ambition for an open and free Asia-Pacific community encountered countervailing realities, including the reluctance of certain Southeast Asian countries to embrace import-substitution industrialisation economic strategies and their disapproval of binding international commitments. Thus, the principle of voluntarism was incorporated as the fourth principle of APEC-based community-building and economic cooperation. However, the heightened voluntarism also provided cover and excuses for inaction, procrastination, and under-delivery, rendering APEC's “pledge-then-deliver” modus operandi unsustainable (Wesley, 2001). The absence of substantial international pressure and monitoring contributed to challenges in implementing Individual Action Plans. APEC is now grappling with maintaining relevance and traction as an institution and a vision (Ravenhill, 2000) after the Bogor Goals lapsed amid the once-in-a-generation pandemic and were quietly replaced by the more vaguely stated Putrajaya Vision 2040.

Around the same time that APEC was getting up and running, the US was contemplating its vision for an Asia-Pacific community, signalling its intention to be a bi-oceanic economic power as unipolarity gave way to a “new world order” (Baker, 1991). In July 1993, a US Pacific turn occurred when Bill Clinton unveiled his integrated strategy for East Asia and the Pacific, known as the “New Pacific Community.” This vision became a regular rallying cry for US diplomatic and economic activism towards the Asia-Pacific region and was featured in all annual national strategy reports from 1994 to 1999. Clinton's vision aimed to holistically link security interests with economic growth and the promotion of democracy. However, the “New Pacific Community” vision faced challenges. China viewed it with suspicion due to the perceived ideological pressure it carried, particularly regarding the peaceful democratic transition thesis. Other Asian countries were incredulous about Washington's ability to handle regional security challenges in North Korea, Cambodia, and Cross-Strait relations from afar. Another setback to the US vision was caused by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. During this crisis, the US-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) showed little solidarity with crisis-stricken countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia and even prescribed crisis-worsening neoliberal “remedial” policies, attempting to cope with an economic calamity caused by neoliberalism in the first place. Moreover, the US vetoed regional countries’ self-help measures, such as the Japanese proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund as an emergency financial safety net (Khor et al., 2022). This led to the emergence of an “IMF stigma” and widespread resentment against US leadership, particularly in the economic sphere, in the western Pacific, as Washington was seen as not being able or willing to understand regional countries’ perspectives.

To fill the void left by the abandoned “New Pacific Community,” several subregional Asia-centric regionalism designs emerged, presenting alternative pathways for economic integration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region without distant US leadership. These designs included Mahathir Mohamad's “East Asia Economic Caucus” (Higgott and Stubbs, 1995), ASEAN Plus Three based on Sino-Japanese cooperative competition (Stubbs, 2002), ASEAN Economic Community, Junichiro Koizumi and Yukio Hatoyama's “East Asian Community” (Bisley, 2007/2008; Zhang, 2005), Shinzo Abe's nascent Indo-Pacific doctrine, Roh Moo-hyun's “Northeast Asian Community” (Roh, 2007), and Kevin Rudd's “Asia Pacific Community” (Frost, 2009). These indigenous designs entered the ongoing discourse on economic integration and cooperation in the region, reflecting aspirations for an Asia-Pacific community led by regional actors. The development of these alternative pathways caused concerns in the US about the emergence of an autonomous “Pacific Asia” in the “Asia-Pacific.” To address these anxieties and construct a regional order based on a balance of power, the US re-engaged with the Asia-Pacific under President Barack Obama, who termed himself “America's first Pacific president.” The US approach this time took the form of the “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” strategy. In contrast to Clinton's emphasis on security and democracy, Obama's Asia-Pacific grand design focused on institutions and the economy. The US began embedding itself more earnestly within the institutional framework of the Asia-Pacific region, for instance, acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2009 before joining the East Asia Summit two years later.

But the most high-profile and well-crafted manifestation of the US's vision for the Asia-Pacific region was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), now known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) due to the US withdrawal. The TPP was a mega-scale trade bloc of twelve economies, often compared to an aircraft carrier in terms of its geo-economic importance (Carter, 2015). In Obama's imagination (2011), a US-led Asia-Pacific community built on the foundation of the TPP would be characterised by rules-based governance, peace, stability, and economic prosperity, with “open and transparent” economies and “free and fair” trade. Although not explicitly stated initially, the TPP also had a strategic objective of containing China's rising influence and promoting a more neoliberal economic model by engaging China through economic integration (Ji, 2022). The emergence and progress of the TPP overshadowed an earlier proposal to create a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and prompted China to counter with its support for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, which excluded the US. However, the TPP eventually collapsed due to the volatile nature of US trade politics (Irwin, 2017), which was further exacerbated by the transactional and protectionist presidency of Donald Trump (Ji and Rana, 2019). Trump not only abandoned the TPP but also reshaped America's outlook towards the region, designating the Indo-Pacific, rather than the Asia-Pacific, as the arena for great power rivalry (Heiduk and Wacker, 2020). The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was launched by the Biden administration five years after the US withdrew from the TPP, along with thirteen other countries. The IPEF aimed to establish a new supply chain that excludes China and counter China's economic influence in the region. While the Indo-Pacific concept may be justifiable in strategic terms, scholars argue that, in the context of regionalism and community-building, it is viewed as offensive, exclusive, and lacking the necessary ideational and executive leadership to be effective (He and Feng, 2020). And the new vision of Indo-Pacific is regarded to be naïve for its misunderstanding of the central role China plays in supply chains throughout Asia. Proponents of the IPEF often fail to recognise in full the complexity and depth of China's economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. The “world's factory,” China's economic influence extends beyond its borders, with a vast network of interconnected supply chains and production links throughout Asia. While the Biden administration's IPEF seeks to promote alternative economic partnerships and supply chain resilience, overlooking or disregarding the existing realities of China's extensive economic involvement in regional supply chains and trade networks only makes the IPEF an impractical approach to addressing regional challenges and achieving economic cooperation and stability.

And as the US ditched its leadership position in the Asia-Pacific, China is ready to fill the gap by leading regional community-building efforts. The next section moves on to discuss the origin and significance of the APCSF vision and why it is more likely to be a beacon of trans-Pacific community-building endeavours than the aforementioned proposals.

Why the APCSF Stands a Better Chance to Achieve Realisation?

Genesis, Evolution and Core Features of the APCSF Proposal

The APCSF is one of the first policy variants emerging from the core concept of a community with a shared future for humanity. In 2013, during the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Bali, Indonesia, President Xi emphasised the need for regional countries to develop a strong sense of community and mutual contribution to each other's development. He called for utilising respective strengths through coordination and interconnection to foster positive energy and achieve sound interactions and coordinated development among all economies. President Xi highlighted the interdependence of APEC members, stating that the success or failure of one member could affect the entire region due to dynamic interactions and knock-on effects (People’s Daily, 2016). Connectivity played a crucial role in President Xi's vision for building the APCSF. To support infrastructure development in developing countries across the Asia-Pacific, China offered to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013 (Haga, 2021). The AIIB, which commenced operations in 2016, has since become one of the financial pillars of the APCSF, as well as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Rana and Ji, 2020). Presently, sixteen out of twenty-one APEC member economies have joined the AIIB, and some non-APEC countries, such as Ecuador, Cambodia, Laos, Fiji, Samoa, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and Vanuatu, are also AIIB members.

Addressing the 2014 APEC CEO Summit in Beijing, President Xi (2014) ratcheted up the rhetoric, presenting a heart-winning idea of the “Asia-Pacific dream.” He said:

This dream is about acting in the spirit of the Asia-Pacific community and out of a sense of shared destinies, following the trend of our times, namely, peace, development and mutually beneficial cooperation, and jointly working for the prosperity and progress of our region. It is about staying ahead of global development and making greater contribution to the well-being of mankind. It is about having more economic vibrancy, free trade and investment facilitation, better roads, and closer people-to-people exchanges. And it is about ensuring greater security and prosperity for our people and giving our children a better environment to grow, work and live.

The importance of multi-dimensional connectivity to build “an Asia-Pacific partnership of mutual trust, inclusiveness, cooperation and win–win cooperation” was again reaffirmed by President Xi who maintained that

[C]onnectivity and infrastructure building in the Asia-Pacific is not only a necessity to achieve regional economic integration, but more importantly, it bears on the long-term development of all economies. We should work together to bring about connectivity covering both sides of the Pacific, which includes hardware connectivity that brings the economies closer and paves the way for an Asia-Pacific connected with each other and the world; software connectivity that enhances alignment and coordination of policies, laws and regulations and creates convenient and efficient supply chains; and human connectivity that promotes people-to-people exchanges and fosters trust and friendship. (Xi, 2014)

The trade conflicts between the USA and China began (nominally) in July 2018, with both sides imposing a 25 per cent tariff on selected imports. During the November 2018 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Papua New Guinea, President Xi timely emphasised the importance of resolving disputes peacefully and amicably among members of the APCSF. Even in Trump's absence, President Xi stated,

[A]s we, Asia-Pacific countries, vary in national conditions, differences among us are normal. What is important is for us to remain committed to the shared goal of common development, address differences through consultation, and explore solutions to common challenges in the spirit of partnership. We need to respect diversity and each other's choices of development path, promote integration and mutual learning on the basis of openness and inclusiveness, and engage in both healthy competition and mutually beneficial cooperation. (Xi, 2018)

This statement served as a subtle rebuttal to America's indulgence in deploying highly confrontational and unlawful tactics to impose its parochial will on the bilateral trade relationship. President Xi's call for peaceful resolution and cooperation reflects China's commitment to maintaining a constructive and cooperative approach to address trade conflicts and other challenges in the region.

The APCSF featured prominently in President Xi's speeches in APEC meetings in 2020 and 2021, with differences being in the former setting he called for a detailed roadmap for “turn[ing] our vision into reality and deliver[ing] a better life for people in the region” (Xi, 2020), whereas in the latter, he juxtaposed the APCSF and attendant community-building efforts with the Global Development Initiative proposed to the United Nations General Assembly (Xi, 2021). At the Twenty-ninth APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting of 2022, President Xi compared Asia-Pacific countries to “passengers in the same boat” who need to look after one another suggesting that the APCSF is “a region where all are ready to help each other” (Xi, 2022).

In short, President Xi's APCSF envisions and strives for a harmonious, inclusive, and intergovernmental society of cooperative and interdependent economies in the Asia-Pacific region. Members of the community collectively commit to a set of goals, values, and norms, such as openness, transparency, coordination, consultation, development, trust, peace, prosperity, security, connectivity, and diversity. The APCSF aims to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, where members complement, understand, respect, and learn from each other's distinctive comparative advantages and success stories. Importantly, the APCSF is designed to be free of great power hegemony or dominance. China's vision for the APCSF is akin to the Confucian worldview of Tianxia, seeking to improve the overall order in the entire region by connecting different constituent parts’ strengths and achievements (Bunskoek and Shih, 2021). China does not aim to dominate the APCSF; rather, it promotes economic diplomacy to create favourable conditions for eventual economic integration in the region. In a joint written interview with Indonesian and Malaysian media outlets, President Xi made it clear that Chinese economic diplomacy aims to “create favourable conditions for eventual economic (emphasis added) integration in the Asia-Pacific” (People’s Daily, 2016). Moreover, the APCSF does not seek sovereignty pooling, sharing, or sundering by establishing supranational governance institutions. It is important to stress that China does not oppose institutionalisation under the framework of the APCSF. However, suggestions of establishing trans-Pacific, legally binding governance and regulatory bureaucracy above the level of sovereign statehood are objectionable from Beijing's standpoint. As such, the APCSF does not envision or promote political integration in the same way as the European Community does through the EU. The historical and cultural contexts of China and Europe play significant roles in shaping their respective conceptions of community. China's emphasis on non-interference and sovereignty is influenced by its long history as a centralised state and its experience with past imperial powers’ invasion and interference. Conversely, Europe's regionalism has been shaped by its history of wars and conflicts, leading to a desire for closer integration to prevent future conflicts. In essence, the EU has pursued deep political integration and normative principles, while China's approach is more pragmatic and focused on economic cooperation while respecting the sovereignty of individual states.

Following President Xi's statements, experts from potential APCSF members echoed his call (Xinhua, 2020). For example, Miguel Rodriguez Mackay, President of the Peruvian Institute of Law and International Relations, praised China's attitude towards strengthening cooperation with regional countries, as embodied in the APCSF proposal, contributing to improved regional integration (Xinhua, 2020). Additionally, Fernando Reyes Matta from Chile's Andres Bello University noted that the APCSF has consolidated the foundation of APEC and provided a strong impetus for regional economic development (Xinhua, 2020). Bobby M. Tuazon from the Philippines’ Center for People Empowerment in Governance commended China's focus on multi-lateralism and international cooperation as the way forward in addressing critical global challenges (Xinhua, 2020). This widespread positive response suggests that China's APCSF proposal is gaining support and recognition for fostering cooperation and economic recovery in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. However, it is worth noting that some analysts, such as Zhang (2022), remain relatively sceptical about the APCSF proposal in the context of building a new world order. They point out that some of China's neighbours seem content with the existing Washington-led world order.

Furthermore, how does the APCSF compare to previous proposals? The APCSF's acknowledgement and respect for regional political and socio-economic diversity make it the most inclusive proposal, especially when compared to American templates such as the New Pacific Community and the TPP. Both American proposals privileged a certain group of Asia-Pacific countries, namely Washington's security allies and partners such as Japan, Australia, and Singapore, or the so-called “likeminded and capable democracies” (Jain, 2013) that subscribe to quintessential American neoliberal values such as democracy, human rights, free markets, rule of law, and separation of powers. In contrast, the APCSF has no such ideological or geopolitical basis, which avoids discriminatory regionalism and allows for a broader scope of cooperation, fostering greater enthusiasm for integration with all Asia-Pacific countries, regardless of their like-mindedness. While it was pronounced at APEC, the boundary of the APCSF is deliberately left porous and ductile, subject to redefinition as internationally oriented economies from Central Asia, South Asia, Pacific Islands, continental Latin America, and the Caribbean region are drawn into the web of Asia-Pacific regionalism and the APCSF vision, in particular. This potential expansion may reduce the strict regionness in terms of the traditional geographic boundaries of the Asia-Pacific, but it also enhances the APCSF's inclusivity and potential impact on a wider scale. In other words, the APCSF is more inclusive than subregional initiatives that promote integration within specific Asia-Pacific subregions. The Japanese conceptions of an Asia-Pacific community have also lost ground. Japan's initial grand plans for an Asia-Pacific community and Tokyo's leadership credentials suffered from the historical baggage of Japanese militarism, stirring up traumatic memories of Japanese dominance and the fierce Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, especially in the Sinic economies of the region (Haddad, 1980; Singh, 2002). Subsequently, when China rose to prominence in Asia-Pacific affairs, Japan's attention shifted from leading regional economic cooperation to waging geopolitical competition with China, either on its own or in partnership with Quad members, including the US, Australia, and India. By comparison, China's regional leadership aspiration, as encapsulated in the APCSF narrative, is free of historical burden and does not target or aim to outcompete anyone; it is “transformational” (Northouse, 2016). Taking to heart its great power responsibility towards the region, China seeks to lead, motivate, and inspire by example, making every member economy of the APCSF better off by sharing the benefits of Chinese economic dynamism. Lastly, the merit of pragmatism in the APCSF is apparent when compared to the Australian vision embodied in APEC. The APCSF aims to strike a balance between economic ideals and political feasibility, whereas the vision contrived by Australia, characterised by unilateral trade liberalisation and multi-lateralisation of trade preferences, is deemed “philanthropic and idealistic” (Hatakeyama, 2007) and, by extension, unrealistic.

Functional Foundations for APCSF's Viability

There are several additional grounds for optimism as to why the APCSF is likely to command serious support around the region. Despite challenges from alternative concepts such as the Indo-Pacific, the idea of the Asia-Pacific as a common, cooperative economic space has been indisputably cemented in the capitals and general publics of countries on the Pacific Rim. In the past, when proposing Asia-Pacific communities, Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington had to make an extra effort and often take a detour to convince domestic and foreign audiences that Asia-Pacific countries, despite being separated by the Pacific Ocean, were worth considering as a unified whole. However, now the awareness, if not the regional identity, of the Asia-Pacific as an historico-geographical-socio-economic reality is so strong that few, if any, would question the utility, necessity, and legitimacy of regional community-building and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific is already the world's single most economically dynamic region, with increasing economic, policy, psychological, and people-to-people connections and interdependences across the Pacific (Roett and Paz, 2016). In a sense, the Chinese proposal of the APCSF is standing on the shoulders of previous proposals that have rallied support for the idea of “Asia-Pacific.” Cross-Pacific mobility has increased (Wong, 2017) and is believed to contribute to the taming of labour shortages and inflation in the region's developed economies. Short-term travellers also feel at home in most corners of the Pacific. China in the western Pacific and the US in the eastern Pacific are the region's largest exporters and importers, respectively.

The number of intra-APEC reciprocal trade agreements signed has increased significantly, reaching seventy-one agreements in 2018, almost twenty-four times more than the pre-1990s (APEC Policy Support Unit, 2019). The Pacific Alliance, comprising Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, was specifically created with a focus on engaging with Pacific Asia (Herreros, 2016). However, arguably the most strategically significant regional trade agreement is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), co-led by China and ASEAN. RCEP, which took effect on 1 January 2022, includes fifteen dynamic and emerging Asia-Pacific economies, such as ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. RCEP is poised to become the world's largest trade bloc, covering a population of 2.3 billion, approximately 30 per cent of the world's population, and a total economic output of around US$26.2 trillion (30 per cent of the global total). RCEP constitutes a de facto free trade relationship between China and Japan and simplifies to some extent convoluted overlapping trading arrangements hampering preference utilisation by exporting businesses, known as the “noodle bow” conundrum (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2011). RCEP streamlines trade arrangements and rules of origin, making it easier for businesses to utilise preferences in the region. RCEP also promotes greater international trade in services, digital goods, and financial services. The potential incremental macroeconomic impact of RCEP is estimated to be US$245 billion by 2030 (Park et al., 2021). As of now, RCEP does not include any Eastern Pacific economies. To realise the vision of the APCSF, it would be essential for RCEP to consider admitting potential new entrants from the Americas. Two potential pathways exist for this integration. One option is to first admit APEC members not yet part of RCEP (Hong Kong, China; Taiwan, China; and Papua New Guinea) and subsequently invite Pacific Alliance members to join RCEP due to their eagerness to integrate with Pacific Asia. The third step could involve inviting Russia, outlying CPTPP members such as the US and Canada, and other interested parties to join RCEP, creating a truly pan-Asia-Pacific agreement. The second pathway envisions a convergence and consolidation of RCEP and the CPTPP before admitting other economies. The presence of dual-track economies such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam would serve as a lubricate of the process.

RCEP is a pillar of the APCSF, so is the BRI. The BRI represents China's call for greater policy, trade, infrastructure, financial, and human connectivity to foster economic growth worldwide (Vangeli, 2020). Most major Asia-Pacific economies, except the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Australia, have embraced cooperation with China under the framework of the BRI. Progress has been made on the Trans-Pacific Silk Road (Rimmer, 2020). The synergy between RCEP and the BRI is therefore noteworthy, as RCEP aims to reduce policy barriers to trade and investment, while the BRI focuses on removing logistical obstacles by financing, building, and maintaining physical infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports, and electricity stations. The complementarity between RCEP and the BRI provides a strong foundation for the development of the APCSF. These initiatives jointly constitute the core comparative advantages of the Chinese APCSF vis-à-vis pre-existing proposals of Asia-Pacific community-building enumerated and reviewed above. Unlike past visions that lacked tangible institutional arrangements, China's strategy focuses on building the APCSF on the solid foundation of existing platforms such as RCEP and the BRI, moving towards its envisioned community. Without RCEP and the BRI, the APCSF would remain a mere concept without concrete progress. In addition, connectivity, whether in terms of trade (RCEP) or infrastructure (BRI), is central to China's APCSF vision. While previous visions were heavily ideological and values-driven, the emphasis on connectivity sets the APCSF apart as a platform for fostering shared prosperity. A World Bank study (2019) confirms that connectivity brings numerous benefits, including economic growth, enhanced productivity, improved market access, and network resilience. Moreover, connectivity seeks to connect countries, economies, peoples, and cultures, which is vital for building a true sense of belonging to the APCSF community. This is precisely what distinguishes a community from a regional organisation. A key distinction between the two notions lies in the depth of integration, shared values, and mutual identification among member states. The APCSF embodies a sense of belonging, collective identity, and a commitment to working together for shared benefits, fostering a deeper level of integration than a mere regional organisation. As Asian-Pacific economies increasingly interact with each other due to the opportunities presented by RCEP and the BRI, a common psychology of belonging to the APCSF is likely to emerge, strengthening the bonds of the community. This collective identity and commitment to cooperation are what set the APCSF apart and give it the potential to become a transformative force in the Asia-Pacific region.

That said, there have been concerns about the terms of the BRI projects and their potential to lead to debt dependency among participating countries. This potential economic leverage could raise questions about the degree of altruism of China's intentions in promoting regional integration. Some would also contend that building a community in the Asia-Pacific region implies creating a cohesive and closely integrated group of members who work together towards shared goals. However, the existence of different organisations such as RCEP, BRI, and APEC with distinct member states can pose challenges to achieving a unified community. Despite these challenges, fostering a sense of community within the broader Asia-Pacific region is possible for several reasons. First, the three platforms have overlapping memberships, with several countries being members of more than one of these organisations. Leveraging this overlap can facilitate cross-collaboration and the exchange of ideas between RCEP, BRI, and APEC members, creating linkages and bridging the efforts of these organisations. China can play a crucial role as a linchpin in this process. Second, while RCEP, BRI, and APEC may have specific goals that differ from each other, there are areas of overlap in their objectives. Identifying shared priorities and finding common ground can lead to coordinated efforts and partnerships in areas of mutual interest. Third, involving non-member countries and engaging various stakeholders can help create a broader sense of community in the region. This inclusivity can foster cooperation and mutual understanding among diverse participants. Fourth, the Asia-Pacific region faces common challenges, such as climate change, natural disasters, and public health issues. Collaborating on addressing these challenges can bring countries closer together and build a shared sense of responsibility. For such reasons, while fully integrating all member states of RCEP, BRI, and APEC into a single community might not be straightforward, a coordinated effort can lead to a more cohesive and interconnected APCSP.

Concluding Remarks

The twentieth century is known as the trans-Atlantic century, but the twenty-first century is likely to be characterised as a trans-Pacific century (Kroenig and Oh, 2017). However, the journey of trans-Pacific community-building will not follow the European-style regionalism approach, but instead, it will be an international society of economies in the Asia-Pacific region bound by values such as harmony, inter-governmentalism, interdependence, economic cooperation, and diversity as the desired end goal. This form of regionalism is more open than the EU model, which has been criticised for being “Fortress Europe.” The differences between community-building efforts in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region call for a systematic examination of what has been termed “the Pacific way” (Mahbubani, 1995) of regional integration and economic cooperation.

In this article, I reviewed major post-war proposals for creating an Asia-Pacific community by Japan, Australia, and the US, and contrasted them with the APCSF proposed by China. It is argued that the Chinese proposal stands a better chance of success because the idea of belonging to an Asia-Pacific community with close interaction and cooperation has become commonplace, and the interdependence across the Pacific Ocean has reached high levels, making regional economies sensitive to the development of other Asia-Pacific economies. The building of the APCSF involves a bottom-up, market-led regionalisation process and a top-down, government-facilitated regionalism success. The RCEP mega-accord, led by China in conjunction with ASEAN, serves as the trade pillar of the envisioned APCSF. The admission of countries on the eastern Pacific coast to RCEP will be a priority to construct the APCSF. The other pillar is the BRI and its component of the trans-Pacific Silk Road, which will reduce policy and physical obstacles towards greater trans-Pacific economic cooperation and community-building in the Asia-Pacific. The sense of pragmatism exhibited by China in proposing the APCSF after the establishment of the two pillars differentiates it from earlier proposals that lacked institutional support. However, the success of the APCSF relies on cooperation across Asia-Pacific countries and requires transformational leadership from China to shape the regional order while influencing the behaviour of other states and actors.

Nevertheless, China's pursuit of economic leadership in the Asia-Pacific region faces some obstacles. Being essentially a work-in-progress, potential disconnection between Chinese rhetoric and actual implementation concerning the promotion of regional community-building and integration in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically in relation to the APCSF might exist. It remains to be seen the faithfulness and goodwill with which China is going to translate its vision into reality. Importantly, realising the APCSF may require a high level of multi-lateral consensus and collaboration. Divergent interests, historical grievances, and geopolitical complexities can make it challenging to achieve such consensus and may hinder the implementation of this vision. Problematic international relations, especially in the Western Pacific, have created mistrust and animosity among certain countries, hindering the establishment of a unified regional community. Geopolitical rivalries with the US add complexity to China's quest for economic leadership, as Washington sees Beijing's influence as a challenge to its regional hegemony. Concerns about the accountable nature of China's economic engagements, as well as navigating diverse interests and priorities among countries, further complicate the establishment of the APCSF. To overcome these challenges, China should adopt a comprehensive and balanced approach. Engaging in diplomatic efforts, leveraging overlapping memberships, building inter-institutional linkages, promoting transparency, and fostering inclusivity are key strategies to address obstacles and build trust and collaboration within the region. Demonstrating the mutual benefits of initiatives such as the BRI and RCEP can contribute to establishing a cohesive and cooperative APCSF. With these measures, China can work towards realising its vision of an interconnected and harmonious Asia-Pacific community.