The Consequences of Electoral Uncertainty in Foreign Policy-Making: The Use of Diversionary Sanctions

Abstract

This article sheds light on the consequences of electoral uncertainty, and specifically, its effects on leaders’ actions. When leaders run for re-election, they may be prone to take advantage of their power for electoral benefits. I hypothesize that while popular incumbents tend to avoid risky actions while nearing elections since their electoral prospects are already favourable, unpopular leaders are more likely to take risks in the hope of boosting their public support. I begin by analyzing approval volatility, estimating the extent of variation in approval rates in the absence of foreign policy actions. Utilizing a data set that links public opinion data with various foreign policy actions, I evaluate the anticipated changes in approval following threats, the use of force, and the imposition of economic sanctions. Tying these “rally-’round-the-flag” effects to pre-election periods, I find strong evidence for my hypotheses. The findings underscore the significant influence of domestic electoral considerations on foreign policy decisions.