Political Research Quarterly

Most economic theories predict a rise in unemployment when unemploy ment benefits increase. The reason is that more people will be willing to exit from work, and fewer people will enter the workforce, when benefits are high. We argue that these theories oversimplify the situation because they do not take into account the way benefits are monitored. We present a model of monitoring benefits which leads to three conclusions that are different from standard economic theory: (1) Size of unemployment benefit has no effect on unemployment; (2) Duration of unemployment benefit has a positive effect on unemployment; (3) Size of unemployment benefit has a positive effect on the monitoring of benefits. We present historical evidence in favor of these propositions from a series of countries, and test them cross-nationally with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data.

In the process of case selection in the U.S. Supreme Court, lawyers try to secure space on the justices' plenary agenda; through briefs amicus curiae, interest groups try to advance their policy views. Thus, both seek access to the Court. What brings lawyers and organized interests together? In this article, I develop a model which examines when and why lawyers who represent petitioners build coalitions with groups. Using survey data from the 1986-87 Term of the Court, I show that lawyers-particularly lawyers with expertise in the agenda setting process-actively recruit the support of interests as amici curiae. Solicitation of amici most often occurs when lawyers and interest groups share similar goals, specifically, the desire for the justices to speak authoritatively on an issue of national importance. Con sistent with the literature on organized interests, the results serve to explain why so few lawyers seek the support of amici curiae, despite their impact on the justices' decision making.

In this study we extend previous research on the impact of constituency preferences on the roll-call behavior of senators during Supreme Court con firmations by examining the 1967 vote on Thurgood Marshall. In contrast to the later case of Clarence Thomas, we find that constituent racial characteristics (as measured by African-American percentage of state popula tion) had a significant negative impact in the Marshall case. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings, and what they illuminate about the changing nature of the Southern Democratic coalition.

The still-influential progressive interpretation of American constitutional history conceives the property-oriented judicial activism of the Supreme Court in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (the era of laissez faire) to have been a natural and logical outgrowth of similar orientations on the Marshall and Taney Courts. It is contended here that the progressive theory is rooted in a serious misinterpretation of the early Supreme Court's constitutional decision making. Far from extending the lines of development laid down by its predecessors, the turn-of-the-century Court in fact uprooted the most important traditions of the antebellum era on the issues of national power, commercial regulation, and the scope of the judicial function.

Freedom of association has long been recognized as a fundamental freedom protected by the liberal state yet it has not received nearly the theoretical attention of other such freedoms as worship or speech. This essay explores a tension between two deeply held convictions of liberal theorists and citizens. First is that like-minded citizens should be free to assemble in order to pursue their conceptions of the good so long as they do not harm others. Second is that the state must treat all citizens with equal respect and that doing so requires government to forbid "publicly supported" associations from imposing membership restrictions (favored by members) that deny some citizens equal opportunity or protection under law. I suggest that a significant contemporary strain in liberal theory, represented by Rawls and Dworkin, gives too much weight to the egalitarian concern and too little to the good associating does for members. By discussing concrete cases, I develop what I call a liberal perfectionist defense of associational rights which redresses this imbalance while still giving considerable weight to the duty of the state to treat its citizens as equals.

The events surrounding the 1992 congressional elections—the check-kiting scandal, the last opportunity to convert campaign funds to personal funds, redistricting, and a public allegedly soured on Congress subsequent to pay raises, scandals, and the Thomas-Hill hearings-provided a unique oppor tunity to test the prevailing models of congressional elections. In this research, we analyze the forces that contributed to the coming of 110 new members to the 103rd Congress. Our conclusion is that, while some aspects of the 1992 elections were unusual, the basic statutes of modem congressional election theory still apply if some needed, friendly amendments are added. Candidates continued to behave strategically, for example, but 1992 indicates the importance of developing the concept of strategic behavior for incumbents as well as challengers.

In this article we examine the psychological processes that lead people to display bandwagon behavior. Next, we test these theories against the momentum that got rolling for George Bush in the 1988 presidential prenomination campaign. The NES Super Tuesday panel data from that year provide the necessary data. Our results suggest that individuals switched to Bush for a variety of reasons. Some got caught up in the excitement of the momentum and threw their support to the vice president uncritically. Others backed him because they liked the feeling of supporting the favorite Still others reluctantly switched to him even though they liked another can didate better because they felt Bush had the nomination locked up. Finally, some people joined in the momentum because they became convinced that Bush had the best chance of carrying the Republicans to victory in November.

This article examines how the Nixon administration attempted to structure and manage advisory groups during two foreign-policy crises that erupted in the Middle East. It focuses on the crises management structures and decision-making processes found during the 1970 Jordanian civil war and the 1973 October War, and discusses the process of decision making during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The broader goal is to explore the links that exist between structure and process in foreign policy-crisis decision mak ing. The research reported here provides evidence of the Nixon crisis ad visory structures and the processes they produced which suggest some lessons about crisis management that can be explored in future research that will need to draw on more cases and presidents.

The incumbency advantage and its cause(s) is a question that political scientists have addressed for several years. This article looks at one piece of the puzzle: the sophomore surge. Using the American National Election Panel Studies of 1956-1960 and 1972-1976, I examine three possible scenarios for the sophomore surge: conversion, mobilization, and absten tion. The evidence presented herein supports the argument that first-term incumbents are able to win the votes of those who had supported the losing candidate in the previous election. It would appear that the source of the incumbency advantage is what the incumbents do in office, not the actions of their potential opponents.

This paper examines how ward representation affects zoning policies with respect to group homes that house or care for the mentally retarded, juvenile offenders, recovering alcoholics and/or drug users. The analysis is motivated by an interest representation model that contends that constituency homogeneity should cause elected officials to be attentive to revealed preferences of their constituents. As predicted, ward representation, which enhances constituency homogeneity, is strongly associated with the exclu sion of group homes in municipal zoning ordinances. The median household income of a city, relative to that of its metropolitan area, also has some ex clusionary effect. Other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of communities, which have been the primary focus of prior research on the siting of group homes, have no statistically significant effect in this analysis.