Abstract
Freedom of association has long been recognized as a fundamental freedom protected by the liberal state yet it has not received nearly the theoretical attention of other such freedoms as worship or speech. This essay explores a tension between two deeply held convictions of liberal theorists and citizens. First is that like-minded citizens should be free to assemble in order to pursue their conceptions of the good so long as they do not harm others. Second is that the state must treat all citizens with equal respect and that doing so requires government to forbid "publicly supported" associations from imposing membership restrictions (favored by members) that deny some citizens equal opportunity or protection under law. I suggest that a significant contemporary strain in liberal theory, represented by Rawls and Dworkin, gives too much weight to the egalitarian concern and too little to the good associating does for members. By discussing concrete cases, I develop what I call a liberal perfectionist defense of associational rights which redresses this imbalance while still giving considerable weight to the duty of the state to treat its citizens as equals.
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