Political Research Quarterly

This paper evaluates whether postmaterialist theory helps explain the democratization movement in the Soviet Union. The findings are based on two public opinion samples conducted in the USSR: one conducted in the Moscow Oblast in February/March, 1990, and the other in the European USSR (May, 1990). Our approach to the measurement of postmaterialism follows closely the work of Ron Inglehart. We find that postmaterialist value orientations seem to play an important role in Soviet mass politics. Postmaterialists, though small in number, are unusually supportive of basic democratic institutions and processes, and are more likely to engage in unconventional, regime challenging political behavior. There is some evidence in our data that postmaterialism is concentrated among younger Soviets, although the relationships are not strong. In general, we think it fair to conclude that postmaterialist value orientations are affecting Soviet politics in much the same way they have affected Western politics.

This article examines the interaction between the rules governing presidential elections and multipartism in Latin America. Data from 16 Latin American systems are examined through the use of a multivariate model to gain an understanding of the independent impact of presidential electoral formula (plurality vs. majority), the timing of presidential and legislative elections (concurrent vs. nonconcurrent) and legislative district magnitude on legislative multipartism, and by extension, on the number of relevant political parties operating in the nation. The findings demonstrate the strong and significant impact which formula and timing have on multipartism. They also point to the importance of examining the interaction between elections for different constituent institutions. Finally, they underscore the applicability of Duverger's law to presidential elections.

Impoundments are actions that eliminate or delay the use of previously appropriated funds. Traditionally, since they were presidential decisions, they have represented the means by which presidents can redress dissatisfaction with regular appropriations outcomes. Since the Impound ment Control Act of 1974, however, the president and Congress both have a role in those decisions. This study addresses the influences on presidential and congressional impoundment behavior, both before and after the Impoundment Act. The analysis suggests that in both periods presidents have attempted to impound appropriations for programs they oppose, although Congress has opposed those proposed impoundments since the Impoundment Act. With few exceptions, about all that presidents now can accomplish with impoundments is a temporary delay in the use of budget authority. In the absence of an effective im poundment instrument, and given recent developments in the budgetary process, the Congress retains ultimate control over budgetary detail.

Some local governments in the U.S. have expanded their economic development policy from the incentives and subsidies that have characterized the arena for 30 years to policy that is increasingly concerned with equity, the control and regulation of private development, and the direction of tangible growth-related benefits to low-income groups. This new development policy orientation provides an opportunity to test the explanatory power of competing models of local politics. Using cross-sectional data on a large sample of U.S. cities, I argue that the role of political actors and local political conditions are extremely important in explaining the variation in development policy across cities.

Scholars often characterize congressional response to public opinion as either reflecting opinion and legislating accordingly or manipulating opinion for political ends. When the wider political environment contains an active, high-profile social movement with rapid shifts in public opinion occurring, the relationship between Congress and opinion appears to be less unidimensional than these options suggest. To test the relationship between Congress and public opinion on women's rights issues, we first coded and factor analyzed New York Times events data chronicling the degree of agitation on behalf of women's rights, 1950-86. We then compiled data examining legislative activity on laws addressing women as a group and public opinion about women's political role. These measures were used to evaluate alternative interpretations of the relationship between Congress and public opinion. Using a three-stage least squares model reinforced by several case studies of congressional activity on laws addressing women's issues, we conclude that during the time when there was an active women's movement, the relationship between Congress and public opinion was reciprocal. Congress and the women's movement competed for leadership of public opinion. Congress both led opinion and followed it, bringing about change that was swifter and less predictable than in normal periods of interest group politics.

Scholarly explanations for comparatively low U.S. voter turnout typically point to the weakness of mobilizing institutions, restrictive registration laws and the character of the election calendar. These same factors are assumed to account for the disproportionate representation of upper-class individuals in United States electorates. Furthermore, it is assumed that high turnout generally enhances class representation. We demonstrate below that turnout is related to class representation only under certain conditions; and we show that the causes of class representation differ from those of voter turnout. Using aggregate data on turnout and class representation in state electorates, we find that mobilizing institutions have modest effects on class representation. Contrary to typical assumptions about the effects of mobilizing institutions, class repesenta tion in U.S. state electorates is largely determined by the socioeconomic attributes (most notably, income and ethnic diversity) of the state's population.

Most recent studies of presidential coattails have attempted to specify the prevalence of coattail voting. In contrast, in this treatment we attempt to identify the psychological mechanism underlying the coattail effect. Our interpretation is that the coattail effect results from voters' reliance on a specific cognitive efficiency mechanism, heuristic processing. Using NES data from the 1976-88 presidential elections, we conduct a multi-level analysis of factors influencing the congressional vote choice. We find that coattail voting varies with attributes of both the individual voter and of the electoral context. These results are consistent with our argument that voters with high need for cognitive efficiency use their evaluations of presidential candidates as cues to guide the decision regarding which House candidate to support.

An established hypothesis explaining the increased incumbency advantage is that incumbents reaped the benefit of the reduction in partisan identification's influence on the congressional vote. Briefly, the hypothesis maintains that as partisan identification's influence waned incumbent behavior's influence increased. The increased incumbency advantage is then the result of incumbents actively attracting voters whose decision is based less on partisan considerations and more on what incumbents offer. Using the 1972-76 NES panel study, we test this hypothesis by examining incumbent behavior's influence on voters with loosened partisan identification. The results support this premise. The interaction between incumbent behaviors and loosened partisan identifi cation increases the probability of an incumbent vote, attracting loosened challenger party identifiers and retaining loosened incumbent party identifiers. Finally, the results suggest that higher levels of incumbent activity increase the probability of an incumbent vote.

This paper addresses the debate over whether retrospective or prospective economic voting has the greater impact on electoral behavior. Considering the presidential elections of 1984 and 1988, we develop models of the effects of economic evaluations on voting in presidential and congressional elections. First, we test this model for the overall electorate. Then, we divide our sample between voters who do and do not hold government economic policies responsible for fluctuations in personal and national well-being. We find that retrospective economic judgments have the stronger and more consistent impact on voting behavior in nearly every case. We discuss the implications of these findings for elections research.

Little research has examined the effects of permissive Supreme Court decisions that give lower courts, legislatures, and others very wide discretion in implementation. This research presents two main hypotheses that link the content of state policy before and after a permissive Supreme Court decision: (1) institutions whose previous policies exceed the scope of a new permissive Supreme Court decision will ignore the new policy and maintain their original course; (2) institutions whose previous policies lag a permissive Supreme Court ruling will innovate by altering their policies to meet but not exceed the new Supreme Court decision. A sub-hypothesis applicable to both of these hypotheses is: state political institutions that previously had no applicable policies, but adopt them following a permissive Supreme Court decision, will follow the main policy innovations chosen by their counterpart state institutions. Focusing on the right to die and the Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, the reserach confirms the hypotheses. The findings suggest that permissive Supreme Court policies have effects similar to other more directive decisions but also that permissive policies reinforce dominant patterns of state policy innovation.