Impoundments are actions that eliminate or delay the use of previously appropriated funds. Traditionally, since they were presidential decisions, they have represented the means by which presidents can redress dissatisfaction with regular appropriations outcomes. Since the Impound ment Control Act of 1974, however, the president and Congress both have a role in those decisions. This study addresses the influences on presidential and congressional impoundment behavior, both before and after the Impoundment Act. The analysis suggests that in both periods presidents have attempted to impound appropriations for programs they oppose, although Congress has opposed those proposed impoundments since the Impoundment Act. With few exceptions, about all that presidents now can accomplish with impoundments is a temporary delay in the use of budget authority. In the absence of an effective im poundment instrument, and given recent developments in the budgetary process, the Congress retains ultimate control over budgetary detail.
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