The Impact of Permissive Judicial Policies: The U.S. Supreme Court and the Right to Die

Abstract

Little research has examined the effects of permissive Supreme Court decisions that give lower courts, legislatures, and others very wide discretion in implementation. This research presents two main hypotheses that link the content of state policy before and after a permissive Supreme Court decision: (1) institutions whose previous policies exceed the scope of a new permissive Supreme Court decision will ignore the new policy and maintain their original course; (2) institutions whose previous policies lag a permissive Supreme Court ruling will innovate by altering their policies to meet but not exceed the new Supreme Court decision. A sub-hypothesis applicable to both of these hypotheses is: state political institutions that previously had no applicable policies, but adopt them following a permissive Supreme Court decision, will follow the main policy innovations chosen by their counterpart state institutions. Focusing on the right to die and the Supreme Court's Cruzan decision, the reserach confirms the hypotheses. The findings suggest that permissive Supreme Court policies have effects similar to other more directive decisions but also that permissive policies reinforce dominant patterns of state policy innovation.