Applied Biosafety

The Biosafety Research Road Map reviewed the scientific literature on a viral respiratory pathogen, avian influenza virus, and a bacterial respiratory pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis. This project aims at identifying gaps in the data required to conduct evidence-based biorisk assessments, as described in Blacksell et al. One significant gap is the need for definitive data on M. tuberculosis sample aerosolization to guide the selection of engineering controls for diagnostic procedures.

The literature search focused on five areas: routes of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination methods.

The available data regarding biosafety knowledge gaps and existing evidence have been collated and presented in Tables 1 and 2. The guidance sources on the appropriate use of biosafety cabinets for specific procedures with M. tuberculosis require clarification. Detecting vulnerabilities in the biorisk assessment for respiratory pathogens is essential to improve and develop laboratory biosafety in local and national systems.

The virus formerly known as monkeypox virus, now called mpoxv, belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus and can cause mpox disease through both animal-to-human and human-to-human transmission. The unexpected spread of mpoxv among humans has prompted the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).

We conducted a literature search to identify the gaps in biosafety, focusing on five main areas: how the infection enters the body and spreads, how much of the virus is needed to cause infection, infections acquired in the lab, accidental release of the virus, and strategies for disinfecting and decontaminating the area.

The recent PHEIC has shown that there are gaps in our knowledge of biosafety when it comes to mpoxv. We need to better understand where this virus might be found, how much of it can spread from person-to-person, what are the effective control measures, and how to safely clean up contaminated areas. By gathering more biosafety evidence, we can make better decisions to protect people from this zoonotic agent, which has recently become more common in the human population.

This article provides a strategy by which a manufacturing process with a Biosafety Level 2 (BL2) designation can be downgraded to Biosafety Level 1 (BL1). The principles of the downgrading process are based on the robust contamination controls in clinical and commercial manufacturing, which typically are not part of Research and Development processes. These strict requirements along with the application of current Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP) principles provide a framework by which processes can be suitably managed and controlled to mitigate biohazard risk, specifically for cell lines that may be contaminated with human pathogenic viral agents.

We demonstrate how a risk assessment guide was used to define the risk profile of a theoretical process with a human cell line intended for clinical/commercial application. Based on the risk assessment, key BL2 elements were identified as suitable for downgrading, including facility containment controls, emergency spill response plans, and storage and shipping requirements. For various reasons, some aspects of the systems were deemed unsuitable for downgrading due to the severity of the control risk and, therefore, remained at BL2.

We have used an established risk assessment guide to show how cGMP compliments and augments biosafety containment. We provide justification for downgrading from BL2 to BL1 for clinical and commercial cell and gene therapy manufacturing with human cell lines.

A safety data sheet (SDS) is an established hazard communication tool for chemicals, for which no comparable document exists in the biotherapeutics industry. As the cell and gene therapy (CGT) field expands, industry leaders have identified a growing need to address this gap in communication of the unique occupational health and safety risks posed by CGT materials and products.

Following the sections of a traditional chemical SDS, information was modified by industry subject matter experts, relevant to CGT biological materials. This guide was developed based on assumptions of a maximum biosafety level 2, and any chemical components present in the material were excluded from the hazard classification.

The guide contains necessary information to conduct a workplace risk assessment and communicate the unique workplace hazards posed by potential exposures to the material. The target audience is intended to be entities handling and producing these materials, plus collaborators, contractors, or operations sites receiving and handling the CGT material. An example of a CGT SDS is provided in Table 1.

The CGT SDS provides industry with a best practice to address an existing gap in hazard communication for CGT. We expect that, as the field evolves, so may the contents. The CGT SDS can be used as a reference for other biological modalities in the field.

This initial CGT SDS communicates workplace hazards and assesses the unique risks posed by these biological materials and can assist in creating exposure control plans specific to the workplace hazards.

Decontamination of farms affected by bovine tuberculosis could be very challenging during outbreaks occurring in the winter with freezing temperatures. Steam treatment has been of practical interest, but information is needed on whether such treatment is able to inactivate the causative agent, Mycobacterium bovis. This study was to evaluate the use of pressurized steam for inactivation of Mycobacterium terrae, a surrogate for M. bovis on various surfaces.

Carrier disks made of steel, wood, or rubber were inoculated with 6.32 ± 0.38 log₁₀ M. terrae. While being held at background temperatures of −20°C, 4°C, or 21°C, these carrier disks were treated with pressurized steam (120°C ± 5°C) for 5, 10, 15, or 20 s. Reduction in colony forming units of M. terrae and temperatures on the top and bottom surfaces of the disks were determined.

Complete inactivation of 6 log₁₀ M. terrae on steel and wood disks was achieved by 10 s of steam treatment at all three background temperatures. In comparison, 20 s of steam treatment was needed for the complete inactivation of mycobacteria on rubber disks. Corresponding to the longer treatment time required for mycobacterial inactivation, temperatures on the bottom surface of the rubber disks rose substantially slower than those of the steel and wood disks at all three background temperatures.

The results suggested that treatment with pressurized steam has potential for efficient and effective disinfection of surfaces contaminated by mycobacteria at or below freezing temperatures in winter.