Getting the Middle East Holdouts to Join the CWC

Abstract

Egypt, Israel, and Syria have yet to fully embrace the Chemical Weapons Convention, but movement is possible. Breaking this impasse would be a powerful move toward a universal ban on chemical weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. It also includes timelines for States Parties to destroy any stockpiles of chemical weapons they still possess. As of December, all but seven of the world's nations (188 in total) had joined the treaty–an impressive percentage. Nonetheless, to establish a global ban on chemical weapons, universal adherence–or at least adherence by all states that are suspected of having chemical weapon arsenals–is required.

Five states have neither signed nor acceded to the convention: Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria. And two have signed the treaty but not ratified it: Israel and Myanmar. If Angola, Somalia, or Myanmar were to join the CWC it would be an important step toward universality. But none is suspected of having usable chemical weapon arsenals. Although such weapons were reportedly used in the decades-long Angolan civil war, it is considered unlikely that the country has them now, and it is only rumored that Myanmar is in possession of such weapons. 1 (Somalia is not suspected of possessing chemical weapons; rather, its lack of a functioning government makes joining the treaty unlikely in the near future). Similarly, an additional distinction should be drawn between largely unresponsive North Korea, which is widely thought to have a large stockpile of chemical weapons, including nerve agents, and the three Middle Eastern states, which are bound together in their approach to the CWC and where progress is most likely. 2

Unfortunately, Libya's 2004 chemical weapons renunciation and the accession to the convention of Lebanon and Iraq in December 2008 and February 2009, respectively, were insufficient to encourage Egypt, Israel, and Syria to follow. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the treaty's implementing body, has successfully maintained a viable, albeit inconsistent, dialogue with the three Middle Eastern stragglers. So there is hope that if one of these three were to join the treaty, the other two would follow. The question becomes, who might be the first to move?

Egypt.

Mustard agents and phosgene were employed by Egypt during Yemen's 1962-67 civil war. 3 According to Mohamed Heikal, a leading Egyptian journalist, by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war Egypt was producing both artillery shells and bombs armed with nerve gas. Yet he claimed the entire program was scrapped after the war. 4 Formally, Egypt has repeatedly denied it possesses chemical weapons. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said in March 1989: “We don't tell lies. We have no chemical weapons.” Yet assessments by independent experts and U.S. government officials suggest otherwise. 5 The former head of Egypt's chemical warfare department, Mamdouh Ateya, explained in a July 1988 interview with the Independent that “until we can catch up with Israel, there must be an urgent deterrent which should go beyond conventional weapons.”

The main impediment, however, to Cairo (and, to a lesser extent, Damascus) joining the convention is the so-called Arab linkage policy, which calls for Arab states to boycott the CWC until Israel commits itself to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (No matter, of course, that 18 other League of Arab States members and the league's four observer states have already ratified the convention.) More largely, Egypt considers the right to possess chemical weapons a political asset to be traded as part of an acceptable deal with Israel. 6 Additionally, Cairo's reluctance to join the CWC derives from its perception of itself as the leading Arab state and its concern over Israel's regional nuclear monopoly.

Egypt has become more amenable to OPCW initiatives in recent years, however. For instance, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter visited Cairo in April 2007, and in 2008 Egypt consented to hosting an OPCW technical goodwill mission. In fact, this relative openness has created quite a predicament for the country. The Arab linkage policy Egypt orchestrated has clearly failed, exposing Cairo's diminished influence in the Arab world. Yet as its initiator, Egypt remains trapped by it. Unilateral accession to the CWC would be tantamount to public humiliation and would have domestic implications for Mubarak's regime. Thus, its policy is unlikely to change until the economic and political ramifications are no longer as costly.

Syria.

It is believed that Damascus possesses impressive tactical and strategic chemical weapons capabilities, such as nerve agents including VX and indigenous chemical warheads for its arsenal of long-range missiles, a claim its officials have implicitly confirmed repeatedly. 7 Syria's attitude toward the CWC, however, has flip-flopped through the years. In 2003, Damascus attended regional OPCW workshops, abandoning its “standoffish approach.” 8 But since 2007, its behavior has changed–and not for the better. Syria refused to participate in the OPCW's April 2009 regional workshop despite Pfirter's personal entreaties, and it has refused to accept an OPCW technical goodwill mission. 9

When the CWC opened for signature in January 1993, then President Hafez al-Assad explained, “Possession [of] chemical weapons by the Arabs constitutes minimal deterrence against Israel's nuclear weapons and allows them a partial strategic balance.”

As opposed to Egypt, the Syrians view their chemical weapons as a necessary security asset, an attitude that derives mainly from the stark imbalance in conventional military forces between Israel and Syria and the fact that Damascus is only 37 miles away from Israeli forces in the Golan Heights. When the CWC opened for signature in January 1993, then President Hafez al-Assad explained, “Possession [of] chemical weapons by the Arabs constitutes minimal deterrence against Israel's nuclear weapons and allows them a partial strategic balance.” 10 Eleven years later, his son, President Bashar al-Assad, declared that Syria would follow Libya's lead “only if Israel agreed to abandon its undeclared nuclear arsenal, [otherwise] we are wasting our time.” 11

Since then, the military gap has only widened, demonstrated by the September 2007 Israeli air strike on a suspected nuclear reactor site deep inside Syrian territory and the ineffective Syrian response. This doubtlessly strengthened Damascus's determination to keep its chemical weapons program active. (In fact, satellite imagery suggests that Syria is expanding its chemical weapons arsenal.) 12 So even if Syria were to be more involved with the OPCW, a unilateral accession in the near future remains unlikely.

Israel.

Given Israel's advanced pharmaceutical industry, its proven qualitative edge in conventional weaponry, its general security concerns, and its chemical weapon-armed neighbors, Israel probably has a chemical weapons program of similar potential and scale to the Syrian and Egyptian chemical weapon programs. In fact, a 2005 report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency concluded that Israel had an ongoing offensive chemical weapons program, citing news reports describing arsenals of nerve and mustard agents. 13 That said, it is difficult to conceive of any active role for chemical weapons in Israeli's defense strategy, which Arab states acknowledge. For example, retired Gen. Moukhtar El Fayoumi of Egypt wrote in 2000 that “Israeli military capabilities, which represent the main potential threat to Egypt, are thought not to rely heavily on [chemical weapons].” 14 Israel's military superiority, accession to the Geneva Protocol, and signature of the CWC along with the weapons' abhorrent effects and, most importantly, the legacy of the Nazi gas chambers, also contribute to the belief that Israel would never initiate the use of chemical weapons. 15

Similarly, Israel has not held up ratification of the convention as a political gambit. After signing the CWC in January 1993, Israel had hoped that the Arab states would follow suit. And it has repeatedly conveyed its intention to ratify the convention once all of its Arab neighbors do so. 16 Accordingly, Israel (as a signatory state) has made sure to be an active participant at annual CWC sessions of the Conference of the States Parties and review conferences. 17 It has even adopted chemical weapons importing and exporting restrictions into its domestic laws. 18 Additionally, in June, Israel hosted an OPCW technical goodwill mission.

Unilateral ratification has been discussed at the highest levels of the Israeli government more than once. In 2001, Israel's former minister of justice, Yossi Beilin, called for ratification as a way for Israel to gain broader acceptance in the international community: “[W]e must not become a pariah state …. We can't be stuck in the mud forever, only because of things that were or were not done in the past.” 19 Clearly, the strategic setting provides the crucial arguments, both pro and con. Mere possession of chemical weapons may deter Syrian use of its own chemical weapons. But if they were used in retaliation against a Syrian chemical attack, international support for Israel would be lost. A review of possible future scenarios where chemical weapons could be used by Syria points to the extreme example of Israel attempting to conquer Damascus. 20 All other scenarios indicate that chemical weapons use would deprive the user of vital international support, even if the international community considered the offender's objectives legitimate (e.g., reclaiming the Golan Heights).

A breakthrough is possible.

Israel is the most likely and appropriate state among the three Middle Eastern CWC holdouts to take the first step to accede to the convention. Chemical weapons are neither essential to its national security (contrary to Syria) nor will ratification cause it to lose face (as is the case for Egypt). Most importantly, Israel's accession might provide cover for Egypt to gracefully join the treaty, and it could strongly motivate Syria to renounce its chemical weapons arsenal. There is precedent: Syria and Israel joined the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of poison gas in war, in December 1968 and February 1969, respectively, while they skirmished across their border. Another carrot that can be dangled in front of Israel is further acceptance into the Western democratic world, which it desperately wants. In this case, the price for admission is quite reasonable–giving up weapons that offer little strategic benefit. If it does so, it will create, in the words of Israeli President Shimon Peres, speaking at the CWC signing ceremony in January 1993, “a new Middle East free of the horrors of war.”