How Biodevelopment can Enhance Biosecurity

Abstract

Without global biotech research on disease, agriculture, and the environment, efforts to secure the world from biothreats are bound to falter–and vice versa.

In February 2006, we released a report, “DNA for Peace,” which laid out the foundation for a new approach to reconciling the bright and dark sides of biotechnology.1 We concluded that the world must not let legitimate concerns about biosecurity undermine the promotion and use of biotechnologies for human development. To ensure this, we recommended investing in the positive applications of biological sciences in the developing world in order to protect against the misuse of these sciences and establishing a model of global governance that would balance the potentially competing agendas of biosecurity and biodevelopment. The report received considerable public attention and prompted valuable feedback from academic colleagues.

The need for an initiative such as the one we outlined in 2006 has only grown in the intervening years. Indeed, recent scientific advances have further demonstrated how biotechnology will be key to addressing many of the health, agricultural, and environmental problems in the developing world. International laws and rules that inhibit investment and growth in these technologies because of security concerns therefore could jeopardize these future benefits. Yet governments and scientists need to pay attention to biotechnology's potential to lead to a devastating new generation of weapons.

To ensure that the biodevelopment and biosecurity agendas do not compete, it is important to recognize the synergistic opportunities they present. The challenge is to find a global mechanism that will enhance the bright side while diminishing the likelihood of the emergence of the dark side. In the following paper, we propose that the concept of human security can provide a coherent mandate that engages both of these challenges, and that nations should work to promote a networked governance system to facilitate these twin goals.

The biotech bargain. In December 1953, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered what became known as the “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations, in which he advocated balancing control of nuclear weapons proliferation and promoting the positive uses of nuclear energy.2 Within his speech he specifically promoted the idea of establishing an international atomic energy agency. While observers hold differing views of the success of the specific nuclear bargain Eisenhower and others ushered into existence, the case of nuclear technologies demonstrated the need to strike a balance between promoting the positive uses of a technology and protecting against its negative uses.

The biological case is very different from the nuclear one. Biotechnology is not capital intensive in the way nuclear technology is; the tools and knowledge of biotechnology are widely dispersed; and the research relating to it is mostly unclassified. These factors naturally remove the emphasis on the role of states that is found in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and put greater emphasis on the role of nonstate actors. In other words, if nuclear technologies are the prototypical centralized threat and cyber-threats are the prototypical disseminated threat, biotechnology is midway between these ends of the spectrum and shares the most similarities with chemical threats.

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is the international agreement that most clearly acknowledges the need for balance between the promotion of the peaceful uses of biotechnology and the prohibition of the non-peaceful uses. Building upon the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits “bacteriological methods” of warfare, the BWC prohibits development, production, stockpiling, or other acquisition of biological agents for non-peaceful purposes but also promotes “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.” Yet the BWC has no enforcement mechanism, no mechanism to promote peaceful uses of the technology, and no associated organization to accomplish these twin objectives.

Another weakness of the BWC is that while it binds signatory states, it does not catch the non-state actors that are more essential to matters of biotech governance. In 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1540, which requires member states to develop and maintain controls over domestic biological weapons materials and their export and also to enact laws that would catch non-state actors, in order to begin addressing this gap in the convention. The World Health Organization (WHO) has also responded by adopting a “biorisk reduction management” approach that aims to protect against natural infection, the accidental release of biological agents, and deliberate use of biological threats. Implicit in this framework is the understanding that naturally occurring infections constitute the largest source, by far, of biological risk. Among the measures it has developed are International Health Regulations, which establish mechanisms for countries to cooperate on biological threats such as influenza, as well as global standards for biological safety and security.

We recognized the problems of using the term “bargain” to describe the tradeoffs between biosecurity and biodevelopment. A bargain is too calculating a way to think of a problem that on one side has one million children dying of malaria.

African nations have been active in furthering discussions of these issues, as populations on the continent stand to benefit tremendously from biotech advances. In October 2005, scientists and policy makers from across Africa and some from the Western world gathered in Kampala, Uganda, for a conference focused on testing ideas related to biosecurity in the developing world. The resulting compact suggested the need for balancing “measures to protect against the misuse of bio-science and assistance to promote human security” and laid out a series of recommendations to promote biodevelopment on the continent and protect against biotechnology's misuse.3 In 2007, the African Union High-Level Panel on Modern Biotechnology provided a blueprint for harnessing biotechnology in agriculture, health, industry, and the environment to accelerate development in Africa.

The Kampala conference was an informative exercise as it highlighted for an important part of the world the need to balance between the bright and dark sides. After attending the conference, we also drew some informal lessons that are useful when considering how best to develop the type of broad framework we advocate. Firstly, as the conference proceeded it became clear how easy it was for outside observers to distort the goals and message of the meeting. The range of headlines about the conference that appeared in local Ugandan papers (“African Science Policy ‘Must Address Bio-Terror Threat’” and “Biological Terrorism a Lethal Possibility”) illustrates how the biosecurity agenda could easily distract policy makers in developing countries from the development agenda.

Secondly, we learned how easily Western concepts of biosecurity can be imposed on audiences in the Global South, even when those concepts aren't salient. In the relatively short period of time that biosecurity has been on the global agenda, scientists and policy makers in developing countries have not had the chance to formulate a way of thinking about the topic that is relevant to their particular situations. If developed, such a perspective would contribute to a more sustained and equal dialogue between northern and southern partners. Finally, we recognized the problems of using the term “bargain” to describe the trade-offs between biosecurity and biodevelopment, language that was carried over from the nuclear non-proliferation sphere. A bargain is too calculating a way to think of a problem that on one side has one million children dying of malaria every year in Africa alone.

The impact on human security. Recognizing the need for a single conceptual framework to encompass both the bright and dark sides of biotechnology, we propose adopting the lens of “human security” as a way to address this challenge more thoroughly. In contrast to national security, which focuses on states, human security focuses on individuals. The human security concept was developed partly to justify overriding state sovereignty in select cases to protect civilian populations, and it serves as the foundation of the “responsibility to protect” concept, which allows for humanitarian intervention.

How can the concept of human security be applied to biotechnology? And how can biotechnology increase human security through improvements in health and agricultural, and by protecting against its misuse? In a paper originally prepared for the Helsinki Process on Democracy and Globalization, sponsored by the foreign ministries of Finland and Tanzania, we attempted to answer these questions.4 We argued that disease, hunger, and environmental degradation are threats to human security and that the application of biotechnology to address these threats would promote human security. For example, biotechnology can be used to improve the health of the poor through the development of vaccines that do not require refrigeration and can be given in a single dose, and through the development of crops that are drought tolerant. Similarly, measures to protect against the misuse of biological knowledge could guard human security from the threat of bioterrorism. For our purposes here, the key point is that the concept of human security provides a single rubric that spans both the bright and dark sides of biotechnology. One could imagine an initiative with a single mandate–to increase human security using biotechnology–which would encompass both.

Now that we've approached the dual goals of biodevelopment and biosecurity with the concept of human security in mind, what would be the best governance mechanism to employ to achieve these goals? Biotechnology is a rapidly evolving domain, involving actors across various sectors–academia, government, industry, and civil society–all around the world. The nature of the discipline seems poorly suited to intergovernmental processes, a static commission approach, or any approach that focuses on Western activities alone. A nimble, flexible approach is needed, one that stretches across sectors of the international community and reaches all corners of the globe. Such an approach would bear semblance to the global policy networks described by Anne-Marie Slaughter in A New World Order, each with specific objectives, activities, membership, and history. Such networks would expand regulatory reach, build trust, establish relationships, exchange information, develop databases of best practices, and offer technical assistance and professional socialization. A similar model is the “global issues networks” advocated by Jean-Francois Rischard.5

The key point is that the concept of human security provides a single rubric that spans both the bright and dark sides of biotechnology. One could imagine an initiative with a single mandate–to increase human security using biotechnology.

Two examples of the application of networked governance to biosecurity are the International Council for Life Sciences and the Biological Threat Reduction Consortium of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The council was founded in 2005 on the premise that successful risk management requires cooperation among all stakeholders including governments, academia, the public, and private industry. Similarly, the consortium recognizes that a number of communities must be brought together to address biological threats, including law enforcement, counterterrorism, national security, public health/medical, emergency management, scientific, business, and government.

Based on these concepts of governance, we have proposed the formation of a Global Genomics Initiative that would network people across sectors–from government, academia, civil society, and industry.6 Such an initiative would not be an end in and of itself, rather it would create the relationships and environment to encourage both biodevelopment and biosecurity. Prior to the release of “DNA for Peace,” we convened a group of experts to define the potential activities of the proposed initiative. After three rounds of a Delphi process, the group had identified the following priorities: standard setting/best practices for biosafety; building capacity for biodevelopment and biosecurity in developing countries; raising awareness of these issues; training and exercises; conducting gap analysis after studying and comparing current biosecurity regimes; developing risk evaluation methods and standards; setting an agenda and priorities for studies in biodevelopment and biosecurity; evaluating potential solutions; implementing research solutions; and designing an authoritative process to execute these issues. A major insight from the meeting was that investments in biodevelopment are logically anterior to building protections against the misuse of biotechnologies, especially in the developing world.

The Global Genomics Initiative would complement existing networks because of its dual focus on the bright and dark sides of biotechnology. Most groups focus on one or the other side, rather than the connections between the two. The initiative could also work to form a network of networks, linking existing networks on all sides of the biotechnology and biodevelopment issue.

Some scientists and observers will caution against linking biodevelopment and biosecurity, arguing that this proposal securitizes development and therefore makes the development agenda hostage to security concerns. Others will argue the reverse: that such a linkage would make progress on safety and security hostage to the development issue, just as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has made nonproliferation hostage to disarmament. Both of these concerns fail to recognize that these two agendas are inextricably linked, whether we like it or not.

As biological knowledge spreads around the world, it can be used for good or ill. By not explicitly reflecting and acting on how to optimize their connections, one agenda will likely conflict and undermine the other. A security-free approach to biodevelopment runs unnecessary risks of accidental or intentional misuse. It also squanders the opportunity to use technical infrastructure throughout the world–both equipment and human capital–to increase biosecurity.

Biological threats require surveillance and identification, and this requires people, equipment, and expertise. A development-free approach to security is likely to fail at a political level, or would require very heavy-handed tactics, because Western nations could not legitimately demand attention for theoretical biological threats when preventable biological threats in the form of malaria, tuberculosis, HIV, and other neglected diseases (including non-communicable diseases) are decimating the public health of developing nations. The logical flaw of these counterarguments sets perfection on one agenda as a pre-condition for action on the other. Yet, in truth, the two agendas need to co-evolve. It is an illusion to believe that these agendas can be separated, and ignoring how they might work in step with one another will only result in missed opportunities.

Moving forward. The ideal convener of a global network linking the biodevelopment and biosecurity agendas would be the U.N. secretary-general. Through its departments and agencies, the United Nations has a mandate both on security and development, including health and agriculture, and has a track record of reaching out to civil society and to industry. Within this amalgam of capabilities and responsibilities, the secretary-general serves as a “norm entrepreneur”–an actor who mobilizes support for a cause and seeks to have it crystallized as an accepted standard of behaviour.7 Indeed, the secretary-general's office has a track record of thinking that is parallel to our initiative.

A U.N. General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus in 2006 explicitly identifies the need for “a forum that will bring together the various stakeholders–governments, industry, science, public health, security, the public writ large–into a common programme, built from the bottom up, to ensure that biotechnology's advances are used for the public good and that the benefits are shared equitably around the world.” In a speech delivered at St. Gallen, Switzerland, in November 2006, former secretary-general Kofi Annan expanded on these ideas and laid the groundwork for a new initiative that would focus on two questions: “First, how to expand the benefits of biotechnology and life science research to build better lives for people around the world. That includes improving human health and food security, and thereby encouraging economic growth and reducing global inequities. It will require making technologies available, encouraging transparency and promoting a cooperative environment. Second, how to develop a global framework to mitigate potential risks. … How to reach workable consensus on appropriate measures is a subject crying out for a focused global debate.”

In December 2006, a group of opinion leaders from academia, industry, government, and civil society met informally with Annan at U.N. headquarters to discuss the establishment of such a forum. These activities represent only the earliest steps in incubating a biotechnology initiative. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon plans to launch such a forum later this year.