Abstract
U.S. officials should not delay in addressing the potential for a global expansion of nuclear energy to lead to weapons proliferation.
During his January senate confirmation hearing, Energy Secretary Steven Chu was surprisingly unequivocal in his support for the construction of new nuclear reactors in the United States. He didn't hesitate to assure those in attendance that he saw nuclear energy as part of the mix of energy sources necessary to address the nation's energy crisis, and he voiced support for implementing and expanding the loan-guarantee program that was designed to jump-start new nuclear construction. (Indeed, any doubt about President Barack Obama's openness to building new nuclear reactors in the United States was put to rest by Chu's testimony.)
The hearing's emphasis on nuclear energy was both encouraging and unsettling. As the head of the Energy Department, Chu will direct national investment in energy technologies–be they nuclear, biofuels, solar, wind, etc.–and it is reassuring to know that a scientist of his stature and analytic ability will guide the evaluation process. Chu's emphasis on a mix of prescriptions to reduce U.S. carbon emissions and U.S. reliance on foreign sources of oil demonstrates his nuanced understanding of these challenges, as does his openness to research on advanced carbon and nuclear technologies, all of which are politically charged topics.
Absent from the hearing, however, was any discussion of the dangers inherent in the use of reprocessing and enrichment technologies, which can be used to create plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. This absence was disturbing. Several senators pressed Chu about the value of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel derived from power reactors and referred to France, Britain, Japan, and Russia as examples of nations that are currently employing reprocessing technology. Yet no one at the hearing talked about the vast stockpiles of separated plutonium with which other reprocessing nations are burdened and the attendant security risks. For example, Britain's civilian stockpile contains more than 100 metric tons of plutonium, and the government has not decided how to dispose of this material; France's stockpile contains more than 80 metric tons, according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials. These stockpiles could provide enough fissile material for approximately 12,500 and 10,000 nuclear weapons, respectively.
Some senators also displayed a dangerous eagerness to employ nuclear technologies without fully considering their range of impacts. “We can study [reprocessing] and study it,” said Alabama Republican Sen. Jeff Sessions, “[and] not get around to starting now to develop a recycling system that we know will work, [instead] waiting to have one that's much better.” North Carolina Republican Sen. Richard Burr was equally impatient regarding the loan guarantees set aside to support new nuclear construction: “We're on a time line that, from a reliability standpoint, we have to start construction, and we have to do it soon.”
Chu was accommodating to these concerns, as one would expect any cabinet nominee to be in front of a panel of his judges. Yet he missed an opportunity to explain the value of thoughtful, research-based planning to a group of decision makers whose primary driver on energy issues is political. In addressing the nation's energy needs, the last thing Congress or the Obama administration should do is act hastily–particularly regarding the development of new nuclear energy capacity or the deployment of reprocessing technology.
Congress needs to confront the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation as the greatest obstacle to domestic and global nuclear energy expansion, and Chu should take the lead in explaining the risks and suggesting ways to address them. The establishment of international agreements and institutions since the dawn of the nuclear age has helped limit weapons proliferation and support the relatively safe and secure use of nuclear power reactors around the world. New international tools and standards will be necessary, however, to ensure that countries building, or considering building, new nuclear reactors don't contribute to weapons proliferation. And Washington needs to take a leading role in shaping them. It won't be enough for the United States to ensure the security of its own nuclear facilities and technologies.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has done a noble job of implementing safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world to ensure that fissile materials are accounted for and that nations use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Nations looking to build new nuclear reactors should help to bolster the agency's capabilities, and the United States should lead in this effort by providing political support and funding. Only by cooperating with the international community will the Obama administration lessen the potential proliferation impact of any global nuclear power revival.