Abstract

Ten years ago, India officially declared itself a nuclear weapon state and announced its intention to develop and deploy a nuclear triad. Today, the sea- and land-based legs of its triad remain under development, and its fighter bombers constitute the only fully operational leg. Despite its slow pace, India's nuclear program continues to grow: India is developing a three-stage land-based ballistic missile, a nuclear-powered submarine, and a potentially nuclear-capable cruise missile.
In August 2008, India completed a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities.1 The deal will allow India to import nuclear technology from countries that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)–even though India is not. This undercuts a long-standing principle of denying nuclear technology to countries that have not signed the NPT and also allows India to free up domestic uranium reserves for use in military reactors to produce plutonium for weapons in its emerging triad of nuclear weapons delivery platforms.
All Indian nuclear delivery systems are dual-capable (they can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads) and their operational statuses are ambiguous. This not only makes the size, composition, and operational status of India's nuclear arsenal difficult to determine, but also has troubling implications for stability on the subcontinent. In a war with Pakistan, for example, an Indian launch of conventionally armed ballistic missiles could be misidentified as incoming nuclear warheads, triggering a retaliatory nuclear attack from Pakistan.
India has said that its nuclear doctrine is “based on the principle of a minimum credible deterrent and no-first-use as opposed to doctrines or postures of launch-on-warning,” stipulating that India's nuclear policy includes a “rejection of an arms race or concepts and postures from the Cold War era.”2 How large such a deterrence force would be is unclear; in 2007, Defense Minister Shri A. K. Antony said that India's minimum deterrence capability would be “commensurate with the size and geostrategic position of India in the world.”3
We estimate that India's nuclear stockpile includes approximately 70 assembled nuclear warheads, with only about 50 fully operational, though we predict this number will grow over the next decade. Whatever the size, it is essential that there be firm civilian and military control over the stockpile; to this end, India established the Nuclear Command Authority in 2003.
The single-seat Mirage 2000H, known as the Vajra (“divine thunder”), is a multi-role aircraft deployed with Squadrons 1 and 7 of the 40th Wing at Gwalior Air Force Station, approximately 270 kilometers (170 miles) southeast of New Delhi; we estimate that one of the squadrons has a secondary nuclear mission.5 The Jaguar IS/IB, known as the Shamsher (“sword”), was nuclear capable when deployed by both Britain and France. Four operational squadrons have approximately 76 Jaguar IS variants; we estimate that two of the squadrons have a secondary nuclear strike mission. The Hindustan Aeronautics-assembled, Soviet-origin MiG-27 Flogger, known as the Bahadur (“valiant”), may also have a nuclear strike mission, although evidence is scarce and circumstantial. (For more about India's nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based missiles, and naval weapons, see the Nuclear Notebooks of September/October 2005 and July/August 2007.)
SNAPSHOT
THE INDIAN ARSENAL
Of the three Prithvi versions that comprise the bulk of India's ballistic missile force, only the Prithvi I (the army version) is identified by the CIA as having a nuclear role. The missile is 9 meters (30 feet) long and about 1 meter (3 feet) in diameter, weighs 4,000 kilograms, and has a range of 150 kilometers (93 miles). Due to the missiles' small size, it is difficult to identify Prithvi bases as well as which Prithvis are nuclear; Prithvi missiles are deployed with the 333rd and 355th Missile Groups, but nothing is known about deployment areas.
The two-stage Agni I has been tested to a range of 700 kilometers (435 miles). The Agni I has been test-launched six times, most recently in March 2008 during an army exercise, an indication that the missile may soon become operational. The Agni II, an improved version of the Agni I, has a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles), can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload, and is road- or rail-launched. The missile has only been test-flown three times, most recently in August 2004, indicating that it is not yet operational.
The Agni III is a two-stage, solid-fuel missile of 17 meters (56 feet) in length, 2 meters (7 feet) in diameter, and a launch weight of 50 metric tons. The Agni III has a range of 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) and is said to be rail-mobile. India has test-flown the Agni III three times. The first test, in 2006, failed, but two others in April 2007 and May 2008 succeeded. “With this missile,” a spokesperson for the Indian Army's Eastern Command said, “India can even strike Shanghai.”6 Defense officials anticipate that the first Agni III could be delivered in 2009, although it will probably need additional flight-tests before the missile can become operational.
Soon after the 2008 Agni III flight-test, India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announced plans to build the Agni IV, with a range greater than 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), capable of targeting Beijing. The new missile (sometimes referred to as Agni III+) will have a third stage and be built with composite materials instead of steel; its first flight-test is scheduled for 2009 or 2010.
Defense officials say that after 2015 and before 2020, India's nuclear missile force will consist primarily of Agni III and Agni IV missiles, all carrying enhanced warheads to theoretically overwhelm ballistic missile defenses.7 Some industry officials have said that both weapons will have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), but given the difficulties India has faced with the Agni I and Agni II–and the technological and financial challenges experienced by other nuclear weapon states developing MIRV technology–we remain skeptical of India's ability to MIRV its missiles anytime soon. Perhaps more importantly, MIRVed missiles would seriously challenge the credibility of India's minimum deterrent doctrine.
The Sagarika is a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of approximately 300 kilometers (190 miles), according to U.S. intelligence.8 A version of the Sagarika, the K-15, was test-launched on February 26, 2008 from a submerged platform near Visakhapatnam on India's east coast. Media reports tagged the range at 700 kilometers (435 miles).9 India currently has no delivery system for the Sagarika; the DRDO has said that the K-15 will be integrated with the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), a nuclear-powered submarine that India has been working on for more than 20 years.10 One source said five ATVs are planned–an interesting number, given that the U.S. intelligence community has stated China might build five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.11 Rumors of a 2008 launch seem dubious. India has also leased a Russian nuclear-powered Akula-class attack submarine for delivery in September 2009.
Footnotes
1.
Staff Report, “IAEA Board Approves India-Safeguards Agreement,” International Atomic Energy Agency, August 1, 2008.
2.
Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD), “Annual Report 2004-2005,” pp. 14, 15–16.
3.
Government of India, Press Information Bureau, “India Will Continue to Strive towards Achieving Minimum Deterrence–Antony,” MOD press release, February 13, 2007.
4.
Vishal Thapar, “N-Capable Agni-III Ready, but Aircraft Remain First Choice,” CNN-IBN, May 8, 2008.
5.
Some sources list a third Mirage squadron, No. 9, at Gwalior, but the Indian Air Force list does not. Moreover, commercial satellite images show only 18 Mirages at the base, not enough for three squadrons.
6.
“Agni III Not Targeted at Any Particular Country: Army,” Times of India, May 8, 2008.
7.
Ajai Shukla, “Agni Missile to Get Multiple Warheads,” Business Standard (India), January 28, 2008.
8.
U.S. Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” NASIC-1031-0985-06, March 2006, p. 23.
9.
“India Successfully Tests Submarine-Based Missile,” Reuters, February 26, 2008.
10.
“India Test-Fires Sea-Based Nuclear-Capable Missile,” Agence France Presse, February 26, 2008.
11.
On the ATVs, see “India Plans to Buy 6 New Subs, Says Navy Chief,” Times of India, December 2, 2007.
12.
Sujan Dutta, “Fearless Tomahawk-Type Missile on Radar,” Telegraph (India), July 20, 2007.
13.
Ibid.
