Abstract
Does Tehran seek nuclear weapons or an international agreement? It's not clear whether even the Iranians know for sure.
Although Iran says that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, its behavior has ^^ J^ aroused suspicions in the international community. Among the worrisome signs: the clandestine nature of Iran's past nuclear programs, Tehran's misleading statements to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its resumption of uranium enrichment in February. Furthermore, Iran's enrichment program makes little economic sense since the country does not have enough indigenous uranium to operate its planned nuclear reactors and would be better off purchasing nuclear fuel from other countries.
Nevertheless, claims that Tehran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability deserve careful scrutiny. The Iranian regime is divided over this issue, and its failure to cooperate with the IAEA might, at least in part, be the result of bureaucratic and ideological infighting. If suspicions over Iran's intentions become articles of faith, attempts by the United States, China, Russia, France, Germany, and Britain to negotiate a solution with Tehran could falter.
Indeed, while Iran probably pursued nuclear weapons in the past, a plausible reading of the evidence suggests that Tehran could be pursuing a different course. A critical turning point came in 2003, when IAEA investigations began to reveal the full extent of Iran's clandestine activities. The IAEA Board of Governors, pushed by the United States, considered referring Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council, a move that could have resulted in punitive measures.
Iran was publicly defiant and resisted cooperating with the IAEA investigation. Yet internally, there were signs that the government was anxious to avoid a potential confrontation with the United Nations. In an apparent attempt to facilitate cooperation with the IAEA, Iran consolidated decision-making authority over its nuclear program around October 2003. Hassan Rowhani, who was the head of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)–Iran's top decision-making body on security-related issues–was put in charge of nuclear diplomacy. Previously, oversight of the issue had been divided between Iran's Foreign Ministry and its Atomic Energy Organization.
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While Iran still proclaimed its right to enrich uranium, subsequent decisions reflected a more moderate approach. For example, Iran agreed in October 2003 to suspend its entire enrichment program as part of an agreement with France, Germany, and Britain. Although Tehran pushed the boundaries of that agreement by, for example, continuing to produce centrifuge components, Iran consented to a more stringent suspension about a year later. As part of the same agreement, Tehran decided to sign and implement (though not ratify) an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. This protocol provided agency inspectors with considerably greater authority to monitor the country's nuclear activities, allowing them to conduct shorter-notice inspections at facilities included in the Safeguards Agreement, as well as visit facilities the agreement didn't cover. That same year, Iran also terminated a laser-based uranium enrichment project. Since October 2003, Iranian officials have, at varying times, also offered to limit the size and scope of their enrichment program, as well as participate in a regional enrichment consortium.
The apparent contradictions of Iran's behavior–sometimes defiant and deceitful, sometimes accommodating–might be partly explained by a lack of bureaucratic coordination. Tehran's left hand has not always known what its right hand was doing. Prior to the consolidation, the Iranian Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark about much of the uranium enrichment program. And in a July 2005 interview, Rowhani candidly acknowledged that some government agencies had not been entirely on board with the SNSC's new role: “It was necessary that different organizations cooperate with the official in charge of the nuclear case, and I wasn't sure at the time if all of them were willing to cooperate 100 percent. When the work started, 90 percent of the problems that I predicted came true. The problems included both disharmony and sabotage.”
Iran's lagging cooperation with the IAEA might also be a consequence of Tehran's persistent skepticism regarding the Bush administration's diplomatic sincerity. For example, Iranian officials have argued that the nuclear issue is merely a pretext for Washington to pursue regime change through the U.N. Security Council, and they have likewise asserted that the United States will pressure Iran about other matters, such as Tehran's support for terrorist organizations, regardless of what Iran does on the nuclear issue. The Bush administration's veiled threats to use military force have further compelled Iran to dig in its heels. Tehran worries that if the IAEA is given unlimited authority to investigate possible nuclear-related activities in its defense facilities, the United States could use such inspections to gather military intelligence, similar to the U.N. Special Commission's espionage activities in Iraq during the 1990s.
Against this backdrop, Iranian hardliners–who became a more dominant force in the government following the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad–argue that Washington would view any compromise as a sign of weakness and attempt to extract more concessions. Meanwhile, recent diplomatic developments have undermined the credibility of those favoring engagement. During the first half of 2005, Iran put a number of proposals on the table during its negotiations with Europe: an offer to suspend industrial-scale enrichment at the Natanz nuclear facility for nearly a decade, permitting a “continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors” at Iran's centrifuge and conversion facilities, and a broader invitation to discuss regional security and terrorism. But a senior Iranian diplomat said in an April 2005 interview that the package of economic, technical, and security incentives that the Europeans offered that summer was “insulting.” Tehran also bristled at the Europeans' demand for a complete halt to Iran's uranium enrichment program, which was not an explicit requirement of the 2004 suspension agreement.
Consequently, Iran has become more recalcitrant. Tehran stopped implementing its Additional Protocol in February and refused to comply with a U.N. deadline to halt enrichment by the end of August. Today, the regime sees itself in a stronger bargaining position than ever before. With American forces bogged down in Iraq, a U.S. military strike seems less likely. And rising oil prices have increased Tehran's ability to withstand broader economic sanctions.
But the very fact that Iran has previously offered several concessions, as well as curtailed some nuclear activities, should signal to the international community that Tehran has not necessarily committed itself to building nuclear weapons–and that there are those within the regime who are reluctant to risk political and economic isolation.
The onus certainly remains on Tehran to clarify its nuclear intentions by resuming suspension of its enrichment program, cooperating fully with the IAEA, and resuming implementation of its Additional Protocol. Yet, if Western governments continue to behave as if Iran has already made the strategic decision to develop nuclear weapons, ongoing diplomatic efforts could be jeopardized unnecessarily. A premature, all-or-nothing demand that the Iranian regime give up its enrichment program altogether could cause negotiations to fail completely.
Were this to occur, the international community could find itself with an unpalatable list of options: taking military action against a country that might respond by deciding that it has nothing to lose by acquiring nuclear weapons; imposing economic sanctions that may prove ineffective; or allowing Iran's nuclear program to continue under the currently inadequate (without the Additional Protocol) IAEA safeguards regime. Even if Tehran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program, its lack of transparency will certainly fuel international suspicions about Iran's intentions for years to come, as well as undermine the credibility of the nonproliferation regime as a whole.
In August, Iran offered a “new formula” to resolve the dispute and indicated that it was ready for “serious negotiations.” These talks will certainly be long and arduous, but at this point, all the participants have something to gain and everything to lose.
A nuclear-armed Iran is not a foregone conclusion. We ought not act as if it were.
Supplementary Material
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Supplementary Material
Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards