Abstract
“Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” U.S. State Department, August 2005.
Just days before the State Department released its report, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” Paula DeSutter, the U.S. assistant secretary for verification, compliance, and implementation, told a Danish audience that there is a “fundamental question of how compliance determinations are made. I suspect there are some that question whether the U.S. makes such determinations based on our dislike of certain regimes. Nothing could be further from the truth.”
Perhaps so. But while the report might send a message to the international community that the United States remains committed to various arms control regimes, it is very critical of certain foreign nations' arms control and nonproliferation policies. As such, the report acts as a useful barometer for discerning the Bush administration's worldview. The State Department assessment may serve another purpose: By compiling such analyses into a single thick volume, rather than delivering them to foreign capitals through routine diplomatic channels, the authors may seek to raise public awareness regarding noncompliance. In that respect, if the U.S. arguments are perceived as credible, the report can advance U.S. interests by providing rhetorical ammunition to nongovernmental organizations as they strive to exert additional pressure against their own governments.
Yet, if that were an underlying objective of this report, the authors badly missed their target in the case of Russia.
The report pays much greater attention to compliance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) than in similar reports published in the past. Indeed, the discussion of this issue even precedes such hot topics as Iran's failure to comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Why the sudden grievance against Russia? The scale of compliance disagreements certainly can't explain it. The report lists five U.S. concerns–three of which have been completely or partially settled, while the remaining two are of a minor nature. Does the size of the cover of the Russian intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicle represent such an important security concern that it deserves to be mentioned at the beginning of the report and in such copious detail?
In Moscow, the report has prompted two opposing interpretations. Some experts believe the White House has begun to turn its attention toward the future of the U.S.-Russian START process. After the Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the prevailing impression was that the United States had lost interest in seriously discussing strategic nuclear issues with Russia. However, strategic arms control supporters in Moscow have long hoped that the closer the calendar moves toward 2009–the year that START expires–the more thinking it would provoke in the United States on how to sustain the intrusive inspection regime required by the treaty. Therefore, arms control advocates see this State Department report as the first indication of renewed interest in engaging with Moscow.
Others believe that the lengthy dissection of Russian noncompliance (although not very convincing) has a different goal. According to them, it aims to prepare public opinion for the death of START in 2009. They cite past incidents when the United States suddenly raised noncompliance issues as a prelude to ending agreements, such as with SALT II and the ABM Treaty. If the other side constantly cheats, the United States can argue, then the arms control agreement provides only a false sense of security, and it would be better to leave it altogether. Indeed, if Washington were truly committed to START, it could continue discussing these relatively secondary compliance issues through established mechanisms like the Joint Consultative and Inspection Commission, where, as the report itself recognized, some of the mentioned problems have been fully or partially solved.
Politically conscious weaponizable pathogens.
By contrast, another section of the report devoted to Russia's alleged noncompliance to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is frank and straightforward. Approximately half of the section consists of a long list of Russian domestic laws and executive regulations on controlling missile exports. This should have pleased Russian diplomats, who always claim that Moscow deserves credit for its efficient export control system. But the report suddenly lurches to the conclusion that the Russian system “has been ineffective in assuring case-by-case review … of transfers that would halt problematic … transfers,” and complains that unspecified “sensitive items” have been supplied to India, Iran, and China.
So, is Russia failing to comply with MTCR by continuing missile-related exports to those countries? The MTCR, in fact, does not establish a full embargo on deliveries to nonmembers, such as India, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. (A bilateral MTCR agreement exists between the United States and China, and Beijing is reportedly close to being accepted as a full-fledged MTCR member.) The State Department report acknowledges that “such transfers are not directly barred by the MTCR.” Instead, the report's authors find it objectionable that “Russia's actions do not accord with the MTCR implementation policies of the United States” (emphasis added).
Certainly, Russia needs to improve its export control system and be more careful in supplying problematic countries with sensitive technology. However, instead of strengthening the arguments of those who advocate such views, the State Department report leaves them almost no room to maneuver. It is one thing to ask Russia to comply with an international regime in which it fully participates, but it is quite another to demand that Moscow follow the “implementation policies of the United States.” Such an expectation would be problematic in any sovereign country, let alone in Russia, with its resurgent self-esteem and history of complex relations with Washington. Even outside of Russia, anyone who advocates acting in accordance with the practices of a foreign government might be compelled to register as a lobbyist of that government–thereby diminishing their credibility among policy makers.
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that Moscow immediately rebuffed the report's findings about Russia's “noncompliance.” The day after it was released, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that “publishing such reports … would complicate solving existing problems, rather than facilitate their resolution.” It remains to be seen whether that's precisely the outcome the authors of this report intended.