Abstract
In 1983, massive protests against the deployment of new U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe so unnerved President Ronald Reagan that he told his secretary of state: “If things get hotter and hotter and arms control remains an issue, maybe I should go see [Soviet Premier Yuri] Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons.”
Today, the Soviets are gone and the mobs of anti-nuclear protesters have dispersed, but hundreds of U.S. nuclear weapons still remain in Europe. In Germany alone, an estimated 150 nuclear weapons are kept at U.S. air bases in Ramstein and Biichel. But post-9/11 shifts in the U.S. nuclear doctrine–most notably, the prospect that nuclear weapons could be used in preemptive strikes–could undermine core arguments that European defense establishments have used for decades to defend the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. As a result, Washington may help accomplish what the peace movement was never able to do: compel European governments to send all U.S. nukes home.
Over the last 15 years, the United States has drastically reduced the number of its tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Today, about 480 B61 gravity bombs remain in five non-nuclear NATO member states–Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, as well as the nuclear weapon state Britain. Of these weapons, 180 are assigned for use by the five non-nuclear weapon states. They participate in nuclear sharing–a policy that was developed during the Cold War to deepen U.S.-European military ties and to create a forum where Europe could have its say on Washington's nuclear policies. But times have changed, and nuclear sharing no longer gives Europeans any influence on U.S. nuclear thinking. The 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with its emphasis on counterproliferation missions–such as possibly using nukes to destroy underground bunkers of biological and chemical weapons–created serious unease among European officials. And the new draft “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” which contains a wide-ranging list of scenarios in which the United States might be prepared for nuclear first-use, contradicts NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, which states that “the fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political.”
Growing anxiety over U.S. nuclear weapons policy has been most evident in Germany, where, in the week before its September 18, 2005 national elections, reports of an updated U.S. nuclear doctrine hit the prime-time news. Claudia Roth, chair of the leftist Green Party, declared: “For us it is absolutely unimaginable that the German armed forces continue to prepare for the use of nuclear weapons or that a nuclear weapons mission [could be] initiated from German soil.” Shortly thereafter, the Christian Democrats–a traditionally right-leaning, pro-transatlantic party–called for a discussion of the draft doctrine within NATO.
But the outcome of Germany's parliamentary elections muffled the rumblings of dissent, and it is unlikely that the new government will make rethinking NATO nuclear policy an immediate priority. Three smaller opposition parties (the pro-disarmament Greens, the free-market Liberals, and the left-wing Socialists) openly favor withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from European soil, but the two larger parties that form the governing “grand coalition” (the Christian Democrats and the left-of-center Social Democrats) are likely to shy away from a confrontation with the Bush administration. New, conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel will probably follow the line of her predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, who was quoted in the daily paper Tageszeitung as declaring that he was “not going to have a row with the Americans just because of those 20 ‘thingamies’ in Biichel.”
Bombs away: Protesters demonstrate against the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe on April 16, 2005.
NATO officials deride the recent mini-debate about U.S. nuclear weapon deployments as a “German issue.” They argue that both the NPR and the draft joint doctrine are ultimately national policy documents that have no direct bearing on NATO's nuclear policy. But this assessment is at best a half-truth. U.S. nuclear doctrine has profound implications for NATO's nuclear posture: What if the White House ordered the use of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe to destroy a suspected biological weapons cache in a Mideast country? Allies might expect Washington to consult NATO in advance, but the only way they could prevent actual deployment would be to deny overflight rights for U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons to their intended targets.
Harald Müller, director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, warned in an October 16, 2005 public discussion with German and European foreign policy officials that German armed forces could also be drawn into a U.S.-initiated nuclear exchange if they were part of a NATO deployment abroad. The draft doctrine lists several scenarios in which a U.S. regional commander may request presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons, including the use or intended enemy use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or alliance forces or civilian populations, and, more generally, in a situation in which nuclear weapons might be necessary to ensure “success of U.S. and multinational operations.”
The U.S. doctrine also exemplifies the growing differences within NATO on how nuclear posture impacts non-proliferation. The Bush administration denies that possession of nuclear weapons by “responsible” states, like the United States, could motivate other states to develop or build weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it argues that its own nuclear policies dampen proliferation by discouraging arms competition. In the words of the draft doctrine, U.S. nuclear forces are for “dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends.”
Europeans generally take a different view, and German politicians in particular have repeatedly voiced concerns that the new doctrine might very well encourage the emergence of more nuclear weapon states. Gernot Erler, an influential Social Democrat and member of Parliament, told German n-tv that the draft doctrine was disastrous: “The conclusion is clear: [A nation that] foregoes nuclear weapons is without protection against U.S. pressure.”
Likewise, the Liberal Party sees a connection between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) crisis and U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe. In a resolution introduced on April 14, 2005, two weeks before the NPT Review Conference, the Liberal Party called on the government to urge the Americans to withdraw tactical weapons deployed in Germany, “in order to strengthen the credibility of the nonproliferation regime and as a sign that the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapon states are being taken seriously.” The Belgian Senate adopted a similar resolution a week later, and Norwegian parliamentarians have also called for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.
These moves may have had an effect. According to press reports, U.S. approval of the draft doctrine has been postponed, and the most controversial language concerning the preemptive use of nuclear weapons may be revised before the document receives final approval.
Even more remarkable, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has recently indicated a willingness to leave the future of NATO nuclear deployments up to Europeans. In a late October interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Rumsfeld said that it is up “to the Germans and to NATO” to pass judgment on the purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons on German soil. “Some countries in Europe made the decision to allow them to be on the continent. It was seen to be in their interest and is still seen that way today as it persists. So one would assume it continues being in their interest,” he contended.
But despite this opening for a fresh debate on NATO nuclear policies, European governments have so far demonstrated a remarkable lack of willingness to rock the nuclear boat. As long as there is no widespread public outcry against U.S. nuclear deployments, European officials will continue to see the topic as one where there is much to lose and little to gain.