Letters

Abstract

Nuclear Notebook is prepared by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kris-tensen of the Natural Resources Defense Council. A footnoted version of this article is available online at www.thebulletin.org. Inquiries should be directed to NRDC, 1200 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C, 20005; 202-289-6868.

Working hard in Idaho

As a member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and a third-term congressman from Idaho's First District, I found the article “Idaho: Nuclear Comes Home to Roost,” in your March/April 2005 issue, informative but sorely lacking perspective.

Jonas Siegel took great pains to give a voice to what is a very narrow and limited public opposition to programs at the Energy Department's Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The result was a vastly overstated impression of public concern, and a dramatically understated impression of the actual attention being paid to the safety and environmental sensitivity of waste cleanup and other programs at the site.

He adequately, if somewhat skeptically, described Energy's goals for research into hydrogen production and the next generation of safer, cleaner, and more efficient nuclear reactors at INL. However, he said nothing about the strong and steadily improving working relationship between the federal government, state government, local communities, and institutions of higher education toward achieving those goals.

INL, Energy, and members of Idaho's congressional delegation are committed to advancing the frontiers of energy technology. Research being conducted at the Idaho site has the enormous potential to enable Americans to avoid the costs associated with new hydroelectric dams that have become virtually impossible to get licensed, new coal-fired generating plants that face onerous restrictions, and imported oil and gas that put our economy and national security at unnecessary risk.

I strongly believe that work being done at INL will play a key role in America's energy future. That promise is undermined by media accounts that fail to provide a balanced perspective. Cong. C. L. “Butch” Otter Republican, First District, Idaho

A quick recount

In the January/February Nuclear Notebook (“U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2005”), Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris stated: “The last submarine-launched ballistic missile test-launch in the Pacific was in July 1993. The navy flight-tested three Tridents in 2003 but none in 2004.” But according to Lockheed Martin's January/February 2005 New Horizons newsletter, the U.S. Navy successfully tested two Trident II D5 ballistic missiles in November 2004. It seems the statement in the Bulletin is incorrect.

More on the 2004 Trident II D5 tests can be found in the April/May 2004 issue of New Horizons.

Vladimir Agapov

Moscow, Russia

Hans M. Kristensen responds: Thanks for alerting us to the omission. Since publication, we've received data from the U.S. Navy that provides additional information to New Horizons–the dates for the two tests. A test from the U.S.S. Nebraska was conducted on February 25, 2004, and one from the U.S.S. Nevada took place on November 10, 2004. Two more test events are scheduled for 2005. We will incorporate these and the 2004 tests into the next update to U.S. nuclear forces.

Rogue lasers

I'd like to provide some further context for your excellent article “Laser Enrichment: Separation Anxiety” (March/April 2005). Silex Systems Limited, the Australian company conducting laser enrichment research, has the full support of the Australian government. This support seems at odds with the government's call for an international five-year moratorium on all new enrichment plants, as well as domestic laws that prohibit the construction of uranium enrichment facilities.

Australia prides itself on its non-proliferation efforts. For example, it played a significant role in the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 44 countries that attempt to limit proliferation by stances by the development of ballistic missiles of various ranges.

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Although there is no evidence that North Korea has modified aircraft for nuclear delivery, such a capability would be easier to develop and more difficult to detect than ballistic missiles. North Korea maintains underground aircraft hangars within a 10-20 minute striking distance of Seoul and has bombers and fighter aircraft that had nuclear strike roles in the Soviet Air Force.

U.S. policies. The current administration's hope that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons seems fanciful at this point. What incentives could possibly persuade it to give up its weapons program, dismantle its nuclear complex, and agree to an intrusive verification regime? It seems highly unlikely that North Korea would agree to abandon the very thing that gives it leverage with its neighbors and the United States.

President George W. Bush's first-term policies failed to move North Korea toward the goal of disarmament and instead proved to be counterproductive. Admonitions that North Korea is an “outpost of tyranny” and part of the “axis of evil” have tended to increase the North's already substantial fear and paranoia of the United States. The hardliners around Bush believe that isolation, pressure, and sanctions will cause North Korea to collapse and that it should not be rewarded for any positive steps it might take. The six-party talks, held in August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004, have yielded little, though the U.S. proposed a step-by-step process for further talks. Convening a fourth round remains difficult because of North Korean demands. The United States and the other parties involved in the negotiations disagree on how to deal with the North. Perhaps the sharpest differences are with South Korea. In a speech that must have shocked the Bush administration, President Roh Moo-hyun said that, “North Korea professes that nuclear capabilities are a deterrent for defending itself from external aggression.” While in many cases its claims and allegations are hard to believe, Roh said that, “In this particular case it is true and undeniable that there is a considerable element of rationality in North Korea's claim.”

A nuclear-armed North Korea could trigger an arms race in East Asia and beyond. This prospect has already prompted the United States to expand its nuclear targeting doctrine, enlarge missile defense programs, and plan the development of new nuclear weapons, such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. A nuclear North could further harden the U.S. posture toward the country and reinvigorate extended nuclear deterrence strategies in the region. Worse, Japan might decide to build its own nuclear weapons program, which would surely provoke a Chinese response and in turn cause reverberations in India and Pakistan. There could also be repercussions in Taiwan and South Korea, both of which built fledgling nuclear weapons programs before U.S. pressure shut them down. Recent public disclosures of secret South Korean nuclear research do little to increase trust and allay fears.

Perhaps the greatest danger of all would be North Korea selling its plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or finished weapons to other countries or terrorists. Its track record with ballistic missiles is not encouraging. It has sold missiles to Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Pakistan–lucrative sources of income to the impoverished country. Fissile material and nuclear weapons would be even more lucrative and would have a far larger impact on regional and international security.