Abstract
Out of Gas: The End of the Age of Oil By David Goodstein, W. W. Norton, 2004, 140 pages; $21.95
The Hype about Hydrogen By Joseph J. Romm, Island Press, 2004, 240 pages; $25.00
In the 1950s, geophysicist Marion King Hubbert predicted that the rate of oil extraction from wells in the continental United States would peak around 1970 and then rapidly decline. Many of Hubbert's peers ridiculed his forecast, but he turned out to be right. From a maximum of slightly more than nine million barrels per day in 1970, the extraction rate has steadily declined to today's rate of fewer than 6 million barrels per day. (Total U.S. production increased with the discovery of Alaskan oil, but that source peaked more than a decade ago.)
A number of experts have applied Hubbert's methods to the global oil supply and concluded that the peak will occur surprisingly soon–if not this decade, then certainly the next. Other respected geologists disagree with that assessment, but David Goodstein, author of Out of Gas, says the peak will happen sooner rather than later. The point he underscores in his book is that after the peak, oil supply will decline forever. This means the end of the Age of Oil–that is, inexpensive oil–and the beginning of a series of closely intertwined and extremely nasty events, Goodstein says.
The impact on the United States will be profound. According to the Energy Department, oil “is the life-blood of America's economy”; specifically, oil supplies “more than 40 percent of our total energy” and “more than 99 percent of the fuel we use in our cars and trucks.” Recent U.S. energy policy that strengthens this dependence will only make matters worse–decades of ignoring the clear need to lessen the reliance on oil guarantees a future far more painful than it need be, according to Goodstein. And when the United States, the largest economy on the planet, feels the pinch, so will the rest of the world.
Goodstein, professor of physics and vice provost at the California Institute of Technology, sees no reason to believe the United States will change its direction anytime soon. He sketches a grim scenario for the future in which “all efforts to produce, distribute, and consume alternative fuels fast enough to fill the gap between falling supplies and rising demand fail.”
Severe inflation and worldwide depression would follow, he predicts; the oil crises of the 1970s were a bitter foretaste. But Goodstein emphasizes that, unlike the experience of the 1970s, “after the worldwide Hubbert's peak, the shortage will not be artificial and it will not be temporary”–prices will not come back down.
At this point, Goodstein believes a disastrous domino effect could begin. Damage to the economy might hinder much-belated efforts to develop alternative fuels that are relatively inexpensive and environmentally benign. Industrial economies might turn to coal, which is plentiful and cheap, but definitely not benign. Along with the toxic impurities released when coal is burned (like sulfur, mercury, and arsenic), increased coal combustion would pump large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, resulting in dire consequences.
Global climate change is surely the greatest threat to the planet's ability to support life. Most atmospheric scientists agree that the changes now under way are caused to a considerable extent by human activities that generate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Burning more coal would be a deadly, perhaps fatal, blow to current efforts to reduce the concentration of these gases in the atmosphere.
The best one can hope for following the worldwide Hubbert's peak, says Goodstein, is that the ensuing disruptions finally trigger energy policies that are both rapid and environmentally sound. For example: A methane-based economy that temporarily bridges the energy gap while other energy infrastructures are put in place; a nuclear revival despite public fears; alternative fuels coming on line; “unconventional” oil getting some use.
The many forms of unconventional oil–heavy oil, oil sands, tar sands, and shale oil–have long been extolled as a fabulously rich supply of fuel that will smoothly replace the conventional variety. But this is misleading, Goodstein says. Take shale oil for example, more of which exists in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, than conventional oil worldwide. But to convert shale oil to usable material takes a labor-intensive process that's more costly, more time-consuming, and more environmentally damaging than extracting conventional oil.
Unconventional oils require more energy input to get a given energy output. “Some experts believe that shale oil will always be a net energy loser,” Goodstein writes. Petroleum expert Kenneth Deffeyes would likely agree. Deffeyes points out that for 50 years the petroleum industry has expected shale to put conventional oil fields out of business, but each time the price of oil goes up, so too does the expected price of shale oil.
The end of cheap oil, combined with potentially catastrophic climate change, has convinced some people that a hydrogen economy is a magic-bullet solution to both problems. After all, hydrogen is by far the most abundant element, and it can power highly efficient fuel cells that generate electricity and heat with no emissions other than water. But Goodstein deflates the fantasy of a hydrogen-economy paradise, contending that the primary energy needed to make hydrogen for fuel cells will be “dirty” and will consume much more fuel than the hydrogen replaces. Surprisingly, he doesn't write much more on the subject.
In contrast, hydrogen is the chief focus of Joseph Romm's book, The Hype about Hydrogen. Romm is well-qualified to evaluate the future of hydrogen: He helped run the Energy Department's program on hydrogen, renewable fuels, and energy efficiency during the Clinton administration, and these days he is helping Iceland switch to hydrogen power. Despite his enthusiasm for hydrogen, Romm says a hydrogen-based transportation system in the United States is at least 30 years away. But the crisis of global climate change–for Romm, the dominant driving force behind energy policy–can't wait that long.
“What do you think? I can't tell if he's showing remorse or not.”
Today, even producing hydrogen affordably and in an environmentally sound way is impossible. Creating hydrogen through electrolysis (splitting water molecules with electric currents) results in problems akin to using fossil fuels–mainly, it's inefficient, and if the electricity is generated by fossil fuels, more greenhouse gases are spewed into the atmosphere. Romm estimates that with respect to electrolysis, “four units of energy are thrown away for every one unit of hydrogen energy produced.”
Producing hydrogen with renewable sources like solar or wind power would eliminate the generation of greenhouse gases, but it wouldn't be the best use of alternative energies, Romm says. Using renewables as direct energy sources in place of coal will be more of a help in reducing greenhouse gases. This is why he, paradoxically at first glance, advocates accelerated development of renewables as a shorter path to the hydrogen economy.
As for making hydrogen from nuclear power–apparently what President George W. Bush had in mind in his 2003 State of the Union address–Romm acknowledges that no strategy for producing hydrogen that is carbon dioxide-free should be dismissed out of hand, but he is skeptical. Romm estimates that “100 or more nuclear water-splitting plants would be needed to replace a significant fraction of U.S. transportation fuel with hydrogen.” The rising price of oil and the impact of climate change may, as Goodstein suggests, reduce public concerns about nuclear power, but that change won't come easily or quickly.
Production problems are only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to creating a hydrogen economy. Because the hydrogen that is produced is a low-density gas, it must be compressed, requiring still more energy. Then there is the rest of the infrastructure that must be built, which is likely to cost several hundred billion dollars, prompting what Romm calls the “chicken-and-egg” problem: “Who will spend the money for that infrastructure before a significant number of commercial fuel cell vehicles are available?” Conversely, “How will vehicles achieve the production levels needed to bring costs down to affordable levels if the infrastructure does not exist?”
Goodstein and Romm agree broadly on what must be done to limit economic and environmental catastrophe, and on what stands in the way. Both advocate sharply increased development of clean energy technologies and a major effort to use electricity and fossil fuels more efficiently–measures vigorously supported by forward-looking energy analysts for decades. And Romm lays out a “long-term, conservative” approach to the hydrogen economy, fearing that overhyping will cause a backlash that ultimately slows progress.
Romm also argues in favor of preparing the public for rough times ahead–for what Goodstein describes as the “worst-case scenario”–and for readying that public for the difficult choices that will have to be made. It's a good idea whose usefulness would be greatly increased if government provided some leadership. But the U.S. legislative and executive branches have failed to warn citizens about the looming crises, much less launch cost-effective programs that would ward the crises off.
In today's political setting, Out of Gas and The Hype about Hydrogen are “must reads.” Most of the pressure for energy policy to change course will have to come from the bottom upward. These books provide information and analysis that will assist that change. And they supplement each other in another important way: Goodstein gives greater emphasis to the end of cheap oil, Romm to global climate change and the optimal energy policy to minimize it. But it isn't necessary to rank these threats–they're inevitable, and we're going to have to deal with them. As both books stress, energy use and the state of the environment are inseparable.
One thing is new about that connection. The phrase “state of the environment” here refers to the capacity of the planet to support the human life now residing on it. The authors are sober scientists, hardly inclined toward unfounded, alarmist forecasts. Yet Goodstein begins and ends with a chilling sentiment (with which Romm would likely agree): Unless the energy and environmental crises can be quickly resolved, “civilization as we know it will not survive.”