Abstract
Opinion on the war in Iraq turned against the president in September.
It is said that Americans are obsessed with money. That aphorism was amply demonstrated on September 7 when President George W. Bush announced to the nation that he was submitting a request to Congress for $87 billion to pay for post-war reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Public and congressional discomfort with postwar Iraq suddenly had a price tag. Congressional criticism of the administration's handling of Iraq and Afghanistan escalated sharply. Public disapproval increased markedly as well.
On May 1, a flight-suited President Bush de-clared on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln that major combat operations were over in Iraq. The banner behind him read “Mission Accomplished.” His popularity soared. The president had demonstrated to his critics at home and abroad unrivaled American military power. The neocons who dominate the Bush foreign policy apparatus were riding high.
But the edge of victory dulled as American casualties after May 1 mounted, eventually exceeding casualties during the march to Baghdad. Between May 1 and September 5, 149 Americans died in Iraq, compared to 138 from March 19 through May 1. Saddam Hussein's government had been routed, but guerrilla attacks continued to cause havoc and take lives. A series of explosions rocked U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, the Jordanian embassy, a Shi'ite shrine in Najaf–and the American sense of omnipotence.
Expectations that American troops would soon be home evaporated when the Pentagon disclosed that National Guard and reservist tours of duty would be extended. Plans to cut U.S. troops in Iraq from 130,000 to 60,000 disappeared. The unilateralist president, who abhorred the United Nations and rejected international treaties, was forced into an about-face to ask for international approval, funds, and troops.
Whispers of “quagmire,” a term so meaningful to the Vietnam generation, began to be heard. When Congress returned from its August recess, Republicans joined in the rising chorus of dissent. In the first week of September, Arizona's Sen. John McCain called for sending two additional combat divisions to Iraq. New Mexico's Sen. Pete Domenici said, “I am expecting new ideas to evolve from the White House on how this is going to be handled.” Former Majority Leader Trent Lott admitted, “Obviously we are not happy with the way it is.” And Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts of Kansas argued, “If Iraq was not a sanctuary for Al Qaeda before, it certainly is now.” All four had supported the war. So too had Pennsylvania's hawkish John Murtha, the ranking Democrat on the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, who called for the ouster of Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary and a leading neocon, and others who failed to plan for the post-war situation. All 10 Democratic presidential candidates, including those who had voted to authorize the use of force in Iraq, joined in the chorus of criticism of the administration's handling of the post-conflict situation.
But it was the president's request for another $87 billion to prosecute the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan that crystallized the dissent. These were big dollars–the largest ever supplemental budget request–at a time when next year's deficit was already heading over $500 billion.
The latest request came on top of an initial supplemental war request of $78.5 billion approved in April. Moreover, Republicans were becoming increasingly uncertain about how to defend their economic stewardship at a time of an anemic economic recovery marked by soaring poverty levels and the loss of 2.7 million jobs since Bush took office.
Republican budget hawks began to get exceedingly nervous. Ohio Republican Sen. George Voinovich suggested on September 18, “It's hard to say to everybody, well, we don't have money for sewers and water [at home], but we're going to put in all that money over there.” Other Republicans suggested that Iraq should be required to repay the reconstruction funds. “It's only fair and right that a small portion of Iraqi oil revenues over the next 10 to 15 years be devoted to paying those costs,” argued North Carolina Cong. Charles Taylor, a senior House appropriator.
Democrats had a field day comparing the $87 billion to major domestic programs, to the cost of previous wars, and to the Bush administration's low-ball estimates for the cost of rebuilding Iraq. Wisconsin Cong. David Obey, the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, disseminated figures comparing spending on Iraqi public services with money spent at home. For example, he noted that the Bush plan called for spending $255 per Iraqi on electrical improvements by 2005, compared to 71 cents per American per year, and $38 per capita on Iraqi hospitals, compared to $3.30 in the United States.
The request also gave the lie to a variety of prewar Bush administration assumptions. In December 2002, the director of the Office of Management and Budget estimated that the cost of the war with Iraq would be $50-$60 billion. Wolfowitz told a House defense subcommittee in March 2003, “We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.” Vice President Dick Cheney suggested in a March 16 interview that American soldiers would be greeted as liberators. These same officials had hyped the prewar threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The quickening drumbeat of criticism was accompanied by declining presidential approval numbers. A USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll released on September 12 indicated that the president's job approval rating had slid to a thin 52 percent, down from a 2003 high of 71 percent in mid-April, and 90 percent job approval in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. It stood just one point above his lowest ever approval rating, shortly before September 11, 2001.
A Washington Post poll released the next day reinforced the president's difficulties. He had planned to win reelection in major part due to his heroic stewardship of the war against terrorism and the victories in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Post poll found that 46 percent of Americans disapproved of the way that the president was handling Iraq, and 61 percent opposed the new budget request. Fifty-five percent of Americans did not think that the administration had a clear plan for handling the Iraq situation.
While more than 60 percent of Americans continued to support the original recourse to war, a whopping 85 percent were concerned that the United States would get bogged down in a long and costly peacekeeping mission (read: “quagmire”).
The rising tide of dissent in both parties was immediately reflected in congressional votes. House and Senate Republicans had remained remarkably disciplined in support of Bush policies and priorities. But in September, that unity began to crack. The Senate voted to overturn new Bush rules for overtime pay 55-45, to restore cuts in student aid 51-44, and to overturn by a vote of 55-40 a Bush regulation loosening media-ownership rules. Even the House of Representatives joined in when it voted 258-160 on September 9 to overturn Treasury Department regulations on company pension plans.
In October 2002, a minority of Democrats voted against the use of force in Iraq. Many argued that a unilateral, preemptive war fought in Iraq was unnecessary, harmed U.S. relations with the world, and risked a rise in terrorism and an expensive rebuilding process. Their cries in the wilderness, and those of Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean, resonated with the left of the Democratic Party, but not with many others.
The president's request for $87 billion has spread that critique to the center, and even to the right. It dawned on many Americans that there was a huge price to pay for the neocons' grand plan for expansion of American power. With post-war chaos expected to endure for many months, it is likely that the tide of criticism will continue to increase.