The Scud B is the most popular ballistic missile in the world. It can be found from Vietnam to Slovakia to Yemen to the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was used in the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan-Soviet war, and the Gulf war. Afghanistan's Northern Alliance reportedly deployed Scuds in its offensive on Kabul last November.
Just where did all these Scuds come from?
The Scud's lineage dates back to the German V-2 rocket, the granddaddy of ballistic missiles. The V-2 (that's “V” for vengeance) was first used by Hitler in 1944 against Britain. Brits called them “Bob Hopes”–you bobbed down and hoped. In the following five decades, the V-2-derived, 300-kilometer Soviet Scud B missile became the slingshot of choice in the backpockets of many developing nations, and it now lies at the heart of missile proliferation problems.
Iraq cannibalized some of its Soviet-obtained Scud Bs to make new, supposedly improved, generations of Scud-based missiles. The Al-Hussein could fly 600 kilometers, and the Al-Abbas 800 kilometers, but both were horribly inaccurate. The range-challenged Al-Samoud was considered a failure, dubbed by U.S. intelligence a “scaled-down Scud.” Today, the status of Iraq's missile program is unknown; the Gulf war cease-fire agreement called for dismantling Iraqi missiles, but some believe Iraq has a hidden arsenal.
The North Korean missile program is more successful. After they got their hands on a small number of Scud Bs from Egypt (which got them from the Soviet Union), the North Koreans were said to have reverse-engineered the design to make the Scud Mod-A. They produced and sold improved versions, the Scud Mod-B and Scud Mod-C (also known as Scud Bs and Cs), to Iran, where they reportedly helped build a missile assembly plant. (And that's how Scuds eventually ended up in the Democratic Republic of Congo–the first buyer of Iranian-made Scuds.)
The next step in the North Korean missile program was the No Dong, which can reach 1,000 kilometers. It was once thought to feature four clustered Scud engines, but missile experts now believe that it has a single, scaled-up Scud engine. Pakistan's Ghauri-1 and Iran's Shihab-3, both with a 1,300-kilometer range, are believed to be of No Dong design, if not simply off-the-shelf No Dongs by different names. Extended fuel tanks reportedly give the Ghauri-2–otherwise a Ghauri-1–a range of 2,000 kilometers.
Who's got ‘em
Scud Bs have a range of 300 kilometers; Scud Cs, 500 kilomScud Ds, 600-700 kilometers. Countries that possess Scud BAfghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, GeorgiaKazakhstan, Libya, Poland, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Yemen. The Congo and Egypt hchased Scud Cs in addition to Scud Bs. Syria has acquired thand Iraq has built the Al-Hussein missile, which has a Scud DThe North Korean, Iranian, and Pakistani missile programs haScud technology to develop missiles with ranges said to be in the 1,300- to 1,500-kilometer range, although these claims may be optimistic. All three are believed to be developing longer-range missiles.
The No Dong is almost certainly the first stage of the more advanced 1,500-kilometer Taepo Dong-1 missile, which is thought to also use a Scud as a second stage. The third stage of the missile, which, if functional, could extend the Taepo Dong's reach into intercontinental range, failed during its only test. There is so little space for a warhead (or any payload) on the Taepo Dong, however, that some U.S. officials refer to the hypothetical warhead as “the golf ball of death.” The beleaguered Taepo Dong doesn't really do North Korea proud as far as reliability, either; one commentator likened it to the “Scarlet Pimpernel of missiles” because “it wobbles here, it wobbles there, it wobbles everywhere.” According to some analysts, cash-strapped Pyongyang is probably more interested in selling longer-range missiles than in threatening U.S. territory with them.
Yet North Korea sits at the top of the Rumsfeld report's list of baddies, mainly “because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses–missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), and underground facility expertise–to other countries of missile proliferation concern.”
But maybe this conventional explanation gives credit where credit isn't entirely due. A couple of years ago, researchers at the Monterey Institute of International Studies began wondering if help from Russian freelancers was the reason the North Korean program had so few problems and tested so rarely. In 1992, 60 Russian specialists from the Makayev missile center were detained at a Moscow airport as they tried to depart for North Korea. No one accuses the Russian government of supporting the North Korean missile program, but private Russian help looks probable. There is even speculation that North Korea's willingness to adhere to a missile test moratorium is due to a technical stasis resulting from discontinued Russian aid.
Egypt, Libya, and Syria are believed to be working toward some level of indigenous Scud production capabilities, trying to make the leap from consumer to producer.
Within striking distance
To put things in perspective, if Chicago were a “rogue city,” with Scuds and all, what cities could it threaten with its “rogue missiles”?
