Abstract
The bush administration is rushing toward early deployment of a limited national missile defense system. If it cannot get the Russians to endorse a revision of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, it threatens to go ahead unilaterally, ending the treaty altogether.
Although the Bush administration has focused on Russia, it began last summer to pay more attention to Chinese concerns; it says it will consult with China on the matter.
In China, U.S. plans for national missile defense are not just a topic for security experts. It is a matter of wide concern. A search for “NMD” on the Internet in China, including the mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, yields about as many web sites as those devoted to McDonald's restaurants. (And in China, the fast food chain's influence is a hot topic.)
About 90 percent of the web pages on the mainland and an even larger proportion in Taiwan and Hong Kong use the English acronym “NMD” rather than its Chinese translation, which indicates that national missile defense is still regarded as a foreign concept.
The Chinese people generally believe that a U.S. national missile defense system is a bad idea. That feeling extends to Taiwan also, where some Taiwanese experts have suggested that national missile defense could have negative effects on international security.
A U.S. trick?
The primary concern in China is that a U.S. national missile defense system could negate the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Some believe that the main purpose of the American plan is to do just that. Even the limited system described by the Bush administration could potentially achieve that goal.
If the United States ever came to feel that it could disarm the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability, the United States might become much less likely to adopt a cooperative approach in resolving disputes with China.
China does not want to waste resources on a nuclear arms race triggered by a U.S. national missile defense scheme. China is determined to focus on economic devel-opment–and that requires an environment free of major tension among the great powers.
In fact, some Chinese scholars believe that national missile defense is actually a trick to bring China into an arms race that would exhaust its resources and harm its economic development.
People who claim this do not necessarily believe that national missile defense is technically possible. The important point is not whether it would work; the only requirement is that it cause China to spend a lot of money in building up its deterrent forces, money that could have been used to improve life in China.
They argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union was largely caused by President Ronald Reagan's hugely expensive military buildup and Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars.” The Soviet Union could not compete in that new game. In Western terms, it went bankrupt. These scholars suggest that the United States is now trying to use the same strategy in an effort to “contain” China.
A related concern: In the past, a major Chinese worry regarding U.S. national missile defense was that it would provoke a response–a nuclear and missile buildup by other countries. Russia, for example, might halt reductions in its nuclear stockpile. (According to treaty reservations adopted by the Russian Duma when it ratified START II, the Putin government would be required to do just that.)
A new worry in China is that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would also shatter a psychological baseline; it would signal an American intention to abandon other arms control efforts. It is no secret that many high-level members of the Bush administration have little regard for the arms control process. If the United States abandons arms control, other countries would do likewise.
Where is the threat?
Many technical people in China do not consider national missile defense as truly feasible. But they worry that unexpected technological breakthroughs might occur, further enhancing U.S. predominance in military technology.
Long-range precision weapons with conventional warheads, for instance, could benefit from further development of guidance technology, detection technology, and computer technology as national missile defense research proceeds.
Such long-range precision weapons with conventional warheads would be distinctly destabilizing because they could be used as a first strike against strategic nuclear weapons.
In Taiwan, some scholars worry that the dispute between mainland China and the United States over national missile defense could put Taiwan in an even more precarious position. They suggest that Taiwanese authorities use great caution in responding to U.S. plans for national missile defense. A few Taiwanese researchers suggest that Taiwan might even play the national missile defense card in exchange for the mainland's tolerance of some theater missile defense for Taiwan.
Beyond the Taiwan issue, which is always difficult, some Chinese researchers worry that deployment of a national missile defense system would steadily increase tensions between Beijing and Washington.
A national missile defense system makes little sense if there is no credible threat. In fact, the current “states of concern,” principally North Korea and Iraq, do not seem to constitute realistic threats. Many scholars do not believe that they have–or are likely to have in the future–the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the United States by long-range missiles.
The Clinton and Bush administrations have repeatedly said that China is not the reason for considering a national missile defense system, except in the case of accidental launch. If it is clearly proved that “states of concern” will not pose a long-range missile threat against the U.S. homeland, or that the threat, if any, could be addressed by diplomatic approaches or by a more geographically limited defense, we expect some American experts and government officials to cite the “China threat” as the best reason to continue pouring money into a very expensive enterprise.
Missile defense and unilateralism
Chinese news articles and commentaries on the U.S. tendency to unilateralism greatly intensified after President Bush entered the White House. The authors of all these articles believe that unilateralism is characteristic of Bush's foreign policy and the push for a national missile defense system is a dramatic example of it.
Some researchers believe that the deployment of a national missile defense system would, in turn, reinforce U.S. unilateral tendencies because the United States would feel even less need in the future to obtain the help of other countries in pursuing its foreign policy objectives.
There is obvious evidence of unilateralism in the development of national missile defense. First, the Bush administration publicly vowed to deploy a system before it had consulted with other countries, including its allies.
Second, the administration threatens to withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally if Russia does not agree to end the treaty.
Third, the administration seems to have little interest in listening to critical responses when it sends envoys to explain the plan to other countries.
Perhaps in an effort to make unilateralism in U.S. national missile defense policy seem more acceptable, the administration began to speak simply of ballistic missile defense rather than the separate activities of national missile defense and theater missile defense. This may have been an effort to convince its allies that the United States would treat their security the same as its own. Therefore, deployment of ballistic missile defense systems should not be regarded as a unilateral effort.
In China, however, unilateralism is regarded as more about the decision-making process than the theoretical coverage of various anti-missile systems. Despite “consultations” with other countries, there is ample evidence that unilateralism is the model for the U.S. decision-making process.
On a broader front, the Bush administration seems intent on unilaterally blocking the international arms control process. It has, for example, rejected the verification protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention, refused constraints over the transfer of small arms, and declined to resubmit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for ratification. Such unilateral actions may ultimately weaken international cooperation in improving nonproliferation regimes.
Build trust, not mistrust
In China, there are differing opinions as to how to weigh the damage caused by the stepped-up U.S. commitment to theater and national missile defense systems. If the United States and Taiwan work together on developing and deploying a theater missile defense system for Taiwan, the “one China” policy would be severely violated and the military connection between Taiwan and the United States tightened. Increased tension would be the result.
China must therefore utilize all of its diplomatic resources to prevent the United States from “selling” the idea of theater missile defenses to Taiwan.
But as worrisome as the Taiwan issue is, the possibility of a national missile defense system for the United States causes the greatest concern in China. The latter has the potential for severely destabilizing U.S.-Chinese relations.
Some Chinese experts believe that China should not react strongly to a decision to deploy a national missile defense system. At least one scholar, for instance, believes that it is the morality-based “nuclear taboo” rather than nuclear deterrence that plays the main role in preventing the United States from launching a nuclear attack anywhere. Therefore, China should not worry much even if China “loses” its nuclear retaliatory capability because of deployment of national missile defense.
Others believe that China must develop a more robust retaliatory force as a counter to national missile defense. Some experts indicate that a buildup in the number of Chinese ICBMs would easily saturate a limited national missile defense system. (Many U.S. diplomats and military and civilian experts agree.) Actually, a slight buildup would not work if we take the Chinese “no-first-use” commitment and survivability of Chinese ICBMs into account.
There are other options, of course. Rather than building many more missiles, China could deploy penetration aids on its missiles, including decoys, stealth technologies, and warhead maneuvering capabilities.
The authors do not accept the argument that there should be little or no Chinese reaction to a U.S. decision to deploy national missile defense. As long as the great powers have nuclear weapons, it would be a mistake for China to permit its retaliatory force to be negated.
We agree that it is unlikely that the United States and China would think about nuclear exchange in any future scenario. Nevertheless, we also believe that U.S.-Chinese relations could be tremendously damaged by deployment of a national missile defense system. Such a system would build mutual distrust–not mutual confidence.
Mutual mistrust would make it far more difficult for the United States and China to seek compromise when disputes arise, and it would return the world to yet another Cold War.
A middle way?
The position of the Chinese government has two tiers. First, China is opposed to national missile defense because the government believes “such a move will lead to a series of negative consequences detrimental to global strategic stability.”
The second tier is that China welcomes serious dialogue with the United States in an attempt to seek a solution “that will not undermine the security interests of relevant countries.” There is no sign that China will change its position.
China has also stated that it will ensure the effectiveness of its nuclear retaliatory capability if a national missile defense system is deployed. We do not, however, know what China would do to ensure that effectiveness.
As previously noted, the authors believe it would be unacceptable for China to fail to react to deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system. But a buildup in the numbers of Chinese ICBMs may not be the best course, either. Perhaps there is a middle way.
We suggest that China continue measures designed to raise the survivability of the Chinese ICBM force, regardless of whether a national missile defense system is deployed. “Survivability” is regarded by everyone in the global security field as critical to maintaining stability in times of crisis. Such work would not increase the perception of a “China threat” in other countries, including the United States.
Our second suggestion is for China to deploy penetration aids with its missiles, if a national missile defense system is deployed by the United States. Penetration aids are inexpensive and they have a low political cost. Further, it is technically unlikely that a U.S. defense system would ever work so well that it could sort out penetration aids from warheads. That would ensure that China's retaliatory force would remain viable.