Abstract
Under attack from Congress.
In the most stunning sneak attack since Pearl Harbor, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee voted on July 12 to eliminate $1.8 billion that the U.S. Air Force had requested to build the first six of its prize F-22 fighter aircraft. The House endorsed the action, by a vote of 379-45, 10 days later. Neither the air force nor Lockheed Martin, the plane's primary contractor and the world's largest defense manufacturer, had an inkling of what was in store for them.
In the mid-1980s, the air force embarked on the F-22 program–then dubbed the Advanced Tactical Fighter–to replace the F-15 as the next-generation fighter for air-to-air combat. A July 19 Baltimore Sun analysis of the program quoted air force reports from 1987 and 1988 stating that the F-22 was created to combat “a technologically advanced, numerically superior enemy. … The program schedule is driven by the threat.”
Even with the Cold War over and Russia's conventional forces diminished drastically, the air force has persisted undeterred with its top priority program.
The air force promised new, efficient construction techniques to make the plane affordable. Despite the promises, the sticker price has risen from $68 million per plane to over $180 million. And costs continue to rise. In mid-July, an independent Pentagon analysis suggested that the $64 billion total program price tag would rise by another $9 billion, making the per plane cost $215 million. Facing this reality, the air force scaled back its purchase from 750 fighters to 339. Making matters worse, the Pentagon gave the go-ahead to production in clear violation of its “fly before you buy” policy. Only 200 of the 4,337 hours of scheduled flight tests had been completed.
This cycle of rising weapons costs, inadequate testing, and over-promising has been repeated many times. Former Lockheed Martin Chairman Norman Augustine once observed that if cost trends continue, one day it will take the entire defense budget to buy a single fighter.
Despite these glaring problems, it is almost unheard of for either Congress or any administration to show the guts to kill a major procurement program this far along. Normal practice is to cut the number of weapons to be purchased: the B-2 program was cut from 132 to 21, MX missiles were reduced from 200 to 50. In a notable exception, President Bush's Defense Secretary Dick Cheney killed the navy's over-budget A-12 program.
Thus, the decision by the House Appropriations Committee marks an astonishing departure from past practice. Significantly, the attack on the F-22 was led by two conservative Republicans, Jerry Lewis of California and C.W. Bill Young of Florida, and conservative Democrat John Murtha of Pennsylvania, all key figures on the House Appropriations Committee. Their average rating on Peace PAC's voting scorecard of national security issues for the past two years was a dismal 16 percent.
They planned the coup carefully. First, they told no one in advance of their plans–not the air force, not the Pentagon, not Lockheed Martin. Following their action, on July 21, Defense Secretary William Cohen told the press: “Neither I nor anyone in this building–or anyone in the air force–was aware of the effort under way on the part of the committee.”
The appropriators correctly calculated that if their plans leaked prematurely, the Pentagon and the contractor community would launch a vigorous counterattack.
Cohen conceded as much, telling the press: “This was done in this fashion in order to be able to recommend the termination of a major program without any countervailing argument or pressure.”
Second, the committee transferred the F-22 money to other programs with alternate constituencies. The $1.8 billion that had been slated for F-22 procurement instead funded eight F-15 fighters, five F-16 fighters, eight KC-130J air tankers, and pilot retention programs.
Third, they secured the support of House Speaker Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (although Hastert later flip-flopped under pressure).
Fourth, they retained $1.2 billion to continue F-22 research and development and called for a pause, not termination, of the program.
The committee's explanation for its actions validated arguments advanced by critics of the plane. In a July 12 statement, Lewis argued that the F-22 had become “so costly that it undermines other urgent spending needs vital to the future of our air forces,” such as air tankers, airlift transports, and aerial reconnaissance. On July 21 he told the Christian Science Monitor: “We have very tough choices, and if you aren't willing to face those, you ought to have another job.” Lewis also pointed out that the aircraft was originated during the Cold War to deal with an enemy that no longer exists.
These same arguments could be applied to other gold-plated weapons on the drawing boards, all of which cost tens of billions of dollars. Competing for funds are three major tactical aircraft programs (the F-22, the navy's F-18 E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter) whose collective costs could top $330 billion–plus other weapons programs such as the army's Comanche helicopter, the New Attack Submarine, and the Aegis destroyer.
There are numerous ironies in this battle. The recently concluded war in Kosovo, like Desert Storm in 1991, confirmed to the world–and the House Appropriations Committee–that F-15s, F-16s, and other current aircraft are more than adequate to command the airways well into the twenty-first century. Lewis's July 12 statement noted: “We already have the most advanced fighter plane in the sky in the F-15. The inventory of these planes, if maintained and upgraded, could continue our air superiority until 2015.”
Another irony: Lockheed Martin is no exception to major defense contractors that spread subcontracts across hundreds of congressional districts, but concentrate key work–and jobs–in the districts and states of important patrons. When the air force focused the program in Georgia, that state's Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn was the key armed forces powerhouse, and its Republican Cong. Newt Gingrich had reigned over the House for the previous four years. Nunn retired in 1997 and Speaker Gingrich left under fire last year. This July, neither could shelter the F-22.
Whether the House Appropriations Committee's blow to the F-22 will survive is unknown. The Senate voted full funding for the troubled program. At first, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner appeared skeptical of the plane's future. He told Secretary Cohen at a July 20 hearing: “We have a program today which has grown from a unit cost of about $68 million a copy to a projected $200 million. That says this program has problems–that's my take.” The next day, he had changed his tune in an interview with Bloomberg News Service: “I think beyond any doubt, it will survive. It is a program that is essential for America's future defense. It's as simple as that.”
Ted Stevens, the Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman and a key figure in the House-Senate conference, agreed. “It must be saved,” said the Alaska Republican. “It is the keystone for our defenses in the next century.”
Air force and Lockheed Martin officials combed the Hill to counter the sneak attack. President Clinton, with an eye to the 2000 elections and always delighted to outflank Republicans on the right, jumped to the defense of the airplane. At a July 21 press conference, he argued: “We can fund the F-22. That is what I will fight to do. I think it would be a mistake to abandon the project.” The administration threatened a veto of a defense appropriations bill without F-22 procurement funding.
One Senate staffer, wise to the ways of the Hill, suggested that the eventual outcome between the Senate funding six planes and the House funding zero would be to split the difference and build three. That might sink the plane. Lockheed Martin executives are concerned that any cut in the program would force renegotiation of subcontracts, delay the program, and raise the price of the plane even further. Air force acquisition official Gregory Martin told the July 16 Defense Daily that he doubted “the aircraft could survive such a pause.”
Whatever the final outcome, the House's action confirms that even with the huge defense budget increases proposed by the Republican Congress and President Clinton, there still are not sufficient funds to pay for the entire Pentagon wish-list. Liberal Democrats call for the Pentagon to make tough budget choices; conservative Republicans just might succeed.