Navigating the Aftermath: Crisis Communication Strategies of Muslim Organizations in the Wake of Terror Attacks Conducted by Islamist Fundamentalists

Abstract

This study seeks to improve our understanding of effective crisis communication of Muslim organizations after terror attacks using real-world examples as stimuli. Actual public statements issued by Muslim organizations in response to the terror attack conducted by Islamist fundamentalists in Berlin in 2016 were used. After presenting these statements, participants completed a survey assessing perceptions of the statements, specifically focusing on the degree of distancing from the perpetrator, the emphasis on societal commitment, and the emotional framing of the statements. Additionally, the survey measured the extent to which respondents attributed responsibility for the terrorist attack to the Muslim organization, as well as their broader perceptions of the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam. Our results show that especially emphasizing societal commitment has a positive effect on public perception, whereas distancing and message framing have lower impact. The present study underlines the importance of including attributed responsibility into the research framework.

Plain Language Summary

This study looks at how Muslim organizations communicate during crises, specifically after terror attacks, by using real examples. It examines public statements made by Muslim organizations following the 2016 terrorist attack in Berlin and how German citizens react to those statements. The survey focused on how people felt about the organizations’ efforts to distance themselves from the attackers, highlight their positive contributions to society, and the emotional tone of the statements. The findings show that emphasizing the organization’s social good and expressing emotions positively influence how the public views the organization, while distancing from the attacker only has a minor impact. The study also highlights the importance of considering how the public assigns blame, even if the responsibility is based on association rather than direct involvement with the attack.

Keywords

crisis communication terrorism responsibility framing IAT

Introduction

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals claiming religious motives in the United States, there has been a substantial increase in negative portrayals of Muslims (Das et al. 2009; Neumann et al. 2018). This has led to a rapid rise in prejudice against Muslims and the emergence of anti-Muslim sentiments that threaten to shake the foundations of multicultural societies (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017). In the aftermath of terrorist attacks rated by individuals claiming religious motives, Muslim organizations face the challenge of countering the proliferation of negative prejudices against the wider Muslim community. Research in crisis communication provide valuable insights into effective strategies that would soften the negative ramifications of a crisis (Choi & Lin, 2009; Coombs, 2007; Kim, 2022; Seeger, 2006). Studies on crisis communication in the context of terrorism predominantly focus on governmental institutions and states as actors (Canel & Sanders, 2010; Cristófol et al., 2020), and mostly ignore non-state actors striving to shape public perceptions of Muslims such as Muslim organizations and their representatives. Muslim organizations serve as a point of dialogue for the society and politics. These organizations are often solicited for comments and occasionally criticized for what is perceived as delayed or insufficient responses to terrorist attacks (Ettinger, 2018).

Currently, two studies have examined the crisis communication strategies of Muslim spokespersons after a terror attack (Durmaz et al., 2023; Farrell & Littlefield, 2012). Both studies apply a qualitative analysis of published documents. Farrell and Littlefield (2012) investigated the crisis communication employed by different stakeholder groups in case of the Fort Hood Shooting in 2009. Their research shows that spokespeople from the Muslim community used a diverse range of crisis communication strategies from denying the act to distancing the Muslim-American community from the perpetrator’s actions. Furthermore, they identified a strategy described as bolstering by Coombs (2007), which tries to highlight the good actions of the past. Durmaz et al. (2024) analyzed statements issued by Muslim organizations after attacks with so-called Islamist and Islamophobic backgrounds between 2015 and 2020 in Europe. Their results show a similar pattern. When responding to attacks, the Muslim organization avoided taking responsibility and distanced itself from the perpetrators. Another response highlighted the organizations’ commitment to the general community and their good deeds for society, thus diverting from the actual incidence.

Despite interesting insights into actual statements used after terror attacks, those studies did not investigate the impact of the statements. Hence, this research aims at deepening our understanding of crisis strategies used by Muslim organizations by assessing their impact on societal perceptions. Specifically, we aim at testing the effects of two main content strategies, (a) distancing from the perpetrator and (b) diverting attention from the incident by emphasizing the societal commitment and good deeds, in addition to (c) the framing of the statement with regards to its emotionality on German citizens’ perception of the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam.

Furthermore, our research will also test whether the effects of the three previously mentioned independent variables on citizens’ perception of the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam are mediated by the attributed collective responsibility for the terror attack. To empirically address these questions, we employed an online survey in which participants were first presented with an actual news article about the terror attack in Berlin in 2016. Subsequent to reading the article, each participant was randomly shown one of 10 authentic press statements from Muslim organizations in Germany responding to the event.

Literature Review

Generalized Perceptions, Discrimination, and Collective Responsibility

Human perception and judgment are shaped by cognitive processes that promote efficiency but may also lead to overgeneralization. Psychological research has shown that people rely on cognitive shortcuts such as schemata, stereotypes, and heuristics to process complex social information (Fiske, 1982, 1998; Macrae et al., 1994). These mental structures allow individuals to quickly interpret new information, but they also facilitate the formation and application of generalized beliefs about entire social groups based on limited observations (Allport, 1954).

While generalization can serve adaptive purposes, its application to social groups often results in negative consequences. Once generalized perceptions take hold, they can manifest as stereotypes and prejudices, leading to biased attitudes and discriminatory behaviors (Dovidio, et al., 2010). Research demonstrates that such processes can occur implicitly, influencing social judgments outside conscious awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The tendency to ascribe characteristics of an individual group member to the group as a whole is especially pronounced following highly salient or negative events, such as acts of terrorism (Cinnirella, 2012; Maass & Schaller, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 2004).

At the societal level, the perpetuation of negative stereotypes and prejudices can erode trust, foster social exclusion, and undermine intergroup relationships (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Pratto et al., 2013). Discrimination rooted in generalized perceptions may result in marginalization, stigmatization, and increased intergroup tension (Craig & Richeson, 2016). These dynamics jeopardize social cohesion and contribute to cycles of distrust and conflict (Tausch et al., 2011), emphasizing the need to explore how cognitive and perceptual processes link individual attitudes to broader societal outcomes.

Attributed Collective Responsibility for Terrorism and Spill-Over Effects

The explanations provided by actors regarding an event can influence individuals’ attributions (Weiner et al., 1988). Communication serves as a tool to influence a person’s attributions and the subsequent emotions associated with those attributions (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Specifically, when determining the cause of an event, people will try to determine the party responsible for it. The more individuals attribute responsibility to a stakeholder group, the higher the likelihood that a negative image of the stakeholder group will develop and trigger negative public response (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).

Knobloch-Westerwick and Taylor (2008) call for distinguishing between attribution of causation and attribution of responsibility. Causal attributions are rooted in intricate concepts and phenomena within attribution theory (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 1985). In the context of attributing causation, an actor is perceived as a cause of an event when both control and intentionality are present. Thus, the perceived controllability and assumed intentionality become crucial components (Weiner, 1985). While responsibility is partly derived from causal attributions, one can be held responsible without having directly caused an event in terms of control and intentionality combined. As Knobloch-Westerwick and Taylor (2008) suggest, the perceived blameworthiness hinges not only on assigned responsibility but also on justifications. Therefore, causal attributions constitute just one aspect of the intricate considerations involved in responsibility and blameworthiness attributions.

A terrorist attack is an event for which individuals or the public seek causes and make attributions. If perpetrators highlight religious motivation, the attack triggers fears and while not being the actual originator of the attack, negative associations can be transferred to Muslims in general. Being linked to a crisis while not being the actual originator of the crisis has been discussed in previous research in different domains using several terms such as crisis contagion, spill-over effects, or guilty by association (e.g., Ahluwalia et al., 2001; Laufer & Wang, 2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006).

These phenomena can be explained by drawing on the accessibility-diagnosticity framework by Feldman and Lynch (1988). According to this framework, if crisis information is both memorable to the public and perceived as diagnostic in forming judgments, the likelihood of spillover increases (Laufer & Wang, 2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Both accessibility and diagnosticity conditions must be met for the spillover effect to occur. Accessibility is understood within the framework of spreading activation, where concepts like terrorism or Islam and the categories they belong to reside in a network. These concepts can activate one another when the connections between them have been established (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Cunha Jr et al., 2015; Roehm & Tybout, 2006).

Enhanced accessibility is achieved through the perceived similarity between the focal object and the object causing the crisis, a phenomenon associated with categorization. The greater the perception that the focal object falls into the same category as the one causing the crisis, the higher the risk of a spillover effect (Janakiraman et al., 2009). In the context of a terror attack conducted by Islamist fundamentalists, this implies that media reporting of perpetrators as Muslims heightens the public’s association of Muslims with terrorism, contributing to the view of guilty by association.

Diagnosticity, also linked to the spillover effect (Janakiraman et al., 2009), becomes salient when there is a connection between the actual crisis and a characteristic of the category. In the context of our research, if the media reports that the perpetrator justifies the attack with religious principles and identifies with Islam, the attack itself may become associated with Islam. Hence, the accessibility-diagnosticity framework offers a valuable explanation for the public’s tendency to associate Muslims and Islam with the perpetrator solely due to guilt by association.

As the process of attribution usually is subject to a spontaneous mechanism, blame emerges as a direct variable in attributing evaluations (Hegner et al., 2018; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Xie & Keh, 2016). The degree of blame is posited to be directly proportional to the severity of the incident (Benoit, 1995). According to attribution theory (Kelley, 1973), humans act like naive scientists, seeking underlying causes for observed events in their environment, thereby striving to gain a sense of control over their lives (Dean, 2004). The more the public attributes responsibility to an object for a specific incident, the more negative the evaluation of the object will be (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Whelan & Dawar, 2016). Consequently, we hypothesize a mediating role of responsibility attribution in the relationship between the perception of the statement and outcomes such as the explicit and implicit attitude toward the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam.

Distancing From the Perpetrator

If communication can alter the public’s causal attributions and influence the emotions tied to these attributions, crisis communication could be employed to mitigate reputational damage. As described by Coombs and Holladay (1996), two strategies can be used to reduce the attribution of responsibility. The first strategy involves an organization’s attempt to distance itself from the event, while the second strategy requires an organization to remind stakeholders of the positive actions it has taken in the past (e.g., involvement in violence prevention) and/or to demonstrate that it is taking action (e.g., organizing a vigil).

Previous studies claim that when the risk of a spillover effect is high, organizational attempt at distancing itself from the originator of the crisis would be the optimal strategy (e.g., Bordia et al., 2000; Iyer & Debevec, 1991; Laufer & Wang, 2018). If spillover effects have already taken place, distancing is considered informative, initiating a correction process where the public adjust their perceptions about the Muslim organization resulting in more favorable evaluations (Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Schwarz & Bless, 1992).

However, Roehm and Tybout (2006) suggest that distancing can also have undesirable effects. The principle of informativeness, which suggests that communication should convey new information to the recipient (Clark, 1985), shapes public understanding of news messages. Messages containing novel information are considered informative and are interpreted literally. However, stories that present assertions or denials redundant with existing beliefs are not deemed informative. Consequently, such messages may lead to pragmatic inferences that the opposite could be true, undermining the very beliefs that were explicitly stated (Gruenfeld & Wyer 1992). This phenomenon, known as the boomerang effect, highlights that the effectiveness of distancing from terrorism depends on whether the public already believes that the organization is linked to the perpetrator of the attack even if it is only by association.

A further aspect that might speak against the strategy of distancing from the perpetrator is derived from research on negations. Even when a negator tag is stored in memory, it may not necessarily serve as a basis for judgments (e.g., Grant et al., 2004; Mayo et al., 2004; Ross et al., 1975; Tybout et al., 1981). The negator tag might become dissociated from the affirmation during judgment formation because the affirmation is more readily accessible than the tag. Thus, even if a negation is accurately retained in memory, the affirmation may still be more accessible than the negation.

Information processing theory suggests that distancing (and thus naming the association to the perpetrator despite denying a link) might increase rehearsal of the link and strengthen the stored association. Applied to the present research, one might infer that despite the Muslim organization explicitly stating a disparity in values from the attacker, the affirmation connecting the association with the attacker might get more accessible. While previous research by Durmaz et al. (2024) and Farrell and Littlefield (2012) show that distancing from the attacker is a frequently applied strategy in practice, we cannot conclude the valence of the impact on the public perception from research. Thus, we are addressing the following research question: To what extent does the perception of distancing from a perpetrator in the aftermath of an attack affect the public’s attitudes toward the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam?

Diverting From the Incident by Emphasizing the Societal Commitment and Good Deeds

Derived from information processing theory, Tybout et al. (1981) introduce an alternative strategy that relates to diverting from the incident. The key objective is to divert the information from the primary object, thereby reducing the potential adverse effects of such an association. In crisis communication research, this strategy is discussed in the context of bolstering (Coombs, 2007). This strategy refers away from the actual incident and reminds the public of positive aspects, for example societal engagement and good deeds.

Reminding the public of the organization’s benevolent actions and community engagement can generate a halo effect (Beldad et al., 2018), which serves as a protective shield for the Muslim organization during a crisis. Coombs and Holladay (2006) noted that such a positive halo effect may lead the public to offer the crisis-hit organization the benefit of the doubt and diminish their tendency to assign responsibility to the organization. The halo effect can be explained by Edwards and Smith’s (1996) disconfirmation paradigm, which proposes that when individuals encounter arguments that contradict their established views and beliefs, they tend to mitigate the intensity and force of those arguments. Diminishing the strength of opposing arguments is a response to the human inclination to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Research in crisis communication confirms the positive effect of creating a reputational halo in order to protect the reputation of a crisis-stricken organization (e.g., Beldad et al., 2018; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2014; Gatti et al., 2012; Hegner et al., 2014; Keh & Xie, 2009; Turk et al., 2012). Thus, we hypothesize that: The perception of societal commitment and good deeds of a Muslim organization in the aftermath of a terror attack has a positive impact on the public’s attitudes toward the Muslim organization, Muslims in general and Islam.

Framing

Previous studies have shown that the emotionality of the message, in addition to the content of crisis communication, impacts people’s willingness to evaluate the message content (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2014; Durmaz et al., 2024; Knobloch-Westerwick & Taylor, 2008). Emotionally framed messages aim to evoke individuals’ emotions by incorporating drama and subjective, evaluative elements (Stafford & Day, 1995; Yoo & MacInnis, 2005). Alternatively, organizations can opt for rational framing, which appeals to the receiver’s rationality by presenting information objectively and directly. The manner in which organizations present or frame crisis information can impact the public’s willingness to engage with the content of a statement (McKay-Nesbitt et al., 2011). While emotional frames are likely to elicit emotional responses from receivers (McKay-Nesbitt et al., 2011; Ndone & Park, 2022; Schoofs et al., 2019; Yoo & MacInnis, 2005), rational frames prompt receivers to assess the credibility of a message by activating cognitive processes (Claeys et al., 2013; McKay-Nesbitt et al., 2011; Yoo & MacInnis, 2005).

Several studies in the context of crisis communication indicate that when people or organizations express sadness, they are more likely to be forgiven by the public (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2014; Kauffman, 2008) than when they offer a neutral apology. Kim and Cameron (2011) postulate that emotional framing produces an emotional response that positively influences the responsibility attributed to an organization and, as a consequence, the attitude toward the organization. Claeys and Cauberghe (2014) propose that an emotionally framed message is beneficial in a post-crisis stage when it is important to restore the reputation of the organization. Thus, we advance the following hypothesis: The perception of an emotionally framed statement of a Muslim organization in the aftermath of a terror attack has a positive impact on the public’s attitudes toward the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam.

To maximize external validity, we used real public relation vignettes from Muslim organizations that responded to the terror attack in Berlin in 2016. After participants read these vignettes, they completed a survey. The survey measured how members of German society perceived the Muslim organizations’ statements, specifically assessing the degree of distancing from the perpetrator, the emphasis on societal commitment and good deeds, and the emotional tone of the statements. In addition, the survey captured respondents’ attributions of responsibility for the terrorist attacks, as well as their perceptions of the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam. Furthermore, we did not only assess explicit measures of perceptions of the Muslim organization but also included an Implicit Association Test (IAT) in the study design because of its relevance in research into prejudice (Devine, 2001; Petty et al.; 2006; Uhlmann et al., 2011).

According to the dual attitudes model, when a change in attitude occurs, an initially explicit and conscious attitude may persist and automatically activate in specific situations without the individual’s awareness, transforming into an implicit attitude (Petty et al., 2006). The dual attitudes model suggests that a new explicit attitude guides responses when there is ample time for reflection, but an individual’s old (implicit) attitude is more likely to influence situations that demand a rapid response or do not involve conscious consideration of attitudes. Researchers exploring these issues (e.g., Dovidio, et al., 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) have posited that when dual attitudes are formed, the resulting attitudes - termed implicit and explicit - operate independently under different circumstances (Petty et al., 2006). Hence, while we expect our independent variables to influence the study’s explicit attitude measures, we do not expect an effect on the IAT measure, as it reflects an attitude that is formed over a longer period. Nevertheless, we expect an effect of attributed responsibility on the IAT as both reflect a measure of more durable existence. An overview of the research model is provided in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Theoretical research model.

Methods

Study Design and Sample

A pre-test (N = 14) was conducted to assess internal consistency and identify any potential issues with the questionnaire. For the main survey, cross-sectional primary data were collected via a German panel provider. A total of 693 participants completed the study (response rate: 51.32%). The sample is representative of the German population in terms of age, gender, income, and education, including only participants with German citizenship and excluding Muslims. Ninety-four participants were excluded due to one of the following reasons: falling below an adequate completion time, non-German citizenship, being Muslim, missing values in the IAT. This resulted in a total sample of 599 participants. The sample size was chosen to ensure representativeness across the 10 statements. In line with established methodological recommendations (e.g., Green, 1991; Harris, 1985; Wilson vanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007), a minimum of 50 to 60 participants per condition was targeted to yield reliable results for correlation and regression analyses. The sample was 46.1% female (n = 276), 53.8% male (n = 322), and 0.2% non-binary (n = 1). The average age was 49.44 years (SD = 14.87). All participants provided written consent and were compensated for their participation through the panel provider. Participants were given a trigger warning for terror-related information before the study started.

To enhance the ecological validity of the research, an actual news article about the terror attack in Berlin in 2016 was presented followed by one of 10 real press statements from Muslim organizations in Germany. During the attack, a truck was deliberately driven into the Berlin Christmas market, leaving 12 people dead and more than 70 victims. The event was classified as an “Islamic terror attack” by the German Ministry of the Interior as the newspaper article reported. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 10 statements issued by a Muslim organization and answered the same questionnaire hereafter. Attention checks were administered after the press statement, and participants were excluded if they answered incorrectly.

Measures

To measure our research constructs, existing and empirically validated scales were employed. Survey respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements measuring the constructs on a 6-point Likert scale, with 1 representing ‘strongly disagree’ and 6 ‘strong agree’. Original statements in English were translated to German using the translation-back-translation method. Table A1 presents the complete list of items and the Cronbach’s alpha value for each scale.

To assess the independent variables, participants were asked to indicate their perception of the statement issued by the Muslim organization. Distancing from terrorism was measured with three items representing the degree of blame for the attack given in the statement to the perpetrator and declaring Islam and Muslims in Germany as innocent. Commitment to the German society was measured with three items based on the bolstering response strategy by Coombs and Holladay (1996) representing the commitment given in the statement toward campaigns against extremism, emphasizing a peaceful society. Framing was measured with a two-item semantic differential scale based on Lee (1978) measuring the perceived emotionality of the statement.

To measure attitudes toward the Muslim organization, we employed seven bipolar semantic differential items adapted from Fiedler (1964). Stereotypes toward Muslims were assessed using eight positively framed items adapted from the stereotype content model (SCM) developed by Fiske et al. (2002). To measure the emotional component toward Muslims living in Germany, we utilized the feeling thermometer scale developed by González et al. (2008). Symbolic threat was measured using four items adapted from González et al. (2008) and Obaidi et al. (2018). We measured prejudice toward Islam using items from the cognitive subscale of the Islamophobia scale developed by Lee et al. (2009). Collective responsibility of the Muslim society for the terror attack was assessed by three items from Denson et al. (2006).

Additionally, we employed the scale familiarity with the German and Muslim names used in the IAT (Park et al., 2007) as a control variable. Furthermore, we control for the quality and quantity of contact with Muslims using five items for the quantity and four items to measure the quality of the contact from Islam and Hewstone (1993). Implicit attitudes were assessed by the Implicit Association Test (IAT) using the study by Park et al. (2007) as a reference. Ten Arab Muslim names and 10 white male first names were selected, along with 10 pleasant and 10 unpleasant words (see Table B1 for the stimuli used in the IAT). The improved D-score was used to assess the predicted effects. The improved D-score requires a correct response in order to continue to the next trial. This version of the D-score algorithm adds up all response times of all responses per trial (Greenwald et al., 2003).

Validity and Reliability Tests

Prior to hypotheses testing, exploratory factor analysis was performed to validate the questionnaire. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity to measure sampling adequacy, were calculated. KMO is 0.954 (> than 0.5) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant at 0.000 (below p < .05). Therefore, the data are suitable for factor analysis.

Principal factor analysis indicated that the items loaded appropriately onto their intended constructs. Collectively, the eight factors accounted for 74.3% of the total variance. None of the 33 items exhibited substantial cross-loadings (i.e., greater than 0.50). All scales demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha values exceeding .7 (see Table A1).

Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to evaluate convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs. Convergent validity was assessed using average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability (CR), with acceptable thresholds of AVE > 0.40 (Floyd & Widaman, 1995) and CR > 0.60 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). The AVE values ranged from 0.52 to 0.88 and the CR values from 0.76 to 0.97, indicating that all constructs met these criteria. Discriminant validity was confirmed by verifying that the square root of each construct’s AVE exceeded its correlations with other constructs. Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, AVE, CR, the square roots of AVE (on the diagonal), and inter-construct correlations.

Table 1.

Summary Statistics and Correlations Among Research Variables.

Construct		CR	AVE		Construct no.
Construct	Mean (SD)	(>0.60)	(>0.40)	MSV	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Distancing from perpetrator	4.59 (1.12)	0.81	0.69	0.07	.721
2. Societal commitment	4.36 (1.06)	0.76	0.52	0.23	.054	.718
3. Framing	3.19 (1.33)	0.76	0.52	0.31	.482	.184	.829
4. Responsibility	2.94 (1.40)	0.87	0.70	0.58	−.137	−.305	−.171	.836
5. Attitude toward Muslim organization	4.30 (1.12)	0.97	0.78	0.41	.216	.555	.266	−.599	.881
6. Positive stereotypes of Muslims	3.53 (1.09)	0.95	0.77	0.55	.180	.400	.223	−.629	.642	.876
7. Symbolic threat by Muslims	3.52 (1.47)	0.96	0.88	0.54	−.054	−.263	−.181	.691	−.493	−.648	.936
8. Prejudice toward Islam	3.33 (1.40)	0.96	0.83	0.58	−.146	−.366	−.171	.763	−.593	−.741	.736	.910

Note. SD = standard deviation; CR = construct reliability; AVE = average variance extracted; square roots of the AVE are in bold.

Results

Structural equation modeling (SEM) was employed using SPSS AMOS 28 to test the hypotheses. The model shows an acceptable model fit with χ² = 2,458.65; df = 939; p = .00; χ²/df = 2.60; IFI = 0.93, TLI = 0.93, and CFI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.05. Table 2 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects based on 500 bootstrap samples and a 95% bias corrected confidence interval.

Table 2.

Standardized Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects.

Independent variables	Dependent variables	Standardized direct effects	Standardized indirect effects	Standardized total effects
Distancing from perpetrator	Attitude toward organization	−0.073	−0.001	−0.074
	Positive stereotypes of Muslims	−0.034	−0.001	−0.035
	Feeling thermometer	0.114*	−0.001	−0.115***
	Symbolic threat by Muslims	0.102*	0.002	0.103***
	Prejudice toward Islam	0.066	0.002	0.067
	Implicit perception IAT	0.022	0.000	0.022
	Responsibility	0.002
Societal involvement	Attitude toward organization	0.420**	0.124**	0.544**
	Positive stereotypes of Muslims	0.143**	0.136**	0.279**
	Feeling thermometer	0.175**	0.141**	0.316**
	Symbolic threat by Muslims	−0.052	−0.186**	−0.238**
	Prejudice toward Islam	−0.117*	−0.206**	−0.323**
	Implicit perception IAT	0.009	−0.039**	−0.030
	Responsibility	−0.293**
Message framing	Attitude toward organization	0.096*	0.052*	0.148**
	Positive stereotypes of Muslims	0.045	0.056*	0.102*
	Feeling thermometer	0.006	0.059*	0.065***
	Symbolic threat by Muslims	−0.042	−0.077*	−0.119*
	Prejudice toward Islam	0.016	−0.085*	−0.069***
	Implicit perception IAT	0.003	−0.016*	−0.013
	Responsibility	−0.122*
Responsibility (mediator)	Attitude toward organization	−0.423**
	Positive stereotypes of Muslims	−0.464**
	Feeling thermometer	−0.480**
	Symbolic threat by Muslims	0.634**
	Prejudice toward Islam	0.701**
	Implicit perception IAT	0.134*
Contact quality (control variable)	Attitude toward organization	0.199**
	Positive stereotypes of Muslims	0.497**
	Feeling thermometer	0.306**
	Symbolic threat by Muslims	−0.239**
	Prejudice toward Islam	−0.308**
	Implicit perception IAT	−0.060
Contact quantity (control variable)	Attitude toward organization	−0.022
	Positive stereotypes of Muslims	−0.008
	Feeling thermometer	0.081***
	Symbolic threat by Muslims	0.027
	Prejudice toward Islam	0.020
	Implicit perception IAT	−0.036
Familiarity with Muslim names (control variable)	Implicit perception IAT	−0.148**
Familiarity with German names (control variable)	Implicit perception IAT	0.147**

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .10.

Distancing from the perpetrator exhibited a direct effect on both feelings toward Muslims and perceived symbolic threat. Notably, while greater distancing was associated with more positive feelings toward Muslims, it concurrently led to higher perceptions of threat. No significant effects of distancing were observed on the other dependent variables or on the mediator, attributed responsibility. Overall, only a weak effect of distancing from the perpetrator was detected.

In contrast, emphasizing societal commitment demonstrated stronger and broader effects, particularly on attitudes toward the Muslim organization. Societal commitment was positively associated with more favorable perceptions of the organization, increased positive stereotypes and feelings toward Muslims, and reduced prejudice toward Islam. Additionally, higher perceived societal commitment corresponded with a lower attribution of responsibility for the terror attack to Muslims.

Emotional message framing showed a weak direct effect on attitudes toward the Muslim organization. Specifically, statements perceived as more emotional were linked to more positive organizational attitudes. However, emotional framing did not significantly influence the other dependent variables, except for a negative association with the mediator: more emotional messages were associated with decreased attribution of collective responsibility to Muslims.

Attributed collective responsibility was highly correlated with all outcome variables. Greater attribution of responsibility resulted in less favorable attitudes toward the organization, more negative general perceptions of Muslims, higher perceived threat, and increased prejudice toward Islam. Additionally, collective responsibility demonstrated a direct effect on implicit attitudes toward Muslims, as measured by the IAT. A positive coefficient signals that attributed responsibility leads to more negative implicit associations (the higher the value in the IAT the more negative the score can be interpreted based on our administration of the IAT).

Given that attributed responsibility was predicted by both societal involvement and message framing and in turn was associated with all dependent variables, significant indirect effects of societal involvement and message framing were observed through the mediator.

Finally, among the control variables, quality of contact with Muslims influenced all explicit measures, whereas quantity of contact did not. Familiarity with Muslim and German names impacted the implicit measure.

Discussion

Terrorist attacks have destructive repercussions. Human fatalities and injuries and damages to properties can be expected. Such attacks are also bound to fuel prejudice against a specific group that might be associated with the perpetrators of the terrorist attack. After a terrorist attack perpetrated by individuals claiming religious motives, Muslim organizations can be instrumental in initiating a dialogue with all social actors to bridge emerging societal gap. Our study addressed two research questions, with the first one focusing on the impact of distancing from the terror attack perpetrators and emphasizing societal commitment as well as the framing of the statement on public perception of a Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam. The second research question pertains to the mediation effects of responsibility attribution in the link between the public evaluation of statements from a Muslim organization and public perception of a Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam.

Regarding our first research question, our results show that distancing from the perpetrator has only a weak relationship with explicit measures regarding Muslims. Theories suggest opposite directions, some suggesting distancing to be beneficial other suggest a harmful effect (e.g., Laufer & Wang, 2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Our findings highlight a notable contradiction that aligns with existing debates in the literature. While greater distancing from the perpetrator was associated with more positive feelings toward Muslims, it simultaneously resulted in heightened perceptions of threat. This suggests that distancing strategies may produce mixed outcomes, fostering improved affective attitudes while inadvertently reinforcing perceptions of symbolic threat. As such, our study cannot resolve this paradox, but instead underscores the complexity of public responses to distancing in the context of intergroup relations. This is one point that merits further research attention to determine the conditions required for the beneficial or harmful effects of a distancing strategy.

However, our research shows a positive effect of the second content strategy, namely diverting from terrorism by emphasizing the societal commitment and good deeds, on the explicit measures. This effect is consistent for the positive outcome variables, namely attitude toward the Muslim organization, positive stereotypes of Muslims, and positive feelings toward Muslims. It can be concluded that the effect of using this content strategy not only impacts the entity making the statement, the Muslim organization, but also extends its influence to the broader Muslim community. The relation is less strong for the negatively framed variables -symbolic threat by Muslims and prejudice toward the Islam - which further confirms the separation of positively and negatively valenced variables (Ahlawat, 1985; Zeng et al., 2020).

The emotionality of framing additionally seems to contribute positively to the perception of the Muslim organization. While a significant positive effect for the Muslim organization exists, the impact of emotionality on Muslims and Islam is not as pronounced. It might be that the effect of emotionality is more strongly evoked by the immediate sender of the statement and not necessarily transferred to the entirety of Muslims and Islam. Theoretically, emotional framing appears to act by humanizing the organization and emphasizing common emotional ground with the majority society. By explicitly conveying sorrow, solidarity, or outrage, emotionally framed responses may help to distance the organization from the perpetrator’s actions, positioning it as a fellow victim or concerned member of society rather than a representative of the outgroup to which blame might be attached. Nevertheless, although the direct effects on perceptions of Muslims and Islam were not as pronounced, it is important to highlight the strong indirect influence exerted by emotional framing through the mediation of attributed collective responsibility.

In relation to the second research question, our results confirm the mediating effect of attributed collective responsibility between the evaluation of the statement and the outcome variables. There are strong associations between the attributed collective responsibility for terrorism and the explicit measures of attitude toward the Muslim organization, Muslims in general, and Islam. Importantly, not only the explicit measures are associated with responsibility, we can also record a significant relationship between attributed collective responsibility and implicit perceptions of Muslims measured by the IAT. The present findings reveal that attributed collective responsibility plays a pivotal mediating role in shaping public responses to Muslim organizations’ statements following a terror attack. Both emphasis on societal involvement and the emotional framing of press statements significantly reduced the extent to which collective responsibility for the attack was attributed to Muslims. In turn, lower attributed responsibility was consistently associated with more favorable attitudes toward the Muslim organization, more positive perceptions of Muslims in general, reduced prejudice toward Islam, and lower perceptions of symbolic threat. These results indicate that the effects of societal involvement and message framing on public attitudes and perceptions are not only direct, but also operate indirectly through their influence on the attribution of collective responsibility. This underscores the importance of carefully crafting organizational communications, not only to directly affect public evaluations, but also to shape the broader interpretive context in which groups are held accountable for acts committed by others. The effect on collective responsibility attribution is particularly important in polarized contexts, where generalized stigma is a risk.

Implications

To summarize, our study complements previous descriptive studies (Durmaz et al., 2024) in the field of public relations by highlighting evidence for more effective crisis communication strategies after terrorist attacks for Muslim organization. The findings from our research indicate that the strategy of distancing from a terrorist attack only has a weak impact, whether negative or positive, on the perception of a Muslim organization. This suggests that merely stating a lack of association with terrorism does not substantially alter public sentiment. Instead, our study reveals that especially an emphasis on social engagement and the use of emotional framing in communication can have a positive influence on how the public views Muslim organizations.

Social commitment entails active participation and contributions to the community, highlighting the organization’s role in fostering societal wellbeing. When a Muslim organization showcases its social activities and initiatives, it can significantly improve its public image. By drawing attention to community service, charitable efforts, and other forms of social involvement, the organization can create a narrative that underscores its positive impact on society. This narrative can help shift public focus from associations with terrorism to the beneficial roles these organizations play.

Emotional framing in communication involves the use of emotionally resonant messages that can connect with the audience on a deeper level. This approach can humanize the organization and its members, making them more relatable and understandable to the public. By using emotionally charged language, the organization can evoke empathy and support, thereby fostering a more positive sentiment among the audience. In addition, our findings indicate that emotional framing in the public statements of Muslim organizations plays a significant role in shaping the extent to which collective responsibility for terrorism is attributed to those organizations and, by extension, to Muslims more broadly. When statements are emotionally framed by demonstrating empathy, condemnation, or expressions of grief, society tends to perceive the organizations as more sincere, engaged, and morally aligned with broader societal values. This, in turn, reduces the tendency to assign collective blame to the organization or the wider Muslim community for the actions of individual perpetrators. Practically, these results suggest that organizations responding to tragic or controversial events should be mindful of not only the content but also the emotional tone of their statements. Employing authentic emotional framing can help reduce group-based stigmatization and prevent the unjust assignment of collective responsibility, thereby contributing to improved intergroup relations and greater societal cohesion.

Thus, our study underscores the critical role of collective responsibility in shaping public perception. When the actions of a few are attributed to an entire group, it can lead to widespread negative attitudes and prejudices. This is particularly relevant for the present context, where terrorist acts committed by a few individuals can unfairly taint the perception of an entire community. Effective crisis communication must, therefore, address and counteract this attribution of collective responsibility. Strategies should include clear and consistent messaging that emphasizes the distinction between the actions of individuals and the values and behaviors of the broader Muslim community.

In summary, our research complements previous studies by providing empirical evidence for more effective crisis communication strategies for Muslim organizations in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. These findings have several practical implications. First, Muslim organizations should focus on highlighting their social contributions rather than merely dissociating from terrorism. This approach can foster a positive public perception by showcasing their beneficial impact on society. Second, incorporating emotional framing in communication can positively influence public sentiment and reduce attributed responsibility, thereby improving the organization’s image. Third, promoting a positive perception of Muslims and Islam is crucial for counteracting prejudice and dispelling negative stereotypes. Finally, effective crisis communication should address the issue of collective responsibility by emphasizing social inclusion and using emotional framing to mitigate negative attitudes.

By adopting these strategies, Muslim organizations can navigate the complex landscape of public perception and foster a more positive and inclusive narrative in the face of crisis situations.

Limitations and Further Research

Our results represent a first step in understanding the role of crisis communication after a terror attack. This study is the first to use real press statements as stimulus material to examine the perception of crisis communication by Muslim organizations after a terror attack, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to other cultural or geographic contexts. Therefore, the research context should be considered as a potential limitation, and future studies conducted in different settings (e.g., different countries, cultures, religions, different types of crises, and different types of media coverage) could further enhance our understanding of the role of crisis communication.

One further limitation of our study design choice concerns the trade-off between ecological validity and experimental control. By employing real-world press statements from Muslim organizations, we aimed to increase the relevance and authenticity of our stimuli, thereby ensuring that our findings closely reflect real-world public discourse. However, the use of authentic materials necessarily entails a loss of tight control over the content, style, and potential confounding variables present in the stimuli. While we believe the advantages in external validity outweigh these drawbacks, we acknowledge that this approach limits the ability to isolate causal effects as precisely as would be possible using standardized experimental materials. Future research may benefit from complementary designs that combine real-world stimuli with more controlled manipulations to disentangle the underlying cognitive processes.

Despite its widespread application and theoretical significance, the IAT’s psychometric properties remain the subject of ongoing scholarly debate. In particular, concerns have been raised about its test-retest reliability, with studies showing that IAT scores can fluctuate over time and exhibit only moderate stability at the individual level (Cunningham et al., 2001; Nosek et al., 2007; Rezaei, 2011). Furthermore, the utility of the IAT in predicting specific individual behaviors has been questioned. While there is evidence for the predictive validity of the IAT in relation to group-level outcomes, its ability to reliably forecast actual behavior for a given individual is limited (Oswald et al., 2013). Therefore, our findings concerning implicit attitudes, as measured by the IAT, should be interpreted with scientific caution. Future research should continue to evaluate and, where possible, supplement IAT measures with alternative approaches to implicit attitudes.

In addition, our results can only provide an initial insight into the effect of distancing from the perpetrator and diverting from terrorism on public sentiment. Our research shows only weak and opposing effects of distancing on public perception. Further research is needed to understand the underlying circumstances that might lead distancing from the perpetrator to be beneficial or harmful for a Muslim organization. We can imagine two different perspectives to be of interest: first, which characteristics of a Muslim organization might lead to a beneficial or harmful effect of distancing and (2) which characteristics of the recipient of a distancing statement might lead to positive or negative effects?

While our research shows that diverting from the incident and emphasizing positive deeds in the past have consistently positive effects on the public perception, it might be interesting to analyze which diverting content might has the most beneficial effects and which recipients might be most receptive to diverting messages.

Furthermore, our research suggests that the emotionality of a statement might only influence the perception of the sender of the statement and does not transfer to the entirety of the Muslim community. Again, investigating the characteristics of the recipients of the message might be a future research outlet in order to analyze diverting effects. Starting from the Elaboration Likelihood Model by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), it might be interesting to include the involvement of recipients as possible moderators.

Lastly, more research into how attributed responsibility can be influenced is needed. While the connection between responsibility and attitude appears intuitive, researchers emphasized that the attribution of responsibility is a rational judgment formed from a one-time situation. However, an attitude toward Muslims and Islam constitutes a comprehensive, synthetic, and enduring evaluation by the public (Kim & Sung, 2014; Ma & Zhan, 2016). This was reflected by the relationship between attributed responsibility and the IAT. Attitudes are shaped not only by a rational analysis of specific situations but also by the social learning and affective components of attitudes (Kim & Sung, 2014). Thus, knowing more about how to mitigate collective responsibility in a sustainable way will be helpful to minimize prejudice and keep societal wellbeing.

Footnotes

Appendix A

Table A1.

Overview of Questions to Measure Explicit Attitudes.

Constructs	Cronbach α	Source
Perception of distancing from perpetrator	.764	Coombs (2007); Coombs and Holladay (1996)
In the press release, the religion of Islam is not given responsibility for the Islamist terrorist attack.
The press release attributes responsibility for the Islamist terrorist attack solely to the bomber himself.
The press release does not attribute responsibility for the attack to Muslims in Germany.
Perception of societal commitment	.768	Coombs (2007); Coombs and Holladay (1996)
The press release emphasizes that Muslims belong to German society.
The press release shows that the Muslim organization is actively working against Islamist extremism.
The press release emphasizes the Muslim organization’s commitment to peaceful coexistence.
Message framing	.780	Lee (1978)
How would you describe the statement you just read?
Rational—emotional
Neutral—passionate
Attributed collective responsibility	.874	Denson et al. (2006)
Muslims in Germany should feel responsible for Islamist terrorism in Germany.
Terrorist bombers are to be seen as members of the Muslim community.
The Muslim community in Germany should be held accountable for Islamist terrorism.
Attitude toward Muslim organization	.961	Fiedler (1964)
How do you perceive the Muslim organization that issued the press release?
Bad—good
Cold—warm
Rejecting—turning toward
Inconsiderate—considerate
Dishonest—honest
Confrontational—mediating
Untrustworthy—trustworthy
Irresponsible—responsible
Positive stereotypes of Muslims	.951	Fiske et al. (2002)
I perceive Muslims as …
Tolerant.
Warm-hearted.
Good-natured.
Sincere.
Open.
Sympathetic.
Symbolic threat by Muslims	.954	González et al. (2008); Obaidi et al. (2018)
To what extent do you see the following aspects of Germany threatened by Muslims?
Values and norms
Traditions
German culture in general
Prejudice toward Islam	.959	Lee et al. (2013)
Islam calls for violence.
Islam is a dangerous religion.
Islam supports acts of violence.
Islam supports acts of terrorism.
Islam is a religion based on hatred.

Appendix B

Table B1.

Implicit Association Test (IAT).

IAT categories:
German names	Muslim names	Positive	Negative
Ali	David	Freedom	Sickness
Amir	Karl	Health	Accident
Muhammed	Maximilian	Love	Sadness
Malik	Paul	Peace	Stench
Omar	Benjamin	Cheer	Poison
Yusuf	Jakob	Pleasure	Poverty
Ibrahim	Anton	Honest	Ugly
Ahmad	Jonas	Happy	Torment

Source. Greenwald et al. (1998).

Note. Most common given names in Berlin 2016 to 2021 (e.g. https://daten.berlin.de/tags/vornamen), positive and negative items are translated from German in English.

ORCID iDs

Sabrina Hegner

Leoni Schilling

Gerrit Hirschfeld

Ethical Considerations

Our online study was conducted in accordance with The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki) for studies involving humans and the American Psychological Associations’ Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct. Participants were recruited through a commercial German panel provider to secure a completely anonymous online survey. The panel provider reviewed the study and ensured that participants would not be harmed by the survey. Participants were informed about the purpose of the study, gave their consent to data processing for scientific purposes and could stop the survey at any time. In the country, where the study was conducted, the review of a study by an ethics committee is not mandatory. Neither of the authors’ institutions has an ethics committee. Further, we did not seek ethics committee approval in this case as data were gathered anonymously and we did not expect any risks of harm for participants. Because our study did not deceive, injure, or place participants under great stress.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research has been conducted with funds from the German Federal Ministry for Education and Science [01UG2038B].

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

The data underlying this article will be shared on reasonable request to the corresponding author.

References

Abrams

Hogg

M. A.

(1990). Social identification, self-categorization and social influence. European Review of Social Psychology, 1(1), 195–228.

Ahlawat

K. S.

(1985). On the negative valence items in self-report measures. The Journal of General Psychology, 112(1), 89–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1985.9710992

Ahluwalia

Unnava

H. R.

Burnkrant

R. E.

(2001). The moderating role of commitment on the spillover effect of marketing communications. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(4), 458–470.

Ahmed

Matthes

(2017). Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis. International Communication Gazette, 79(3), 219–244.

Alicke

M. D.

(2000). Culpable control and the psychology of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126(4), 556–574.

Allport

G. W.

(1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading/Addison-Wesley.

Anderson

J. R.

(1983). The architecture of cognition. Harvard University Press.

Bagozzi

R. P.

(1988). On the evaluation of structural equation models. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16(1), 74–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02723327

Beldad

A. D.

van Laar

Hegner

S. M.

(2018). Should the shady steal thunder? The effects of crisis communication timing, pre-crisis reputation valence, and crisis type on post-crisis organizational trust and purchase intention. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 26(1), 150–163.

10.

Benoit

(1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration strategies. State University of New York Press.

11.

Bordia

DiFonzo

Schulz

C. A.

(2000). Source characteristics in denying rumors of organizational closure: Honesty is the best policy. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(11), 2309–2321.

12.

Canel

M. J.

Sanders

(2010). Crisis communication and terrorist attacks: Framing a response to the 2004 Madrid bombings and 2005 London bombings. In Coombs

W. T.

Holladay

S. J.

(Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication (pp. 449–466). Wiley.

13.

Choi

Lin

Y. H.

(2009). Consumer responses to Mattel product recalls posted on online bulletin boards: Exploring two types of emotion. Journal of Public Relations Research, 21(2), 198–207.

14.

Cinnirella

(2012). Think ‘terrorist’, think ‘Muslim’?: Social-psychological mechanisms explaining anti-Islamic prejudice. In Helbling

(Ed.), Islamophobia in the west (pp. 179–189). Routledge.

15.

Claeys

A.-S.

Cauberghe

. (2014). What makes crisis response strategies work? The impact of crisis involvement and message framing. Journal of Business Research, 67(2), 182–189.

16.

Claeys

A. S.

Cauberghe

Leysen

(2013). Implications of stealing thunder for the impact of expressing emotions in organizational crisis communication. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 41(3), 293–308.

17.

Clark

H. H.

(1985). Language use and language users, In Elliot

, (Ed.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 179–232). Addison-Wesley.

18.

Collins

A. M.

Loftus

E. F.

(1975). A spreading activation theory of semantic processing. Psychological Review, 82(6), 407–428.

19.

Coombs

W. T.

(2007). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The development and application of situational crisis communication theory. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163–176.

20.

Coombs

W. T.

Holladay

S. J.

(1996). Communication and attributions in a crisis: An experimental study in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4), 279–295.

21.

Coombs

W. T.

Holladay

S. J.

(2006). Unpacking the halo effect: Reputation and crisis management. Journal of Communication Management, 10(2), 123–137.

22.

Craig

M. A.

Richeson

J. A.

(2016). Stigma-based solidarity: Understanding the psychological foundations of conflict and coalition among members of different stigmatized groups. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25(1), 21–27.

23.

Cristófol

F.-J.

de San-Eugenio-Vela

Paniagua-Rojano

F.-J.

(2020). Active listening in the management of crisis communication: Case study of the 2017 terrorist attack in Barcelona. Communication & Society, 33(4), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.15581/003.33.4.61-74

24.

Cunha Jr

Forehand

M. R.

Angle

J. W.

(2015). Riding coattails: When co-branding helps versus hurts less-known brands. Journal of Consumer Research, 41(5), 1284–1300.

25.

Cunningham

W. A.

Preacher

K. J.

Banaji

M. R.

(2001). Implicit attitude measures: Consistency, stability, and convergent validity. Psychological Science, 12(2), 163–170.

26.

Das

Bushman

B. J.

Bezemer

M. D.

Kerkhof

Vermeulen

I. E.

(2009). How terrorism news reports increase prejudice against outgroups: A Terror Management account. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(3), 453–459.

27.

Dean

D. H.

(2004). Consumer reaction to negative publicity, effects of corporate reputation, response, and responsibility for a crisis event. Journal of Business Communication, 41(2), 192–211.

28.

Denson

T. F.

Lickel

Curtis

Stenstrom

D. M.

Ames

D. R.

(2006). The roles of entitativity and essentiality in judgments of collective responsibility. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 9(1), 43–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206059857

29.

Devine

P. G.

(2001). Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(5), 757–759.

30.

Dovidio

J. F.

Hewstone

Glick

Esses

V. M.

(2010). Prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination: Theoretical and empirical overview. In Dovidio

J. F.

Hewstone

Glick

Esses

V. M.

(Eds.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 3–28). Sage Publications.

31.

Dovidio

J. F.

Kawakami

Beach

K. R.

(2001). Implicit and explicit attitudes: Examination of the relationship between measures of intergroup bias. In Brown

Gaertner

S. L.

(Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes (Vol. 4, pp. 175–197). Blackwell.

32.

Durmaz

Hegner

Schilling

Hirschfeld

(2024). Strategic communication of Muslim organizations in the Aftermath of Islamist terrorist attacks–A qualitative analysis from Germany. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 18(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2023.2265916

33.

Edwards

Smith

E. E.

(1996). A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of arguments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 5–24.

34.

Ettinger

(2018). Qualität der Berichterstattung über Muslime in der Schweiz. Eine Studie im Auftrag der Eidgenössischen Kommission gegen Rassismus EKR (Quality of Reporting on Muslims in Switzerland. A Study Commissioned by the Federal Commission against Racism (EKR) (p. 31). https://www.ekr.admin.ch/pdf/Studie_Qual_Berichterst_D.pdf

35.

Farrell

L. C.

Littlefield

R. S.

(2012). Identifying communication strategies in cases of domestic terrorism: Applying cultural context to the fort hood shooting. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 9(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1515/1547-7355.1949

36.

Feldman

J. M.

Lynch

J. G.

(1988). Self-generated validity and other effects of measurement on belief, attitude, intention, and behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73(3), 421–435.

37.

Festinger

(1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.

38.

Fiedler

(1964). A contingency model of leadership effectiveness. In Berkowitz

(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology: Vol.1. Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 149–190). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60051-9

39.

Fiske

S. T.

(1982). Schema-triggered affect: Applications to social perception. In Clark

M. S.

Fiske

S. T.

(Eds.), Affect and cognition (pp. 55–78). Psychology Press.

40.

Fiske

S. T.

(1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In Gilbert

D. T.

Fiske

S. T.

Lindzey

(Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 357–411). McGraw-Hill.

41.

Fiske

S. T.

Cuddy

A. J. C.

Glick

(2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 878–902. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.878

42.

Floyd

F. J.

Widaman

K. F.

(1995). Factor analysis in the development and refinement of clinical assessment instruments. Psychological Assessment, 7(3), 286–299.

43.

Gatti

Caruana

Snehota

(2012). The role of corporate social responsibility, perceived quality and corporate reputation on purchase intention: Implications for brand management. Journal of Brand Management, 20, 65–76.

44.

González

K. V.

Verkuyten

Weesie

Poppe

(2008). Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory. The British Journal of Social Psychology, 47(Pt 4), 667–685. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466608X284443

45.

Grant

S. J.

Malaviya

Sternthal

(2004). The influence of negation on product evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(3), 583–591.

46.

Green

S. B.

(1991). How many subjects does it take to do a regression analysis? Multivariate Behavioral Research, 26, 499–510.

47.

Greenwald

A. G.

Banaji

M. R.

(1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102(1), 4–27.

48.

Greenwald

A. G.

McGhee

D. E.

Schwartz

J. L.

(1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1464–1480. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.74.6.1464

49.

Greenwald

A. G.

Nosek

B. A.

Banaji

M. R.

(2003). Understanding and using the implicit association test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2), 197–216.

50.

Gruenfeld

D. H.

Wyer

R. S.

(1992). Semantics and pragmatics of social influence: How affirmations and denials affect beliefs in referent propositions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(1), 38–49.

51.

Harris

R. J.

(1985). A primer of multivariate statistics (2nd ed.). Academic Press.

52.

Hegner

S. M.

Beldad

A. D.

Hulzink

(2018). An experimental study into the effects of self-disclosure and crisis type on brand evaluations–the mediating effect of blame attributions. Journal of Product & Brand Management, 27(5), 534–544.

53.

Hegner

S. M.

Beldad

A. D.

Kamphuis op Heghuis

(2014). How company responses and trusting relationships protect brand equity in times of crises. Journal of Brand Management, 21(5), 429–445. https://doi.org/10.1057/bm.2014.12

54.

Islam

M. R.

Hewstone

(1993). Intergroup attributions and affective consequences in majority and minority groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(6), 936–950.

55.

Iyer

E. S.

Debevec

(1991). Origin of rumor and tone of message in rumor quelling strategies. Psychology & Marketing, 8(3), 161–175.

56.

Janakiraman

Sismeiro

Dutta

(2009). Perception spillovers across competing brands: A disaggregate model of how and when. Journal of Marketing Research, 46(4), 467–481.

57.

Kauffman

(2008). When sorry is not enough: Archbishop Cardinal Bernard Law’s image restoration strategies in the statement on sexual abuse of minors by clergy. Public Relations Review, 34(3), 258–262.

58.

Keh

H. T.

Xie

(2009). Corporate reputation and customer behavioral intentions: The roles of trust, identification and commitment. Industrial Marketing Management, 38(7), 732–742.

59.

Kelley

H. H.

(1973). The process of causal attribution, American Psychologist, 28, 107–128.

60.

Kim

H. J.

Cameron

G. T.

(2011). Emotions matter in crisis. Communication Research, 38(6), 826–855.

61.

Kim

(2022). It is time that matters in crisis communication: The role of temporal distance and crisis threat appraisal. Public Relations Review, 48(2), Article 102155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2022.102155

62.

Kim

Sung

K. H.

(2014). Revisiting the effectiveness of base crisis response strategies in comparison of reputation management crisis responses. Journal of Public Relations Research, 26, 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/1062726X.2013.795867

63.

Klein

Dawar

(2004). Corporate social responsibility and consumers’ attributions and brand evaluations in a product–harm crisis. International Journal of research in Marketing, 21(3), 203–217.

64.

Knobloch-Westerwick

Taylor

L. D.

(2008). The blame game. Communication Research, 35(6), 723–744.

65.

Laufer

Wang

(2018). Guilty by association: The risk of crisis contagion. Business Horizons, 61(2), 173–179.

66.

Lee

R. S. H.

(1978). Credibility of newspaper and TV news. Journalism Quarterly, 55(2), 282–287. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769907805500209

67.

Lee

S. A.

Gibbons

J. A.

Thompson

J. M.

Timani

H. S.

(2009). The Islamophobia scale: Instrument development and initial validation. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 19(2), 92–105.

68.

Lee

S. A.

Reid

C. A.

Short

S. D.

Gibbons

J. A.

Yeh

Campbell

M. L.

(2013). Fear of Muslims: Psychometric evaluation of the Islamophobia Scale. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 5(3), 157–171.

69.

Zhan

(2016). Effects of attributed responsibility and response strategies on organizational reputation: A meta-analysis of situational crisis communication theory research. Journal of Public Relations Research, 28(2), 102–119.

70.

Maass

Schaller

(1991). Intergroup biases and the cognitive dynamics of stereotype formation, European Review of Social Psychology, 2(1), 189–209.

71.

Macrae

C. N.

Milne

A. B.

Bodenhausen

G. V.

(1994). Stereotypes as energy-saving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(1), Article 37.

72.

Mayo

Schul

Burnstein

(2004). “I am not guilty” vs “I am innocent”: Successful negation may depend on the schema used for its encoding. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(4), 433–449.

73.

McKay-Nesbitt

Manchanda

R. V.

Smith

M. C.

Huhmann

B. A.

(2011). Effects of age, need for cognition, and affective intensity on advertising effectiveness. Journal of Business Research, 64(1), 12–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.09.013

74.

Moskowitz

G. B.

Skurnik

I. W.

(1999). Contrast effects as determined by the type of prime: Trait versus exemplar primes initiate processing strategies that differ in how accessible constructs are used. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6), 911–927.

75.

Ndone

Park

(2022). Crisis communication: The mediating role of cognitive and affective empathy in the relationship between crisis type and crisis response strategy on post-crisis reputation and forgiveness. Public Relations Review, 48(1), Article 102136. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2021.102136

76.

Neumann

Arendt

Baugut

(2018). News and Islamist radicalization processes: Investigating Muslims’ perceptions of negative news coverage of Islam. Mass Communication and Society, 21(4), 498–523.

77.

Nosek

B. A.

Greenwald

A. G.

Banaji

M. R.

(2007). The implicit association test at age 7: A methodological and conceptual review. In Bargh

J. A.

(Ed.), Social psychology and the unconscious: The automaticity of higher mental processes (pp. 265–292). Psychology Press.

78.

Obaidi

Kunst

J. R.

Kteily

Thomsen

Sidanius

(2018). Living under threat: Mutual threat perception drives anti-Muslim and anti-Western hostility in the age of terrorism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(5), 567–584. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2362

79.

Oswald

F. L.

Mitchell

Blanton

Jaccard

Tetlock

P. E.

(2013). Predicting ethnic and racial discrimination: A meta-analysis of IAT criterion studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(2), 171–192.

80.

Park

Felix

Lee

(2007). Implicit attitudes toward Arab-Muslims and the moderating effects of social information. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29(1), 35–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973530701330942

81.

Petty

R. E.

Cacioppo

J. T.

(1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change (p. 4). Springer-Verlag.

82.

Petty

R. E.

Tormala

Z. L.

Brinol

Jarvis

W. B. G.

(2006). Implicit ambivalence from attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model. Journal of personality and social psychology, 90(1), 21–41.

83.

Pratto

Henkel

K. E.

Lee

I. C.

(2013). Stereotypes and prejudice from an intergroup relations perspective: Their relation to social structure. In Stereotyping and prejudice (pp. 151–180). Psychology Press.

84.

Rezaei

A. R.

(2011). Validity and reliability of the IAT: Measuring gender and ethnic stereotypes. Computers in Human Behavior, 27(5), 1937–1941.

85.

Roehm

M. L.

Tybout

A. M.

(2006). When will a brand scandal spill over, and how should competitors respond? Journal of Marketing Research, 43(3), 366–373.

86.

Ross

Lepper

M. R.

Hubbard

(1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(5), 880–892.

87.

Schoofs

Claeys

A. S.

De Waele

Cauberghe

(2019). The role of empathy in crisis communication: Providing a deeper understanding of how organizational crises and crisis communication affect reputation. Public Relations Review, 45(5), Article 101851.

88.

Schwarz

Bless

(1992). Scandals and the public’s trust in politicians: Assimilation and contrast effects. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(5), 574–579.

89.

Seeger

M. W.

(2006). Best practices in crisis communication: An expert panel process. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 34(3), 232–244.

90.

Shaver

K. G.

(1985). The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness. Springer.

91.

Stafford

M. R.

Day

(1995). Retail services advertising: The effects of appeal, medium, and service. Journal of Advertising, 24(1), 57–71.

92.

Tajfel

Turner

J. C.

(2004). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In Jost

Sidanius

(Eds.), Political psychology (pp. 276–293). Psychology Press.

93.

Tausch

Schmid

Hewstone

(2011). The social psychology of intergroup relations. In Tausch

Schmid

Hewstone

(Eds.), Handbook on peace education (pp. 75–86). Psychology Press.

94.

Turk

J. V.

Jin

Stewart

Kim

Hipple

J. R.

(2012). Examining the interplay of an organization’s prior reputation, CEO’s visibility, and immediate response to a crisis. Public Relations Review, 38(4), 574–583.

95.

Tybout

A. M.

Calder

B. J.

Sternthal

(1981). Using information processing theory to design marketing strategies. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1), 73–79.

96.

Uhlmann

E. L.

Poehlman

T. A.

Tannenbaum

Bargh

J. A.

(2011). Implicit Puritanism in American moral cognition. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 312–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.10.013

97.

Weiner

(1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Psychological Review, 92(4), 548–573.

98.

Weiner

Perry

R. P.

Magnusson

(1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(5), 738–748.

99.

Whelan

Dawar

(2016). Attributions of blame following a product-harm crisis depend on consumers’ attachment styles. Marketing Letters, 27, 285–294.

100.

Wilson VanVoorhis

C. W.

Morgan

B. L

. (2007). Understanding power and rules of thumb for determining sample sizes. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 3(2), 43–50.

101.

Xie

Keh

H. T.

(2016). Taming the blame game: Using promotion programs to counter product-harm crises. Journal of Advertising, 45(2), 211–226.

102.

Yoo

MacInnis

(2005). The brand attitude formation process of emotional and informational ads. Journal of Business Research, 58(10), 1397–1406. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2005.03.011

103.

Zeng

Wen

Zhang

(2020). How does the valence of wording affect features of a scale? The method effects in the undergraduate learning burnout scale. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, Article 585179. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.585179