Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

In transitional democracies, the boundary work of defining journalism and through this, ousting certain media actors as illegitimate and threatful to national security and/or democratic stability can hold a particular urgency. This article considers the sanctions against three Russia-affiliated TV channels by the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council adopted in February 2021 – and the ensuing public debate on this decision – as a particularly informative case of such boundary work. Using thematic analysis of materials from Ukrainian news sites and TV talk shows, the article maps out how media regulators and representatives of the sanctioned and non-sanctioned media outlets competed over the authority to define the boundaries of legitimate journalism in Ukraine amid growing security threats. The findings show that the regulator labeled the sanctioned TV channels as “parasites of journalism,” situated within the Ukrainian media system, yet functioning in the interest of a foreign state. In turn, the sanctioned media actors styled themselves as repressed opposition media, attacking both regulators and non-sanctioned media for undemocratic intervention and a lack of professional solidarity, respectively. Lastly, non-sanctioned media actors have largely supported the sanction decision and detached from the sanctioned actors’ self-legitimation discourse. The study contributes to the literature on boundary work in journalism and showcases how a novel theory of parasites of journalism can enhance the analysis of complex discourses surrounding antagonistic media actors, including in non-Western contexts.

Keywords

journalistic norms boundary work media sanctions propaganda transitional democracy Ukraine Russia

Introduction

Recent research on the threats of propaganda and dis-/misinformation has mostly focused on the role of populist actors (Hameleers 2022) and foreign powers (Lukito 2020), with particular attention to social network platforms as willing amplifiers (Stöcker 2020) of this “information disorder” (Wardle and Derakhshan 2017). And yet, journalistic and quasi-journalistic actors may also pose a challenge to the viability of media systems, putting pressure on democracies to establish clear demarcation lines between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” and thus potentially harmful journalism. This “boundary work” (Carlson and Lewis 2015) of defining journalism is of particular relevance in transitional democracies, where disruptive media practices can have a dangerously destabilizing impact.

Drawing on the theory of parasites (Serres 2007) and its application to journalism by Nordheim and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2021), as well as on Voltmer's discussion of media as part of “democratization conflict” (2019), this article examines how such journalism boundary work may play out in the public debate. Taking the case of the sanctions against three Russia-affiliated Ukrainian TV channels introduced by the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) in February 2021, we conduct a thematic analysis of material from a wide range of media sources (n = 115) to investigate the perspectives of media regulators, as well as sanctioned and non-sanctioned media outlets, on what is legitimate journalism. The analyzed data includes news reports, op-eds, and political talk show episodes from the mainstream Ukrainian media not affected by the sanctions, but also material from the sanctioned TV channels and affiliated media outlets, including a talk show episode that is no longer publicly available as it was broadcasted on YouTube after the sanction decision and got subsequently removed from the platform.

While the selected case is instructive per se and has been regarded by the expert community as the most significant event on the Ukrainian media market in 2021 (Dankova 2022), it has gained additional relevance with Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Now, amid intensified information warfare and increased hybrid threats, both transitional and established democracies are facing the need to balance freedom of speech and security considerations when handling deviant media actors. Thus, in March 2022, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia's state-owned outlets RT and Sputnik, claiming that they pose “a significant and direct threat to the Union's public order and security” (Council of the EU 2022). This measure was later complemented with a ban on seven other Russian broadcasters in the EU – RTR Planeta, Russia 24, TVCI, NTV, Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya 1, and REN TV (European Commission 2022). Against the background of these unprecedented decisions and the accompanying public debate, the present study contributes to the literature on boundary work in journalism by tracing this process using the example of a previously unstudied, yet highly informative non-Western case.

Journalistic Boundary Work as a Democratization Conflict

In democracies, the privileges of journalistic media, among them freedoms such as rights to information, source protections, licenses, etc., come with certain expectations regarding their functions in society. Such functions include, for example, acting as watchdogs to monitor political powers, providing reliable information, or facilitating an exchange of diverse views and opinions as a forum for society at large (Singer 2015). However, as Voltmer (2013) points out, journalistic functions are based on democratic norms, which, in turn, must be continuously recalibrated and weighted. In practice, this gives rise to conflicting notions about the role of journalism. As Carlson puts it, journalism is a “variable rather than a fixed entity” (2018: 2) and must continuously adapt to the necessities of a given social reality at a given point in time. Aside from the natural instability inherent in journalistic boundaries, they can additionally be shaken by social upheavals, such as revolutions, wars, or terrorist attacks (Figenschou and Beyer 2014). In such cases, the public visions of what constitutes the spheres of consensus, controversy, and deviance in the realms of journalism and its regulation become especially fluid and polarized (Hallin 1986: 116–17).¹

The “malleable, evolving character” (Lewis 2012: 852) of journalism requires boundary work (Carlson and Lewis 2015) to define it both internally and in relation to the outside world. The associated process of social negotiation holds potential for conflict because this boundary work involves recognizing or denying certain rights and freedoms as well as epistemic authority and social legitimacy. The question of who may call themselves journalists becomes a question of social power. The conflictive potential of boundary work is particularly apparent when we consider transitional democracies, i.e., systems in transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of government (Stradiotto and Guo 2010). As a rule, the transition process is accompanied by a multitude of discourses in which the still volatile democratic norms are socially negotiated. These negotiation processes, also called “democratization conflicts” (Voltmer 2019), redefine the relationship between citizens and power, unfolding along the crucial fault lines that pervade the fragile system of a transitional democracy.

The fragility of the system can manifest itself in different ways. Often, citizens of young democracies have little trust in elites and thus in the democratic institutions that they represent; there is no unifying narrative to emphasize the unity of the citizenry and to instill a sense of national identity; instead, different segments of the population and political groups vie for dominance in a culture of mutual distrust that often stems from longstanding historical conflicts. In such contexts, the media are expected not to further divide and incite conflict – which is at odds with the eminently vital role of journalism to point out grievances and denounce abuses of power by elites to prevent democratic backsliding.

Media thus play a central, and at the same time potentially ambivalent, role in such situations of high volatility: The fact that they operate at the tipping points of democratic development makes them powerful instruments of stabilization and democratization (Cauhape-Cazaux and Kalathil 2015). But at these neuralgic points, media can also be deployed as destructive, destabilizing agents (Quandt 2018) by reactionary actors seeking to restore the “old order” or foreign powers aiming to expand their spheres of geopolitical influence. Here, democratic values, such as freedom of speech, represent vulnerabilities and potential avenues for interference. In this sense, the abuse of democratic freedoms is a central component of hybrid warfare strategies that aim “to exacerbate existing ethnic, religious, political or economic fault-lines, thereby undermining societal cohesion” (Kalniete and Pildegovičs 2021: 25).

The Parasites of Journalism Framework

One possible framework for examining such disruptive practices in the media realm is the theory of parasites (Serres 2007). It defines a parasite of journalism as “a subsystem that threatens the integrity of the primary system” (Nordheim and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2021: 86) by invoking media freedoms and privileges in order to undermine their very basis. Parasitic actors are characterized by three key elements: Their position between the inside and outside of the system (Serres 2007: 107); their compromising effect on the system in which the latter is forced to adjust to the presence of a parasite (Mejias 2010: 615); and their reflexive nature that enables the next parasite to occur (Leanza 2014: 37). Parasitic practices are made possible by a strategic ambiguity: Antagonistic media meet the normative expectations of journalism only partially, or only seemingly, in order to leverage its resources (trust, authority, visibility, etc.) and thus to boost the impact of destructive communication strategies (e.g., propaganda). These media strategies are particularly effective because they destabilize the democratic system at two levels: The content of a disinformation campaign may erode national security but also undermine trust in media and political institutions as epistemic authorities.

The paradox of the parasite, which consists in the fact that it acts outside the boundaries of a system, yet legitimizes itself through this very system, forces at least two actors to position themselves in relation to it: First, those who define boundaries (here, regulators and political decision-makers); second, those with whom the parasite ostensibly identifies and whose position (and legitimacy, authority, etc.) it undermines through its norm-violating behavior (here, journalistic actors). To illustrate, let us consider the parasitic challenge from the perspective of a regulator. As it feels compelled to take action against antagonistic media, a normative dilemma arises: The attempt to preserve certain democratic values restricts the freedoms derived from those very values. In other words, the regulator must justify why it restricts press freedom in order to preserve democracy. Its arguments must therefore hold up to the inevitable accusation that the expulsion itself is an undemocratic intervention. For the argument to be waterproof, the excluded actor must be demonstrably outside the “realm of legitimate journalism” (Carlson 2018: 3). In the inescapable discursive conflict that will follow, the various parties will then put forward arguments for inclusion or exclusion, and both sides will reference norms, addressing a public whose judgment ultimately determines whether the expulsion is perceived as an act of resilience or democratic backsliding.

And yet, we still lack empirical studies exploring which strategies are employed and which norms are interpreted in which way to back each side's position in real-life cases. This paper seeks to fill this research gap by tracing the public debate following the announcement of a regulatory expulsion of media outlets in a transitional democracy – here, the revocation of broadcasting licenses of three TV stations in Ukraine. To this end, we examine the published positions on this decision from three perspectives: the institutional perspective of the boundary setters (regulators), the actors that were thus excluded (sanctioned media outlets), and the actors that were thus included (non-sanctioned media outlets).

Institutional Perspective

On a macro level, we will shed light on how boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate journalism are drawn by institutional mechanisms. Various actors play a role here, such as (media) politicians or bureaucrats who decide to support or license media entities, as well as ethics councils that monitor compliance with certain journalistic principles (Ihlebæk and Nygaard 2021: 275). These institutions are the first instances of an expulsion – they must justify their decision before the public. We trace this by asking:

RQ1:

What boundaries do institutions draw between legitimate and illegitimate journalism and how are these boundaries (normatively) justified?

Media Perspective

On a meso level, the concept of boundary work describes how media organizations “confront controversy or challenge through the creation of insider-outsider narratives intent on re-establishing the terrain of valid news practices” (Carlson 2016: 352). Here, we must distinguish between the narratives of sanctioned and non-sanctioned media outlets. While the former aim to defend their legitimacy, challenging the authority of the institutional body that excluded them, the other journalists’ position is less predictable. If the intervention is external, as in the case of regulatory intervention, it makes sense for journalists to defend their autonomy as an interpretive community to retain control over boundary setting in their profession (McDevitt 2003). On the other hand, we could also plausibly assume that they understand the institutions’ arguments and support them to distinguish themselves from the sanctioned actors. From the perspective of the media actors involved, we ask:

RQ2:

How and with reference to which norms do sanctioned media define and legitimize themselves?

RQ3:

How and with reference to which norms do non-sanctioned media deny/assign legitimacy to the sanctioned media?

Contextualizing the Case of the Sanctioned TV Channels

Since the collapse of the totalitarian Soviet regime, Ukraine has been going through a democratic transition even though this path has not always been linear (Freedom House 2013). The anti-governmental mass protests of 2014, also known as Euromaidan, marked the beginning of the most recent stage of democratization in Ukraine. Despite the problems with the transparency of the government and the independence of the judiciary, Ukraine has had an uninterrupted record of free and fair elections since 2014, with various opposition groups represented in the national parliament. As the political system of Ukraine remains dynamic, the combination of its features makes the country a textbook example of a transitional democracy (Gherghina and Volintiru 2021). As for the Ukrainian media system, it is usually classified as “transitional” or “hybrid,” with strong politicization but a relatively low level of commercialization of the media market (Dobek-Ostrowska 2019). Similarly to other Eastern-European countries and also to representatives of the polarized pluralist media model, the Ukrainian media system has been characterized by a high degree of external pluralism and low newspaper circulation (Ryabinska 2011, Ryabinska 2017). Before being overtaken by social media in 2019, it was commercial television that remained the main source of political information in Ukraine (InMind Factum Group 2021), which brings us to the topic of the sanctioned TV channels.

The TV channels to be discussed further are 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK.² Before the imposition of sanctions in February 2021, these outlets were de jure owned by Taras Kozak, who at the time served as a people's deputy from the Ukrainian pro-Russian political party Opposition Platform – For Life (OPFL) but remained under the actual control of Viktor Medvedchuck, a co-chair of the same party and one of Vladimir Putin's closest allies in Ukraine (OCCRP 2021). The channels’ ownership structure systematically affected their content: OPFL members and affiliates enjoyed favorable coverage in news bulletins and on talk shows, while political opponents of the party were facing stricter time limits and more critical treatment in general (Zubchenko 2021).

Media-political entanglements that affect the editorial policy of a channel are a common phenomenon in Ukrainian commercial television (Yanchenko 2021), where unbiased reporting is impeded by the fact that all major TV stations are owned by business moguls with political interests. From this perspective, Medvedchuck's pool was typical of a media environment defined by “oligarchic pluralism” (Lyhachova 2015). However, what made the case of 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK special was their loyalty not only to a Ukrainian political actor but also to a foreign one – the Kremlin (Dovzhenko 2021). During the 2020 local elections in Ukraine, three of Medvedchuk's channels “were responsible for more than half of the cases of Kremlin disinformation messages being spread in the Ukrainian media” (Institute of Mass Information 2021). Another study showed that the channels functioned as a sourcing hub for the dissemination of the Kremlin's narratives in Ukraine through the network of Viber channels and social media blogs (Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre 2021). Therefore, in terms of content, Medvedchuk's TV channels differed from most other Ukrainian channels by their systematic alignment with the messages and agenda of a foreign state.

Importantly, Medvedchuk's holding did not emerge overnight but formed gradually as part of the Kremlin's information infrastructure in Ukraine. All three channels had already existed before Kozak bought them under obscure circumstances in 2018–2019. The last channel to join the pool was ZIK after which its “managers and journalists left in droves in protest against the new owner” (Korbut 2021). The consolidation of Medvedchuk's holding can be viewed as the Kremlin's response to changes in Ukraine's political and media landscape. Before 2014, a third of Ukrainians had been routinely consuming Russian state-controlled television, most notably Channel One Russia, without intermediation (InMind Factum Group 2014), so there was no practical need for the Kremlin to maintain media outlets like 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK in Ukraine. The situation changed after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas when 14 Russian television channels were blocked from Ukraine's cable network for “broadcasting propaganda of war and violence” (Reuters 2014). From this perspective, Medvedchuk's holding filled the vacuum created by the prohibition of Russian state-controlled broadcasters in Ukraine.

The discussion about the influence of Medvedchuk's pool on the information security of Ukraine began immediately after Kozak had purchased the channels. Back in 2018, the Ukrainian parliament voted to impose sanctions against 112 Ukraine and NewsOne, but the resolution was not considered by NSDC due to the lack of political will. On February 2, 2021, NSDC imposed personal sanctions against Kozak, which indirectly suspended broadcasting by 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK by revoking their licenses for five years. The formal basis for the sanctions was an investigation by the secret services of Ukraine, which established that legal entities associated with Kozak supplied coal from the Russian-occupied territories of Donbas, thereby contributing to the financing of terrorism. The sanction decision caused ambiguous reactions in Ukraine and abroad. According to a survey by the sociological group Rating (2021), 58 percent of Ukrainians approved the decision, and 28 percent opposed it. Russia condemned the sanctions as an assault on the freedom of speech. In the West, opinions were divided: For instance, the G7 ambassadors supported the decision while journalistic organizations, such as the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), denounced it as being politically motivated.

Method

Data

Using the traffic data from SimilarWeb (2021), we identified the three most visited Ukrainian news outlets for February 2021, the month when the sanctions were imposed. These were Censor.net with 35.83 M monthly visits, Ukrainska Pravda with 21.82 M visits, and Strana.ua with 18.49 M visits. The former two sources are considered quality news while Strana.ua (now blocked in Ukraine) used to be a pro-Kremlin low-quality outlet (Institute of Mass Information 2020). Detector Media, a niche online publication of the Ukrainian media community, was also included in the sample to address the study's third research question on how non-sanctioned media assessed the NSDC decision.

The search for materials in the four above-mentioned outlets was carried out using the keyword Medvedchuk* (Медведчук*). The sampling time frame was from February 2 to February 18, 2021, because on February 19, NSDC voted for a package of personal restrictions against Medvedchuk, and the media discourse fully switched to that topic. The keyword search returned 391 materials including news items, op-eds, social media reviews, statements by individual journalists and journalistic organizations, two video blogs, and one podcast, which were scraped from the websites of the respective media outlets.

Besides, we also sampled three episodes of television political talk shows, as talk shows serve as important platforms for public debate in Ukraine (Yanchenko 2021). “Freedom of Speech with Savik Shuster” on Ukraina and “Right to Power” on 1 + 1 were sampled as each of these top-rated talk shows devoted an entire episode to the topic of the sanction decision. The episode of “Puls” on 112 Ukraina, broadcasted on YouTube after the channel's disconnection from the cable network was also sampled to answer the study's second research question on how the sanctioned media defined and legitimized themselves.

There are two major reasons for the large diversity of the sampled materials. First, since the coverage of the studied media debate was focused in time, the overall amount of relevant data was feasible, so we were not forced to limit ourselves to certain genres or mediums and could qualitatively analyze multimedia material. Because media outlets with the largest readership were sampled, the resulting collection constitutes an adequate representation of the actual media debate that took place, especially considering that many other news outlets were producing very similar or identical content. Second, since we were interested in the positions of the specific actor groups, it was important to make sure that all of those groups were represented in the sample. For example, including publications from Detector Media was one of the few ways to capture the genuine position of the media community (as opposed to trying to infer it from the tone or other characteristics of the news items that appeared on regular media outlets). For a comprehensive overview of the sample, see Table A1 of the Supplementary Information file.

Preparation of the Corpus

As a first step, the corpus was cleaned of irrelevant materials. The materials were deemed relevant if (1) they contained evaluation(s) of the sanction decision and (2) reasoning for such evaluation(s). After applying these criteria, as well as eliminating duplicates and news items that were not related to the topic, the corpus was reduced to 115 documents containing positive and/or negative evaluations of the sanctions along with the reasoning for such assessment(s).

As a second step, the documents were sorted into three groups of actors that evaluated the sanction decision. The resulting groups corresponded to the three research questions and were labeled as follows: (1) regulators (41 documents), (2) sanctioned TV channels and affiliated actors (49 documents), and (3) representatives of non-sanctioned media (25 documents). When a document contained evaluations made by actors from different groups, as in the case of talk show transcripts, it was split into separate files, each containing evaluations by only one group of actors. When categorizing actors, we considered the peculiarities of the Ukrainian political and media systems. For instance, while formally, NSDC does not regulate media in Ukraine, it did perform this function in the studied case and was treated accordingly. Similarly, Strana.ua and its journalists were assigned to the “sanctioned TV channels and affiliated actors” group as this outlet (now blocked in Ukraine) belonged to the pro-Kremlin media wing (Vichrov 2020). For more details on the categorization rules, see Table A2 of the Supplementary Information file.

The Main Analysis

The multimedia corpus structured by actors was analyzed inductively using a three-step thematic coding proposed by Thomas and Harden (2008). The procedure included “free line-by-line coding [of the arguments pro and contra the sanctions]; the organization of these ‘free’ codes into related areas to construct descriptive themes; and development of analytical themes” (Thomas and Harden 2008: 4). As a result of these steps, 15 arguments favoring the sanctions and 19 arguments opposing the sanctions were identified. The final stage of the analysis consisted of generating analytical themes based on the previously identified descriptive themes. To ensure the validity of this step, we employed a concept mapping technique by Jonsen and Jehn (2009: 137).

Findings

The findings report is focused on the most salient themes for each group of actors considered in the study. For the exhaustive coding frame explaining and illustrating all the identified arguments, see Table A3 of the Supplementary Information file.

Institutional Strategy: Securitizing Ties With Russia Amid the Ongoing War in Donbas

Regulators and associated actors largely defended the legitimacy of the sanction decision in their public communication. The main argument of this group of actors concerned Russian influence on the channels and the related consequences for their editorial autonomy and content. The speakers repeatedly contraposed the concepts of “journalism” and “Russian propaganda”, arguing that the latter prevailed on the sanctioned channels: “[These sanctions] are an attempt to return to civilized rules of conduct in the media market and an institutional counteraction to a large-scale propaganda campaign”³ (Mykhailo Podoliak, adviser to the Head of the Office of President Zelensky, RE_1); “I do not distinguish these media outlets from those ran by the Kremlin … Today, the director of RT invited journalists of these channels to go straight to Russia, apparently to continue the work they did here in Ukraine” (Oleksandr Tkachenko, Minister for Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, RE_2). A salient aspect of the Russian influence theme was the channels’ alleged dependence on Russian funding. Regulators put forth the evidence of indirect financial aid to these Ukrainian channels from Russia as inadmissible in the conditions of the ongoing war in Donbas: “…When it became clear that the people who make money in Russia started using this money to fund Ukrainian TV channels, and this funding was not quite transparent, it was like a horror…” (Oleksii Danilov, NSDC Secretary, RE_3). Thus, regulators justified their decision by arguing that the sanctioned channels were instrumentalized by the Kremlin, and hence should be regarded as alien to the Ukrainian media system. As Zelensky put it, “We did not close our channels. We closed theirs” (President Zelensky, RE_4).

Another dominant argument used by regulators, and closely linked to the previous theme, regarded the sanctioned TV channels as a threat to the national security of Ukraine. In making this argument, speakers used collocations such as “information terrorism,” “information poison,” and “hybrid warfare.” Most of the time, however, they offered no elaborate explanations of how exactly Medvedchuk's channels undermined national security: “[The channels] became one of the tools of the war against Ukraine, so they were blocked to protect national security” (Yuliia Mendel, press secretary in the office of President Zelensky, RE_5); “…Now we are talking about the fifth column, which destabilizes our country and takes part in anti-state activities…” (Oleksii Danilov, NSDC Secretary, RE_6). Overall, security considerations dominated the regulators’ rhetoric, while references to democratic norms were quite rare.

Another important theme was that of journalistic standards. This part of the discussion was largely initiated by the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine (NCTRBU).⁴ The speakers did not limit themselves to criticizing journalistic performance on the sanctioned channels but also pointed out the dangers that unprofessional journalistic practices posed to the Ukrainian media system as a whole: “…We have long talked with the producer of these three channels about how their actions discredited the profession as such; how the concepts of journalism and a TV presenter got discredited” (Olha Herasymiuk, the Сhair of the NCTRBU, RE_2); “Unfortunately, the very existence of these TV channels with their fakes and manipulations severely damaged media standards in Ukraine. Because if somebody is allowed to constantly say that white is black, other journalists may also be tempted to do so” (Oleksandr Tkachenko, Minister of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, RE_2). Thus, at one level, the argument was about specific professional norms of journalism, such as accuracy and integrity during reporting. Yet at another level, regulators were also concerned about how systematic violation of these norms would affect the reputation of the Ukrainian media as an institution and the professionalism of other, non-sanctioned media.

Sanctioned Actors’ Strategy: Normalizing Own Performance Through the Selective Appropriation of Journalistic Resources

Despite the seeming diversity of the group, the sanctioned channels’ representatives and affiliated political and media actors unanimously opposed the NSDC decision. In reacting to the sanctions, they chose an attack strategy, trying to legitimize themselves by delegitimizing the sanction decision and the actors who made it. The main arguments used by this group of actors can be clustered into two themes – the procedural aspects of the decision and its implications for democracy. As part of the procedure criticism, the sanctions were assessed as “illegal,” “unconstitutional,” and “non-transparent.” Speakers also argued that the decision was adopted under political pressure from Washington (the foreign control theme). Statements from the second category maintained that the sanctions were inappropriate because they meant severe democratic backsliding for Ukraine. Particularly, it was argued that the decision violated the freedom of speech, was politically motivated, and testified to the usurpation of power by Zelensky. Thus, the sanctioned actors mainly cited the rule of law and democratic norms to defend their legitimacy.

Another salient theme within this part of the discourse was that of media performance. It concerned how the sanctioned channels assessed their role in the Ukrainian media system, including in relation to other media outlets. Particularly, the sanctioned channels positioned themselves as repressed opposition media (this label was used exclusively within this group of actors and also by the Russian state-controlled media). According to the speakers, it was objective, yet politically inconvenient reporting that led to the confrontation with the Ukrainian authorities:

[My channels] show Ukraine we live in: Ukraine with sky-high bills, super-scale corruption, Ukraine sold out to foreigners for a penny … [My channels] openly and fearlessly say that vaccination [against COVID-19] can be started right now – just use the agreements of Viktor Medvedchuk [with Vladimir Putin to supply the Russian vaccine Sputnik to Ukraine]. But Zelensky and his Western curators do not like this. (Taras Kozak, the formal owner of the channels, a deputy from OPFL, AN_1)

Speakers also referred to certain profession-specific indicators to testify to their legitimacy as media outlets. For instance, high ratings were put forward as evidence of journalistic excellence, ignoring a possibility that strong viewership numbers could be explained by other factors, for example, by sensationalist and negativistic reporting:

The only objective criterion to judge the performance of a TV presenter is their ratings, the number of viewers. If the rating is high, it means that a significant number of people likes what a presenter is doing, and this is an indicator of his work. (Dmytro Spivak, a presenter on the channels, AN_2)

In a similar vein, the fact that politicians from different parties attended the channels’ talk shows was presented as evidence of the media holding's impartiality (and the hypocrisy of politicians who first used the channels to communicate with the public and then supported the sanctions): “Everyone in this studio, except for Mr. Poturayev and Ms. Danilevskaya, was on this channel, which is now being called propaganda” (Diana Panchenko, TV host, NewsOne, AN_3).

Notably, the sanctioned actors’ justification of their journalistic performance was often accompanied by attacks on non-sanctioned media outlets: “After we were turned off, the ratings of other information channels immediately increased. Those channels that, by the way, are also financed by some of the oligarchs. Our share became their share” (Diana Panchenko, TV host, NewsOne, AN_5); “Yes, Savik Shuster's talk show seems unbalanced. But this is not a reason to close it down in lawlessness!” (Anastasiia Tovt, Strana.UA, AN_4). As seen, the sanctioned outlets were simultaneously criticizing the Ukrainian television market and striving to be perceived as an intrinsic part thereof, even when it meant something negative, for instance, media-political parallelism.

Non-Sanctioned Actors’ Perspective: Supporting the Essence and Questioning the Form of the Sanction Decision

Non-sanctioned representatives of the Ukrainian media community expressed a more balanced position regarding the sanctions than the two previous groups of actors. While mainly supporting the essence of the decision and showing no solidarity with Medvedchuk's channels, they also voiced concerns about the procedural aspects of the sanctions. We will start with the pro-sanction arguments.

Similarly to regulators, media community representatives placed the biggest emphasis on the security dimension of the topic. The themes dominating this part of the discourse included Russian influence on the sanctioned channels and the threats they posed to the national security of Ukraine: “It's indeed very convenient not to think about who you are taking your money from. To think that you are in opposition without noticing that you are on the other side of the trenches” (Pavlo Kazarin, journalist, OT_1); “The activities of NewsOne, 112 [Ukraine] and ZIK were aimed at providing information support to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. And this is no exaggeration” (Yaroslav Zubchenko, Detector Media, OT_2).

The security arguments were complemented by a relatively nuanced discussion of journalistic practices. For example, the speakers not only criticized media content and journalistic standards on the sanctioned channels but also provided analysis of cases when similar restrictive measures against media outlets were adopted in established democracies. A separate argument within the journalism theme was dedicated to freedom of speech abuse. The speakers maintained that there was no freedom of speech on the sanctioned channels in the first place and stressed that when used irresponsibly, freedom of speech can be turned against itself: “Currently, some people are trying to justify and protect those who sow discord while hiding behind freedom of speech and manipulating it” (from the statement of the regional organizations of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, OT_3); “Another threat to freedom of speech is a mimicry of freedom of speech. In this mimicry, information is used not as a means to establish the truth and support public debate, but as a means of conscious and systematic harm…” (from the statement of media organizations, OT_4). The freedom of speech abuse theme was mentioned exclusively by non-sanctioned media representatives, attesting to their rejection of the absolutist interpretation of freedom of speech, as well as to their awareness of how this specific democratic principle can be instrumentalized (e.g., for spreading propaganda).

Proceeding to criticism of the sanctions, representatives of the media community mainly questioned the decision-making procedure rather than the overall appropriateness of the measure. One of the points of criticism concerned the lack of transparency of the decision: “Of course, I would like to see all the details of the investigation conducted by the interim commission of inquiry, lists of accounts, the details of financial transactions; [the absence of this information] is the authorities’ mistake” (Tetiana Popova, journalist, Dom, OT_5). Some speakers also argued that sanctions are not a sustainable mechanism for domestic media regulation in a democracy: “The strength and speed of the effect that can be obtained by way of sanctions in internal affairs may become too much of a temptation in the hands of politicians” (Sevgil Musaieva, Editor-in-Chief, Ukrainska Pravda, OT_1). So, even when non-sanctioned media representatives supported the sanctions, they tended to discursively distance themselves from the authorities, in line with the watchdog function of journalism.

Importantly, criticism of the NSDC decision by non-sanctioned media was very different from criticism voiced by the sanctioned media, both in quantity and quality. Even the most outspoken critics of the decision among the non-sanctioned group used less than half of the arguments that the sanctioned media representatives made in defense of their legitimacy. For example, representatives of non-sanctioned media never mentioned arguments that framed the sanctions as a threat to social cohesion, as a signal for the Nazi groups to terrorize other “unwanted” media, as an attempt by the US to subjugate Ukraine, and others. Yet all these themes played an important role in the discursive strategy of the sanctioned media and their affiliated actors.

Discussion

The boundaries of legitimate journalism are being continuously constructed and renegotiated at different societal levels. This process can become especially tense under conditions of fragile institutions, political polarization, and security threats, all of which are often characteristic of states undergoing democratic transition (Voltmer 2013). This paper employed a case study approach to explore how various political and media actors in Ukraine demarcated legitimate journalism amid the controversial revocation of the broadcasting licenses of three Kremlin-backed Ukrainian TV stations. The theory of parasites (Nordheim and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2021) provides a useful analytical tool to interpret the discourse of all three groups of actors considered in the study.

The Ukrainian media regulatory authorities (RQ1), despite not having used the specific term, emphasized all three elements characterizing a parasitic actor: Its ambiguous position in the system, its compromising relation to the system, and its reflexive nature. The ambiguous position of the channels belonging simultaneously to the Ukrainian media market and the geopolitical toolkit of a foreign state was reflected in the part of the debate that focused on Russian influence. In turn, the aspects of relation and reflection were salient in the debates about journalistic standards and practices on the channels. From the institutional perspective, the channels not only violated certain journalistic norms but also challenged the operational logic of journalism as a profession: They overstepped the boundaries of legitimate debate on many topics (e.g., Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity) and saturated the broadcast with the viewpoints bordering the sphere of deviance, thereby forcing other media actors to adjust their agendas and routines accordingly. Thus, the regulator identified the parasitic nature of Medvedchuk's channels as the main reason for denying them journalistic authority and excluding them from the Ukrainian media system.

Proceeding to the sanctioned media and affiliated actors (RQ2), their self-legitimation strategy was also in line with the parasitic framework, which prescribes that a parasite would feed on the (normative) structures of journalism while simultaneously undermining those very structures. Particularly, this ambivalence was reflected in how the sanctioned channels referred to freedom of speech and pluralism to delegitimize the sanction decision (implications for democracy theme) – the same principles that they were consistently neglecting, according to NCTRBU and non-sanctioned media actors (journalistic practices and freedom of speech abuse themes). The paradoxical nature of the sanctioned channels also manifested in how they positioned themselves in relation to the Ukrainian media system – by simultaneously opposing it and attempting to be perceived as its legitimate part. For example, while the sanctioned channels attacked other Ukrainian TV channels by pointing to their dependence on politically motivated owners, they, nevertheless, insisted on their conformity to the same model (similarity to other channels theme). Such rhetoric allowed the sanctioned channels to counter the regulators’ exclusion narrative by situating themselves within the norms of the Ukrainian television market defined by “oligarchic pluralism” (Lyhachova 2015) and, at the same time, to obscure the factor of Russian influence. In a similar vein, the sanctioned channels rejected some of the criteria of quality journalism as being imposed on them for political reasons (e.g., responsible coverage of sensitive topics) and utilized others (e.g., TV ratings and attendance by politicians) to emphasize their journalistic legitimacy and credibility. On a theoretical level, such contradictions illustrate the strategic ambiguity of a parasitic actor that meets the normative expectations of a host media system only partially, or only seemingly (Nordheim and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2021).

Lastly, non-sanctioned media denied journalistic authority to the sanctioned channels (RQ3), which once again highlights that the sanctioned channels were not perceived as legitimate by those actors with whom they allegedly identified and whose resources (reputation, credibility, trust, etc.) they attempted to claim. A closer look at how sanctioned and non-sanctioned media outlets assessed the NSDC decision reveals their very different perspectives on what should constitute the spheres of consensus, deviance, and legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986) in the realms of journalistic performance and regulation. In the case of non-sanctioned media, the analysis allows us to clearly identify the three spheres. For instance, there was consensus within the media community about Medvedchuk's channels spreading Kremlin propaganda and posing a threat to the national security of Ukraine. There was also a distinct sphere of legitimate controversy, where actors argued whether, for example, it was a legal and proportionate measure to revoke the channels’ licenses by the mechanism of sanctions. Finally, there was a relatively broad sphere of deviance, containing topics and viewpoints that were voiced in the discourse generated by the sanctioned outlets, but never made it to the agenda of non-sanctioned media as too inappropriate or extreme (see foreign control, usurpation of power, civilized world, carte blanche for the Nazis, part of a bigger picture themes in Table A3 of the Supplementary Information file). For the sanctioned media, the spheres of consensus and deviance were inverted. For instance, there was no disagreement within this group of actors about the U.S. imposing the sanction decision on Kyiv (foreign control theme) and, at the same time, no mention of Medvedchuk's business ties with Russia or any other information that could potentially legitimize the NSDC decision. In turn, the sphere of controversy, and consequently a room for debate, was effectively absent as neither representatives of the sanctioned media nor any of the affiliated actors questioned narratives coming from this group of actors.

The present paper is among the few scholarly attempts to trace the process of journalistic boundary-making in a transitional democracy (for some exceptions, see Budivska and Orlova 2017, Orlova 2016, Zirugo 2021) and, to our best knowledge, the first application of the parasites of journalism framework to a real-life case. The analyzed metajournalistic debate vividly illustrated how the sanctioned TV channels utilized parasitic strategies to preserve Russian information influence in Ukraine even after major Russian state-controlled broadcasters were blocked from Ukraine's cable network in 2014. Notably, the Ukrainian systemic vulnerabilities that Medvedchuk's channels exploited to maintain such an influence, for example, low public trust in democratic institutions or historically conditioned social cleavages, are typical of many other transitional democracies (Voltmer 2013). This makes the findings of the case study relevant for other post-Soviet and some Arab countries, where the process of democratic transition is also non-linear and associated with severe social upheavals (Elbadawi and Makdisi 2016).

From the theoretical perspective, our analysis revealed the challenges of distinguishing journalism from similar practices in hybrid media systems (Chadwick 2013) and in contexts where neither mainstream nor deviant media actors are guided by the standards and norms commonly accepted in the West. For example, none of the studied actors implied that to count as legitimate, the sanctioned channels should be politically independent, as such a demand would be unfair in the realities of the Ukrainian television market. Instead, independence from a specific foreign actor was identified as the criterium for legitimacy. Obviously, such a view entails a different interpretation of journalistic autonomy and other related norms compared to what media codes of most established democracies would suggest. One way to examine such unconventional cases is through the lens of a theory of parasites, which views media actors in relation to each other and in relation to the host and outside systems rather than to a set of predetermined standards and norms. This theoretical approach to studying antagonistic media actors will merit further investigation, including in the context of established democracies, as even the most resilient media systems are not immune against infiltrations. In the digital age, maintaining the boundaries of legitimate journalism without compromising freedom of speech may become a major challenge for countries committed to democratic values.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-hij-10.1177_19401612231167791 - Supplemental material for “Repressed Opposition Media” or “Tools of Hybrid Warfare”? Negotiating the Boundaries of Legitimate Journalism in Ukraine Prior to Russia's Full-Scale Invasion

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-hij-10.1177_19401612231167791 for “Repressed Opposition Media” or “Tools of Hybrid Warfare”? Negotiating the Boundaries of Legitimate Journalism in Ukraine Prior to Russia's Full-Scale Invasion by Kostiantyn Yanchenko, Alona Shestopalova and Gerret von Nordheim, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw in The International Journal of Press/Politics

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Kostiantyn Yanchenko

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author Biographies

Kostiantyn Yanchenko is a PhD candidate at the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Hamburg (Germany). He holds a master's degree in Journalism, Media, and Globalization from Aarhus University (Denmark). His dissertation project focuses on the effects and audiences of populist narratives.

Alona Shestopalova is a PhD candidate at the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Hamburg (Germany). She holds a master's degree in Political Science from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv (Ukraine). In her dissertation, Alona studies Russian state-controlled communication.

Gerret von Nordheim is a postdoctoral researcher in the field of communication science at the University of Hamburg, Germany. His research focuses on intermedia effects in the hybrid media system, especially between journalism, social media and populist actors. He specialises in computational methods.

Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw is a Professor for Journalism and Communication Studies, esp. Digital Communication and Sustainability at the Universität Hamburg. Her research focuses on the impact of digitalisation and technological innovations on political communication and, in particular, the role of social network platforms and their use by citizens and political actors.

References

Budivska

Halyna

Orlova

Dariya

. 2017. “Between Professionalism and Activism: Ukrainian Journalism After the Euromaidan.” Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal 3(Special Issue: Civil Society in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine):137–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12088.

Carlson

Matt

. 2016. “Metajournalistic Discourse and the Meanings of Journalism: Definitional Control, Boundary Work, and Legitimation.” Communication Theory 26(4):349–68. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12088.

Carlson

Matt

. 2018. “Boundary Work.” In The International Encyclopedia of Journalism Studies, ed. Vos

T. P.

Hanusch

, 1–6. Malden, Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Carlson

Matt

Lewis

Seth C.

, eds. 2015. Boundaries of Journalism: Professionalism, Practices and Participation. Explorations in Communication and History. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Cauhape-Cazaux

Eduardo

Kalathil

Shanthi

. 2015. “Official Development Assistance for Media: Figures and Findings.” OECD . https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/CIMA.pdf

Chadwick

Andrew

. 2013. The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power. Oxford Studies in Digital Politics. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Council of the EU. 2022. “EU Imposes Sanctions on State-owned Outlets RT/Russia Today and Sputnik’s Broadcasting in the EU.” March 2. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-outlets-rt-russia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/

Dankova

Nataliia

. 2022. “Топдесятка подій українського медіаринку у 2021 році. [Top 10 Events of the Ukrainian Media Market in 2021].” Detector Media, January 3. https://detector.media/rinok/article/195294/2022-01-03-topdesyatka-podiy-ukrainskogo-mediarynku-u-2021-rotsi/

Dobek-Ostrowska

Bogusława

. 2019. How the Media Systems Work in Central and Eastern Europe. Public Service Broadcasting and Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

10.

Dovzhenko

Otar

. 2021. “Ні, закривати канали Порошенка не потрібно. Бо ці канали працюють на Порошенка, але не на Росію [No, Poroshenko’s Channels Do Not Need to Be Closed. Because These Channels Work for Poroshenko, but not for Russia].” Detector Media, February 16. https://detector.media/infospace/article/184933/2021-02-16-ni-zakryvaty-kanaly-poroshenka-ne-potribno/

11.

Elbadawi

Ibrahim

Makdisi

Samir

. 2016. “Resistance to and Prospects for Democracy.” In Democratic Transitions in the Arab World, ed. Elbadawi

Makdisi

, 307–12. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

12.

European Commission. 2022. “Questions and answers: Ninth package of restrictive measures against Russia.” December 16. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_7653

13.

Figenschou

Tine U.

Beyer

Audun

. 2014. “The Limits of the Debate: How the Oslo Terror Shook the Norwegian Immigration Debate.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 19(4):430–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161214542954.

14.

Freedom House. 2013. “Freedom in the World 2013. The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties”. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2013_complete_book.pdf

15.

Gherghina

Sergiu

Volintiru

Clara

. 2021. “Political Parties and Clientelism in Transition Countries: Evidence from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.” Acta Politica 56(4):677–93. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-020-00151-x.

16.

Hallin

Daniel C

. 1986. The “Uncensored War”: The media and Vietnam. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

17.

Hameleers

Michael

. 2022. “Empowering the People’s Truth Through Social Media? (De)Legitimizing Truth Claims of Populist Politicians and Citizens.” Politics and Governance 10(1):210–19. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i1.4726.

18.

Ihlebæk

Karoline A.

Nygaard

Silje

. 2021. “Right-wing Alternative Media in the Scandinavian Political Communication Landscape.” In Power, Communication, and Politics in the Nordic Countries, ed. Skogerbø

Ihlen

Ø.

Nørgaard Kristensen

Nord

, 263–82. Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.

19.

InMind Factum Group. 2014. “Survey of Media Consumption in Ukraine 2014.” Internews, October 6. http://umedia.kiev.ua/english/media-research/595-internews-survey-reveals-large-majority-in-donetsk-still-watching-ukrainian-tv-but-just-24-trust-the-veracity-of-the-information-provided.html#.YdMpXWhByM8

20.

InMind Factum Group. 2021. “USAID-Internews 2021 Media Consumption Survey.” November 8. https://internews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/USAID_Internews-Media-Consumption-Survey-2021_ENG.pdf

21.

Institute of Mass Information (IMI). 2020. “Report of the Monitoring of Compliance with Professional Standards in Online Media.” December 29. https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/zvit-z-monitoryngu-dotrymannya-profstandartiv-v-onlajn-media-chetverta-hvylya-monitoryngu-u-2020-i36958

22.

Institute of Mass Information (IMI). 2021. “Media Movement Supports Sanctions Against Medvedchuk’s TV Channels and Urges Not to Persecute Its Employees.” February 8. https://imi.org.ua/en/news/media-movement-supports-sanctions-against-medvedchuk-s-tv-channels-and-urges-not-to-persecute-its-i37520

23.

Jonsen

Karsten

Jehn

Karen A.

. 2009. “Using Triangulation to Validate Themes in Qualitative Studies.” Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal 4(2):123–50. https://doi.org/10.1108/17465640910978391.

24.

Kalniete

Sandra

Pildegovičs

Tomass

. 2021. “Strengthening the EU’s Resilience to Hybrid Threats.” European View 20(1):23–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858211004648.

25.

Korbut

Anna

. 2021. Strengthening Public Interest in Ukraine’s Media Sector. Chatham House, April 23. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/strengthening-public-interest-ukraines-media-sector/03-ukraines-main-media-actors

26.

Leanza

Matthias

. 2014. “Border Noise: On the Figure of the Parasite in Systems Theory.” BEHEMOTH – A Journal on Civilisation 7(1):28–47. https://doi.org/10.6094/behemoth.2014.7.1.771.

27.

Lewis

Seth C

. 2012. “The Tension Between Professional Control and Open Participation.” Information, Communication & Society 15(6):836–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.674150.

28.

Lukito

Josephine

. 2020. “Coordinating a Multi-Platform Disinformation Campaign: Internet Research Agency Activity on Three U.S. Social Media Platforms, 2015 to 2017.” Political Communication 37(2):238–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1661889.

29.

Lyhachova

Natalya

. 2015. “МедиаОБОЗ или медиаАВАНГАРД? [Media-baggage or Media-vanguard?].” Mediasapiens, April 20. https://ms.detector.media/mediaanalitika/post/13071/2015-04-20-medyaoboz-yly-medyaavangard/

30.

McDevitt

Michael

. 2003. “In Defense of Autonomy: A Critique of the Public Journalism Critique.” Journal of Communication 53(1):155–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2003.tb03011.x.

31.

Mejias

Ulises A

. 2010. “The Limits of Networks as Models for Organizing the Social.” New Media & Society 12(4):603–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444809341392.

32.

Nordheim

Gerret von

Kleinen-von Königslöw

Katharina

. 2021. “Uninvited Dinner Guests: A Theoretical Perspective on the Antagonists of Journalism Based on Serres’ Parasite.” Media and Communication 9(1):88–98. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v9i1.3419.

33.

OCCRP. 2021. The Sweetheart Oil Deal Funding Ukraine’s Top Pro-Kremlin Politician. March 25. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/the-sweetheart-oil-deal-funding-ukraines-top-pro-kremlin-politician

34.

Orlova

Dariya

. 2016. “Ukrainian Media After the EuroMaidan: In Search of Independence and Professional Identity.” Publizistik 61(4):441–61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11616-016-0282-8.

35.

Quandt

Thorsten

. 2018. “Dark Participation.” Media and Communication 6(4):36–48. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1519.

36.

Rating. 2021. Суспільно-політичні настрої населення (22-23 лютого 2021) [Socio-political Attitudes of the Population (February 22-23, 2021)]. February 24. https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/obschestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_naseleniya_22-23_fevralya.html?fbclid=IwAR1794cUyHFycxKOBGM1gw8evO_-h5ulj9qULDiHyVofwPziINsG1SRq2NU

37.

Reuters. 2014. “Ukraine Bans Russian TV Channels for Airing War ‘Propaganda’.” August 19. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-television-idUSKBN0GJ1QM20140819

38.

Ryabinska

Natalya

. 2011. “The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine: Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism.” Problems of Post-Communism 58(6):3–20. https://doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216580601.

39.

Ryabinska

Natalya

. 2017. Ukraine’s Post-Communist Mass Media: Between Capture and Commercialization. Berlin: Ibidem Verlag.

40.

Serres

Michel

. 2007. The Parasite. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

41.

SimilarWeb. 2021. “Ranking of the top websites in the category ‘News and Media’ in Ukraine.” https://www.similarweb.com/ru/top-websites/ukraine/category/news-and-media/

42.

Singer

Jane

. 2015. “Out of Bounds: Professional Norms as Boundary Markers.” In Boundaries of Journalism: Professionalism, Practices and Participation, ed. Carlson

Lewis

S. C.

, 21–36. Oxford: Routledge.

43.

Stöcker

Christian

. 2020. “How Facebook and Google Accidentally Created a Perfect Ecosystem for Targeted Disinformation.” In Disinformation in Open Online Media, ed. Grimme

Preuss

Takes

F. W.

Waldherr

, 129–49. Leiden, The Netherlands: Springer International Publishing.

44.

Stradiotto

Gary A.

Guo

Sujian

. 2010. “Transitional Modes of Democratization and Democratic Outcomes.” International Journal on World Peace 27(4):5–40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266546.

45.

Thomas

James

Harden

Angela

. 2008. “Methods for the Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Research in Systematic Reviews.” BMC Medical Research Methodology 8:45. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-8-45.

46.

Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre (UCMC). 2021. “Як канали Медведчука стали основою механізму просування російської пропаганди в Україні [How Medvedchuk’s Channels Became the Basis of The Mechanism For Promoting Russian Propaganda in Ukraine].” February 11. https://uacrisis.org/uk/kanaly-medvedchuka

47.

Vichrov

Maksym

. 2020. “Проросійський трансформер [A pro-Russian Transformer].” May 20. https://tyzhden.ua/Politics/243872

48.

Voltmer

Katrin

. 2013. Contemporary Political Communication. Cambridge: Polity.

49.

Voltmer

Katrin

. 2019. “Introduction: Democratization Conflicts as Communicative Contestations.” In Media, Communication and the Struggle for Democratic Change, ed. Votmer

Christensen

Neverla

Stremlau

Thomass

Vladisavljević

Wasserman

, 1–31. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

50.

Wardle

Claire

Derakhshan

Hossein

. 2017. Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making. Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe. http://tverezo.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/PREMS-162317-GBR-2018-Report-desinformation-A4-BAT.pdf.

51.

Yanchenko

Kostiantyn

. 2021. “‘We Will not Get Another Chance if We Lose This Battle Now’: Populism on Ukrainian Television Political Talk Shows Ahead of the Presidential Election in 2019.” East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies 8(2):275–306. https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus560.

52.

Zirugo

Danford

. 2021. “Journalism Hybridization in Postcolonial Societies: Paradigm Adaptation Tensions in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” Journalism Studies 22(7):860–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2021.1899843.

53.

Zubchenko

Yaroslav

. 2021. “Чому закриття каналів Медведчука – це не наступ на свободу слова [Why Closing down Medvedchuk’s Channels is not an Attack on Freedom of Speech].” Detector Media, February 3. https://detector.media/infospace/article/184529/2021-02-03-chomu-zakryttya-kanaliv-medvedchuka-tse-ne-nastup-na-svobodu-slova/

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.05 MB