Abstract
This article introduces a Special Issue on Thailand's 2023 election. The articles unravel the factors driving the surprising results of the 14 May poll, which prima facie delivered impressively liberal outcomes, only later to be confounded by a series of conservative moves. Drawing on rich empirical data from fieldwork, interviews, and surveys, the articles uncover important societal and political changes that produced the election results, especially new social cleavages along generational lines, new styles of campaigning, and the relative decline of populist money politics. The papers test new concepts and add to a range of literatures including gender in politics, digital politics, diaspora politics, and authoritarian securitisation.
Thailand's general election on 14 May 2023, ushered in an unprecedented result. The country's most reformist and progressive political party, the Move Forward Party (MFP), won the most seats, allowing it to convene a majority coalition and place its leader Pita Limcharoenrat in the box seat to become Prime Minister. The election results spelled the end of an 8-year rule by General Prayuth Chan o-cha, a junta leader whose coup d’etat in 2014 plunged the country into dictatorship. They also marked the end of the red-yellow political divide, that polarised the country for more than two decades, as well as the relative decline of the Pheu Thai party. The triumph of the MFP, marked by its orange colour, was surprising because the party's key campaign promise was to reform the monarchy and the military – the two most powerful institutions that have long influenced Thai politics.
Polling day was far, however, from being decisive. Two more critical joint parliamentary sittings were needed before a government could be formed, by which time global attention had moved on. The first, on 13 July, ended Move Forward's hopes of forming a Pita-led government. Under section 272 of the 2017 constitution, the party needed support from at least sixty four senators to achieve 376 votes of the joint parliament of 750. These votes were not forthcoming, thwarting the will of the majority, and confirming that despite the election, Thailand's political system remained competitive and authoritarian in nature. The second sitting on 22 August saw Pheu Thai and the military-proxy parties Phalang Pracharath and United Thai Nation reach hands across the political divide to elect Pheu Thai's Srettha Thavisin as prime minister, in cabinet comprising members from the former government parties. The “secret deal,” which underpinned the new alliance of convenience, saw former prime minister and Pheu Thai dynast Thaksin Shinawatra return to Thailand under a royal pardon, suggesting elite manoeuvres had again been potent in shaping the country's political outcomes. Arguably, this election was not finished until the following year, when on 7 August 2024 the Constitutional Court dissolved the Move Forward party, deeming its policy of reforming the s.112 if the criminal code as tantamount to attempting to overthrow Thailand's democracy with the monarch as head of state. The party's overnight rebirth as the People's Party sets the scene for the next election, due in 2028.
While these events were ultimately crucial in deciding Thai governance, they do not negate the imperative or value of deep reflection on the demographic, regional, gender, and party political dimensions of the election. This election saw new cleavages open up in the electorate, the continued drift away from old styles of campaigning, and a reconfirmed commitment to elections and parliamentary processes as the foremost arena for resolving differences and bringing about change. While the ultimate results were illiberal, the election was not without liberalising aspects, as women and LGBTQI candidates were elected in significantly greater numbers than ever before.
This special issue brings together Thai studies scholars who have conducted original empirical research relating to the Thai 2023 election, drawing on diverse methodological approaches and theoretical frameworks. They bring new data and fresh insights into what might explain the election outcomes and their implications for the Southeast Asian region more broadly.
Core Findings of the Special Issue
The Special Issue highlights three salient points about the 2023 Thai election. First, the commitment to electoral democracy amongst ordinary Thais remains strong, contrary to the highly qualified respect for the outcomes democratic processes produce amongst conservative elites. The 2023 election saw 40 million Thais, or 75 per cent of eligible voters, exercise their franchise. This positive spirit defied a long history of Thailand's conservative elites using institutional mechanisms to hinder the victors of the election from taking power. It might be observed that elections have something for everyone: progressive voters can nourish hope that things might be different “this time,” while conservative voters feel assured that no matter what unfavourable results the polls might produce, the system will preserve their interests. In this sense, Thailand offers an interesting case for examining how elections outcomes in competitive authoritarian quasi-democracy shape voter feelings about democracy, a phenomenon examined in a number of the papers in this Special Issue.
Secondly, whilst the tension between voting outcomes and government outcomes is a constant between elections in Thailand, the 2023 election suggests deep change with respect to key battleground issues and electorate cleavages. This election confirmed the passing of class and region as key determinants of voting preferences, which, manifested in the yellow-red shirt divides and other colour identities defined the years of between the 2006 and 2014 coups. This election, in contrast, held in the wake of the unprecedented youth protests of 2020, appeared to highlight a generational divide. Younger Thais were much more prepared to vote in support of structural reforms to key institutions such as the monarchy and the military, and less interested in populist policies intended to deliver short-term economic benefits. While large swathes in voters remained loyal to Pheu Thai as a party of both democracy and economic promise, a new bloc of voters were far more prepared to advocate for fundamental change. Conservative elites perceived in this shift an existential threat and reacted by framing the youth as misled and a challenge to basic conceptions of Thainess. The younger voters themselves recommitted to the parliament as the venue for seeking fundamental change in Thailand in which the sovereignty of the people is enshrined in the parliament and under pinned by the rule of law.
Thirdly, the methods by which parties compete are changing, influenced by both shifts in technology and shifts in social values. This election saw the continued rise of social media campaigning and the decline (though not disappearance) of traditional vote-brokering and village-based money politics. Younger voters looking for structural change are highly attuned and adept in social media, and more interested in policy content. That is not to say that personality and image brand are unimportant, these still count. Locally rooted big political families can also attract votes, but vote buying is less prevalent and certainly less reliable as a means by which to win office. This election also saw significant advances in the diversity of party representation, with women and non-binary candidates scoring big and unexpected victories in the 2023 Thai elections.
The Articles in This Issue
Each contributing article focuses on a unique perspective to making sense of the election. Two articles focus on explaining change and continuity in
Saowanee Alexander examines the electoral outcomes in the
Surachanee Sriyai and Akkaranai Kwanyou explore
Jacob Ricks and Allen Hicken explain how electoral outcomes shape the ways voters view
Aim Sinpeng examines the role of
Gregory Raymond returns to the question of the conservative mindset in the face of generational change, analysing the behaviour, decision-making, and discourses of the
Pavin Chachavalpongpun investigates the role the
In sum, this election showed Thailand's ideological divide between what voters want and what conservative institutions are prepared to permit has remained. How this chasm is navigated, will be an issue for future research, and will be important to determining whether Southeast Asia's democratic regression continues, consolidates, or reverses. This Special Issue also reveals that just as voters are changing in the nature and extent of their demands, political parties are changing in their campaigning strategies and methods, and in their representation.
Author Biography
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
