Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Behavioural Consequences of Political Trust in Contexts of Inequality: The Case of Latin America

Abstract

Spanish

This article examines the impact of political trust on citizen engagement, focusing on its interaction with economic inequality in Latin America. In a regional context of persistently low trust in democratic institutions and high inequality, we examine how these factors shape citizens’ strategies of engagement with the political system. Drawing on Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, we argue that the interplay between low trust and inequality generates distinct behavioral patterns that may foster active citizenship. Building on data from the AmericasBarometer and using hierarchical modeling, our findings suggest that low-trusting citizens are more likely to engage in both exit and non-institutional voice strategies, particularly for the latter when inequality increases. Conversely, higher levels of political trust are associated with greater institutional voice. Notably, trust in political parties follows a different pattern: it is associated with lower levels of non-institutional voice.

Keywords

Political trust inequality political behavior Latin America

Introduction

What is the impact of political trust on political attitudes and behaviors? What strategies do citizens adopt to engage with the political system when they lack trust in their institutions? Contemporary Latin America is undergoing a period characterized by diminished trust in political institutions and actors, mirroring similar trends observed across other modern democracies worldwide (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Citrin and Stoker, 2018; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Stolle and Hooghe, 2005). Public opinion data reveal that political trust in the region has declined significantly over the last decades, reaching levels as low as 20 per cent (LAPOP, 2023). This widespread erosion of trust has raised urgent questions about its potential consequences for democratic systems and their relationships with civil society. To what extent does the observed decline in political trust pose negative effects for active democratic citizenship? What mechanisms do low-trusting citizens employ to engage with their political systems?

In Latin America, addressing these questions requires acknowledging the central role of economic inequality. As one of the most unequal regions in the world, Latin America has historically struggled with structural socioeconomic disparities that shape political attitudes. Sharp levels of economic inequality erode perceptions of fairness and inclusion, discouraging political engagement and citizens’ dissatisfaction with democratic institutions (Solt, 2008). When political systems are perceived as complicit in perpetuating inequality, they risk alienating large segments of the population, further undermining trust in institutions. Scholars have demonstrated that inequality exacerbates perceptions of institutional unfairness (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Uslaner, 2008) potentially intensifying the behavioral consequences of low trust. This intersection of economic inequality and low-trusting societies makes the region a crucial case for understanding how structural disparities, together with low levels of institutional confidence, influence citizen engagement.

In this sense, this research seeks to combine two theoretical approaches: one exploring the relationship between political trust and active citizenship, and the other examining how trust in institutions interacts with economic inequality to shape civic behaviors. Building on Hirschman (1970) influential theory on exit, voice, and loyalty, the aim of this article is to examine the behavioral consequences of (low levels of) political trust in contexts of socioeconomic inequality. Specifically, we explore how variations in trust (acting as loyalty) in political institutions and actors interact with socioeconomic inequality to shape citizens’ active engagement with the political system through exit and voice strategies.

If trust is indeed a cornerstone of civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), are low-trusting citizens inherently less culturally civic? In this article, we use the term citizen engagement to refer to the set of attitudes and behaviors through which citizens interact with the political system. This concept has been employed to capture different dimensions of citizenship, including efforts to address public concerns through individual or collective action and involvement with democratic institutions (Arvanitidis, 2017). These activities encompass involvement in political, as well as social affairs, whether through formal or informal institutions (Ekman and Amnå, 2022; Verba et al., 1995).

By analyzing behavioral patterns in low-trusting societies and high-inequality contexts, we aim to assess whether diminished trust poses a genuine threat to citizen engagement and active citizenship and to ascertain the extent to which cross-level interactions between perceived political trust and inequality influence the strategies citizens choose to engage with the political system. Drawing on public opinion data, we fit multilevel regression models across 17 Latin American countries over a ten-year period (2010–2019). Overall, our results suggest that lower levels of political trust are positively associated with engaging in non-institutional voice and exit behavioral strategies, while negatively associated with institutional forms of participation. That is, as expected, low-trusting citizens are more likely to get involved in protest or consider migration, and less likely to participate in community-based or formal political activities. Additionally, this effect is stronger in contexts of high economic inequality. However, trust in political parties exhibits a distinct pattern when it comes to non-conventional forms of engagement.

Documenting the relation between political trust and citizen engagement is theoretically and empirically relevant for two reasons. First, exploring how political trust impact citizen engagement may help gain a deeper understanding on the fact that low levels of political trust may not actually be negative for democracy and for developing an active citizenship. Additionally, Latin America combines low levels of political trust with high levels of socioeconomic inequality. These conditions create an ideal case for studying the intersection of trust and inequality and its effects on citizen engagement.

By analyzing the exit, voice, and loyalty patterns among Latin American democracies, our study can add to the understanding of these mechanisms in unequal contexts. Second, by regarding political trust as the explanatory variable, this study may help understand whether trust is actually related to outcome, whose literature is lacking as stated by many scholars (Carstens, 2023; Citrin and Stoker, 2018; Devine, 2024; Levi and Stoker, 2000). Thus, our analyses contribute to the still growing branch of research that studies political trust as the hypothesized cause and not only as the consequence of different political phenomena.

The article proceeds in four sections. First, it outlines the theoretical argument and mechanisms for the consequences of low political trust for citizen engagement and how its interaction with socioeconomic inequality shapes these effects, emphasizing the intersection of these structural and individual-level factors in influencing political behavior. Second, it delves into the data description and the methods. Third, it analyzes the results to examine the combined effects of trust and inequality on citizens’ strategies for engaging with the political system, focusing on voice and exit strategies. Finally, it concludes by discussing the main findings and their implications and limitations for the study of political trust.

The Behavioral Consequences of Political Trust

This paper explores the role that political trust plays in affecting citizen engagement under unequal contexts. In recent decades, political trust has been a central focus of political science, motivated by widespread declines in institutional confidence across many contemporary democracies (Torcal, 2014, 2017; Van der Meer and Zmerli, 2017). Extensive scholarship suggests that democracy is under threat due to the structural erosion of citizens’ attachment to core democratic institutions (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Mounk, 2018). Broadly defined, political trust refers to citizens’ perceptions of the reliability and performance of key institutions within the political system (Denters et al., 2007; Lipset and Schneider, 1983; Montero et al., 1997).

In other words, citizens deposit their trust in a specific object of the political system and expect that it will behave accordingly to their expectations even when it is not under surveillance. As Easton (1975) states, the presence of trust would mean that individuals would feel that their own interests would be attended even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision of scrutiny. This expectation that the trustee will not take advantage of the trustor's vulnerability and will act with predictability and goodwill (Maguire and Phillips, 2008) shapes perceptions of legitimacy and impacts decisions on how individuals choose to engage with their political systems.

Recent theoretical debates on political trust have been dominated by the “rational-culturalist” perspective, emphasizing performance assessments and perceived political responsiveness (Lane, 1992; Lipset and Schneider, 1983; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Norris, 1999; Van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017). This “trust-as-evaluation” approach contrasts with the earlier “traditional-culturalist” paradigm, which views political attitudes as relatively stable products of socialization (Almond and Verba, 1963; Citrin and Stoker, 2018; Easton, 1975; Lerner, 1958).

However, while there is a rich body of literature on the factors explaining political trust, far less attention has been given to its consequences. As several review studies have shown, existing empirical research on this topic is fragmented and often lacks a common theoretical framework (Carstens, 2023; Devine, 2024; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Uslaner, 2018; Weinberg et al., 2021). Despite these limitations, the literature has identified the most frequently examined outcomes when analyzing political trust as the hypothesized cause. These include compliance, participation, voting behavior, and policy preferences (Citrin and Stoker, 2018; Devine, 2024).

Drawing primarily on survey-based research, the literature on political trust presents two distinct perspectives. Since the foundational works of Easton (1975), Offe (1972), and Miller (1974), political trust has been regarded as a fundamental pillar for the legitimacy and, therefore, the stability of political systems, considering it as an essential component of the civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963). Based on these notions, the dominant perspective in academic debates regards low levels of trust as a significant cause of concern, suggesting that such trends can erode democracy and ultimately undermine the democratic process itself (Dalton, 2004; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 1997). This perspective posits that higher levels of trust in core democratic institutions foster engagement in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation (Schnaudt, 2019). Letki (2006) reinforces this view, suggesting that political trust represents a sense of civic responsibility that motivates citizens to engage constructively with the political systems. However, so far systematic empirical evidence supporting these claims remains surprisingly limited.

Conversely, an alternative strand of scholarship challenges these assumptions indicating that criticism of institutional performance is not inherently negative for democracy. The “critical citizens” (Norris, 2011) argument contends that political distrust can actually motivate political engagement, particularly among individuals reporting high political efficacy (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Shingles, 1981). This perspective suggests that diminished trust in political institutions and actors may, in fact, serve as a catalyst to promote citizens’ participation and monitoring of the political system, thereby forcing it to demonstrate greater responsiveness to public demands and expectations (Inglehart, 1997; Levi, 1998; Norris, 1999, 2022; Rosanvallon, 2008; Warren, 2017).

Scholars in this tradition argue that critical citizens are more likely to engage in political activities and hold public officials accountable (Van der Meer and Zmerli, 2017). Individuals who feel abandoned or marginalized by institutions may experience a sense of urgency to intervene and demand accountability (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Rosanvallon, 2008). Rather than leading to political disengagement, low trust can catalyze active participation aimed at holding institutions accountable and achieving systemic change (Booth and Seligson, 2009).

Additionally, trust may sometimes foster complacency or even credulity, leaving citizens susceptible to manipulation, particularly when public officials disseminate misinformation (Seyd, 2024). Moreover, scholars have also identified a negative relationship between political trust and political interest, suggesting that high-trusting citizens tend to be less politically engaged than their low-trusting counterparts. This raises critical questions about whether political trust is always a democratic asset, as the traditional works argue, or if under certain conditions decreasing trust may play a constructive role in promoting active citizenship.

However, different levels of political trust can have nuanced impacts on the acceptance of democracy and its institutions, ranging from passive public attitudes to active mobilization against the system (Butzlaff and Messinger-Zimmer, 2020). According to Hirschman (1970), the ideal-type responses to growing dissatisfaction with the system are voice (attempts to reform or influence it) and exit (withdrawing from it). Building on this framework, if trust represents the “loyalty” an individual feels toward the political system, a decline in that loyalty may prompt “exit” and “voice” behaviors (Hirschman, 1970). The basic proposition is that low-trusting citizens will respond by engaging in voice or exit strategies.

Exit can take various forms, such as abstaining from voting during elections but also as choosing to migrate, the “voting with your feet” option, as conceptualized by Tiebout (1956). Examples of voice include participating in political protests, attending community meetings, joining neighborhood associations, signing petitions, or supporting anti-establishment parties. Hirschman's central claim is that the choice between these responses is significantly shaped by the presence or absence of loyalty. Within this reasoning, loyalty acts as a mediating factor that may help determine which strategies citizens are more likely to pursue when engaging with the political system.

Nevertheless, it is also important to note that, following modernization theories (Dalton and Van Sickle, 2005; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), citizen engagement can take different forms. Building on this idea, Barnes and Kaase (1979) introduced a crucial distinction between conventional and unconventional participation. While conventional participation, such as voting or party membership, generally reflects support for the political system, dissent within democratic societies often manifests through more confrontational and unconventional actions, including protests, strikes, and other forms of disruptive mobilization (Barnes and Kaase, 1979: 444). In this regard, distrust will have different effects depending on the type of political activity. Prior research indicates that individuals with negative attitudes toward the political system are generally more likely to engage in actions like protesting and signing petitions than those with more positive political orientations (Harrebye and Ejrnæs, 2015; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Norris, 2011). In this sense, lack of trust in institutions and disaffection with the political system would drive protest activism (Gamson, 1992).

On the other hand, following the traditional approach of Almond and Verba (1963), scholars have argued that trusting citizens are more likely to engage in conventional engagement activities like voting, contacting representatives, or participating in community meetings, as they perceive these actions as effective ways to influence the political system (Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Seligson, 1980). Consequently, building on these logics, while Hirschman does not explicitly develop a typology of voice in his original work, in this paper, we distinguish between “institutional” and “non-institutional” voice.

Following these mechanisms, we propose the following as our general hypotheses:

H1a: Lower levels of political trust are positively associated with non-institutional voice

H1b: Lower levels of political trust are negatively associated with institutional voice.

H1c: Lower levels of political trust are positively associated with exit.

The Role of Inequality

The relationship between political trust and citizen engagement is neither uniform across individuals nor consistent across contexts. Citizens differ not only in their personal attitudes and resources, but also in the structural and social environments in which they are embedded. Inequality, in particular, shapes the expectations and capacities of individuals, thereby conditioning how political trust translates into various forms of political behavior. A growing body of research highlights that factors such as community context and socioeconomic identity can mediate or moderate patterns of political engagement (Laterzo, 2021). These factors may interact with political trust in ways that either promote or hinder engagement, suggesting that the link between trust and political behavior may be contingent on both individual-level characteristics and broader structural conditions, such as economic inequality.

Inequality plays a critical role in shaping political attitudes and behaviors, especially in the Latin American context. As one of the most unequal regions globally, Latin America stands out from other areas of the world for its income concentration within a small elite (Maldonado Graus and Schorr, 2023; Sánchez-Ancochea, 2021). These entrenched economic hierarchies not only shape access to material resources, but also condition the way citizens perceive and interact with the political system. Research shows that inequality might affect engagement patterns. In particular, low-income individuals living in highly unequal contexts are more likely to engage in non-institutional political behaviors rather than conventional forms, due to both structural exclusion and perceived inefficacy (Cicatiello et al., 2015).

In this vein, when individuals perceive that political systems are either perpetuating or failing to address these economic disparities, their likelihood of engaging in non-institutional voice and exit behaviors increases. Consequently, we argue that economic inequality interacts with low political trust to increase the likelihood of both extra-institutional voice and exit behaviors. In other words, building on Hirschman's (1970) framework, we propose that rising inequality intensifies the effects of declining loyalty on citizens’ decisions to voice and exit. We posit that economic inequality may moderate the effect of political trust on citizen engagement through two related mechanisms.

First, drawing on the relative power theory (Bartels, 2008), the “mechanical effect of inequality” (Evans et al., 2004; Neckermann and Torche, 2007) proposes that rising economic inequality alters political outcomes by reshaping the social gradient of political behaviors. This theory posits that economic inequality generates disparities in the access to resources and power, which influence individuals’ capacity and willingness to engage with the political system. In societies where income is more concentrated within a small elite, as is the case of Latin America (Sánchez-Ancochea, 2021), power similarly becomes concentrated, leaving citizens who belong to the bottom of the social ladder feeling excluded from political processes. In this context, an influential strand of sociological research argues that rising inequality leads to social dysfunction by widening social distances, which in turn foster greater status anxiety and erode political trust (Buttrick and Oishi, 2017; Delhey and Steckermeier, 2020; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010).

This power imbalance reduces the perceived efficacy of political action for lower-income citizens, discouraging conventional participation while potentially increasing the likelihood of exit and confrontational voice. In this sense, economic inequality might discourage individuals from lower-income strata from engaging through institutional channels, as their low levels of trust are reinforced by the perception that these avenues are ineffective or systematically biased in favor of the wealthy (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). Feeling excluded from formal political processes, these individuals may opt for more radical forms of political expression, such as protest and strikes, as these behaviors offer a more direct challenge to the status quo (Brady, 2004; McVeigh, 2006; Oliver, 2001). In contrast, higher-income individuals may interpret low trust not as disempowering but as evidence of a persistently ineffective state, particularly in terms of redistribution (Svallfors, 2013).

Exit remains a potential strategy, yet one that is significantly more costly and constrained, especially for disadvantaged groups. International migration, for example, involves substantial economic, legal, and informational barriers that many low-income individuals cannot overcome. As suggested by de Haas (2010), migration is often selective and structurally conditioned, requiring resources that the poorest segments frequently lack. Similarly, Carling (2002) argues that many individuals experience a “migrant aspiration-ability gap,” where the desire to migrate is not matched by the capacity to act on it.

The second mechanism is rooted in the relative deprivation theory, which emphasizes the role of subjective perceptions of injustice in driving political behavior (Gurr, 1970). This approach highlights how economic inequality intensifies feelings of frustration and exclusion among marginalized groups. According to Gurr (1970), political unrest and collective action are often driven by the perceived gap between what individuals or groups expect and what they actually receive in terms of economic, social, and political opportunities. Rising economic inequality amplifies these perceptions of injustice by creating sharp contrasts between the living conditions of different social strata. In such contexts, low-trusting individuals are likely to perceive the political system as fundamentally biased and unresponsive, amplifying their sense of exclusion and marginalization.

When inequality rises and institutional trust is low, citizens who experience relative deprivation are more likely to adopt non-institutional voice and exit behaviors as responses to their perceived marginalization. This dynamic is driven by two critical factors. First, economic inequality broadens the gap between citizens’ expectations and their perceived capabilities, intensifying political frustration (Gurr, 1970). This frustration, when combined with low institutional trust, can trigger confrontational forms of voice, such as protests, strikes, and participation in social movements, as citizens seek to challenge the status quo and demand greater political accountability.

Norris (2011) argues that political distrust, which can be exacerbated by inequality, can stimulate engagement, particularly among individuals with high political efficacy. Following Della Porta (2013), disillusionment with established political channels and perceptions of injustice drive citizens towards social movements and protests. This dynamic further widens the gap in political engagement, as inequality deepens the perceived disconnect between marginalized citizens and political institutions, thereby intensifying the behavioral consequences of low trust.

Second, in contexts of high inequality, the costs of remaining politically passive may outweigh the risks associated with voice and exit, as marginalized groups have less to lose from challenging the status quo (Schlozman et al., 2012). For low-trusting individuals, this can lead to oversee conventional political channels as ineffective, pushing them toward extra-institutional forms of participation or even complete disengagement from the political system. However, political trust may not influence all forms of civic engagement equally. Hirschman's (1970) framework assumes that individuals decide whether to exit, voice, or remain inactive by weighing the costs of their action against the potential benefits. This evaluation depends on their perceived likelihood of effecting change through voice compared to the relative costs and risks associated with exit, such as moving to another country. Migration decisions are also shaped by access to mobility networks, state policy regimes, and individual-level resources (Bakewell, 2010; Czaika and de Haas, 2013). Consequently, exit behavior is expected to be less responsive to inequality in its interaction with trust due to the higher material and structural costs associated with this form of disengagement.

These two mechanisms reflect complementary pathways through which inequality heightens the effects of low political trust. Consequently, we posit the following hypotheses:

H2a: Low-trusting citizens will be more likely to engage in non-institutional voice activities, the higher economic inequality is.

H2b: Low-trusting citizens will be less likely to engage in institutional voice activities, the higher economic inequality is.

H2c: Low-trusting citizens will be more likely to engage in exit activities, the higher economic inequality is, although this effect is expected to be less pronounced than for voice behaviors due to the higher structural and personal costs associated with exit.

In this article, we focus primarily on the moderating role of economic inequality, given the nature of our data, which does not allow for a full exploration of causal pathways. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that inequality may operate through multiple interrelated channels, shaping the extent and form of citizen engagement. By emphasizing the moderating function, we aim to assess how varying levels of inequality condition the association between political trust and different forms of political behavior, while recognizing the broader conceptual complexity of these relationships. We hope to investigate these pathways more fully in future work with data that allows for a more precise assessment of causal mechanisms.

Data

To assess the effects of political trust on exit and voice strategies, this study relies on individual-level public opinion data from LAPOP-Americas Barometer (2010–2019). LAPOP has conducted cross-national surveys across Latin America since 2004 and it includes a range of measures of political trust as well as questions that proxy voice and exit strategies in a comparative longitudinal approach. This article relies on pooled cross-sectional data composed of non-repeated individual observations from a non-random sample of macro-level units (Fairbrother, 2014). Our sample consists of more than 130,000 individuals across 17 Latin American countries over nearly ten years (2010–2019).¹ We use all available waves of the survey which include our main variables of interest.

Building on Hirschman's (1970) theoretical framework, our objective is to use trust in several institutions and actors as the expression of loyalty to explain the different strategies (voice and exit) citizens use to engage with the political system in low-trusting societies, considering also whether these attitudes differ depending on the effect of inequality. Political trust thus operates as our key predictor that shapes the decision to engage with the political system. Drawing on different variables from LAPOP, our two core outcomes, voice and exit, are operationalized using different activities that are included in the civic and political engagement index (Keeter et al., 2002).

First, following the “voting with one's feet” hypothesis (Tiebout, 1956), the exit dimension is captured by individuals’ self-reported intention to live in another country within the next three years (0 = no; 1 = yes). Any intention to migrate is interpreted as an exit-oriented response. Second, consistent with our theory, we distinguish between two types of voice: institutional and extra-institutional. Institutional voice is captured through a non-electoral form of participation, specifically, involvement in community improvement associations (0 = no; 1 = yes).

We deliberatively avoid using voting as an indicator of engagement given that in several Latin American countries voting is compulsory. Additionally, existing research has shown that surveyed voting behavior often overestimates actual turnout due to social desirability bias (Granberg and Holmberg, 1991; Karp and Brockington, 2005). Finally, building on the participation literature (Dalton, 2004; Hooghe and Marien, 2013), extra-institutional voice, by contrast, is captured through participation in protest activities (0 = no; 1 = yes), reflecting active citizen engagement aimed at influencing political outcomes.² Descriptive evidence from the LAPOP data reveals variation in the prevalence of these behaviors over time, with a general upward trend for the three variables (Figures A1–3, Supplementary Material).

To measure our key predictor, political trust, LAPOP provides repeated individual-level information on a variety of indicators of trust in different institutions and actors of the political system. Following prior research on the topic (Torcal and Carty, 2023), we conceptualize political trust as a multidimensional concept, distinguishing between the institutions of representation (congress), the political actors (parties), and the institutions of the rule of law (judicial power). We use three items from a battery of questions in which respondents report their level of trust in each of these entities on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (“none”) to 7 (“a lot”). Building on previous research that suggest that aggregating trust measures into a single index might not be a reliable indicator to capture trust in institutions, given that each institution and actor may differ both theoretically and empirically (Denters et al., 2007; Lipset and Schneider, 1983; Torcal, 2014), we model trust for each institution separately. This approach allows for more nuanced and institution-specific insights into the relationship between political trust and citizens’ engagement strategies.

On average, citizens in the region exhibit relatively low levels of trust in political institutions and actors. The mean trust score across all available waves is 3.35, with political parties receiving the lowest average level of trust (2.88), and the judiciary the highest (3.72). Trust in congress falls in between (3.58). As illustrated in Figure A4 of the Supplementary Material, there is a general downward trend in trust over time across the three institutions. However, this decline is not uniform. While trust in political parties shows a steady and sharper decrease, trust in congress and the judiciary declines more moderately. Moreover, these trends vary across countries (Figure A4, Supplementary Material). Some countries (e.g., Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay) exhibit a marked decline in trust across all institutions, while others (e.g., Ecuador and Nicaragua) show more fluctuation or relative stability. These cross-national and institutional variations reinforce our decision to model each institution separately, allowing us to capture more accurately object-specific dynamics in the relationship between political trust and citizens’ engagement strategies.

Our moderator variable is economic inequality, measured at the aggregate level. We use the Gini index for each country-year drawing on data from Standardize World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2020). The Gini index, which ranges between 0 (complete equality) and 100 (extreme inequality), is harmonized in the SWIID to allow for valid cross-country and temporal comparisons, incorporating multiple imputations to address estimation uncertainty.

Our analyses also include a range of controls. At the individual level, we control for income using monthly household income. Since the LAPOP income variable was categorized into 11 intervals (0‒10) through the 2010 wave and expanded to a 17-interval scale (0‒16) from 2012 onwards, we recoded the latter waves to match the earlier format, following the approach of Franetovic and Castillo (2022) and Márquez Romo (2025). As a result, the final income variable is standardized across all waves as a continuous scale ranging from 0 (lowest decile) to 10 (highest decile).

Additionally, in line with previous works (Craig, 1980; Gamson, 1968; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Paige, 1971), to account for a possible moderating effect of political competence on engagement, we control for internal political efficacy using a LAPOP's question in which individuals are asked to report on a 7-pt disagree/agree scale whether they feel they understand the most important political issues of their country. We also control for self-placement on the left-right scale (1 left-10 right), years of education (19-pt scale, from 0- none to 18- university or more) and age (continuous with a mean of 39).

Finally, at the aggregate level, we control for economic development, as previous research suggests including it to ensure that the effect of inequality is not distorted (Schmidt-Catran, 2016). To address this, we incorporate the logged annual national real gross domestic product per capita, drawn from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015). Descriptive statistics of our outcomes and main predictors can be consulted in the online Appendix (Table A2).

Method

To test our hypotheses, given the hierarchical structure of our data and the binary nature of our dependent variables, we employ mixed-effects logistic modeling. This approach is particularly suited to our study because one of our predictors (economic inequality) is a group-level measure, and failing to account for such grouping can result in biased standard errors (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016). This specification allows us to account for the dependence between observation within groups.

Formally, the estimated regression model is specified as follows:

\log (\frac{π_{i t k}}{1 - π_{i t k}}) = β_{0} + β_{1} x_{1 i t k} + β_{2} x_{2 i t k} + β_{3} x_{3 i t k} + β_{4} x_{4 t k} + β_{5} C o n t r o l s_{i t k} + u_{k} + u_{t k} + ϵ_{i t k} .

where

π_{i t k}

denotes the probability that individual i in country k and country-year t engages in an exit/voice activity.

β

is a p × 1 vector of the fixed effects, which represents the effect of a X vector of individual and country-year covariates.

u_{t k} \sim N (0, σ_{u}^{2})

is a random intercept for each country-wave combination, capturing unobserved country-specific and time-specific heterogeneity, and

ϵ_{i t k}

represents the error term at the individual level. The model includes simultaneously the three trust measures.

First, we estimated three mixed-effects logistic models (one for each dependent variable) with a random intercept at the country-year level (Model 1). This specification accounts for time-invariant characteristics and specific country and year features, enabling us to isolate the effect of our variables of interest. This modelling strategy allows us to evaluate how within-individual variation in political trust impacts citizen engagement outcomes, while simultaneously considering the broader structural and temporal context in which individuals are nested.

Second, to examine whether the effect of political trust on citizen engagement is conditional on economic inequality, we estimated three different cross-level interactive random effects models (one per outcome) for each institution/actor (Model 2), including interaction terms between trust and economic inequality. This specification allows us to test how the effect of political trust on voice and exit strategies varies across levels of economic inequality. By incorporating a random component at the country-year level, the model accounts for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and controls for time-invariant factors within countries and years.

As robustness checks, we also estimated additional models in which political trust variables were recoded as dummy measures. In these models, respondents were classified into two categories: 1–3 indicating a lack of trust, and 4 or higher representing trusting citizens. This alternative operationalization allows us to verify the consistency of our results when using a binary measure of political trust, providing confidence in the robustness of our findings. Finally, following previous works (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Norris, 2011; Shingles, 1981), we re-estimate the same set of models excluding political efficacy.

Results

Figure 1 presents the results of the mixed-effects logistic regression models predicating different forms of citizen engagement in Latin America. Given that we are estimating logistic models, we report odds ratios to facilitate the interpretation of the results. Full results with log-odds can be consulted in Tables B2–4 in the Supplementary Materials.

Figure 1.

Mixed-Effects Logit Regression, Predicting Voice and Exit Patterns. The Figure Displays Odds Ratios with Capped Horizontal Lines Representing 95% CIs. Source: Own Elaboration Based on LAPOP Data (2010–2019).

The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), calculated after estimating a null model (Table B1 in the Supplementary Materials), reveals that over 6 per cent of the variance in non-institutional voice, 8 per cent in institutional voice, and 6 per cent in exit within the sample is attributed to the country-year level. All things considered, at the individual-level, results in Figure 1 confirm that, after controlling for other potential explanatory measures, our three variables of interest regarding political trust are significant when it comes to explaining citizen engagement in Latin America. However, the effects differ for the case of the political parties.

First, concerning voice, Model 1 yields different results depending on the institution and the nature of the activity. In the case of non-institutional voice, while a similar negative association is observed for trust in congress and the judicial system, the dynamics diverge for political parties. Contrary to our expectations, as trust in political parties increases, so does the likelihood of having participated in a protest. A one-unit increase in trust in political parties is associated with a 6 per cent increase in the odds of having participated in a protest, controlling for other factors (OR = 1.06, p < .000). In contrast, both trust in congress and trust in the judicial power are associated with a 5 per cent decrease in the odds of engaging in non-institutional voice (OR = 0.95, p < .000).

Predicted probabilities in Figure 2 show that at the lowest levels of trust in congress and the judiciary, the probability of participating in protests reaches its maximum level (about 11 per cent). By contrast, for the case of the political parties, the predicted participation in protests reaches its highest level (11 per cent) at the highest level of trust. Therefore, H1a is partly supported: while low trust aligns with increased voice for congress and the judiciary, the case of political parties suggests higher trust encourages protest participation. However, we believe this is a relevant finding because it highlights the nuanced and institution-specific ways in which political trust interacts with citizen behavior, paving the way for further research.

Figure 2.

Effect of Political Trust on Citizen Engagement. The Figures Show the Estimated Effect of Political Trust (with 95% Confidence Intervals). Source: Own Elaboration Based on LAPOP Data (2010–2019).

Although this finding may entail further theoretical and empirical discussions, it may be explained if we take into consideration that trust in political parties in a context of general distrust can be seen as a symbol of predisposition to participation and system engagement (Hult, 2018; Mauk, 2020). Furthermore, as argued by the resource mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), political parties often serve as mobilizers, articulating the discontent in form of demonstrations. In this sense, trust in political parties might actually foster citizens to voice their concerns through protest, rather than deterring such action. Additionally, this finding reinforces our theoretical and empirical decision to analyze political trust separately across institutions. This aligns with Easton's (1975) conceptualization of the term, who posits that different institutions represent distinct objects of political support, and these differences may shape their relations with citizen engagement.

Second, regarding institutional voice, as expected, higher trust in all three institutions is associated with greater likelihood of engagement in attending community meetings. A one-unit increase in trust in political parties is associated with a 4 per cent increase in the odds of having participated in a community meeting (OR = 1.04, p < .000), whereas the increase is 2 per cent for both congress and the judiciary (OR = 1.02, p < .000). These findings align with the theoretical expectation that trust promotes system-oriented behavior and facilitates citizen involvement through institutionalized channels. Moreover, they underscore the importance of distinguishing between different types of political participation. While trust appears to activate engagement within the boundaries of the institutional system, its effects on non-institutional participation may follow different logics, as illustrated in the contrasting patterns observed. In this sense, H1c is supported.

Third, consistent with our expectations, political trust exerts a statistically significant effect (for the three measures at the .00 level) on exit. Higher levels of trust in congress, the political parties, and the judicial power are negatively associated with the likelihood of engaging in exit strategies. A one-unit increase in trust in political parties is associated with a 3 per cent decrease in the odds of expressing exit intentions (OR = 0.97, p < .000). The effect is slightly stronger for trust in congress (4 per cent decrease, OR = 0.96, p < .000) and the judiciary (5 per cent decrease, OR = 0.95, p < .000), indicating that lower institutional trust is consistently linked to a greater likelihood of exit-oriented strategies. That is, there is a significant association between lower trust in these actors and the intention to migrate in the near future. These findings confirm our expectation, grounded in Hirschman's (1970) framework, that low political trust drives citizens toward exit behaviors. This effect persists even after accounting for individual and contextual-level controls. Therefore, H1b is supported: lower political trust is positively associated with a higher likelihood of exit.

To ensure robustness, we have re-run our analyses dichotomizing our main predictors of political trust (low-trusting/high-trusting citizens). Results from these models (detailed in Table B6 of the Online Appendix) support our previous findings: low trust in the three institutions/actors is significantly associated with a higher probability of exit and lower levels of institutional voice. Similarly, low trust in congress and the judiciary is positively associated with higher likelihood of non-institutional voice behaviors; however, for political parties, the relationship diverges, with higher levels of trust being associated with greater participation in protests. Main results remain the same. Additional models that do not control for political efficacy³ still reveal the same exit-voice patterns that our previous model.

After assessing the general association between political trust and citizen engagement, Model 2 tests the interactive hypotheses (H3a-c) regarding the moderating role of economic inequality. We report the model results in Tables B2–4 of the Online Appendix. Figures 3–4 plot the cross-level interaction for the lowest (36.44) and the highest values (50.95) of the Gini index. Results of the interactions terms provide partial support for our expectations.

Figure 3.

Marginal Effects: Political Trust Effects on Non-Institutional Voice Across Economic Inequality. Source: Own Elaboration Based on LAPOP Data (2010–2019).

Figure 4.

Marginal Effects: Political Trust Effects on Institutional Voice Across Economic Inequality. Source: Own Elaboration Based on LAPOP Data (2010–2019).

Figure 3 shows how economic inequality moderates the individual effect of political trust in the probability of exhibiting non-institutional voice patterns, and the low/high divide is clearly stronger in the case of high economic inequality. This reveals that when levels of economic inequality are high, those who exhibit lower levels of political trust are more likely to engage in protest activities, while citizens with higher levels of trust in institutions are less prone to exhibit non-conventional forms of voice. These findings provide support for H3a in the case of non-institutional voice behaviors, revealing that the engagement gap between high- and low-trusting citizens widens in contexts of greater inequality, consistent with the expectation that inequality intensifies grievance-based mobilization among the distrustful.

In contrast, Figure 4 shows the marginal effects of political trust on institutional voice, again conditional on economic inequality. Here, the interaction operates in the opposite direction. Across all three panels, the interaction follows a similar pattern: under low inequality, higher levels of political trust are associated with increased likelihood of participating in institutional forms of engagement, such as community meetings. However, under high inequality, the effect of trust flattens and becomes statistically insignificant. For trust in political parties, the predicted probability of participation remains high but no longer varies with trust. This pattern confirms H2b, indicating that inequality weakens the mobilizing role of political trust in conventional forms of participation.

Taken together, these results provide strong support for the idea that economic inequality moderates the behavioral consequences of political trust in a differentiated manner: it amplifies the effect of low trust on protest behavior while simultaneously inhibiting the participatory effect of high trust through institutional channels. These findings align with Hirschman's (1970) framework and the dual mechanisms outlined above—the structural exclusion of low-income groups and their perceived injustice.

In contrast, as reported in Table B4 in the Supplementary Material, the results for exit behaviors (H2c) do not show a statistically significant interaction between political trust and inequality. While we expected low-trusting individuals to be more likely to exit under conditions of high inequality, the findings suggest that this relationship is not significant. This suggests that, unlike the case of voice, economic inequality does not appear to condition the behavioral impact of political trust on exit decisions. The lack of a significant interaction effect likely reflects the high structural and personal costs associated with migration, which may constrain individuals’ ability to act on their political dissatisfaction. As discussed in the theoretical section, exit entails greater economic, legal, and informational barriers than voice, and these barriers are particularly binding for low-income groups (Carling, 2002; de Haas, 2010). In contrast, protest provides a more immediate and accessible alternative for expressing discontent.

Discussion and Conclusions

The literature on political trust has traditionally highlighted the potential negative impact of low levels of political trust on democracy (Easton, 1975; Miller, 1974). However, empirical studies that systematically analyze the consequences of political trust remain relatively limited. This study has contributed to filling this gap by exploring the association between political trust and citizen engagement in Latin America, considering the moderating effect of economic inequality. Building on Hirschman's (1970) framework of exit, voice, and loyalty, our main findings suggest that political trust influences citizen engagement: lower levels of trust are negatively associated with institutional voice, while positively associated with exit and non-institutional voice.

Interestingly, for this last case, the direction for confidence in the political parties diverge from this pattern, suggesting a positive association between trusting the parties and having participated in protest activities. Although further research on this issue needs to be conducted, we hypothesize as a possible explanation for this that trust involves vulnerability and expectations of positive outcomes, which could explain why citizens might trust specific parties even when distrusting the broader system (Mayer et al., 1995).

Individuals who trust parties might be part of more politically engaged social networks, increasing their likelihood of protest participation. This predisposition towards engagement may make individuals who trust parties more likely to be politically mobilized across various forms of participation, including protests activities. Such individuals may view protest as a complementary form of political engagement rather than an alternative to institutional participation, using both conventional and unconventional channels to voice their concerns and influence the political system (Ekman and Amnå, 2022). This relationship suggests that trust in political parties may potentially be a catalyst for active citizenship, enabling individuals to engage with the political system in diverse ways.

Moreover, the interaction term between political trust and economic inequality reveals distinct patterns for non-institutional voice behaviors between low and high-trusting citizens, emphasizing the importance of considering structural disparities when studying trust and citizen participation. The moderating role of economic inequality highlights its impact on how trust shapes citizen behavior. High inequality increases the likelihood of engaging in non-institutional voice decisions for low-trusting individuals. This supports the notion that economic disparities intensify the negative effect of discontent with democratic institutions, motivating citizens to seek alternative forms of engagement (Anderson and Singer, 2008; Uslaner, 2008).

By contrast, for institutional voice, the interaction operates in the opposite direction: while trust in institutions is positively associated with participation in conventional forms of engagement under low inequality, this effect disappears in high-inequality contexts. In other words, inequality neutralizes the mobilizing power of political trust through formal channels, suggesting that in unequal societies even trustful citizens may feel discouraged from engaging through institutional means.

Finally, the effects of low trust on exit strategies appear less sensitive to inequality levels, potentially reflecting the higher structural and personal costs associated with migration. These barriers constrain the capacity of low-trusting individuals, particularly those in disadvantaged socioeconomic positions, to act on their discontent through exit. This finding calls for further research on the conditions under which political disengagement takes the form of migration versus passive endurance.

This study makes several theoretical contributions to the literature on political trust. First, while much of the existing scholarship has focused on political trust as an outcome, our research positions trust as an explanatory variable, exploring its association with citizens’ behaviors. Our findings challenge the prevailing view that low trust in political institutions threatens democracy. Instead, they suggest that low trust can serve as a mobilizing force, fostering active citizenship through unconventional forms of engagement. Second, our findings for the case of the political parties uncover nuanced dynamics in institutional trust and provides empirical support for conducting separate analyses of individual institutions rather than relying on aggregated trust indices. Moreover, our research underscores the importance of further exploring the dynamics of trust in political parties for active citizenship. Finally, this study advances the understanding of the interplay between political trust and inequality in shaping citizen engagement.

Despite the robustness of the associations, this article also has certain limitations. It does not aim to provide a definitive answer to the behavioral consequences of political trust, but rather suggests potential avenues for further exploration on this interaction. First, the observational nature of our data restricts causal inferences. Future research employing experimental designs could better establish the causal pathways linking trust, inequality, and engagement. Second, while this study focused on the moderating role of economic inequality, this predictor may also be conceptualized as an antecedent variable that, as previous works suggest, erodes political trust, which in turn affects political attitudes and preferences (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997). Future research could therefore benefit from employing mediation analysis to examine the extent to which political trust acts as a mechanism linking inequality to patterns of participation and disengagement. Additionally, as our interaction term between political trust and economic inequality yielded mixed results for exit behaviors, more systematic analyses are needed to unpack the conditions under which distrust translates into disengagement.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-pla-10.1177_1866802X251384315 - Supplemental material for Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Behavioural Consequences of Political Trust in Contexts of Inequality: The Case of Latin America

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-pla-10.1177_1866802X251384315 for Should I Stay or Should I Go? The Behavioural Consequences of Political Trust in Contexts of Inequality: The Case of Latin America by Castellar Granados and Francisco Sánchez in Journal of Politics in Latin America

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Gustavo Pérez-Arrobo for his valuable comments and suggestions. Previous versions of this article have benefited greatly from presentations at the 8th Latin American Political Methodology (LAPolmeth) Meeting and the Comparative Politics Workshop at the University of Salamanca. This research was conducted within the framework of a predoctoral contract co-financed by the University of Salamanca and Banco Santander.

Data Availability

Data and research materials are available on reasonable request to the corresponding author.

Declaration Conflicting of Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Castellar Granados

Francisco Sánchez

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author Biographies

Castellar Granados is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Universidad Alfonso X El Sabio (Spain). She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Salamanca. Her research focuses on the causes and consequences of political trust and their interactions with inequality. She has been a visiting fellow at LAPOP Lab (Vanderbilt University) and the European University Institute. Email: mgranagu@uax.es

Francisco Sánchez is Full Time Professor of Political Science at the University of Salamanca and Director of the Iberoamerican Institute (Spain). He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Salamanca. His research interests include social movements, inequality, political elites, and Ecuadorian politics. Email: fsanchez@usal.es

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