Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) viruses occasionally infect humans, but
currently do not transmit efficiently among them. However, the risk for human pandemic
influenza is a major concern should these viruses acquire the capacity for human-to-human
transmission and retain their current virulence. Recently, two research teams have
succeeded in modifying HPAI A (H5N1) viruses in such a way that they could be efficiently
transmitted by respiratory route between ferrets, the experimental model for studying
influenza virus transmission. In this article, the authors discuss the risk assessment of
these mutant HPAI A (H5N1) viruses in the context of the European Union regulatory
framework and recommend that laboratory-derived HPAI A (H5N1) viruses transmissible in
ferrets should be handled in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) facilities with some additional
biosafety measures.
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