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Abstract

Since the 2004 accession to the European Union (EU), Poland, like many other post-communist countries, have gone through a significant process of convergence to the EU institutions, laws and processes. In this process, the European values, policies and institutions have become an important reference point for the legitimacy of major national system reforms. In education, there have been a significant number of reforms aligned with ‘European standards’ as integration with the EU was seen as a priority for Poland’s national interest. This paper is interested in the changing policy discourses that have been defining and legitimising Poland’s education policy objectives, with a particular attention given to the idea of ‘quality education’ and the role of education. In this way, it is also interested in the processes of Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation – turning away from ‘EU-isation’ of policies. The emerging picture from the analysis illustrates the tensions between the neoliberal and populist policy discourses pursued by a variety of Polish governments, including significant policy shifts under the government of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) (Law and Justice) coalition.

Keywords

Europeanisation European Education Area de-Europeanisation Poland populism neoliberalism policy legitimation quality education

Introduction

In September 2020, the European Commission published a strategic document on achieving the European Education Area (EEA) by 2025 (European Commission, 2020). It included six policy dimensions representing specific sets of values and assumptions for education policies of members states. While the Commission President argued that the European Education Area ‘aims to bring to the education and training communities the support they need to fulfil their fundamental mission’ (European Commission, 2020: 1) assuming a common set of educational objectives, it seems education policies of some national education systems in Europe have been shifting away from European Union’s (EU) common vision of education.

Since the 2004 accession to the EU, Poland, like many other post-communist countries, has gone through a significant process of convergence to EU institutions, laws and processes (e.g. Dąbrowski, 2012; Gąsior-Niemiec, 2003; Kamińska, 2014). In this process, European values, policies and institutions have become an important reference point for the legitimacy of major national system reforms. In education, for example, the Ministry of National Education (MEN) emphasised that ‘the role of education (. . .) in achieving the Lisbon objectives is unquestionable’ (MEN, 2007: 4). There have been a number of educational reforms in Poland aligned with the European standards including adjusted higher education structures to the Bologna process; restructuring the school education system; aligning its governance structures to fit with EU institutions; participating in all EU-level educational initiatives including the commitment to the European benchmarks in early childhood, youth and lifelong learning. In general, the integration with the EU was seen as a priority for Poland’s national interest and its ‘return to Europe’.

Nevertheless, the wave of ‘illiberal’ shifts (Krastev and Holmes, 2018) that have swept across Europe in recent years, signify a paradigm shift for Poland where the EU is no longer seen as a guarantor of a better future but at odds with the Polish interest (Buras, 2018). Indeed, it may be argued, that this ideological shift signifies the return ‘from Europe’ for Poland with an increased focus on Polish traditions and identity, and away from Western liberal ideals. Since 2015, the right-wing Polish government has undertaken wide-spread institutional reforms across a variety of sectors including renationalisation of the largest industry sectors, judicial reforms and a restructure of the education system.

Research on European integration in education and domestic policy convergence, undertaken over the last decade, is vast and dominated by the literature illustrating the tensions related to the influence of European integration on national education policies, and the mechanisms governing the European education space. Specifically, Martin Lawn, Antonio Nóvoa and Sotiria Grek’s extensive contributions (e.g. Lawn, 2011; Lawn and Grek, 2012; Nóvoa and Lawn, 2002) emphasise the active construction of a European education space by the EU through different forms of ‘soft governance’ including standardising, expert networks and datafication. More importantly, Nóvoa and Lawn (2002) see this process extending beyond institutions to social structures creating ‘new European identities within emergent policy networks, leading to the emergence of the European education space’ (p. 4). One example of such integration is the e-learning policy (Salajan, 2013), another adult education (Milana et al., 2020) where Europeanisation can be observed in polices as well as through formal and informal measures and activities. Indeed, the new EEA 2025, for example, is seen as an instrument for deepening integration as it acts as a tool for structuring and strengthening of the relationships amongst member states (Kushnir, 2022). These changes have been made possible through the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) process which does not lead to binding EU legislative measures nor does it require member states to change their law, but it uses a number of soft policy instruments such as standards, benchmarking, peer pressure etc. While the Europeanisation process of domestic policy is a voluntary process within the OMC, Lawn (2011) argues that it leads to a number of standardised national education policies which are more ‘governable’. What is significant according to the academic literature, is the emphasis on how deeply European education ideas have been embedded in the knowledge economy perspective where the objective of education and education policies has been ‘redefined at its core’ (Lawn, 2011: 267) and fabricated (Nóvoa and Lawn, 2002; Ozga et al., 2011). Equally important here are the complexities of European policy implementation at the national level where European-level policy is reinterpreted and strategically implemented by the members states (Alexiadou and Lange, 2013). The current contribution adds another consideration to these ongoing discussions by showcasing how populist governments may resist Europeanisation by selective legitimation and prioritisation of certain aspects of education policies.

This paper is focusing on the analysis of policy objectives, legitimation and the approach to ‘quality’ in education through the analysis of strategic education policy documents in Poland spanning a decade. The paper is making the argument that the Polish case opens up discussion for reconsideration of policy changes in domestic policy, and their relation to EU policy and illustrates how some EU members resist further European integration. It investigates how education ‘problems’ and policy objectives have been identified and framed by national governments over the last decade, to understand the process of Europeanising and highlights how political the implementation of the common EU education policy can be. It will attempt to understand the dynamics of the process of European integration in the area of education and the challenges of aligning national policies with the common European Education Area 2025.

Understanding Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation of education policy in the context of populist politics

The term ‘Europeanisation’ has been utilised by scholars of international relations, political science and education policy to explain multi-layered and interlinked policy-making within the EU for decades, and has gained prominence during the significant integration period following the ‘Eastern enlargement’ in 2004. On the other hand, focus on differentiated integration and de-Europeanisation has increased over the last decade as a consequence of the economic crises, the growth of populism and right-wing nationalism and Brexit (e.g. Copeland, 2016; Onursal-Beşgül, 2016; Raik and Rikmann, 2021). De-Europeanisation may be viewed through a number of perspectives. For Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016: 5) it may be understood in broader terms as ‘the loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public debates’. In such a process, legitimacy to carry out reforms is no longer sought through reference to the EU and policy discourse and policy agendas deliberately refrain from referring to EU documents and policies. Copeland (2016: 1126) goes even further and proposes that de-Europeanisation ‘deconstructs previous achievements made through the process of Europeanisation’ and in regard to the OMC such a shift ‘prevents future uploading and downloading in the governance process’. This suggests not only normative but also practical policy creation and implementation effects.

It is argued that the rise of populism in Europe, and the de-Europeanisation trends have been facilitated by a deeper institutional failure of the EU, which has been crippled by its technocratic and neoliberal character (see e.g. Foster et al., 2021). There is a clear trend of discourses de-legitimising European politics and policies among populist governments (Bartha et al., 2020). Indeed, the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) (Law and Justice) coalition has been strongly opposed to any further EU ‘encroachment’ on national sovereignty, as evidenced by the PiS Programme statement:

We do not accept an uncontrolled erosion of sovereignty of the European countries. We will strongly defend our freedom, by introducing strong legal barriers against the possibility of employing such practices with respect to Poland. This is our Euro-realism (PiS, 2019, cited in Kopińska, 2020: 76)

At the core of the PiS party’s ideological programme lies ‘a nation state’ that is autonomous, and a rejection of any cultural unification policies (PiS, 2018). These beliefs result from the basic populist ideological assumptions that the EU represents a ‘corrupt elite’ which acts against ‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘the pure people’ (Csehi and Zgut, 2021). This discourse leads to rejecting the rules and values of the EU, questioning the value of the EU’s common social policies and possibly leading to de-Europeanisation. This is in line with typical populist policy-making (Bartha et al., 2020) where established institutions and processes are ignored, policies challenge mainstream paradigms and the voice of experts or technocrats is disregarded. What has also stood out for the PiS populist rhetoric is its Euroscepticism combined with a highly emotional communication style drawing on national identity building, creating an integrated national self-image which Pankowski (2010) calls ‘Polonism’. This is utilised in combination with the ‘Active Historical Policy’ (Mendel, 2018) which mythologises specific historical events and actively eliminates those that do not align with the ideological narrative (e.g. trial of Holocaust historians, see: Gessen, 2021).

Indeed, the processes of de-Europeanisation in Poland have been observed and increasingly analysed by researchers, mostly in relation to Poland’s foreign policy (Cianciara, 2021; Dyduch and Müller, 2021; Zuba, 2021). Dyduch and Müller (2021) concluded that the process of de-Europeanisation was well under way and included weakening of foreign policy institutions, changes to processes and policy substance through centralisation, restructuring and limiting the role of the ‘Europeanised foreign policy bureaucracy’ (p. 582). What is interesting in their research is how strategically selective the PiS government was by focusing on de-Europeanising the issues that would not ‘complicate’ their strategic relations with their strategic partners like the US, for example. Such ‘selective’ policy focus is confirmed by Cianciara (2021) who analysed the legitimating and de-legitimating practices of differentiation in populist narratives in France, Poland and the UK. She has established that political narratives of populist and technocratic political actors are based on ‘flexible and complementary usages’ depending on their interests. In Poland’s case the mixed messaging is evident through a discourse both de-legitimising existing relations in the EU and pursuing Eurozone accession at the same time. This paper adds to the mounting evidence of the strategically selective behaviour of the populist PiS government in policy-making, in which education policy priorities align with selected EU policies, and represent a combination of neoliberal and populist objectives.

Tracing policy change through substantive and discursive policy analysis

This research is premised on the assumption that text analysis can assist in exploring and revealing relations between policy discourse and society, ‘implicit, hidden, or otherwise not immediately obvious in relations of discursively enacted dominance or their underlying ideologies’ (Amoussou and Allagbe, 2018: 13). Employing a content and discursive meaning analysis approach (Bartha et al., 2020), the language within specific texts can provide valuable insight into dimensions of social life and the complex factors that lead to shared meanings (van Dijk, 1997). Empirically, both Europeanisation and discourse analysis are difficult to operationalise, however there is a shared ontological assumption about public policy grounded in the constructivist belief that values, discourses and believes shape the social reality. Content discourse analysis can assist in finding correlations between the discourse and specific social/political practices.

To identify the links to EU policies, Europeanisation and possible de-Europeanisation of education policy in Poland, this paper will undertake a document analysis (Bowen, 2009) of a corpus of official texts published by the Ministry of Education (MEN) over the last decade using basic principles of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) method (Amoussou and Allagbe, 2018). The corpus of the official texts comprises 10 annual Strategic Plans developed by the MEN, and published in the years 2011–2020 (MEN, 2011–2020). The documents were published by five successive Ministers of National Education representing the Platforma Obywatelska (PO) (Civic Platform) coalition governments (2011–2015) and the PiS coalition governments (2015–2020). The Plans address school education and the school-based training sector, as well as lifelong learning policies. They are a significant analytical tool here, as they can be seen as the main agenda-setting tool and a ‘policy formulation’ instrument helping in identifying how the government’s priorities are set for each year. They are standardised documents generally containing the same thematic categories every year (up to five main priorities for education are presented in a table format) with a similar structure since 2011. While a change of government contributed to changes in the content, it seems the format remained basically unchanged which allowed for a consistent document analysis.

This analysis combines two elements of policy-making: the substantive and the discursive (Bartha et al., 2020). The substantive relates to the inclusion of any references to EU policies into the Strategic Plans as a first step to uncovering if and how EU policies have been used to legitimise the education policy reforms in Poland and thus to understand the process of Europeanisation, and de-Europeanisation. One of the tools of Europeanisation is policy convergence which includes common laws, policies, networks and agreed policy objectives, therefore it was important to examine if and how Polish governments have used the references to EU education policies. The examination was conducted through two steps:

the review of all Strategic Plans and identifying any mentions of EU policy documents in the ‘strategic reference document’ section,

for any periods where national policy documents were referenced with no mention of the EU policy, the text of each national document was searched for any references to the EU policy document.

The discursive element of policy-making was investigated by exploring in what ways the neoliberal discourse of ‘knowledge economy’ and populist ideas have interacted in the analysed documents. The free market and liberal ideals may stand in contrast to the populist ideology so it is assumed that education policy based on knowledge economy principles may reveal some underlying cultural struggles between the EU and Polish governments’ ideological assumptions about education, especially when taking into account the strong right-wing populist direction of the PiS governments since 2015. The European education ideals are embedded deeply in the knowledge economy perspective so the focus on ‘knowledge economy’ within Poland’s national education policy discourse may reveal its perspective on how educational goals have been redefined under PiS rule. The presence of a technocratic and neoliberal discourse (Foster et al., 2021) can be traced through attention to the values of ‘capitalist economic and political practices’ which are market-based (Gray et al., 2018: 473). These discourses and values focus on commodification of education and educational ‘responsibilisation’ and reflect the knowledge-economy language such as ‘quality control’, ‘impact’, ‘modernisation’, ‘standards’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘accountability’, ‘employability skills’ and ‘labour market’ (Gray et al., 2018: 473). In contrast, the discourse analysis of the populist elements has focused on typical populist features such as ‘national identity’, meaning of equality or references to family values or patriotic and historical references which may include Euroscepticism, a highly emotional communication style, (Bartha et al., 2020), ‘Polonism’ (Pankowski, 2010) and the presence of the ‘Active Historical Policy’ (Mendel, 2018).

While the qualitative document analysis provides sufficient means to trace change and development of policy priorities, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this approach. This paper takes a broad view on the definition of de-Europeanisation and applies it to a knowledge base limited to policy texts. Nevertheless, it provides a first step to recognising visible shifts in the discourse on agenda-setting and policy legitimation and can thus act as a trigger for further empirical research, which may include policy actor interviews and which could provide insights into their motivations, decision-making processes and the effects of setting these policy objectives on understanding the process of European integration. Before presenting the analysis of the policy documents, a short context section explaining the changes in Polish education policies in recent years is provided.

From a ‘rising star’ in global rankings to shaping ‘ladylike virtues’: The transformation of Poland’s educational goals

Poland has been undergoing complex economic, political and social transformations for decades. The country established itself as a democratic transformation model, perceived as one of the ‘rising stars in education’ (Hicks, 2012) with high results in the PISA rankings (Białecki et al., 2017; OECD, 2019; Prończuk, 2019). The educational improvements have resulted from the structural reforms of the education system since 1999, changes in the curriculum, educational mobility and closer cooperation within the EU (Dąbrowski and Wiśniewski, 2011; Educational Research Institute (IBE), 2011; Jakubowski et al., 2010; Klatt and Elliott, 2016). Just as in all post-communist systems, educational reforms were driven largely by the idea of a ‘return to Europe’ and ‘learning from elsewhere’ (Birzea, 1994 cited in Silova, 2009: 296). Teaching standards have been adjusted for comparability with qualification requirements already implemented in the other EU member states. A policy shift, towards emphasising learning outcomes, has been introduced in schools and higher education institutions. The National Qualifications Framework was developed in line with the European Qualifications Framework. Furthermore, these changes influenced the shape of the vocational education system and curricula in Poland (Kust, 2020).

Since the 2015 change of government, there has been a major shift in Poland in most of the domestic policy areas including a transformation of Poland’s education system (structural and curricula reforms). The country has slipped in most of the major democracy rankings and the media freedom rankings. For example, it has been recently recategorised from Consolidated Democracy to Semi-Consolidated Democracy (Freedom House, 2020).

Populism as enacted by the Party leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, and PiS Party representatives, has been increasingly included referencing symbolic, emotional and moral themes in the context of education. One example is the ‘Active Historical Policy’ (Mendel, 2018), aimed at constructing a specific national mentality, based on historical memory and traditional family values. It was implemented by the ruling coalition, under the rule of Kaczyński, the creator of this concept. In line with it, the work of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture is to be governed by this policy, which is crucial for the identity of the state built by PiS. This ‘Active Historical Policy’ has influenced the shape of education policy including the proposal to force schools to reinforce ‘ladylike virtues’ for its female students (Nasz Dziennik, 2020). The ‘Active Historical Policy’ coupled with structural changes to the education system elevated education policy to the top of the policy agenda for the populists as education became a cornerstone of nation building.

Instrumental and selective use of the EU’s education policies

Each Strategic Plan (MEN, 2011–2020) includes a list of strategic policy documents relevant for implementation of the educational priorities for each year. The substantive review of these policy references in each document revealed that in the years 2011–2014, EU policies were included as a significant strategic policy reference point in all Strategic Plans as they incorporated references to a number of specific EU documents and objectives including: Europe 2020 strategy, EU cohesion policy 2007–2013, Education and Training 2020, EU Agenda for new skills and jobs and Youth on the Move. The Strategic Plans have also referred to a number of national policies which were developed in response to EU goals and objectives including the Polish EU Presidency Plan and the National Reform Programmes (KPR) to implement Europe 2020 Strategy.

The year 2015 was the first time when no direct reference to a specific EU policy was included in the Strategic Plan (MEN, 2015). It was an election year and education goals, it may be argued, had become a part of the domestic power struggle – a move Princen (2009: 31) calls ‘conflict expansion’. Educational goals were elevated to become a part of the election strategy and were presented by the then Prime Minister, Ewa Kopacz, as part of her annual Exposé, which addressed popular issues such as the provision of free primary school textbooks, increased security in schools and a renewal of vocational programmes. These items, and a reference to the PM’s speech, replaced the usual reference to EU policy documents in the Strategic Education Plan (MEN, 2015) – and in this way the Prime Minister’s Exposé played a legitimising role for these priorities.

Unsurprisingly, after the successful election of the PiS government in 2015, no EU policies were referenced directly in the Strategic Plans again. However, some national policies which were based on EU policies, and which had been formulated under the previous governments, were still referenced in 2016 and 2017 before the PiS coalition passed a number of laws aligned with its own values and objectives.

The big shift eventuated in 2018 with the change of PM to Mateusz Morawiecki, a former banker and a highly loyal party member who demanded adherence to the so called ‘dignity agenda’ a move to introduce the concept of ‘dignity’ consistent with the PiS’ ‘Polonism’ drive (Pankowski, 2010: 154), in a number of policy areas including historical and social policy (Forsal, 2019). Therefore, a complete overhaul of the policy space with nine national ‘horizontally integrated’ strategies was developed and implemented to align with the PiS’ vision (Rada Ministrów, 2020). In legitimising the Strategic Plans from this period two documents stand out: (1) A new long term national programme called INDEPENDENT 2017–2021 (Rada Ministrów, 2017a), and (2) The Social Capital Development Strategy – SRKS 2017 (Rada Ministrów, 2017b, updated in 2020). The text of each document was searched for existing references to EU policy documents to identify what area of education was referenced and legitimised through the EU.

The INDEPENDENT can serve as a great illustration of the ‘Active Historical Policy’ with its focus on implementation of the series of activities, initiatives and education programmes to celebrate 100 years of national independence. Naturally it was referenced in the Strategic Plans. It referenced two EU documents seen as strategically supporting the goals of INDEPENDENT: the EU Decision on Establishing the European Year of Cultural Heritage (2018), and the Council Conclusions of 21 May 2014 on cultural heritage as a strategic resource for a sustainable Europe (Council of the European Union, 2014).

The second policy, the SRKS, is one of the nine national strategies aligned with the PiS’ Vision to Year 2030. Similarly, this Strategy included a direct reference to the recommendations and priorities of EU policies, including the Europe 2020 Strategy (2010). The SRKS emphasised its alignment with the ‘inclusive growth’ agenda of Europe 2020 (fostering a high-employment economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion). However, the interpretation of this ‘alignment’ is very broad and represents a particular version of a civil society and social cohesion focusing on national values. The Strategy confirms that its goals align with the ‘inclusive growth’ agenda however at the same time these goals have been determined to:

strengthen citizens’ sense of national belonging, to shape patriotic responsibilities towards the country and the local community which manifest through the respect for every human life, and in respect of one’s own and other people’s freedom, dignity and possession, setting the direction in which the development of social and civic space should take place as part of strengthening social capital. (Rada Ministrów, 2020: 5)

[aby umacniać obywateli w poczuciu wspólnoty narodowej, kształtować patriotyczny obowiązek względem państwa i społeczności lokalnej, które objawiają się w poszanowaniu każdego życia ludzkiego, w poszanowaniu własnej oraz cudzej wolności, godności i własności, wytyczając kierunek, w jakim rozwój przestrzeni społecznej oraz obywatelskiej w ramach wzmacniania kapitału społecznego powinien następować.]

Upon reflecting on the discourse used here on the set priorities (‘to strengthen citizens’ sense of national belonging’, ‘shape patriotic responsibilities towards the country’), it seems that this vision is quite inward-looking, with a national focus where ‘social cohesion’ is understood through a lens of responsibility towards one’s own country while ‘respect’ is not linked to a sense of diversity but rather uniformity – the patriotic focus on a specific Polish national identity. Education priorities linked to societal improvements in the name of this view of ‘social cohesion’ do not represent a common global understanding of such initiatives which typically include peace education, sex and relationships education or environmental education but, in contrast, represent a narrow, normative and nationalistic stance (Green and Janmaat, 2016; Ramirez et al., 2016).

Similarly, the references to the European Year of Cultural Heritage with its theme of ‘Our Heritage: where the past meets the future’ perfectly align with the PiS’ ideological focus on the past and its ‘Polonism’ but seem to be used in a very selective policy-legitimation effort. These examples illustrate a deliberate shift away from the EU as a reference point for education policy since 2015, or instrumental and selective use of EU’s strategies for specific political purposes.

‘Quality education’ defined through a neoliberal economic perspective

The review of the discursive elements of the Strategic Plans between 2011 and 2020 tracing the objectives related to improving quality of education very clearly shows a strong adherence to neoliberal values across this decade of policy-making. This is evidenced through the references to the ideas of modernisation, standards, effectiveness and accountability which have been integrated within the education policy priorities since 2011.

The 2011 Strategic Plan, proposed by Minister Katarzyna Hall (MEN, 2011), stands out with its framing of the education reforms through ‘legislative solutions for aligning education with the needs of the labour market’ and ‘creating effective system for quality assurance in education’ (two top Priorities for 2011). This plan focused on continuing major reforms of the governance system aimed at increasing the ‘effectiveness’ and ‘accountability’ of the processes. It is interesting, but not surprising, that the discourse of legitimation of this policy direction – strongly influenced by the context of the EU agenda – is based on a belief that such a direction would increase ‘quality and effectiveness of education and upbringing’ (Goal 1 of the Plan – MEN, 2011). These priorities were constructed within the context of strengthening collaboration with other EU member states to meet Poland’s EU Presidency priorities for education (Priority 5/2011), and the EU strategic documents including Europe 2020 and Education and Training 2020 which pointedly focus on building the Knowledge Economy in Europe. Such an understanding of the priorities for education promotes and anchors education within market-economy ideas.

Across all the years included in this analysis, there has been a consistent focus on ‘employability skills’ and links to the ‘labour market’. Since 2012, this priority has been included in all Strategic Plans and, since 2015, has been positioned at the top of the agenda (Priorities 2/2015, 2/2016, 1/2017, 2/2018, 1/2019, 2/2020), and included such statements:

Preparing students for making decisions about career choice and further education [Przygotowanie uczniów do podejmowania decyzji o wyborze zawodu i kierunku kształcenia] (Priority 2/2018) (MEN, 2018),

Increasing the influence of employers, businesses, and business associations on the functioning of vocational education and training, and promoting industry specific education among students, parents and others [Zwiększenie wpływu pracodawców, firm oraz organizacji zrzeszających przedsiębiorstwa na funkcjonowanie kształcenia zawodowego] (Priority 1/2019) (MEN, 2019),

Adapting vocational education to the needs of the modern economy [Dopasowanie szkolnictwa zawodowego do potrzeb nowoczesnej gospodarki] (Priority 2/2020) (MEN, 2020).

While the above strategic directions with a focus on employability have not been legitimised through references to any specific EU policy, the focus on knowledge economy principles in education has been consistently utilised in this policy discourse. However, the ‘common sense’ framing of employability as a value of education is a typical consequence of acceptance of neoliberal ideals, and the effect of Europeanisation and globalisation of education policy (Lawn and Grek, 2012).

The discursive analysis focusing specifically on the issue of ‘quality’ of education in the Strategic Plans, shows that this issue has been front and centre of education policy but has been reinvented across the years. The Plans have explicitly included ‘increasing the quality of education’ as their priority in the years 2012–2019. Some Plans specified an education sector in which quality needed attention:

Increasing the quality of education in senior years [Podniesienie jakosci ksztalcenia w szkolach ponadgimnazjalnych (Priority 3/2012) (MEN, 2012),

Increasing the quality of vocational education by closer alignment with the needs of the labour market [Podnoszenie jakosci ksztatcenia zawodowego poprzez zblizenie do potrzeb rynku pracy] (Priority 2/2016; Priority 2/2017) (MEN, 2016, 2017)

Increasing the quality of education and support for students with special needs [Podnoszenie jakości kształcenia i wsparcia dla uczniów ze specjalnymi potrzebami edukacyjnymi (Priority 1/2018) (MEN, 2018).

Apart from the direct statements on increasing quality of education, the type of proposed system reforms (e.g. financing or re-structuring), issues of equality or attention to specific curricular priorities may also indicate different governments’ understanding of what quality education means.

What has been consistent across the years is that quality of education has been predominantly seen by all governments as being dependent on successful structural reforms and linked to employability as discussed above. In the years 2011–2013, the reforms included decentralising educational governance, a focus on effective coordination of the education system and introducing checks and balances for accountability in the various spheres of education provision (MEN, 2011, 2012, 2013). These reforms were a continuation of the restructure of the whole education system undertaken since 1999 which aligned the organisation of learning into similar levels and years with other European countries. It seems that they also aligned closely with the ‘social’ agenda of the EU where issues of social cohesion, inclusion and diversity have become much more pronounced in relation to education policies.

However, these reforms were contested, and in 2016 the change in the model and approach to schooling was one of the first electoral promises implemented by PiS in education (Priority 4/2016). This may be seen as one of the major steps towards de-Europeanisation of education policy. The Strategic Plan of 2016 (MEN, 2016) not only set out a complete restructure of the education system, reversing the previous reforms (Priority 4/2016), but also included changes to the governance of teacher professional development (Priority 5/2016). The quality of education was redefined through these structural reforms followed by several interventions including new approaches to teaching, centralising school governance, narrowing down the curriculum and introducing specific national civic education programmes. The main priorities included:

Strengthening the effectiveness of pedagogical supervision and the role of the education superintendent in planning teacher professional development [Wzmocnienie skuteczności nadzoru pedagogicznego i roli kuratora oświaty w obszarze planowania pracy przez publiczne placówki doskonalenia nauczycieli] (Priority 5/2016) (MEN, 2016),

A motivating and simplified teacher reward system [Motywacyjny i uproszczony system wynagradzania nauczycieli] (Priority 5/2017) (MEN, 2017),

Ensuring appropriate implementation of the new curricula in early childhood education and schools [Zapewnienie właściwego wdrożenia nowej podstawy programowej wychowania przedszkolnego i kształcenia ogólnego] (Priority 3/2018) (MEN, 2017),

Reducing bureaucracy in the work of schools and educational system institutions [Odbiurokratyzowanie pracy szkół i placówek systemu oświaty] (Priority 1/2020) (MEN, 2020).

There is a clear departure in these Priorities from the ‘Europeanised’ discourse on education which increasingly emphasises school autonomy, links between quality education and equality for diverse minority groups, and targeted structural reforms based on evidence from data generated by global and EU institutions.

The most apparent divergence in conceptualising quality of education can found in the discourse on the social aspects of education, including civic education. Since 2017, the Plans have included ‘facilitating students’ civic attitudes’ [kształtowaniu postaw prospołecznych] (Priority 3/2017), and ‘strengthening the educational function of the school that includes shaping patriotic attitudes of students as well as maintaining the sense of national identity of Polish children and youth living abroad’ [wzmocnienie wychowawczej funkcji szkoły, w tym kształtowanie postaw patriotycznych uczniów oraz podtrzymywanie poczucia tożsamości narodowej polskich dzieci i młodzieży zamieszkałych za granicą] (Priorities 4/2018–2020) (MEN, 2017, 2018, 2020). This social dimension in education has had a very specific national focus and follows a typical populist type of rhetoric focused on traditional family values and attitudes, and creates tensions with the EU policies focused on freedom of expression, inclusion and gender equality. Under the prime ministership of Beata Szydło, the idea of ‘expanding the role of schools in shaping socially-oriented attitudes’ [Rozwijanie aktywności szkół w kształtowaniu postaw prospołecznych] (Priority 3/2017) was added to the 2017 Strategic Plan. The Plan has also become an instrument in the ‘Active Historical Policy’ by re-enforcing nationalistic Polish-focused curriculum content especially in language and history education by introducing a set of Polono-centric educational activities in Polish public schools as well as abroad through embassies or consulates (MEN, 2017).

The ‘Polonism’ is evident in policy discourses in the documents from 2016 onwards where strong attention is paid to ‘shaping attitudes’ [kształtowanie postaw] and ‘upbringing’ [wychowanie]. The Strategic Plans in the period 2018–2020 consistently repeated the goals of education to ‘shape patriotic and national identity attitudes’ through introducing educational games and resources with specific themes and examples of curricular content topics such as the cultural heritage of Pope John Paul II. One of the success indicators for the Ministry included in the Plans was the percentage of schools implementing these programmes.

The significance of the illiberal policy shifts in education under the populist government of the PiS coalition

The above analysis of the Strategic Plans 2011–2020 shows significant changes in Poland’s education policy related to the legitimation of its policy strategy, neoliberal economic lens applied to education and the reinterpretation of the social role of education. EU policies used to be seen as a natural reference point for a majority of Poland’s educational policies, facilitating voluntary Europeanisation of Poland’s education policies with strong attention to the ‘knowledge economy’ principles. While EU policies are no longer a reference point for legitimising national education strategies, it seems that across these years and across different governments’ ideological positions some educational objectives as defined and developed within the European policy space have continued to be referenced or have been selectively referenced or implemented. It includes the focus on employability skills, educational market and accountability. These priorities align with the neoliberal conceptualisation of education based on competition (e.g. parental choice; high stakes testing), standardisation (learning targets; prescribed curricula) and corporate management of schools (performance pay for teachers; datafication).

What is of note here, is the continued unchanged and pervasive inclusion of neoliberal topics which contrasts with the reinterpretation of themes such as inclusion or social cohesion in the context of a particular ideological frameworks. This aligns with assertions by Iversen and Soskice (2019) that the rise of populism is unlikely to put the new knowledge economy at risk as the populist ideology is not an attack on the neoliberal policies and the market economy. On the contrary, the neoliberal ‘market’ enables the growth of populism by continuing the less equal distribution of income and disrupting inter- and intragenerational mobility which rather facilitate the spread of populist parties.

Furthermore, the closer links to the European common policy, through the OMC, to achieve convergence of education goals may have been conducive of these neoliberal discourses. Alexiadou et al. (2010: 347) postulated that ‘OMC represents a paradigm shift by promoting the neoliberal project of “education for the economy” with limited space for a dimension of “social Europe”’. Indeed, in the case of Poland, there is a clear distinction between ‘social’ and identity-building aspects of learning, and the common, economic goals of education and sustaining the market economy. The PiS coalition government has continued the implementation of the widespread principles of neoliberal education policy, while reinterpreting the social dimension of education under its ideological framework.

There is a clear departure of how quality of education has been understood and re-defined in Poland and the EU. EU policies such as the EEA (European Commission, 2020) have been refocusing on increasing school autonomy, ensuring equality for diverse minority groups, and targeted structural reforms, while the Polish policies under the populist governments have focused on ensuring patriotic content of curricula and centralisation of school management system increasing pressure on individual teachers and school principals. Such strategy enables control over ‘legitimate knowledge’ and expected attitudes (Apple, 2004). This in turn points to an urgent need to re-evaluate what is meant by the conceptual apparatus of Europeanisation through the OMC governance mechanisms in education; it also confirms the findings from the literature on how European policies may be reinterpreted at the national level or how they get deflected in a strategic political way (Alexiadou and Lange, 2013).

The new national and patriotic dimension assigned to national education since 2018 excludes diversity and multicultural values and promotes conservative, Polish and Catholic values. It seems that education policies under PiS use the discourse of social justice but its vision of addressing social justice issues is limited to free textbooks for primary school students, providing more digital tools for schools but at the same time accelerating competitiveness, school choice and early streaming into vocational education which traditionally contribute to increased inequality.

The process of weakening European integration in some aspects of education policy was already apparent in early 2015 with a growing focus on domestic politics and pre-election promises – a time when the Strategic Plan 2015 did not include explicit references to any EU policy. In the following years, it seems a de-Europeanising process was set in motion with policy discourses and agendas deliberately avoiding any references to EU policies. However, it is still too early to say if the de-Europeanisation of Poland’s education policy ‘deconstructed previous achievements made through the Europeanisation’ (Copeland, 2016). What can be clearly seen is the deconstruction of the previous domestic policy and education system. The areas that were clearly de-Europeanised are related to the ‘big’ social issues such as social justice, equality and school governance, as they have been affected by a normative shift and the ideological content of education.

Conclusions

The impact of Poland’s education policy shifts on the European Education Area 2025

While the Commission President has unveiled a new strategic vision for the European Education Area 2025, there are questions that need to be asked about the future of this policy at a time of resistance to Europeanising education policy in Poland, and the paradigm shift in how Poland’s ruling party perceives European integration.

So, it seems we can see a weakening of integration in the education area with some interconnectedness and adherence to general principles of EU policies still intact, but core values, contents and frames being moved away from the EU ideals. The changes in Poland’s vision for education, driven by Polish traditional ideals and identity politics, clearly stand in opposition to the underlying values of the European Education Area 2025 which designates ‘freedom, diversity, human rights and social justice’ as values that strengthen the European way of life including social market economy and democracy (European Commission, 2020: 1).

This points to several tensions between the EEA 2025 and Poland’s education priorities based on different ideological premises. The first issue relates to the dimension of ‘Quality’ which addresses specifically the idea of improving basic skills, international cooperation, multilingualism, cultural diversity and a European perspective in education (European Commission, 2020: 5). It cannot be denied that increasing quality of education is a top priority of all education systems and governments, however the tension here would relate to the understanding of what ‘quality’ is, and the best strategies for achieving quality learning. The European Commission sees ‘quality education’ as the mastering of basic skills – this includes basic mathematics, science and reading tasks, as well as digital competences strengthened through structural education reforms, increasing school autonomy, tackling inequalities from early years and investing in teachers (European Commission, 2020). For Poland’s government ‘quality education’ features deeply embedded national values and morals. It focuses on curriculum reforms, introducing compulsory textbooks with nationalistic and catholic themes and limiting school principals’ autonomy by centralising control about what is being taught in schools. As is clearly apparent, these visions of education quality are contrasting.

The second highly contentious issue is the ‘Inclusion and gender equality’ dimension promoted within the EEA which encourages a strategic approach by targeting social, economic and cultural status to improve upward social mobility, complying with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, lifelong learning strategies and cross-border collaboration (European Commission, 2020). In the European Education Area, education and training systems should consider developing stronger gender sensitivity in education processes and institutions and challenge and dissolve gender stereotypes. This space will be very challenging for Poland which lacks a national Youth Strategy, scores low in adult skills assessments and lags behind in improving gender-related bias and inequality. For example, only 25% of academics at professor level are women (University of Gdansk, 2020) which may be the effect of so called ‘triple glass ceiling’ in Poland – created by society, institutions and their partners (Wojniak et al., 2016). The controversial LGBT ‘free zones’ that officially exclude LGBT persons in many local councils further confirm the current governing elites’ preference for traditional definitions of gender roles and conservative and stereotypical views on family and women. The educational priorities in Poland’s national Strategic Plans do not offer any insight into addressing ‘Inclusion and gender equality’ (with the exception of ‘special needs’ education – Priority 1/2018, Priority 5/2019), making these issues invisible in the educational space in Poland.

It will be interesting to see if the Strategic Plans released after 2022 will include any references to the EEA’s common vision of education. Furthermore, there is a question whether Poland’s push against the EU’s normative influence in education will stop here or become more aggressive? It will be important for the European Commission to pay closer attention to the issues of quality education, gender equality and inclusion in Poland’s education system when implementing any common activities related to the promotion of the EU’s common vision for education. It is possible, that through specific policy instruments linked to the EEA such as working groups, peer learning activities or special purpose funding, stronger links between national and European policies could be forged, but these would most likely relate to addressing the least challenging issues such as those linked to the neoliberal approach to education.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Gosia Klatt

Author biography

Gosia Klatt is an Associate Professor at the Melbourne Graduate School of Education at the University of Melbourne. Her research addresses questions about the impact of policy-making processes and structures on the democratic governance of education systems in Europe and Australia, and spans a broad spectrum of topics including youth transitions, adult education, education system transitions, and governance.

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Resisting Europeanisation: Poland’s education policy and its impact on the European Education Area

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Understanding Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation of education policy in the context of populist politics

Tracing policy change through substantive and discursive policy analysis

From a ‘rising star’ in global rankings to shaping ‘ladylike virtues’: The transformation of Poland’s educational goals

Instrumental and selective use of the EU’s education policies

‘Quality education’ defined through a neoliberal economic perspective

The significance of the illiberal policy shifts in education under the populist government of the PiS coalition

Conclusions

The impact of Poland’s education policy shifts on the European Education Area 2025

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

ORCID iD

Author biography

References