Building upon the “new” new trade theory, this article proposes that the regional business demography plays a prominent role in shaping Europeans’ preferences on globalization. Specifically, I argue, regional populations of high-growth enterprises that take advantage of internationalization and export opportunities drive positive attitudes on globalization, especially among the “losers” of import competition. Regression models on cross-sectional survey data from Eurobarometer surveys covering ten waves between 2015 and 2019 supplemented by a series of macro-level covariates establish that residents in regions with higher shares of high-growth enterprises are more likely to view globalization as an opportunity. More importantly, the positive association between regional high-growth enterprise shares and support for globalization is particularly pronounced among lower-educated and lower-skilled individuals.
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