The rise of “new regionalism” is one of the most salient features of the post-Cold War international order. Despite the resurgence of regionalism in Europe, little consensus exists on how regional identity impacts public opinion toward the European Union. To remedy this problem, this study examines the impact of three types of individual-level regional identity on support for integration: parochialism (exclusive regionalism), inclusive regionalism, and pseudo-exclusive regionalism. Contrary to scholarly expectations, the multilevel analysis reveals that inclusive regionalists are as equally Eurosceptic as parochial regionalists. In general, regional identity depresses support for integration unless it is expressly combined with a supranational identity. This finding holds true even in minority nations, where respondents are, on the whole, less Euro-friendly.
AndersonB (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New York: Verso.
2.
AndersonC (1998) When in doubt, use proxies: Attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European integration. Comparative Political Studies31(5): 569–601.
3.
Antonsich M (2010) Exploring the correspondence between regional forms of governance and regional identity: The Case of Western Europe. European Urban and Regional Studies 17(3): 261–276.
4.
ArmingeonKCekaB (2013) The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system. European Union Politics15(82): 82–107.
5.
ArmingeonKGuthmannK (2014) Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011. European Journal of Political Research53(3): 423–442.
6.
ArmingeonKGuthmannKWeisstannerD (2016) How the Euro divides the union: The effect of economic adjustment on support for democracy in Europe. Socio-Economic Review14(1): 1–26.
7.
BergL (2007) Multi-Level Europeans: The Influence of Territorial Attachments on Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes, Göteborg, Sweden: Göteborg Studies in Politics, p. 104.
8.
BowlesSGintisH (2004) Persistent parochialism: Trust and exclusion in ethnic networks. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization55(1): 1–23.
9.
BrewerM (1999) Multiple identities and identity transition: Implications for Hong Kong. International Journal of Intercultural Relations22(2): 187–197.
10.
BrigevichA (2012) Peeling back the layers: Territorial identity and EU support in Spain. Regional and Federal Studies22(2): 205–230.
11.
BrigevichA. Why don’t you like us?: The impact of exclusionary attitudes on European identity construction and support for integration. In: Paper presented at the 2014 Midwest Political Science Association annual conference.2014. Chicago, 3–6 April.
12.
BrigevichA (2016) Regional identity and support for Europe: Distinguishing between cultural and civic social identity in France. Regional & Federal Studies24(4): 475–507.
13.
CareyS (2002) Undivided loyalties is national identity an obstacle to European integration. European Union Politics3(4): 387–413.
14.
CitrinJSidesJ (2004) More than nationals: How identity choice matters in the new Europe. In: HerrmannRBrewerMRisseT (eds) Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 161–185.
EliasA (2008) From Euro-enthusiasm to Euro-scepticism? A re-evaluation of minority nationalist party attitudes towards European integration. Regional and Federal Studies18(5): 557–581.
Fitjar RD (2010). Explaining variation in sub-state regional identities in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 49(4): 522–544.
19.
FligsteinN (2008) Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe, New York: Oxford University Press.
20.
FosterCFriedanJ (2017) Crisis of trust: Socio-economic determinants of Europeans’ confidence in government. European Union Politics18(4): 511–535.
21.
GabelM (1998) Public support for European integration: An empirical test of five theories. Journal of Politics60(2): 333–354.
22.
HepburnE (2007) The New Politics of Autonomy. Territorial Strategies and the Uses of European Integration by Political Parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia, 1979–2005, Florence: Cadmus Online Publications (EUI).
23.
HoogheLMarksG (2001) Multilevel Governance and European Integration, Baltimore: Rowman and Littlefield.
24.
HoogheLMarksG (2005) Calculation, community, and cues: Public opinion on European integration. European Union Politics6(4): 419–443.
25.
HoogheLMarksGSchakelA (2010) The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies, NY: Routledge.
26.
InglehartR (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
27.
JefferyC (2000) Sub-national mobilization and European integration: Does it make any difference?Journal of Common Market Studies38(1): 1–23.
28.
JollyS (2007) The Europhile fringe? Regionalist party support for integration. European Union Politics8(1): 109–130.
29.
KarolewskiIP (2007) Regionalism, nationalism, and European integration. In: KarolewskiIPSuszyckiAM (eds) Nationalism and European Integration: The Need for New Theoretical and Empirical Insights, New York: Continuum, pp. 9–32.
30.
KeatingM (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
31.
KeatingMHoogheL (2001) Bypassing the nation-state? Regions and the EU policy process. In: RichardsonJ (ed.) European Union. Power and Policy-Making, New York: Routledge, pp. 239–256.
32.
LaitinD (2001) National identities in the emerging European state. In: KeatingMMcGarryJ (eds) Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 54–113.
33.
LawlerE (1992) Affective attachments to nested groups: A choice-process theory. American Sociological Review57(3): 327–339.
34.
Lipset S (1985). Consensus and Conflict: Essays in Political Science, volume 1. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers: 253–294.
35.
LlamazaresIReinaresF (1999) Identificaciones territoriales, ciudadanía europea y opinión pública Española. In: LlamazaresIReinaresF (eds) Aspectos politicos y sociales de la integración europea, Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, pp. 179–200.
36.
LynchP (1996) Minority Nationalism and European Integration, Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
37.
MarksG (1999) Territorial identities in the European Union. In: AndersonJ (ed.) Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 69–91.
38.
MarksGWilsonC (2000) The past in the present: A cleavage theory of party response to European integration. British Journal of Political Science30(3): 433–459.
39.
McLarenL (2006) Identity, Interests, and Attitudes to European Integration, Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
40.
MorenoL (1999) Local and global: Mesogovernments and territorial identities. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics5(3/4): 61–75.
41.
MorenoL (2006) Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the “Moreno question”. Scottish Affairs54: 1–21.
42.
OlssonA (2007) Regional minority nationalist attitudes toward European integration. In: KarolewskiIPSuszyckiAM (eds) Nationalism and European Integration: The Need for New Theoretical and Empirical Insights, NY: Continuum, pp. 52–66.
43.
PaasiA (1986) The institutionalisation of regions: A theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of regions and the constitution of regional identity. Fennia164(1): 105–146.
44.
Rabe-HeskethSSkrondalA (2005) Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, College Station, TX: Stata Press.
45.
RisseT (2010) We the European Peoples? Identity, Public Sphere, and European Democracy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
46.
SnijdersTABBoskerRJ (1999) Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modeling, London: SAGE Publications.
47.
TajfelH (1981) Human Groups and Social Categories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
48.
TajfelH (1982) Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
49.
VasilopoulouS (2011) European integration and the radical right: Three patterns of opposition. Government and Opposition46(2): 223–244.
