The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. The European Parliament is more successful in the post-Amsterdam period, when the Council decides by qualified majority voting, the rapporteur comes from a large party, the European Commission is supportive, and when national administrations are more involved in the implementation process than the Commission.
AchenCH (2006) Institutional realism and bargaining models. In: ThomsonRStokmanFNAchenCHKönigT (eds) The European Union Decides. CambridgeCambridge University Press86–123
BaronDPFerejohnJA (1989) Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review83(4): 1181–1206
4.
BenedettoG (2005) Rapporteurs as legislative entrepreneurs: The dynamics of the codecision procedure in Europe’s parliament. Journal of European Public Policy12(1): 67–88
5.
CameronCM (2000) Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative PowerCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6.
CostelloRThomsonR (2011) The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs’ impact on decision outcomes in the European Union. European Union Politics12(3): 337–357
7.
CrombezC (1997) The Co-decision procedure in the European Union. Legislative Studies Quarterly22(1): 97–119
8.
CrombezC (2001) The Treaty of Amsterdam and the co-decision procedure. In: SchneiderGAspinwallM (eds) The Rules of Integration: Institutional Approaches to the Study of Europe. ManchesterManchester University Press101–122
9.
DixitASkeathS (1999) Games of StrategyLondon: W.W. Norton & Company.
10.
EpsteinDO’HalloranS (1999) Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate PowersCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11.
European ParliamentDelegations to the Conciliation Committee: Activity Report 1 May 2004 to 30 April 20092009Bruxelles: European Parliament.
12.
FarrellHHéritierA (2004) Interorganizational negotiation and intraorganizational power in shared decision-making: Early agreements under codecision and their impact on the European Parliament and Council. Comparative Political Studies37(10): 1184–1212
13.
FranchinoF (2007) The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EUCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
GailmardSHammondT (2011) Intercameral bargaining and intracameral organization in legislatures. Journal of Politics73(02): 535–546
15.
GarrettG (1995) From the Luxembourg Compromise to codecision: Decision-making in the European Union. Electoral Studies14(3): 289–308
16.
GarrettGTsebelisG (1996) An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism. International Organization50(2): 269–299
17.
HagemannSHøylandB (2010) Bicameral politics in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies48(4): 811–833
18.
HixS (2002) Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation: Why the European Parliament won at Amsterdam. British Journal of Political Science32(2): 259–280
19.
HosliMOMattilaMUriotM (2011) Voting in the Council of the European Union after the 2004 Enlargement: A Comparison of old and new member states. Journal of Common Market Studies49(6): 1249–1270
20.
IngbermanDEYaoDA (1991) Presidential commitment and the veto. American Journal of Political Science35(2): 357–389
21.
KasackC (2004) The legislative impact of the European Parliament under the revised co-decision procedure: Environmental, public health and consumer protection policies. European Union Politics5(2): 241–260
22.
KönigTLindbergBLechnerS (2007) Bicameral conflict resolution in the European Union: An empirical analysis of conciliation committee bargains. British Journal of Political Science37(2): 281–312
23.
MatthewsSA (1989) Veto threats: Rhetoric in a bargaining game. Quarterly Journal of Economics104(2): 347–369
24.
McCartyNMeirowitzA (2007) Political Game TheoryNew York: Cambridge University Press.
25.
McCartyNM (1997) Presidential reputation and the veto. Economics & Politics9(1): 1–26
26.
MoravcsikA (1999) A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. International Organization53(2): 267–306
27.
NapelSWidgrénM (2006) The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision. Social Choice and Welfare27(1): 129–154
28.
PollackMA (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EUOxford: Oxford University Press.
29.
30.
31.
RasmussenA (2005) EU conciliation delegates: Responsible or runaway agents?. West European Politics28(5): 1015–1034
32.
RasmussenA (2008) The EU Conciliation Committee: One or several principals?. European Union Politics9(1): 87–113
33.
RasmussenA (2011) Early conclusion in bicameral bargaining: Evidence from the co-decision legislative procedure of the European Union. European Union Politics12(1): 41–64
34.
RubinsteinA (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica50(1): 97–109
35.
SchellingTC (1960) The Strategy of ConflictCambridge: Harvard University Press.
36.
SlapinJBProkschS-O (2008) A scaling model for estimating time-series party positions from texts. American Journal of Political Science52(3): 705–722
37.
SteunenbergB (1994) Decision-making under different institutional arrangements: Legislation by the European Community. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics150(4): 642–669
38.
SteunenbergB (1997) Codecision and its reform: A comparative analysis of decision-making rules in the European Union. In: SteunenbergBvan VughtF (eds) Political Institutions and Public Policy: Perspective on European Decision-Making. DordrechtKluwer205–229
39.
ThomsonR (2011) Resolving Controversy in the European Union: Legislative Decision-Making Before and After EnlargementCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40.
ThomsonRStokmanFNAchenCH (2006) The European Union DecidesCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41.
TsebelisG (1997) Maastricht and the democratic deficit. Aussenwirtshaft52(1/2): 29–56
42.
TsebelisG (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions WorkPrinceton: Princeton University Press.
43.
TsebelisGGarrettG (2000) Legislative politics in the European Union. European Union Politics1(1 February): 9–36
44.
TsebelisGJensenCBKalandrakisA (2001) Legislative procedures in the European Union: An empirical analysis. British Journal of Political Science31(4): 573–599
45.
TsebelisGMoneyJ (1997) BicameralismCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
