This paper examines member state bargaining success in legislative negotiations in the European Union. Bargaining success is thought to be determined by factors attributable to intervention behaviour, relative policy positions and power. Intervention relates to a member state’s efforts to make its position known over the course of negotiations, relative policy positions relate to a member state’s position in the policy space under negotiation relative to other actors’ positions, and power refers to the size of the member state. New measures for bargaining success are introduced that account for the saliency of the legislative proposals under consideration. The results presented suggest that there are more winners than losers when measuring bargaining success.
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