Numerous studies have explored how the European Union's institutions shape political behavior and legislative outcomes in the EU. Far fewer examine in detail how individual institutional changes have come about. This paper presents a formal model that allows us to analyze under what conditions institutional change should be expected, with a focus on the Council of Ministers' voting rule in particular. Changes in the number of member states in the EU, changes in the legislative procedures and changes in the policy areas under consideration are found to affect the ability to pass legislation, and thereby provide the impetus for adjustments in equilibrium coalition sizes and chamber voting rules.
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