Immigration, economic hardship, and the European Union (EU) are typically emphasized as key concerns for the electorates of European populist radical right (PRR) parties. At the subnational level, however, these parties perform increasingly well in areas relatively unaffected by ethnic diversity, postindustrial economic decline, or transnationalism. What explains this paradox? Through a novel longitudinal analysis of rich municipal electoral, economic, and demographic data from Finland, this study uncovers the conditions under which immigration, economic hardship, and EU transfers influence support for the PRR. Although levels of ethnic diversity or economic hardship poorly predict support for these parties, they find fertile ground in areas undergoing rapid ethnic changes or economic decline. Growing reliance on EU funds, in contrast, decreases their anti-EU appeals. Thus, by clearly differentiating structural conditions from cyclical effects, this study helps reconcile rival theoretical perspectives on social contact and receptiveness toward immigrants and debates over the economy’s effects on these parties’ performance.
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