A persistent puzzle in the study of civil wars is why some peace agreements foster durable settlements while others do not. Previous research on peace duration following settlements emphasizes the process of negotiating peace. We focus on how peace agreements substantively address rebel issues and affect the risk of future fighting. We argue that agreements addressing rebel group claims should significantly improve the duration of peace. As rebel group leaders are under pressure from fighters and supporters to provide meaningful reforms, agreements that fail to address many of their stated issues, especially those about intangible issues, are likely to spur future fighting as a form of spoiling. We examine the durability of peace agreements using a novel dataset of rebel group demands made during civil wars and newly coded concessions from all peace agreements between 1990 and 2015. The results provide robust support for our key arguments.
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