Once a set of civil war actors reach a final peace agreement, a number of different implementation sequences are possible as the negotiated provisions are put into practice. We focus on a key but threatening stepping stone in the post-accord period—the holding of the first post-accord election—which has the capacity to be a stabilizing or destabilizing force. We identify effective accommodation provisions that civil war actors can negotiate and implement before the first post-accord election to reduce the chances of renewed violence. Utilizing new longitudinal data on the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements between 1989 and 2012 and a series of survival models, we find that if the first post-accord election is preceded by the implementation of accommodation measures, elections can have a peace-promoting effect. However, in the absence of preelection accommodation measures, elections are much more likely to be followed by peace failure.
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