Recent incidents and accidents have sparked an increased interest in understanding helicopter pilot responses to alerts and in-flight malfunctions. Previous research identified factors that affect fixed-wing pilot response times to alerts and indicated that response times were frequently longer and more variable than expected. However, the factors that affect helicopter pilot response times are often different from those in fixed-wing operations, and the data are scarce and difficult to locate. The purpose of this review was to address these challenges by focusing on the following for helicopter pilots/operations: (a) identify and review the literature related to response times to alerts and in-flight malfunctions, (b) identify factors that may increase variability in response times, and (c) make suggestions for future research. A major goal for this review was to provide data and information in a format that can be used directly by practitioners who design or evaluate rotorcraft systems and operations.
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