The following article uses a simple-game theoretic model to explain the termination of the Colombian-armed conflict. Assuming a rationality of the Colombian Government and the guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, People’s Army within the internal armed conflict, an analysis of conjuncture and an identification of dimensions and strategies are used to try to explain the evolution of the armed conflict in the last two decades and its particular transformation. This is done by comparing the frustrated Caguán process, which took place between 1999 and 2002, with the recently completed Havana process that has put an end to more than five decades of internal conflict.
AguileraM (2010) Las FARC: La Guerrilla Campesina 1949–2010. Bogota: ARFO.
2.
AlmondGVerbaS (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
3.
AvenhausR (2009) Game theory as an approach to conflict resolution. In: BercovitchJKremenyukVZartmanWI (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. London: SAGE, pp. 86–101.
4.
BatesR (2008) State failure. Annual Review of Political Science11(1): 1–12.
5.
BauschA (2015) Democracy, war effort and the systemic democratic peace. Journal of Peace Research52(4): 435–447.
6.
BejaranoAPizarroE (2003) Colombia: the partial collapse of the state and the emergence of aspiring state-makers. In: KingstonPSpearsI (eds) States Within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 99–118.
7.
BernheimD (1986) Axiomatic characterizations of rational choice in strategic environments. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics88(3): 473–488.
8.
BouldingK (1962) Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper & Row.
9.
BouldingK (1977) Twelve friendly quarrels with Johan Galtung. Journal of Peace Research14(1): 75–86.
10.
CollierP (2000) Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank.
11.
CollierPHoefflerA (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers56(4): 563–595.
12.
ColomerJ (1990) El Arte De La Manipulación Política. Barcelona: Anagrama.
13.
CrockerC (1992) High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Road Neighborhood. New York: W.W. Norton.
14.
DalmagroFJiménezJ (2015) Agent based modeling of the coevolution of hostility and pacifism. International Journal of Modern Physics26(9): 1–16.
15.
DoyleM (2000) A more perfect union: the liberal peace and the challenge of globalization. Review of International Studies26(5): 81–94.
16.
DuncanG (2006) Los Señores De La Guerra: De Paramilitares, Mafiosos Y Autodefensas En Colombia. Bogota: Planeta.
17.
FarberHGibbonsR (1996) Learning and wage dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics111(4): 1007–1047.
18.
FisherR (1997) Interactive Conflict Resolution. New York: Syracuse University Press.
19.
GaltungJ (1969) violence, peace and peace research. Journal of Peace Research6(3): 167–191.
20.
GiblerDM (2007) Bordering on peace: democracy, territorial issues, and conflict. International Studies Quarterly51(3): 509–532.
21.
GoebertusJ (2008) Palma de aceite y desplazamiento forzado en Zona Bananera: “trayectorias” entre recursos naturales y conflicto. Colombia Internacional67: 152–175.
22.
HarsanyiJC (1967) Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I-III. part I. The Basic Model. Management Science14(3): 159–182.
23.
HarsanyiJC (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
24.
HartoF (2004) Investigación Para La Paz Y Resolución De Conflictos. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
25.
HermansLCunninghamSSlingerJ (2014) The usefulness of game theory as a method for policy evaluation. Evaluation20(1): 10–25.
26.
IdikeANAguSU (2014) African union and intra-state conflict resolution: a return to the Libyan crisis. International Journal of Public Administration37(8): 466–473.
27.
JitRShekharCy KawatraM (2016) Servant leadership and conflict resolution: a qualitative study. International Journal of Conflict Management27(4): 591–612.
28.
KalyvasSN (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29.
KissingerH (1969) The Vietnam negotiations. Foreign Affairs48(2): 38–50.
30.
KleiborM (1994) Ripeness of conflict: a fruitful notion?Journal of Peace Research31(1): 109–116.
31.
KuhnHWTuckerAW (1950) Contributions to the Theory of Games. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
32.
LessingB (2013) The logic of violence in drug wars: cartel-state conflict in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia. CDDRL Working Paper 145, Stanford University, October. Stanford, CA: CDDRL.
33.
LessingB (2015) Logics of violence in criminal war. Journal of Conflict Resolution59(8): 1486–1516.
34.
LeventogluBSlantchevBL (2007) The armed peace: a punctuated equilibrium theory of war. American Journal of Political Science51(4): 755–771.
35.
LinzJJStepanA (1978) The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
36.
LuceRDRaiffaH (1957) Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. North Chelmsford, MA: Courier Corporation.
37.
McCainRA (2009) Game Theory and Public Policy. Northampton: Edward Elgar.
38.
MasonA (2002) Exclusividad, autoridad y Estado. Análisis Político47: 55–75.
39.
MedellínPRangelA (2010) La Política De Seguridad Democrática. Bogota: Norma.
40.
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (2010) Logros De La Política De Consolidación De La Seguridad Democrática. Bogotá, Colombia: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional.
41.
MitchellC (2006) Conflict, change and conflict resolution. In: AustinBFischerMGiessmannH-J (eds) Advancing Conflict Transformation. Opladen; Framington Hills, MI: Barbara Budrich Publishers, pp. 76–100.
42.
Observatory of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law) (n.d.) Síntesis De La Violencia Y La Confrontación Armada En Colombia, 1998-2012 y 2015. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República de Colombia.
43.
OteroD (2010) El Papel De Los Estados Unidos En El Conflicto Armado Colombiano. Bogota: Aurora.
44.
RaghavanTES (2015) Legal disputes resolved via game theoretic methods. International Game Theory Review17(2): 1–7.
45.
RapoportA (1960) Fights, Games and Debates. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
RayDVohraR (2001) Coalitional power and public goods. Journal of Political Economy109(6): 1355–1385.
48.
RayDVohraR (2015) Coalition formation. In: YoungPZamirS (eds) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 4. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 239-326.
49.
ReyesA (2009) Guerreros Y Campesinos. El Despojo De La Tierra En Colombia. Bogota, Colombia: Norma.
50.
RichardsonL (1960a) Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press.
51.
RichardsonL (1960b) Statistics of Deadly Quarrel. Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press.
52.
RíosJ (2016a) La narcotización del activismo guerrillero de las FARC y el ELN. Revista UNISCI41: 205–233.
53.
RíosJ (2016b) Dinámicas de la violencia guerrillera en Colombia. Revista De Ciencias Sociales22(3): 84–103.
54.
RíosJ (2017) Breve Historia Del Conflict Armado En Colombia. Madrid: La Catarata.
55.
RotbergRI (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
56.
Sánchez-CuencaI (2009) Teoría De Juegos. Madrid: Cuadernos Metodológicos del CIS.
57.
Security and Democracy Foundation (2008) El debilitamiento de los grupos irregulares en Colombia, 2002-2008. Revista Coyuntura De Seguridad23: 5–11.
58.
SeltenR (1988) Models of Strategic Rationality, Theory and Decision. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
59.
ShakunMF (2003) United States—China plane collision negotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation12(6): 1–19.
60.
SilvaAMalyutovMPierceGet al. (2013) Threats to peace: threat perception and the persistence or desistence of violent conflict. In: European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC), Uppsala, 12–14 August, pp. 186–189. Uppsala: IEEE.
61.
SnyderR (2006) Does lootable wealth breed disorder? A political economy of extraction framework. Comparative Political Studies39(8): 943–968.
62.
TouvalSZartmanIW (eds) (1985) International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
63.
TuckerAW (1983) The mathematics of Tucker: a sampler. The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal14(3): 228–232.
64.
UngerleiderJ (2012) Structured youth dialogue to empower peacebuilding and leadership. Conflict Resolution Quarterly29(4): 381–402.
65.
Von NeumannJMorgensternO (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
66.
ZagareFC (1990) Dynamics of escalation. Information and Decision Technologies16(3): 249–261.
67.
ZagareFC (1992) NATO, rational escalation and flexible response. Journal of Peace Research29(4): 435–454.
68.
ZartmanIW (1993) The unfinished agenda: negotiating internal conflicts. In LickliderR (ed.) Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York University Press, pp. 20–34.
69.
ZartmanIW (2001) The timing of peace initiatives: hurting stalemates and ripe moments. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics1(1): 8–18.
70.
ZartmanIWBermanMR (1982) The Practical Negotiator. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
