Abstract
This paper responds to an article by Maltby (1998) which, in part, challenges the Jones and Aiken (1995) (British Accounting Review, Vol.27, No.1) analysis of social and political influences on the development of nineteenth century companies legislation. Maltby asserts that the laissez-faire/collectivist framework proposed by J&A provides an insufficient basis for evaluating legislation of the period. She presents evidence of an alternative hypothesis, claiming, among other things, that large investors played a more significant role in the shaping of companies legislation. The analyses and rationales underlying Maltby's “large investor” hypothesis are critically examined. While there are some noteworthy strengths to Maltby's methodological approach, it is concluded that her findings are, nevertheless, insufficient to reject the laissez-faire thesis.
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