Wars and the formation of the welfare state in Bulgaria

Abstract

This article examines the impact of interstate wars on the development of the Bulgarian welfare state. Drawing on extensive primary sources, it shows that military conflicts were a major catalyst for the introduction and expansion of social policy in a predominantly agrarian society under authoritarian rule. In the course of the five interstate wars in which Bulgaria was involved between 1879 and 1944, a variety of welfare measures were adopted, including social protection for soldiers and veterans, social insurance programmes, labour protection legislation and pro-natalist family policies. These reforms stemmed from the strategic efforts of authoritarian elites to secure political loyalty, social cohesion and internal stability under conditions of mass mobilisation and war crisis. The article contributes to comparative welfare state research in three ways. First, it shows that autocratic regimes pursue selective social policies, particularly with pension policy, targeting occupational groups that are crucial to regime survival and state capacity. Second, it shows that large-scale military mobilisation forces even authoritarian governments to extend social protection to new groups of beneficiaries. Third, the Bulgarian case illustrates that democracy is neither a necessary condition nor a conditioning factor for postwar welfare state expansion, underscoring the tremendous impact of wars on social policy. The study contributes to a more global and historically grounded account of the emergence of the welfare state and calls for further research on the role of warfare in shaping social policy development in Eastern Europe and the Global South.

Introduction

“It is not enough for a nation to have only tanks and planes […]. There must be someone to throw the grenades […], and to fly the planes.

(Stenographic Reports of the Bulgarian National Assembly of 19 December 1940: 662)

The effects of war on public policy have long been neglected in comparative politics (Castles, 2010; Kasza, 1996). However, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the impact of warfare on welfare state development. Inspired by Titmuss’ classic essay on the impact of war on social policy (Titmuss, 1958), many studies have empirically examined the impact of interstate wars on various aspects of social policy such as social spending, welfare legislation and the establishment of welfare ministries (e.g., Obinger et al., 2018; Obinger and Schmitt, 2018, 2020, 2024; Petersen et al., 2023; Walter and Emmenegger, 2022). A key finding is that large-scale wars such as the two World Wars have been an important driving force for welfare state development. However, existing research has exclusively focused on the Western world. Most strikingly, the countries in Eastern Europe were completely neglected by these studies, even though this region was heavily affected by interstate wars.

To fill this gap, we look at the case of Bulgaria. Relying on archival sources, parliamentary minutes and secondary literature, we investigate for the period between 1879 and 1944 whether and to what extent military conflicts spurred the adoption and expansion of social policy in various areas. Specifically, we focus on old-age pensions, health care, unemployment compensation, veterans’ benefits, family cash benefits and labour protection legislation.

Case selection is motivated by three considerations. First, Bulgaria is an extreme case in terms of our key independent variable as the country was involved in five interstate wars in this period: the Serbo-Bulgarian War (1885), the two Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and the two World Wars. These conflicts were characterised by mass mobilisation and especially the Balkan Wars and World War I had devastating social and economic consequences. Second, Bulgaria is one of the few countries in Eastern Europe that was established already in the late 19^th century. As a result, and in contrast to countries like Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Poland, there was no welfare legislation inherited from collapsed empires so that Bulgaria had to develop its social policies from scratch. This is important as we are interested in the impact of war on the initial introduction of welfare legislation in various areas. Third, Bulgaria is an unlikely case for early welfare state formation. In economic terms, Bulgaria was and has remained one of the poorest countries in Europe (Maddison Project Database, 2020) and had a huge agricultural sector until well into the 20^th century. Industrialisation was delayed, urbanisation was low and average life expectancy was only 42 years at the turn of the 20^th century (Zafeiris and Mourgova, 2024).

Politically, Bulgaria was a constitutional monarchy with varying degrees of authoritarian rule over time (see Figure 1). Political developments in the period under analysis were turbulent and characterised by many changes in government dominated by the political right. Given the country’s late industrialisation, the labour movement was weak in numbers. The (communist) left could only seize power with the support of the Red Army in late 1944.

Figure 1.

Bulgaria’s political development and social reforms adopted during and in the aftermath of wars (1879–1944).

Overall, the socio-economic and political context was rather unfavourable for the early adoption of comprehensive welfare reforms (e.g., Korpi 1983; Wilensky, 1975). However, Bulgaria was not a welfare state laggard in the area of social security for workers (see Table 1). Moreover, Bulgaria was the first Balkan country to introduce labour legislation ¹ and a pioneer in Eastern Europe in extending pension insurance to the rural population. ² We argue that this outcome is related to military mass mobilisation and the horrors generated by war which accelerated welfare reform in an “ill-prepared” socio-economic and political context. In fact, as shown in Figure 1, several important welfare reforms were enacted during or immediately after large-scale inter-state wars.

Table 1.

Years of introduction of social insurance and family allowances in Bulgaria and selected Western countries.

Country	Accident insurance	Sickness insurance	Old-age insurance	Unemployment insurance b	Family allowances
Bulgaria	1918 a	1918	1924	1925	1942
Canada	1918	1971	1927	1940	1944
Finland	1895	1963	1937	(1917)	1948
France	1898	1928	1910	(1905) 1967	1932
Germany	1884	1883	1889	1927	1954
Greece	1914	1922	1934	1954	1958
Italy	1898	1943	1919	1919	1937
Spain	1900	1942	1919	(1931) 1961 a	1938
Sweden	1901	1891	1913	(1934)	1947
Switzerland	1911	1911	1946	(1924) 1976	1952
United Kingdom	1897	1911	1908	1911	1945
United States	1908	–	1935	1935	–

Source: Social Security Administration (2018a), 2018b; Alber (1982); Espuelas (2013a): 26; 2013b: 79.

^a = corrected by the authors.

^b = Without brackets: introduction of compulsory insurance; with brackets: introduction of voluntary state-subsidised scheme.

Our contribution to the comparative welfare state literature is threefold.

First, in line with the existing literature (Grünewald, 2021; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017), we find that autocracies pursue selective social policies by providing social benefits – especially pensions – to occupational groups that play a crucial role in the survival of the regime and the functioning of the state.

Second, in the case of military mass mobilisation, even authoritarian governments are forced to extend social protection to new groups of beneficiaries. Moreover, and in line with many countries, Bulgaria adopted welfare programmes to address war-induced problems and social needs. This includes the introduction of unemployment assistance, veterans’ benefits and family cash benefits.

Third, the Bulgarian case illustrates that democracy is neither a necessary condition nor a conditional factor for post-war welfare state expansion. This is an important finding as critics of warfare–to–welfare accounts have argued for Western countries that the post-war welfare state expansion was less a product of war itself but rather driven by war-induced democratisation, electoral reform (e.g., introduction of proportional representation) and the resulting shifts in power resources towards pro-welfare state parties. Even though all these political transformations were absent in Bulgaria, we find a push effect of war on social policy, underscoring the tremendous impact of emergencies on social policy.

The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly summarises theoretical arguments and causal mechanisms through which warfare may affect welfare state development in an authoritarian context dominated by the political right. Sections 3 to 5 present the empirical findings and show that the various interstate wars in which Bulgaria was involved had a significant impact on social policy much in line with the recent findings for Western countries. The final section concludes and discusses avenues for future research.

The warfare-welfare nexus in an autocratic context

Bulgaria has been an autocracy throughout the period of analysis (see Figure 1) and has been dominated by the political right. After the country was founded in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman war, Bulgaria was involved in five interstate wars of increasing intensity until 1944. We argue that both autocracy and interstate war are the key factors explaining the timing of welfare legislation and the patterns of social policy until 1945. While right-wing autocracies under normal circumstances target welfare benefits only to particular groups that are essential for regime stability, military mass mobilisation and war-induced necessities and problems of legitimacy pressure authoritarian governments to extend social protection to groups that bear the costs of war and/or endanger the stability of the home front and thus the overall war effort.

When it comes to the impact of autocracies on social policy, welfare state scholars have long emphasised that the need for legitimacy and revolutionary fears among political elites were historically an important driving force behind welfare state formation (Alber, 1982; Rimlinger, 1971). Napoleon III in France, Otto von Bismarck in Germany or Eduard Graf Taaffe in the Austrian Empire enacted welfare reforms in an effort to pacify a radicalised labour movement and to gain its loyalty. More recent and theoretically more elaborated research on social policy in autocracies has empirically confirmed that autocracies provide social protection to social groups or professions that are pivotal for regime survival (Grünewald, 2021; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017; Mares and Carnes, 2009; Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2022). Old-age pensions play a key role in this respect. Knutsen and Rasmussen (2017) argue that old-age pensions are club goods that can be easily targeted to groups essential to enhancing regime stability. Moreover, public pensions solve a credible commitment problem as they represent a stable and secure source of income in the future, which in turn bolsters regime support from such critical groups in the long run.

Another reason why authoritarian governments offer welfare benefits to particular professional groups is state- and nation-building. The provision of social protection is an important vehicle for the building and functioning of a modern and powerful state apparatus. Almost everywhere in the world, civil servants and the military were the first professions that benefited from public welfare provision, notably pensions (Rothenbacher, 2004). Benefits provided to these groups were often generous and can be classified as “loyalty benefits” (Shalev and Gal, 2018) as they were designed not only to bind civil servants more closely to the state, but also to incentivise entry into public service. For the Bulgarian case, it is quite likely that state- and nation-building were a political priority in the early years after the establishment of the state in the late 19^th century and this endeavour required, among other factors, the loyalty, skills and co-optation of certain professions.

In sum, a key finding of the extant literature is that autocracies provide social protection only selectively. Compared to democracies, this aligns with lower coverage in social protection but often also higher benefit generosity (Grünewald, 2021; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017). For ideological reasons, right-wing autocracies are hesitant to expand social security beyond groups that are necessary for regime survival. Only under conditions of severe emergencies such as interstate wars or revolutionary threats (Rasmussen and Knutsen, 2022) are authoritarian regimes compelled to extend social protection to larger segments of the population.

Within the first 60 years of its existence, Bulgaria was involved in five interstate wars which were waged with growing intensity. The spread of universal conscription, huge advances in military technology and the related massive increase in the firepower of the weaponry (Oronato et al., 2014) paved the way for a totalisation of warfare over time, causing unprecedented numbers of military and civilian casualties. The emergence of industrialised mass warfare raised concerns among the political and military elites about the quantity and the quality of the population, as well as civilian morale in wartime (Titmuss, 1958). Declining fertility rates due to demographic change, the poor physical fitness of young men and social unrest in the hinterland were seen as a threat to national security and the power ambitions of governments in foreign affairs. While such concerns triggered welfare reforms already as part of war preparation and war planning (Dörr and Grawe, 2020; Dwork, 1987), the outbreak and the subsequent cruelties of war meant a turning point for social policy. Both demand-side and supply-side causal mechanisms play a role (Obinger et al., 2018: chap. 1).

On the demand side, mass mobilisation warfare causes high risks or even uncertainty for large parts of the population (Rehm, 2016). This situation not only creates a demand for risk pooling and, in consequence, social insurance (Dryzek and Goodin, 1986) but also changes individual preferences and attitudes. In addition to a greater acceptance of the welfare state (Walter and Emmenegger, 2022), the collapse of financial markets and the loss of household assets in war-torn economies lead to higher preferences for redistribution. Finally, people show more solidarity when they are exposed to existential threats or are facing an uncertain future (Bauer et al., 2016; Frizell et al., 2025).

At the macro-level, industrialised mass warfare generates social needs of a magnitude that requires state intervention. Belligerent countries need to provide income support to disabled veterans, dependents of killed servicemen and war refugees. Veterans also need healthcare and assistance for successful reintegration into society and labour markets. This included, at least for a transition period, the provision of unemployment benefits, housing, education and training. Acts of war on the homeland also have a tremendous impact on the economy. Destruction of production sites and infrastructure, military demobilisation, lay-offs in the munitions industry and shortages of raw materials cause unemployment and poverty at the end of war. In addition, war is a breeding ground for rampant diseases or even pandemics and has a devastating impact on demographics. The decline in birth rates, rising infant mortality and the death of hundred thousands of procreative young men in combat often align with pro-natalist population policies (Obinger and Schmitt, 2024).

Seen from a functionalist perspective, governments cannot neglect these tremendous social needs and are therefore under pressure to expand the welfare state, not least in order to safeguard social peace and political stability. This is facilitated by war-induced transformations in the economy and politics that strengthen the state’s capacity to act. These supply-side transformations are related to the fact that waging a large-scale war requires organisation and funding. What therefore typically can be observed in belligerent countries in wartime is the centralisation of government, the build-up of administrative capacities such as the establishment of welfare ministries, or the introduction and raising of taxes (Petersen et al., 2023; Porter, 1994; Scheve and Stasavage, 2010). These changes not only generate the institutional and fiscal means necessary for maintaining the war machinery and the overall war effort but also allow governments to respond to the tremendous social needs generated by the horrors of war. Typically, this happens immediately after the end of military conflict when military spending plummets (Obinger and Schmitt, 2020). Moreover, many of these war-induced transformations (e.g., higher taxation, centralisation and enhanced state capacities) are not reversed after the end of military conflict (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; Scheve and Stasavage 2010).

To summarise our argument: We contend that right-wing autocracies only have an incentive to provide welfare benefits to groups and professions that are important for state-building and regime stability. Only exogenous shocks and challenges such as an interstate war or a credible revolutionary threat motivate and force autocracies to extend social protection to broader segments of the population. Furthermore, authoritarian governments have to respond to the devastating social and economic impacts of wars and the key motivation to do so is to preserve regime stability and to secure mass compliance for the overall war effort. In the following sections, we will empirically examine this hypothesis for the Bulgarian case in chronological order.

War of independence and the Serbo-Bulgarian War

The Bulgarian state was created as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. Under the provisional peace treaty of San Stefano (1878), Bulgaria was to be established within ethnic borders. The creation of a large Bulgarian nation-state, however, was met with resistance from the European Great Powers (Britain, Austria, Germany, Russia and France), resulting in a revision of the peace treaty at the Berlin Congress in 1878 and the creation of a small Bulgarian vassal principality. ³ The creation of a large Bulgaria, also called the national question, became the primary goal of the newly created state from the very beginning of its political existence. Domestic policy was largely devoted to the acquisition of material and military resources for this purpose (Daskalov, 2005a: 183–184). In an effort to resolve the ‘national question’, Bulgaria was involved in five military conflicts in the following decades.

At the time of its foundation, Bulgaria was a predominantly agricultural country. About three-quarters of the working population were employed in agriculture and the land was almost exclusively owned by small peasant proprietors (Crampton, 2007: 282). Only around 20% of the total population lived in cities and industry was virtually non-existent (Daskalov, 2005b: 10; Lampe, 1986: 22). In 1879, Bulgaria adopted a very liberal constitution based on the Belgian model (Daskalov, 2005a: 27). The so-called Tarnovo Constitution (1879), declared the Principality (since 1908 Kingdom) of Bulgaria a hereditary and constitutional monarchy with a representative parliament, called the National Assembly. The constitution granted the population a wide range of civil and political rights, including male universal suffrage, freedom of speech, of press and of association; it also prescribed universal education and compulsory military service (Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006: 15; Crampton, 2007: 99).

During the first years after state formation, various state institutions and the means for national defence were established. Military expenditure was the biggest spending item, with about one third of the state budget allocated to the formation of the army (Popov, 1916: 432–433), which was indispensable for the future solution of the ‘national question’ (Daskalov, 2005a: 127). The process of state-building took place against a background of political instability as well as efforts to modernise the country. In 1881, the first Bulgarian prince, Alexander of Batemberg, staged a coup d’état, suspended the constitution and imposed a so-called personal regime. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria was united with Eastern Rumelia, which caused the outbreak of the Serbo-Bulgarian War. In 1886, pro-Russian officers forced the prince to abdicate. One year later, Ferdinand I became the new prince but was recognised neither by Russia nor by the Great Powers, resulting in domestic political polarisation. Between 1887 and 1894, the liberal politician Stefan Stambolov, an important figure in the national liberation movement, headed the government (Crampton, 1987; Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006). In the mid-1890s, however, Ferdinand I disempowered Stambolov, imposed his own personal regime and eventually adopted the title of Tsar in 1908.

Loyalty benefits for veterans and soldiers

Already in 1880, Bulgaria introduced tax-funded public pensions and other welfare benefits for needy, wounded and disabled veterans of the Russo-Turkish War of Independence (1877–1878) and participants in the national liberation movement. ⁴ The Act on State Support for the Fighters of the Liberation Movements and Their Heirs was one of the first bills passed by the newly founded National Assembly and its adoption was triggered by patriotic considerations and numerous requests for state support from these groups. ⁵ The Act provided support to impoverished veterans, granting them preferential treatment in the allocation of public offices, or land and a lump sum of financial support, or a state pension. ⁶

Also in 1880, invalidity benefits for civil servants and members of the military were introduced. The Invalidity Act was drafted by the Ministry of War and submitted to the National Assembly together with the bill to introduce compulsory military service. ⁷ The bill provided invalidity pensions (including survivors’ pension) or invalidity allowances to employees in public service who became permanently or temporarily unable to work due to a work injury or illness. ⁸

Several years later, the Serbo-Bulgarian War demonstrated that the benefits granted by the Invalidity Act were inadequate. Over the course of the brief war (November 1885), Bulgaria mobilised 100,000 soldiers, equivalent to about 3.6% of the country’s total population, and suffered losses of about 700 dead and 4500 wounded (Daskalov, 2005a: 141; Konstantinov, 2014: 16; Huhn, 1886: 44–46). As the benefits provided under the Invalidity Act of 1880 did not ensure adequate support for war victims and their families, a new bill, the Military Invalidity Pension Act, was submitted to Parliament by the War Ministry with the following justification:

In all well-established armies we see a whole series of measures aimed in one way or another at securing the existence of those soldiers who, through their self-sacrifice and the honest fulfilment of their duty to the fatherland, have deprived themselves of the possibility of earning their living through their own work. [...] There is no doubt that the soldier who knows that he will be provided for by the government in case of serious wounding or mutilation will always fight more selflessly than the one who, after being wounded, is left only with the prospect of starving and earning his daily bread in a most degrading manner. ⁹

The law was passed unanimously and significantly increased pension benefits compared to the legislation of 1880, while also extending entitlement to survivors’ pensions. ¹⁰ In order to provide adequate protection to the victims of the Serbian-Bulgarian War, the law came into force retroactively in the summer of 1886. ¹¹

State- and nation-building: The emergence of pension insurance

The introduction of compulsory pension insurance for particular professions during the reign of Prime Minister Stambolov was an exercise in state- and nation-building and helped to stabilise the regime in times of political instability. Old-age pensions were provided to professions highly relevant for building an effective and powerful modern state and strengthening national identity and patriotism. Key professions in this respect were teachers, civil servants, priests and the military. At the same time, pensions are a powerful vehicle to secure long-term support from critical groups (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017) and to recruit personnel for the state.

In 1888, just a decade after the founding of the new state, the Teachers’ Pension Act was enacted. Under this mandatory scheme, teachers became the first profession entitled to old-age, invalidity and survivors’ pensions. ¹² The Act was drafted by the Ministry of Education and submitted to Parliament with the following justification:

It is the duty of all Bulgarians, and especially of those entrusted with public and state affairs, to be grateful to those of their fellow citizens who have worked for the revival and enlightenment of the nation. [...] Of all the servants of the nation, the teachers are the most neglected, those who are the architects of the foundation on which the future of the nation is built. […] But unfortunately, in our country, not much attention is paid to this important issue, [and as a result,] hundreds of teachers and their families suffer, […] and at the same time our entire education system. ¹³

Even though teachers made a significant contribution to preserving the identity of the Bulgarian nation within the Ottoman Empire during the period of national revival, their material situation deteriorated considerably after the establishment of the new nation-state (Enicharova, 2019: 9; Daskalov, 2005b: 381). The introduction of pension insurance for teachers was a vehicle for improving the education system in an effort to expedite modernisation. Moreover, patriotic education, promoting a common language and rolling back illiteracy, was of key importance for nation-building. Pension reform was accompanied by the adoption of a comprehensive education reform in 1891 and a massive increase in public investment in education (Kumanov, 2018: 192–194; Enicharova, 2019: 8; Mitova et al., 2004).

With the adoption of the Priests’ Pension Act in 1889, ¹⁴ the clergy became the second profession entitled to old-age pensions. The Act was passed in the midst of a deep crisis between the newly created state and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. During the period of national revival, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church had been a central political authority in Bulgarian society, a kind of ‘proto-state’, fulfilling many tasks that were later transferred to the state (Petkov, 2015: 11). With the establishment of the Bulgarian principality, the role of the Church changed fundamentally, as it was displaced from its leading position in society and politics and left in a precarious material situation (Sazdov, 2008: 91; Petkov, 2007: 5). During the term of Stefan Stambolov, the state-church conflict reached a critical dimension (Daskalov, 2005b: 446; Petkov, 1994: 65–69; Crampton, 2007: 136). In the long run, however, the state could not afford to have such a strong enemy as the Church, which was a key institution of national identity. The Priests’ Pensions Act was passed as part of a series of measures aimed at resolving the conflict between the monarchist state and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

In the following 2 years, the Stambolov government extended pension insurance to members of the military and civil servants. The Military Pension Act ¹⁵ was passed in 1890, and given the enormous importance of the army in a war-torn region and for resolving the ‘national question’ it granted members of the military far more generous pension benefits than teachers and priests. Inspired by German, Austrian and Serbian legislation, the law provided retirement pensions for officers, military doctors and civil servants in the military department. ¹⁶ The introduction of old-age pensions was intended to increase the number of reserve officers and retain a young cadre of officers in the army, an essential prerequisite for the creation of a mass army, which became a priority after the outbreak of the Serbo-Bulgarian War and Ferdinand’s accession to the throne (Daskalov, 2005a: 121).

The next step was the passing of the Civil Servants’ Pension Act in 1891. ¹⁷ The introduction of this law was long overdue, as the constitution of 1879 had enshrined the right to a pension for civil servants. However, the first attempts to implement pensions failed ¹⁸ and it was the Stambolov government that eventually introduced this programme. The establishment of the pension fund for civil servants marked the end of the first phase of welfare state development in Bulgaria. This period saw the creation of an occupation-based pension system with a hierarchical order, whereby the military was the most privileged group in terms of eligibility requirements, pension benefits and state co-financing of pension provision, followed by civil servants, teachers and priests.

Balkan Wars and World War I

At the beginning of the 20^th century, Bulgaria already had modern state institutions, legislation and national armed forces; strategic infrastructure had been created and the tax system inherited from the Ottoman Empire had been reformed (Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006; Daskalov, 2005a; Crampton 1987; Brussarski 2021). The first decade of the century was marked by intense preparations for war, with large-scale military rearmament taking place 1901–1909. During this period, military expenditure remained the largest item in the state budget, accounting for more than 20% of public spending (Popov, 1916: 432; Daskalov, 2005a: 128). Foreign loans were the main source of financing military build-up, causing a huge increase in public debt – by 1912, it was already almost four times as high as the state budget (Daskalov, 2005a: 398).

Between 1912 and 1918, Bulgaria became involved in three military conflicts. In 1912, Bulgaria fought in the First Balkan War as a member of the Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire, mobilising more than 600,000 soldiers, i.e., 62% of the male population aged 19–50 (Daskalov, 2005a: 141). The Second Balkan War (1913), in which Bulgaria fought on four fronts against its former allies in the Balkan League plus Romania and the Ottoman Empire, ended in “the first national catastrophe”. Around a quarter of the mobilised soldiers were killed or wounded, tens of thousands of civilians died from epidemics, the country suffered enormous economic damage and lost strategically important territories (Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006: 285–287). In 1915, Bulgaria entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers to reconquer the lost territories. Between 1915 and 1918, the country mobilised a total of 857,063 men, equivalent to 86% of the male population aged 19–50 – one of the highest proportions of all the belligerents (Cankov, 1921: 38; Crampton, 1987: 73; Daskalov, 2005a: 141). The balance of the war was devastating. Almost all men of working age were drafted, a total of 101,240 were killed and 150,000 wounded (Dimitrova, 2018: 139). In addition, hundreds of thousands of refugees poured into the country from the lost territories in Macedonia and Thrace (Lampe, 1986: 49). Bulgaria’s defeat, which became known as the “second national catastrophe”, forced Ferdinand I to abdicate in October 1918 in favour of his son Boris who reigned as Tsar Boris III between 1918 and 1943. After the signing of the Peace Treaty of Neuilly in 1919, Bulgaria was internationally isolated, lost important territories and had to pay enormous reparations. This further exacerbated the economic, financial and social crisis caused by the wars and contributed significantly to the political radicalisation and instability that culminated in two military coups in the interwar period (see Crampton, 2003, 2007).

Compensating soldiers: War-related social legislation during World War I

During the Balkan Wars, no special wartime welfare legislation was enacted in Bulgaria. Poverty, high mortality rates and a deteriorating standard of living were the disastrous consequences. The number of deaths from epidemics and diseases among soldiers far exceeded the number of fallen servicemen (Dimitrova, 2017: 108; Ânulov, 1941: 74; Daskalov, 2005b: 68). All this was now considered a threat to national defence and political stability. The urgent need to mobilise all resources in World War I marked a turning point in economic and social policy.

In economic terms, World War I provided a strong impetus for the expansion of state control over the economy and for the centralisation of government (Lampe, 1986: 42; Todorov et al., 1981: 300; Daskalov, 2005a: 365). Rising inflation and war-induced shortages of basic consumer goods forced the liberal government of Vasil Radoslavov (1913–1918) to already renounce economic liberalism in the first war year. In August 1914, a special law regulated the price of basic goods (Ânulov, 1941: 11). Further price regulations and export controls were introduced in early 1915, when the government passed the Law on Public Providence ¹⁹ to counter the deteriorating economic situation, which was seen as “a threat to the population and the internal peace of the country”. ²⁰

World War I not only led to massive intrusion of the state into economic affairs but was also a turning point in social policy. During World War I, for the first time in Bulgaria’s history, the state officially took responsibility for providing financial security to the families of soldiers during mobilisation and war. The idea for such legislation initially came from the Socialists. ²¹ After the end of the Balkan Wars, when many soldiers’ families found themselves in dire straits due to a lack of state support, the Socialists began to advocate for public assistance to soldiers’ families. This was reflected in a bill drafted by the Socialist Party (broad) and submitted to Parliament in the second half of 1913; shortly afterward, the Narrow Socialists also submitted a legislative proposal. These proposals served as the basis for the government’s legislation during World War I (Ânulov, 1941: 16–23, 1946: 321, 1924: 157). Faced with the urgent need to maintain domestic peace and sustain the combat spirit of the troops, the government adopted the Law on Support for Soldiers’ Families (1915) at the very first session of Parliament held after entering the war. ²² All dependents of soldiers, including wives and children, parents, grandparents and siblings, were entitled to a lump-sum state allowance provided they were supported by the conscripted person before mobilisation. The allowance was tax-funded and was a completely new approach in that the protection of soldiers’ families was seen as a legal obligation of the state for the first time (Dimitrova, 2017: 107; Ânulov, 1941: 16–19). The law’s intention was to prevent the demoralisation of the troops. Or as the Minister of the Interior put it: The Bulgarian soldier would be “much braver and more self-sacrificing if he knew that the fatherland thinks of and cares for those he leaves behind at home.” ²³

To ensure social peace and a stable home front, the Law on Support for Soldiers’ Families also provided various social services and benefits for the unemployed and poor for the first time as the war caused an increase in unemployment, ²⁴ which was a serious social problem and even led to mass urban riots (Konstantinov, 2014: 139–143). Already before the law’s enactment, a report on the situation of the unemployed by the sub-director of the Labour Office, D. Todorov, recommended income support for the unemployed. He advocated the introduction of unemployment assistance, arguing that the costs should be offset by “increasing national strength” by “not allowing the starving and unemployed to fall victim to disease, epidemics and physical weakness.” He further stressed: “That the health of the nation should be a matter of concern to the state […] is shown by the statistics on the number of young men unfit for military service” (Ministerstvo na t”rgoviâta, promišlenosta i truda, 1918: 822–823). As a result, World War I provided the impetus for the expansion of public welfare, the temporary introduction of unemployment benefits and the establishment of employment offices in Bulgaria.

In 1916 the mortality rate from diseases behind the front increased by almost 6% and even reached 75% in some regions (Dimitrova, 2017: 109–110). The situation was exacerbated by the fact that many doctors were sent to the front “due to the exceptional conditions created by the war”. ²⁵ In consequence, the deterioration in public health became a major concern for the government, leading to the enactment of the Law on People’s Hygiene Councils (1916), which enforced strict hygiene regulations and preventive measures (Ânulov, 1941).

To ensure mass compliance and prevent demoralisation at the front, the government took further measures to promote social peace. In addition to improvements in military pensions (1918), the Wartime Rents Act (1917) and the Act on Employment and Wages of Workers in Private Enterprises in Wartime (1917) were passed. The former regulated landlord-tenant relations for the first time and was submitted to Parliament by the Minister of War with the following justification: “The absence of a law [regulating landlord-tenant relations] in the present exceptional circumstances is causing additional anxiety and worry to soldiers’ families, and this also affects those who are now fighting bravely against the enemies of our country.” As the poor housing conditions in which many military families lived threatened to have “a detrimental effect on the fighting spirit” of soldiers, he considered it “imperative” to take immediate action to legally regulate landlord-tenant relations, “which in turn will minimise soldiers’ concern for their families.” ²⁶ The latter bill introduced important innovations in labour legislation for workers in private enterprises by stipulating that soldiers who had been employed in private companies before mobilisation retained their workplace until after demobilisation and continued to receive half of their salary during military service. Initiated by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour, Z. Bakalov, the law was passed based on the premise that “it will bring not only material benefits to society as a whole, but also greater justice in the relations of a large part of its members.” Additionally, it was intended to “maintain and strengthen the vitality and fighting strength of the nation” and “exert a positive impulse in all directions at the front and in the rear.” ²⁷

Pacifying workers: Labour protection legislation and social insurance during World War I

Bulgaria’s involvement in World War I and the necessity to strengthen social cohesion and solidarity also triggered a change in the perception of the role of the state in regulating labour relations and social security. This led to an unprecedented expansion of labour protection legislation (1917) and the introduction of workers’ social insurance (1918).

Before World War I, labour and social security legislation for workers was quite limited. The first measures date back to the early 20^th century, when the country experienced its first serious urban unrest (Crampton, 1987: 50; Ânulov, 1924). Although the working class was weak in numbers at the time (with some 60,000 wage workers in industry and crafts and more than twice as many in agriculture (Konstantinov, 2014: 70)), Bulgaria had the best organised socialist movement in the Balkans (Cramton, 2007: 188). The Socialists, who had the labour unions under their influence from the outset, systematically exerted pressure on the government to pass labour and social legislation, by means of strikes, petitions, protests, demonstrations, surveys and press releases (Ânulov, 1921, 1924, 1946; Cramton, 2007: 188). Consequently, Bulgaria became the first Balkan state to adopt labour legislation (Daskalov, 2005b: 301). The Women and Children Labour Act (1905) improved working conditions and limited working hours, prohibited child labour under the age of ten and granted women 1 month of maternity leave. Although several social insurance funds were established in 1905/1906, they remained irrelevant in practice, ²⁸ with the exception of the Insurance Fund for Workers in State Enterprises, which provided accident and sickness benefits since 1906. Institutional developments included the establishment of a Labour Inspectorate (1907) and Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Labour (1911). In the pre-war period, the demands of the working class for social security legislation did not materialise, mainly due to resistance from employers (Ânulov, 1921).

It was World War I that crucially accelerated welfare state formation by shifting the balance of power and prompting the ruling elite to make concessions to the working class. In October 1914, the Tsar announced in his speech from the throne that the government intended to pass several long-demanded pieces of legislation for the social protection of workers, including legislation on labour protection and social insurance. ²⁹ A year later, a special law was passed to merge the aforementioned workers’ insurance funds set up in the pre-war period. Under pressure from the Socialists, whose influence on the trade union movement had further grown during the war years, the insurance funds received an annual subsidy from the state budget. This reform, to quote the Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour, Žeko Bakalov, was to enable the country to “introduce almost all types of social insurance in the future without significant social disruptions and unbearable burdens on the state budget and employees and employers.” In his opinion that “should be the guiding principle of a forward-looking social policy of the modern state.” ³⁰ He argued that this reform was just a first step in a series of social reforms to be implemented in the near future to achieve “harmony between labour and capital” through “state intervention to solve the social question” and thus “eliminate as far as possible all the distortions that have led to disasters in industrialised countries.” ³¹

And indeed, in the final years of the war, major social reforms that had long been demanded by the labour movement but persistently rejected by employers were adopted. Of particular importance were the Occupational Hygiene and Safety Act (1917) ³² and the Workers’ Accident and Sickness Insurance Act (1918). ³³ The former, as stated by Minister Bakalov, aimed to “create harmony in the protection of capital and labour” ³⁴ by improving working conditions for workers, regulating working hours and night work and raising the minimum age for children to work in factories to 12 years. The law also extended maternity leave to 8 weeks, during which women received half their wages. It also established the Supreme Labour Council as an advisory body for the implementation of social policy in the country. The Workers’ Accident and Sickness Insurance Act introduced compulsory accident and health insurance for all workers in public and private enterprises. Its adoption was declared “an act of supreme state foresight”, which “paved the way for further social reforms”, which in turn would “facilitate the desired unity between the various interests and the strengthening of the strongly needed social solidarity.” ³⁵

Wartime social reforms accelerated welfare expansion in the interwar period. In 1919, on the recommendation of the Supreme Labour Council and in line with the respective ILO Convention, the eight-hour day was introduced as “an act of political and social foresight” (V”rhoven S”vet na Truda, 1919: 101–107). Workers’ social insurance was improved and the Council recommended the adoption of new, more comprehensive social insurance legislation (V”rhoven S”vet na Truda, 1919: 41–50, 108–116). In 1923, the right-wing Democratic Alliance government took the initiative to expand social insurance to secure working-class loyalty (Ignatova-Pfarr, 2026). Compulsory pension insurance for workers was introduced in 1924, followed a year later by unemployment insurance, resulting in the establishment of a social insurance system covering all major risks as early as 1925.

Social policy during World War II

At the outbreak of World War II, Bulgaria was a right-wing royalist dictatorship (Payne, 1980: 119) ³⁶ under the leadership of Tsar Boris III. This regime had its origins in a military coup in 1934, which ushered in a “new era” in the country’s political life, in which far-reaching reforms were to be implemented to promote economic modernisation and ensure “social harmony” (Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006: 520). The right-wing regime (1934–1944) banned all political parties and restricted civil rights. The trade unions were placed under state control and reorganised according to professional status. The political system was restructured on a corporatist basis to represent the professions into which society was now divided (Crampton, 2003: 126). During the rule of the non-party regime, the main characteristics of Bulgarian society and economy remained almost unaltered. The country remained predominantly rural, agriculture was almost exclusively in the hands of small farmers and dominated the country’s exports (Daskalov, 2005b: 228; Crampton, 2007: 282–298). Industry remained underdeveloped, and contributed only 5.6% to national income in 1938, by far the lowest share in Southeastern Europe (Lampe, 1986: 94).

In the second half of the 1930s, Bulgaria experienced a period of remarkable economic growth, the so-called “golden decade” (Ivanov, 2004). This enabled the state to introduce measures to improve the population’s standard of living. Moreover, public investment in agriculture was increased to boost production and farmers’ income. Agricultural exports were encouraged and trade with Nazi Germany massively increased (Crampton, 1987: 144).

Against the backdrop of growing international tensions in the second half of the 1930s, Boris III declared the modernisation of the army a task of “utmost importance” (Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006: 579). As a result, military spending rose sharply, reaching nearly 29% of the state budget in 1939. ³⁷ At the beginning of World War II, Bulgaria declared its neutrality. In early 1940, the pro-Western Prime Minister Kioseivanov was dismissed and replaced by the pro-German Bogdan Filov. In September 1940, with German military support, Bulgaria regained southern Dobruja through the Treaty of Craiova (Crampton, 2003: 129). On 1 March 1941, Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Tripartite Pact. In 1943, Boris III died suddenly. In September 1944, the Communists, backed by the Red Army, seized power in a coup d’état, marking the beginning of the communist era in Bulgaria (1944–1989).

Although Bulgaria was an ally of the Axis Powers, it was only involved in major combat activities after the communist takeover. Hence, the Bulgarian economy and society suffered less damage than in World War I. For example, the number of deaths (32,000, mainly killed in 1944/1945) was significantly lower, there was no wave of refugees and the decline in the standard of living was less drastic (Lampe, 1986: 124; Statelova and Grʺnčarov, 2006: 611–612). Nevertheless, martial law was imposed and the country mobilised 25% of the male population (Daskalov, 2005a: 149).

Protecting soldiers at the front and civilians in the rear during World War II

Wartime social policy was guided by the principles and legislative measures that had been implemented during World War I. Welfare policies aimed at strengthening national security by improving the protection of war victims, at securing the income of soldiers and their families and at preventing a drastic decline in the people’s standard of living to preserve social peace. In the spring of 1939, just a few months before the outbreak of the war, the government raised military pensions to prevent a deterioration in the standard of living of war victims and at the same time strengthen national defence. ³⁸ This was reflected in the parliamentary debates on the government’s bill. Emphasising the “moral side” of the reform, one MP declared:

Now, when the whole world is frantically arming, when everyone is prepared for possible complications and surprises, when we ourselves decided a few months ago with unprecedented unanimity, enthusiasm and ease to spend billions on arming the national army, we must at this moment fulfil another of our most patriotic and public duties. We have the task of morally arming our people. It is no secret that morale is no less important a factor in arming. Especially for us as a small and poor nation with few material resources that are not sufficient for a real and complete modern armament, morale has played and will continue to play a crucial role on the battlefield. So, it is up to us to arm the morale of the Bulgarians. One of the ways to do this is to provide more support to the victims of war. ³⁹

Three years later, in March 1942, when the government decided to raise military pensions again, the Minister of Finance argued in a similar way:

Through this improvement we want to strengthen the moral virtues of the nation, consolidate the strongest foundations of the state. [...] We must uphold the cult of achievement, the cult of the hero, the cult of self-denial, the cult of selfless service at the altar of the fatherland. This is the duty of every nation. ⁴⁰

In 1940, when the danger of becoming involved in the war increased, a series of preparatory measures were introduced to “ensure the state’s independence and security, and strengthen national defence.” ⁴¹ These included the regulation of landlord-tenant relations as well as employment and wage protection for mobilised soldiers (Ânulov, 1946: 324). The Civilian Mobilisation Act (1940) was passed, which authorised the state to control supply and production (Lampe, 1986: 109) and regulated income support for soldiers’ families (Ânulov, 1941: 72–73).

Expansion of pension insurance and emergence of family policy during World War II

In 1940, Tsar Boris III appealed in his throne speech to “always be in close contact with the people” and to ensure that “all state activities are inspired by the spirit of social justice” (Ânulov, 1940: 1). This declaration signalled a turning point in public policy, as solving the social question became one of the regime’s top priorities. In fact, welfare reforms were an integral part of the Filov government (1940–1944). The ultimate goal of domestic policy was to “create a strong and socially just Bulgarian nation-state in accordance with the principles of the new European order” (Filov, 1942: 5).

The social question featured prominently in the parliamentary debate on the royal speech in December 1940. For example, the Minister of the Interior and Public Health, P. Gabrovski, declared the social question “one of the most important state questions.” ⁴² Its solution, he emphasised, required extensive public intervention. Therefore, the government announced comprehensive social reforms, including the expansion of public pensions and the introduction of measures to “promote the birth rate and support large families.” ⁴³ The government’s reform agenda sought to “further strengthen the Bulgarian state, make it powerful, just and organised so that it [. …] is capable of coping with the challenges of modern life and the extraordinary times.” ⁴⁴ In addition, public policy was intended to “strengthen national unity and develop a common Bulgarian solidarity based on justice, especially social justice.” ⁴⁵

In the following years, public pension provision was reorganised and expanded. The Miners’ Pension Act (1940) ⁴⁶ and the White-Collar Workers’ Pension Act (1941) ⁴⁷ relaxed eligibility requirements and provided more generous pension benefits. In 1941, an Institute for Public Insurance was established. ⁴⁸ Moreover, between 1941 and 1943, compulsory pension insurance was extended to artisans (1941), ⁴⁹ farmers (1941), ⁵⁰ and merchants (1943). ⁵¹

The Peasants’ Pension Act was undoubtedly the most important welfare reform of the Filov government. The law was passed just 2 weeks before Bulgaria entered the war, in the midst of a profound government crisis caused by the accession to the Tripartite Pact. Originally planned as a voluntary pension scheme, it was eventually made compulsory to satisfy farmers’ demands (Filov, 1990: 250). Farmers were entitled to an old-age pension at the age of 60, with pension benefits granted from 1 January 1942. In contrast to all other pension programmes in the country, the farmers’ pension scheme was mainly financed by the state, which illustrates the enormous importance that the royalist government attached to farmers as the backbone of the Bulgarian economy and society. As the parliamentary debates reveal, the adoption of this law was of strategic importance to the regime: “The state interest demands, the national interest and the international situation demand that domestic, social and economic peace come to the Bulgarian village as soon as possible, that there be no unrest and that cohesion and unity finally be achieved, [since] if we have internal unity, cohesion and peace, we can also be strong and authoritative externally.” ⁵² At the same time, the new pension legislation was intended to bind the peasantry to the authoritarian state and strengthen national defence: “National defence is not only what is in the barracks […] national defence is the village, 85% of the Bulgarian nation. If we bind the village to the state, if we secure its support for the ideas of the current non-party government, then we will have 100% secured national defence.” ⁵³ Another MP pointed out:

The Bulgarian peasant, if we arm him morally, he remains internally and externally a granite fortress of the Bulgarian spirit and the Bulgarian state. [...] That is why, if we morally arm these people with this legislation, we will achieve a brilliant result. The nation spends billions to equip its army. Why shouldn’t we spend not billions but millions to secure the other factor of national defence – the man? It is not enough for a nation to have only tanks and planes, bayonets and machine guns, grenades and bullets. There must be someone to throw the grenades, someone to fire the bullets, someone to fly the planes, someone to carry out the orders of the command instantly. This we can achieve by strengthening the spirit of the nation. ⁵⁴

The war years also witnessed the adoption of pro-natalist legislation for the first time. In the mid-1920s, the birth rate in Bulgaria gradually declined due to demographic change, while infant mortality remained very high (Ânulov, 1943: 40–42). Between 1924 and 1944 the birth rate fell by almost 50%, so that the country recorded the lowest reproduction rate in Southeastern Europe (Konstantinov, 2006: 303; Lampe, 1986: 1986). In late 1930s, low birth rates and the looming danger of a new war triggered a public debate on pronatalism (Baloucova, 2011: 141–142). Reflecting growing authoritarian and nationalist tendencies across Europe, population decline was seen as a threat to the future of the nation, its survival and national security, thus requiring legislative measures to promote population growth. Demographic, social and nationalist arguments became increasingly intertwined, and in parliamentary and public discourse the family was portrayed as a symbol of the state and ideologically framed as the “basic cell of society” (Baloucova, 2011: 157). In this respect, the Bulgarian debate reflected broader European concerns about demographic decline and national strength during the interwar period. The pro-natalist measures adopted in Bulgaria during the late 1930s showed notable similarities to policies introduced in contemporary fascist regimes, particularly in Italy and Germany, where family policy was likewise closely linked to demographic, national and military objectives (Obinger and Schmitt, 2024). ⁵⁵

The government initially focused on measures to improve the health of mothers and children. In 1940, universal and free medical care was introduced for women during pregnancy and after childbirth and for children up to pre-school age. ⁵⁶ In 1941, when Bulgaria joined the Axis powers, family allowances for civil servants were introduced. The Law for Temporary Wage Increase of State Officials and Temporary Supplementary Family Subsidies (1941) ⁵⁷ and the Law for Improving the Material Status of State, Municipal and Other Employees in the Kingdom (1942) ⁵⁸ granted child allowances to civil servants both within the old state boundaries and in the new Aegean territories occupied in April 1941. The aim was to alleviate the rapidly deteriorating standard of living of public officials and thus promote social peace and the functioning of the state apparatus. Moreover, cash benefits should increase the loyalty of civil servants and encourage Bulgarian settlement in the newly occupied territories (Baloucova, 2010: 89, 2011: 91–94). The Regulations for Workers’ Child Allowances (1942), and the subsequent amendments to this law (1943), extended family allowances to workers in the private sector (Ânulov, 1964: 40–41).

In March 1943, the Law for Large Bulgarian Families ⁵⁹ was introduced to encourage marriages and births by granting various privileges to large families (families with four or more children) such as tax breaks, preferential treatment in land distribution and health care, symbolic honours for mothers. While previously only civil servants and workers received family benefits, the new bill introduced means-tested and tax-funded child allowances for all Bulgarian families with more than three children up to the age of five. According to the official justification of the bill, the “promotion, preservation and support of healthy and large Bulgarian families” was considered a task “of crucial importance for the future of the Bulgarian nation.” The main purpose of the law was therefore “to encourage marriages and births and, above all, to support large Bulgarian families.” ⁶⁰

In essence, Bulgaria’s pro-natalist policies (1941–1943) represented a nationalist response to population decline, aimed at promoting national strength by boosting the population size in the face of the threat of war. Measures such as family support for marriage and childbirth, financial incentives (e.g., family allowances, tax breaks, affordable medical care, housing entitlements and loan relief for births) and symbolic honours were used, modelled on fascist policies to promote population growth for war purposes.

Conclusion

Previous research on the impact of war on social policy has largely overlooked Southern and Eastern Europe. Addressing this gap, this article examined how wars shaped the development of social policy in Bulgaria. Despite unfavourable conditions in this very poor, peripheral country, which was authoritarian-ruled by the political right until 1944, Bulgaria was not a laggard in social policy from a comparative perspective. Drawing on extensive primary and secondary sources, we showed that military conflicts were a key driver of the emergence and expansion of public social policy in Bulgaria.

As in many other states, state formation was the result of war, and veterans of the war of independence were the first social group to receive public social benefits. After state formation, the construction of a modern state apparatus, regime consolidation, nation-building in domestic politics and the resolution of the national question in foreign policy became key political priorities. Occupational groups relevant to achieving these goals were early on provided with social protection by the authoritarian state. Specifically, pension benefits were granted to members of the military, civil servants, teachers and priests whose loyalty was required for the stability of the authoritarian regime, as they were crucial for building a modern and powerful state apparatus and for promoting nation-building. This pattern of favouring regime-relevant professions or social groups with public pensions is consistent with recent research on social policy in autocracies (Grünewald 2021; Knutsen and Rasmussen 2017).

It was only with the military mass mobilisation during the wars of the 20^th century that social policy was expanded to broader segments of the population. The country’s heavy involvement in World War I and the autocratic regime’s need to ensure social peace and mobilise society for the war effort provided a strong impetus for the expansion of state capacities and state control over the economy, as well as for the introduction of various welfare measures to support soldiers and their families, the unemployed and the poor. Moreover, World War I marked a turning point in workers’ social security, as the authoritarian government had to make concessions to the small but radicalised working class by introducing labour protection legislation (1917) and compulsory health and accident insurance (1918). While the working class was insignificant in the late 19^th century due to the country’s late modernisation, it became a threat to the regime during the First World War, especially as this war and the Russian revolution had radicalised the labour movement.

World War II also had a profound impact on the development of Bulgaria’s social security system. Against the backdrop of the challenging war situation and to maintain internal stability and national security, the autocratic government headed by Bogdan Filov implemented major social reforms between 1939 and 1943. These included improvements in pension provision for members of the military and the extension of pension insurance to broad sections of the population, above all to farmers who were the backbone of the quasi-fascist regime. Moreover, and much in line with the policies adopted in fascist countries abroad, the right-wing government introduced family allowances and promoted pro-natalist policies.

Overall, this study showed that interstate war has also been a catalyst for welfare state expansion in Eastern Europe. The finding that the warfare-welfare nexus is not only relevant in industrialised countries but also in a less economically developed country such as Bulgaria, where welfare reform is rather unlikely, underscores the transformative impact of mass warfare on social policy. Another important finding is that the push-effect of interstate war on social policy occurs independently of regime type.