The risk of impoverishment in urban development-induced displacement and resettlement in Ahmedabad

Abstract

Processes of globalization and neoliberal reforms of local governance in Indian cities have created distinct patterns by reshaping the physical and social landscapes of India’s cities, triggering contestations between the privileged and the dispossessed. This paper addresses the consequences for poor households of mega-urban renewal and infrastructure projects and the processes of displacement and resettlement in Ahmedabad, India. The findings indicate that the displaced poor households have been further impoverished in the course of current practices as a result of limited attention to the risk of impoverishment both in policy and in local government practices. Contrary to the state’s rhetoric of inclusive governance, the urban poor are completely excluded from planning for infrastructure development and resettlement processes, leading to a lack of understanding of their needs by the state and their subsequent impoverishment after resettlement.

I. Introduction

Contemporary urban development and city-making in India have been largely based on the national government’s flagship investment programme, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), India’s largest single infusion of public funds to urban local governments for slum⁽¹⁾ upgrading, transport and other infrastructure. The objectives were both rapid economic growth through large-scale infrastructure projects and the inclusion of the urban poor in economic growth. Within JNNURM, the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) has focused on infrastructure investment through its Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) programme; the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MHUPA) focused on the integrated development of slums through the Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP) programme. However, this two-pronged approach belies a strategy of deliberate confusion and the dispersion of accountability and responsibility.⁽²⁾

Under the UIG programme, city morphology and functions were being altered by forced land acquisition for infrastructure projects such as road widening, the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS), flyovers, and waterfront-based development, causing large-scale displacement of poor households living in informal self-built neighbourhoods, as witnessed in all major cities⁽³⁾ including New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, Visakhapatnam and ironically also Kolkata.⁽⁴⁾ Displaced households that could prove their “eligibility” in theory got compensatory shelter, mainly under BSUP; others were left to fend for themselves. “Eligibility” criteria are based on state-approved documentary residence proof for an arbitrary cut-off date that varies from city to city: in Delhi 1998; in Mumbai 1995; while Ahmedabad set two cut-off dates, 1976 and 2002, for two categories of project-affected people.

Contrary to JNNURM rhetoric, limited space and resources have been allocated for the urban poor.⁽⁵⁾ BSUP resettlement projects are often implemented in the city peripheries, distant from peoples’ workplaces, schools and hospitals, and thus not meeting the criteria of adequate shelter.⁽⁶⁾ Contrary to the objective of providing in situ basic services to poor households, in most cities BSUP projects have funded off-site rehabilitation housing for project-affected people whose replacement housing should have been budgeted for within the profit-making projects that displaced them, thereby depriving the intended urban poor beneficiaries of outreach.⁽⁷⁾ The Final Monitoring Report for JNNRUM indicates the ineffectiveness of BSUP,⁽⁸⁾ showing that only 52 per cent of the almost one million approved dwelling units were constructed and only 36 per cent of those approved were actually occupied. A low level of occupancy, attributed to the isolated and inhospitable locations of BSUP housing projects, is reported across all the cities, including Bengaluru (43 per cent occupancy) and Greater Hyderabad (10 per cent occupancy).⁽⁹⁾

Within this context this paper examines the consequences of the nexus between urban renewal projects and new local governance arrangements and the processes of the displacement and resettlement of poor households under BSUP as it occurred in Ahmedabad, India. Though BSUP will come to a close in April 2015, it paved the way for Rajiv Awas Yojna (RAY) in 2013, which is again a central government-subsidized programme for provision of housing, improvement of basic civic infrastructure and social amenities in situ or in relocated slum sites. The lessons from BSUP should contribute towards restructuring of RAY so that better outcomes can be achieved.

II. Understanding Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement In India

The state generally rationalizes concerns around large infrastructure development with rhetoric about the greater good, maintaining that the rehabilitation of the displaced to prior levels of wellbeing can be achieved, thereby justifying avoidable ills. Critics of displacement posit that those displaced are inevitably exposed to multiple impoverishments, and many researchers have demonstrated social, economic and cultural consequences, raising issues of social justice and equity.⁽¹⁰⁾ Displacement in developing countries mostly affects people living below the poverty line, rendering the poor even more impoverished.⁽¹¹⁾

Cernea proposes eight interlinked forms of impoverishment (landlessness, homelessness, joblessness, marginalization, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, morbidity and mortality, and social disarticulation) in his Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model.⁽¹²⁾ These have been empirically reconfirmed in the past two decades,⁽¹³⁾ largely in the context of rural displacements. Other forms have also been identified, including psychological marginalization⁽¹⁴⁾ and loss of access to services,⁽¹⁵⁾ schooling⁽¹⁶⁾ and civil rights.⁽¹⁷⁾ “Impoverishment” is defined by Cernea to refer to situations in which people’s welfare and livelihoods worsen as a result of a specific intervention; and “risk” as the possibility that adverse effects such as losses, destruction, functionally counterproductive impacts, and deprivations of future generations will be triggered.⁽¹⁸⁾ Impoverishment risks, he argues, can be controlled through a policy response that mandates participation of potentially affected communities from the onset.⁽¹⁹⁾ Dysfunctional communication between decision-makers and affected communities and the consequent lack of understanding of the latter’s needs and aspirations have been emphasized as the key cause of resettlement failure and impoverishment of displacees.⁽²⁰⁾

Most studies on development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) have used Cernea’s framework in the context of rural displacement. Research on urban DIDR, relatively unstudied⁽²¹⁾ until the last decade, is currently emerging, especially in the Indian context, in three areas: governance aspects and displacement processes, the implications of resettlement for displacees, and both of these topics in the specific context of JNNURM and BSUP.

Most of this research focuses on displacement processes and governance. Ramanathan discusses the role of the judiciary in effecting large-scale demolitions and displacement of urban poor in the process of “cleaning up” Delhi and also in the emerging notion of “illegality” of slums.⁽²²⁾ Desai discusses how authorities in Ahmedabad officially represented their urban mega-project as inclusive despite profoundly disregarding issues of social justice.⁽²³⁾ Dupont discusses the creation of new squatters and densification of existing slums after displacements in Delhi.⁽²⁴⁾ A small body of research is emerging related to the implications for those displaced. The research of the Society for the Promotion of Area Resources Centres (SPARC) on Mumbai, where about 60,000 people living along railway tracks were resettled to a site about four stations away, describes this as a successful resettlement that did not impoverish the displaced.⁽²⁵⁾ The research attributes the success to the realignment of roles among state agencies, NGOs and the community, with the latter fully involved in designing, implementing and managing the resettlement. However, this case is exceptional; most evidence from Indian cities points to the negative consequences of displacement. Menon-Sen and Bhan’s New Delhi research indicates how eviction and resettlement related to the Commonwealth Games eroded the rights and undermined the livelihoods of 3,000 resettled families, marooning them in a distant site and leaving them in a state of “permanent poverty”.⁽²⁶⁾ HRLN’s compiled evidence from many Indian cities points to demolition sprees and de-housing of the urban poor under various mega-infrastructure projects with minimal support for the displaced poor.⁽²⁷⁾ The extent of the impact is not indicated in qualitative or quantitative terms.

Both the governance aspects of displacement processes and the implications for the urban poor are increasingly discussed in the context of JNNURM and BSUP. Research shows that, although large-scale displacements are evident across Indian cities, only “meagre” rehabilitation has occurred since JNNURM began,⁽²⁸⁾ largely through BSUP. In the absence of appropriate guidelines in most cities, BSUP has been implemented through off-site rehabilitation projects in isolated city peripheries, resulting in poor access to jobs and amenities. Through extensive research on BSUP implementation in 11 cities, Patel indicates increased impoverishment of the poor emerging from the exclusion of slum dwellers in design, planning and decision-making.⁽²⁹⁾

III. Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement In Ahmedabad

Adding to this emerging body of research on urban DIDR in India, this paper considers the consequences in Ahmedabad of various projects that caused major displacement and resettlement, mainly under JNNURM and BSUP. We specifically seek to answer three questions.

1. Are the poor further impoverished after resettlement?

2. Are there gaps in policy pertaining to impoverishment risks? And where policy exists, are there gaps between policy rhetoric and the reality of practice by local government?

3. Was there effective community participation in critical decisions related to displacement and resettlement in Ahmedabad?

a. Background

Ahmedabad has a legacy of Gandhian values, a strong economic base of textile industries (until their collapse in the mid-1980s), and vigorous civil society organizations (CSOs), initiated by Gandhi through establishment of the Textile Labour Association. For many years, Ahmedabad nurtured inclusive and peaceful development, with a local government functioning as a welfare state in collaboration with CSOs. Two important products of the partnership were the Slum Networking Programme (SNP), focused on in situ upgrading of slums and granting of de facto tenure rights,⁽³⁰⁾ and the Nirmal Gujarat Sanitation Plan, focused on large-scale provision of basic services to the poor at rates much higher than in other cities of India.⁽³¹⁾ This history stands in sharp contrast to Ahmedabad’s response to globalization and neoliberal reforms since 2000, with rapid economic growth, large-scale infrastructure projects, the consequent displacement of the urban poor from prime locations in the city, and the infringement of social justice. The communal riots of 2002 between the two major communities, Hindus and Muslims, formed a significant part of this remaking of the city. They were the result of a perceived threat of invasion of the Muslim “other” in the city’s life spaces, shrinking rapidly under the effects of globalization and collapse of the textile industry.⁽³²⁾ As a consequence, the first large-scale displacement was of Muslim families in 2002–03 from the riot-affected areas in the city core to other parts of the city.⁽³³⁾

Simultaneously, Ahmedabad’s vision of being a world-class city paved the way for many iconic urban renewal projects such as the Sabarmati River Front Development (SRFD), the Kankaria Lakefront Development (Figure 1A and Figure 1B), the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS), flyovers, road projects, and reclamation of public reservations inhabited by the urban poor. Such projects have caused large-scale displacement of the urban poor to the city’s periphery. Estimates are that about 28,000 houses in 47 slums were demolished from 2003 to 2010, followed by another 1,000 houses from 20 slums along the Sabarmati riverfront in May 2011.⁽³⁴⁾

Figure 1A and Figure 1B

Satellite images of 2001 and 2010 showing a slum displacement under the Kankaria Lakefront Development, Ahmedabad

The first resettlement allotment⁽³⁵⁾ was offered only in 2005 on a site and services area on the outskirts of the city, adjacent to the city’s solid waste disposal site. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) claimed that permanent arrangements would be provided within 18 months,⁽³⁶⁾ but many households continued to reside on the interim site seven years after their resettlement.

Though labelled a “site and services option”,⁽³⁷⁾ the site was undeveloped and had only a few common water taps and a block of common-use toilets. BSUP construction commenced in 2007, and in 2009 the first dwelling units were allotted to SRFD project-affected people by order of the high court of Gujarat. Desai explains that the AMC implemented eviction and resettlement in such a fragmentary manner in order to limit community mobilization and resistance and consequent judicial intervention.⁽³⁸⁾

b. Methods

The study collected and analysed primary and secondary data on policy and the effects of DIDR on affected households. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key AMC personnel and civil society actors; and the BSUP guidelines, BSUP project appraisal toolkit and report, SRFD master plan, and media reports were analysed as sources to construct the official “claims”. We analysed the master plan of SRFD, as it caused major displacements (Table 1), and BSUP policy as it is relevant to resettlement. Because data on actual resettlement of displaced households were not publicly available when research commenced in May 2011, we conducted a household survey from June to August 2011 using a two-step process. Of 28,000 households displaced from 2003 to 2010, 3,275 were identified as resettled on BSUP sites and 609 on the interim resettlement site at Piplaj. From an additional 1,000 houses demolished in May 2011, only 670 households could be traced. Four categories of resettlement emerged: direct resettlement in a BSUP dwelling unit, resettlement in a BSUP dwelling unit after a short stay on the interim site, prolonged stay on the interim site, and no resettlement, with households continuing to reside on demolished slum sites in makeshift shelters. To estimate impoverishment amongst displacees in the four categories, a stratified random survey (10 per cent sample size or 396 households) was conducted (Table 2), with displacees on each site stratified according to their departure slum sites (Figure 2). One house was randomly identified as a starting point for the survey; thereafter every third house in each sub-stratum was selected.

Table 1

Projects that caused displacement

	Distribution (%)	No. of Hhs (in sample)
Total households (Hhs)	100%	396
Hhs displaced under SRFD	61%	241
Hhs displaced under Karnakia Lakefront Development	19%	77
Hhs displaced under BRTS	18%	71
Hhs displaced under development plan road widening	2%	7

Table 2

Sample framework (from primary reconnaissance survey, June 2011)

Site	Dwellings/plots constructed	Dwellings allotted	Dwellings occupied	Sample no. (10%)
A. Direct resettlement on BSUP site
BSUP Bag-e-Firdosh	672	472	459	46
BSUP Isanpur	384	197	172	17
BSUP Odhav	320	164	121	12
BSUP Rakhial	704	479	422	42
BSUP Vadaj	576	465	395	39
BSUP Vatva	2,768	674	533	52
Subtotal for A	5,424	2,451	2,102	208
B. Resettlement on BSUP site from interim site
BSUP Vatva	2,224	824	615	61
Subtotal (A+B)	7,648	3,275	2,717	269
C. Long-duration resettlement on interim site
Interim site	1,500		609	60
D. No resettlement: continued residence on demolished site
Demolished site			670	67
Total (A+B+C+D)			3,996	396

Figure 2

Displacement and resettlement patterns on interim and permanent (BSUP) sites and sample distribution

For indicators to assess impoverishment, Cernea’s impoverishment risks were reinterpreted based on the context of Ahmedabad (Table 3).

Table 3

Specific indicators employed in Ahmedabad, based on Cernea’s impoverishment risks

Impoverishment form	Specific indicators
Landlessness	Loss of land interpreted as distant relocation leading to increased distances to livelihood, social amenities, marketplace, etc., as well as loss of access to opportunities, etc.
Joblessness	Sustained loss of job
	Loss of working days
	Increased distance to work and associated transport cost
	Increased monthly expenditure as percentage of income
	Increased debt
Homelessness	Loss of assets
	Cost of transporting assets
	Cost of reconstruction on new plot
	Loss of group’s cultural space, resulting in sense of placelessness
Marginalization	Lower socioeconomic status in new location
	Coercive displacement
	Deliberate subjugation of vulnerable groups, i.e. women and minority communities
	Hostility from host community
	Loss of standing in community
Health risk, i.e. food insecurity, morbidity and mortality (health risk interpreted as combination of two categories)	Lack of access to safe drinking water and sewerageInadequate solid waste managementDecreased access to fair price shops (public distribution shops that provide subsidized goods to poor)Decreased access to primary and higher-order health facilities
Loss of access to common facilities, i.e. education and health (common property resources interpreted)	Decreased access to education and health servicesSchool dropout ratio and loss of school attendance daysIncreased distance, travel cost and monthly cost for education vis-à-vis incomeDecreased access to hospitals in emergenciesFragmentation of social unitsDissatisfaction and discord with new communityLoss of community institutionsApplication for transfer to reunite with kinAlienation and abuse of common resources
Social disarticulation

The data related to conditions of beneficiaries before and after resettlement were captured quantitatively and qualitatively in the questionnaire from the recall of the residents. Recall of such quantitative measures as distance, income and loss of assets was triangulated through other means. The recall of qualitative data such as community bonding, feelings of inclusion, etc. was solely based on memory.

To corroborate survey findings, we used semi-structured interviews that involved civil society actors, focus group discussions with the displaced communities, field observations and documentary analysis of media reports, judicial rulings, academic reports and official AMC notices to displacees at various stages of displacement. Field observations were carried out from May to December 2011 on slum sites that were to be displaced, BSUP sites, the interim resettlement site, and still-occupied post-demolition slum sites.

IV. The Gap Between Impoverishment Risks and Policy in DIDR in Ahmedabad

This section discusses our findings related to the gap between policy and the reality of impoverishment. For each form of impoverishment, whether based on Cernea’s framework or a new emergent form, we discuss the policy claims and actual practice as revealed through our survey.

a. Landlessness

Land is the principal foundation for people’s livelihoods, commercial activities, social networks and productive systems, and its expropriation is a principal form of impoverishment and de-capitalization.⁽³⁹⁾ In the urban context, the key importance of land is its location with respect to opportunities for livelihoods, social networks, and amenities for health and education.

Policy: In the BSUP Detailed Project Report (DPR) appraisal checklist, there was a perfunctory reference to relocation distance – “Is the new site in proximity to the original site/work-place?”⁽⁴⁰⁾ However, “proximity” was not clearly defined and remedial measures were not mentioned. The SRFD master plan (1998) underlined the need for a close relationship between places of residence and work, rejected the forced displacements of urban poor in the riverbed to distant sites,⁽⁴¹⁾ and earmarked three relocation sites within three kilometres of the displaced households’ former homes. AMC claimed that “to the extent possible the displaced households are being resettled within the same ward.”⁽⁴²⁾

Reality: Contrary to these claims, Figure 2 reveals that no surveyed household was resettled within the same ward and only 3 per cent were resettled within 3 kilometres of their departure slum. Mean relocation distance varied from 4.63 kilometres (interim site) to 8.77 kilometres (BSUP sites), as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Households displaced twice were subject to a mean of 15 kilometres of displacement from the departure slum over a period of two to six years.

Figure 3

Mean, median and mode of distance of relocation of slum households from departure slums to interim and BSUP sites

Figure 4

Mapping of pattern and distance of relocation of displaced households to interim and BSUP sites

Travel distance to school increased by an average of 1.2 kilometres, and cost increased by 50 per cent. Access to public hospitals was hampered due to increased distance and inadequate access to public transport. Those households that stayed on demolished sites were the worst off and many resorted to begging. Our findings thus show a trend towards greater impoverishment as a result of more distant, off-site resettlement.

There was actually scope for AMC to resettle a large number of displaced households within the same ward or within 3 kilometres as promised. Our analysis shows one BSUP site to be within 4 kilometres of most of the evicted slums. For example, about 164 households from two slums in the west riverbed were relocated early in 2011 to the Odhav BSUP site, 14.5 kilometres away on the eastern periphery of the city, even though two fully built BSUP sites were located within 6 kilometres of these two slums, with over 1,000 unallotted units.

b. Joblessness

Loss of employment, a major issue linked to displacement, can be temporary or sustained. Even those who find employment after relocation may not find jobs matching their skills and former income levels. If the distance and cost of travel to work increases significantly, reduced earnings and higher expenditures may lead to debts and aggravate impoverishment.

Policy: BSUP policy and guidelines did not include support to the displaced on livelihoods or capacity and skill building, but did state that “Convergence of health, education and social security schemes for the urban poor” could be an admissible component within BSUP.⁽⁴³⁾ This implies that existing schemes in a city or state could be supported under BSUP. However, such schemes were not found in any of Ahmedabad’s BSUP sites, pointing to a lack of policy attention to this aspect of impoverishment in Ahmedabad.

Reality: Our survey shows that after dispossession, 14 per cent of workers remained chronically unemployed at the time of the survey and 38 per cent had lost income days, with an average loss of 28 days (Table 4). Households that endured two relocations suffered the most. When relocated to the interim site, 26 per cent were unemployed; when resettled at a BSUP site, after an average of four years, 20 per cent remained chronically unemployed. The inability to find work suiting their skills, loss of clientele in a new location, and the need to spend time for reconstruction and adjustment at the new site were cited as reasons for sustained unemployment. For those who found employment, the distance to work, as noted, increased almost twofold by an average of 3.74 kilometres. Both the interim and BSUP sites are on the city’s periphery, and public transport, in terms of frequency, is inadequate. Many people (average 13 per cent) shifted from cycling and public transport to private forms of motorized travel and the average travel expenditure to work increased by 50 per cent (Table 5). The cumulative effect is that monthly expenditure increased sharply relative to income and savings were rendered negligible. A third of households in the interim site and a quarter in BSUP sites had debts of over US$ 500, and impoverishment had set in.

Table 4

Loss of employment and income days after displacement

	% of workers who lost employment	% of workers who lost income days	Average loss of income days
Interim site	16%	31%	67
BSUP site	10%	53%	22
Interim site (at first)	26%	18%	35
BSUP site (after stay at interim site)	20%	17%	9
Demolished site	5%	30%	25
Overall	14%	38%	28

Table 5

Increase in distance to work and travel to work expenditure after displacement

	Average increase in distance to work (km)	% increase in distance to work	% of work trips shifted to private or motorized mode of transport	% increase in travel expenditure to work
Interim site	4.00	154%	23%	58%
BSUP site	5.14	281%	16%	66.3%
Interim site (at first)	4.16	121%	23%	33.6%
BSUP (after stay at interim site)	0.90	12%	–3%	23%
Demolished site	0.48	22%	0%	21%
Overall	3.74	175%	13%	50%

c. Homelessness

Loss of shelter means loss of physical assets; cost of transporting assets; cost of reconstruction on a new site; increased deprivation of water, sanitation, education and health services; and loss of cultural space and identity, leading to alienation, status deprivation and impoverishment.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Policy: In urban projects that have induced displacement, claims of universal compensation of house for house have not been made and budgeted in the projects, and the resettlement of “eligible” households is therefore offloaded onto BSUP. There is thus a clear gap in policy pertaining to homelessness.

Reality: Not all of those displaced with eligibility documents were allotted BSUP dwelling units or an interim site plot; nor did all allottees have eligibility documents. Such inconsistencies point to possible exclusionary and discriminatory practices. Homelessness was witnessed in two categories: households that endured long stays at the interim site and those that, excluded from resettlement, continued to reside on the demolition site. The former had to construct a new house on the interim site at their own cost; compensation from AMC was less than US$ 100 (Indian rupees (INR) 5,000) against an average cost per household of US$ 1,087 (INR 54,362) (Table 6).⁽⁴⁵⁾ One third of households incurred debts to cover their costs. On the interim site, more than 80 per cent lived in temporary, structurally unsafe shelters (Photo 1A and Photo 1B); most of them previously had a permanent home that they had occupied for 23 years on average.

Table 6

Loss of shelter and associated losses for displacees on the interim site and demolished sites

	% of households with permanent or semi-permanent houses in departure slum	Average value of lost assets (INR)	Average cost of transporting assets (INR)	Average cost of reconstructing on interim/demolished site (INR)	Average total cost (INR)
Interim site	69%	21,449	1,888	31,025	54,362
Demolished site	48%	19,779	0	2,446	22,230
Overall	58%	20,568	891	15,948	-

Photo 1A and Photo 1B

Quality of the interim site and its services and shelter

Displacement to the interim site has also meant increased deprivation of water, sanitation, education and health services. According to a civil rights activist, “The water supply is irregular. Sometimes there is no supply even for two days. Water taps are dirty and contaminated water is being supplied in the area, with no cleanliness.”⁽⁴⁶⁾ For many households that have endured seven years at this interim site, loss of shelter has become sustained rather than transitory impoverishment.

For households that continued to reside on demolished sites, deprivation was even worse; they squatted on open land on or near the demolished site, without permanent shelter or access to water and sanitation. Municipal guards patrolled the sites to prevent re-occupation, adding to feelings of insecurity. The average cost to these households from the loss of assets was US$ 444 (INR 22,230), and they were denied relief compensation for transfer or reconstruction elsewhere.

d. Loss of access to community facilities (education and health)

Access to common property, listed by Cernea, is interpreted in the urban context of Ahmedabad as access to facilities such as public schools, public health centres and public hospitals. Loss of access to such facilities may lead to significant deterioration in the economic and human wellbeing of the resettled.

Policy: Claims of access to lower-order community facilities were perfunctory in the BSUP Detailed Project Report appraisal checklist, which inquired whether provisioning for a community centre, community primary health care centre, primary education centre, parks and open spaces had been made in the BSUP project.⁽⁴⁷⁾ There are no claims in BSUP guidelines regarding access to higher-order community facilities such as public hospitals.

Reality: Our survey shows that a municipal primary school has been constructed near only one BSUP site (Vatva), where about 5,000 dwellings have been constructed. Other smaller BSUP sites managed with only a primary education centre for children up to seven years of age. The interim site, designed for 1,500 households, had only a primary education centre in 2012, a full seven years after it was established. We found that on a few BSUP sites primary education centres were not even fully functional (Table 7). The buildings were constructed according to guidelines, but owing to the lack of personnel or institutional arrangement, services were absent or minimal.

Table 7

Status of community facilities on BSUP sites (primary survey, August 2011)

		Status of amenities
BSUP site	Resident welfare association formed	Primary health centre constructed	Primary health centre functioning	Primary education centre constructed	Primary education centre functioning	Primary school constructed	Primary school functioning
Bag-e-Firdosh	Under process	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Isanpur	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Odhav	Under process	No	No	No	No	No	No
Rakhial	Under process	Yes	Yes (doctor visits for 2 hrs/day )	Yes	Yes	No	No
Vadaj	Under process	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Vatva A	Under process	Yes	Mobile health van	Yes	Yes	Yes (in common for 2 sites)	Yes

Resettlement has a major impact on education (Table 8 and Table 9). After dispossession, 18 per cent of students dropped out of school; an additional 11 per cent lost school attendance, with an average of 94 days lost. Households that relocated twice suffered the most. The increased distance to public schools, lack of adequate access to public transport, and needed funds and time for reconstruction and readjustment to the new site were cited by 80 per cent of households as reasons for chronic or temporary loss of school attendance. Most students who resumed school faced longer travel at much higher expense.

Table 8

School dropouts and loss of school days after dispossession

	% dropouts	% of students who lost school days	Average loss of school days
Interim site	33%	9%	74
BSUP site	18%	11%	97
Interim (at first)	31%	19%	288
BSUP (after stay at interim site)	33%	2%	43
Demolished site	20%	20%	21
Overall	18%	11%	94

Table 9

Increase in distance to school and travel to school expenditure after dispossession

	Average increase in distance to school (km)	% increase in distance to school	% of work trips shifted to private or motorized mode of transport	% increase in travel expenditure to school
Interim site	2.31	199%	15%	13%
BSUP site	1.78	235%	20%	107.3%
Interim (at first)	1.13	87%	33%	51.1%
BSUP (after stay at interim site)	–1.17	–48%	–18.0%	–78%
Overall	1.21	153%	15%	51%

Access to health facilities is similarly poor. Although primary health centres were constructed on almost all occupied BSUP sites, only two were functional; at the other sites mobile health vans were operated by AMC (Table 7). At the interim site a weekly mobile health service was provided only in 2010 following civil society, media and judicial pressure. This is insufficient for a large population with significant health issues, nor do these mobile services respond to emergency needs. The four AMC multi-specialty hospitals are on average 5.7 kilometres distant, and only three BSUP sites have a hospital closer than 6 kilometres away (Table 10).

Table 10

Distance to municipal hospitals (in kilometres)

Site	Civil Hospital	VS Hospital	Sharda Hospital	LG Hospital
BSUP Ajit Mill	4.74	7.24	3.15	4.96
BSUP Bag-e-Firdosh	12.09	12.81	10.51	4.45
BSUP Isanpur	8.83	9.56	6.65	1.95
BSUP Odhav	11.22	14.65	9.68	10.69
BSUP Vadaj	6.69	6.75	9.38	11.85
BSUP Vatva	14.09	11.79	12.57	6.60
Interim site	11.18	7.56	12.50	7.77

e. Health risks (morbidity and mortality, food insecurity)

Health risks on resettlement sites are exacerbated by such factors as poor access to safe drinking water, sanitation and waste management, and fair price shops or below poverty line identity cards for subsidized food rations.

Policy: Claims of access to sanitation and waste disposal were perfunctory in the DPR appraisal checklist, which inquired whether provisioning for water supply, sewerage, solid waste disposal, storm water drains and street lighting had been made in the BSUP project. Claims related to issues of food security and provision of fair price shops were absent in BSUP guidelines.

Reality: The interim site is adjacent to AMC’s solid waste disposal site and had negligible services. Contaminated tap water was supplied for two hours a day, community toilets were dysfunctional and solid waste was collected once a fortnight. On BSUP sites, although basic services were provided as per guidelines, the quality of services was compromised. The sewerage network was described as choked and overflowing, and households disposed of solid waste in open spaces, with AMC clearing the bins only once a week. These factors have led to poor hygiene and increased incidence of related diseases. The lack of clean drinking water on the interim site and many BSUP sites has contributed to ill health, and dysentery, typhoid fever, viral and bacterial gastroenteritis, and hepatitis were common in almost every house. A study of drinking water quality⁽⁴⁸⁾ showed alarmingly high concentrations of chemicals and coliform bacteria (1,600 parts per million (ppm) as against the prescribed limit of 2 ppm) and declared the water “unfit” for consumption. Several residents reported their experiences: “The water is so murky that we allow an hour for the sediments to settle before scooping it from the top”, “The day after we shifted here, our daughter Roshni began vomiting. Within 24 hours, she was dead” or “What can be more basic than drinking water? Yet, if you store water in the house for two days, it starts stinking. We cannot afford to hire water tankers. We have been left here to die.”

Food insecurity exacerbates health risks. Only 20 per cent of displacees have been issued the Below Poverty Line identity cards that allow access to the fair price shops, which in any case are not available in the new localities. Others bought food at market prices. Unlike in the departure slums, no shopkeepers offered staple foods on credit. The loss of employment also means lowering essential food intake and can lead to undernourishment.

Stress from the general insecurity adds to the risks. According to one woman,⁽⁴⁹⁾ “There is no electricity here. The area becomes dark at night and very unsafe for us, especially women and children… Women constantly fear being molested.” Even suicide has been reported.

f. Marginalization

The marginalization of those displaced is experienced in economic, social and psychological terms, and expressed through loss of human capital, loss of confidence and feelings of vulnerability. The coercive nature of the displacement and frequent hostility from host communities contributes further to what is often a pre-existing sense of exclusion.

Our study shows that vulnerable religious minority groups and oppressed castes were disproportionately represented amongst the displacees; 25 per cent were Muslims, compared to 12 per cent in the city, and a striking 88 per cent belonged to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes or other backward classes.

Eviction without prior notice and subjugation of minority households have been reported. According to a newspaper report, “…when they [slum dwellers] asked officials to show some mercy on at least the women and children, they behaved rudely with the women. The hutment [hut encampment] dwellers allege that one official struck a woman with a stick”.⁽⁵⁰⁾ James reports a displaced Muslim garage owner’s plea, “All of a sudden the AMC bulldozers came and demolished our houses. I don’t know what do to. I have been standing here searching for my belongings which are buried under the debris.”⁽⁵¹⁾ On some BSUP sites located within relatively prosperous neighbourhoods, settlers were labelled chapprawala (a pejorative for one living under a tin roof or “slumdog”). At one site they were barricaded from entering the adjoining neighbourhood park.

g. Social disarticulation

Displacement fragments the social fabric of a community, including its spatial, temporal and cultural determinants.⁽⁵²⁾ As kinship groups, voluntary associations and mutual help groups become scattered, the capacity for collective action or social capital is lost. The resulting alienation remains unperceived and unrecorded and has long-term consequences.⁽⁵³⁾

Policy: According to AMC, “on all BSUP sites Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) have been appointed for community mobilization and the formation process is ongoing”.⁽⁵⁴⁾ The NGOs argued, however, that AMC’s practice of fragmentary resettlement caused delays: “A Resident Welfare Association can be formed by us only when all houses on a site are allotted to households and full community representation is realized. In the current scenario, 100 percent allotment of all houses is not witnessed on any BSUP site because of AMC’s practice of ad hoc allotment. Consequently the formation is being inordinately deferred.”⁽⁵⁵⁾

There was no policy attention to averting social disarticulation by planning for group relocation based on kin units, extended families, neighbourhoods, ethnic groups, etc.

Reality: Our study shows that communities have been relocated in a dispersed manner over six BSUP sites rather than in social groups or units despite the possibility of the latter (Table 11). For instance, the Kagdivad community was resettled over four sites, each site at least 4 kilometres distant from the others. After relocation, 44 per cent of households applied for transfer to another site to be reunited with their former neighbours and kin, and many more were unhappy with the situation. About 17 per cent of the allotted units remained unoccupied as families preferred to reside close to the departure slum site and their social networks.

Table 11

Resettlement pattern of slum communities on various resettlement sites

BSUP Site	Dwellings Constructed	Dwellings Allotted	Dispersal of slum communities in various BSUP sites (Name of slum community and number of families displaced to a BSUP site)
Isanpur			V.S.	Kagdivad
	384
		197	71	101
Odhav			V.S.	Kagdivad
	320
		164	38	83
Rakhial				Kagdivad	Raikhad	Ramlal No khado	Dudheshwar Tank		Om Ghat		Anvar Ni Chali	Khanpur Karbala Masjid	Gurjari lal darvaja	Samshan Ghat	Mahakali Mandir (Vidya Mahadev ni chali)	Bhairavnath ni chali	Sharanagar	Nath baba ni chali	Ankleshwar ni chali
	704
		479		1	3	36	57		6		26	28	43	39	74	43	32	7	27
Vatva				Kagdivad	Raikhad	Ramlal No khado	Dudheshwar tank	Mahakali	Om ghat	Om Ghat	Victoria Garden	lal Darvaja Victoria	Bhairav nath	Khanpur Darwaja
	2768
		674		36	81	2	3	2	62	64	18	242	1	13
Vadaj					Shantipura	Ramlal No khado	Dudheshwar Tank	Mahakali	Dudhnath Mahadev	Kashmira Mahadev	NID na chapra	Maniben Ni Chali	Usmanpura
	576
		465			62	47	102	31	33	64	13	40	3
Bag-e-Firdosh					Shantipura	Ramlal No khado	Dudheshwar Tank	Mahakali	Sindhi Camp		Machipir
	672
		472			76	10	70	40	60		203
									Sindhi Camp	Sindhi Camp	Machipir	Machipir	Chamunda Nagar	Danilimda Banas	Mahakali Mandir	Danilimda	Mahakali Mandir Piplaj
Vatva	2224
(via interim)		824							100	83	214	122	40	16	4	11	25

On BSUP sites where communities have been resettled in fragments, social disarticulation was strikingly evident. In Vatva, where groups from nine slums were relocated, participation of households in the upkeep of common property resources and their interpersonal harmony was virtually absent. Most common spaces were covered with garbage, water pilferage from common tanks had become routine, and fights between neighbours over common property issues were frequent (Photo 2A and Photo 2B). Former slum leaders were unwilling to create structures for self-administration, citing lack of interest and identification with the new community. Residents expressed a sense of powerlessness and dependency on AMC intervention to prevent further decay of common property.⁽⁵⁶⁾

Photo 2A and Photo 2B

Physical manifestations of social disarticulation: abuse of common property and infrastructure on the newly constructed BSUP site at Vatva

h. Uncertainty (in the pre-dispossession processes)

Uncertainty has emerged in our research as an additional form of impoverishment. As initially proposed by de Wet,⁽⁵⁷⁾ we suggest that exclusion from the planning of the resettlement processes and lack of transparent information lead to uncertainty in the community even prior to dispossession, enhance the perception of risk, distract people from pursing their economic activities and contribute to impoverishment.

Policy: Under JNNURM guidelines, BSUP projects were to be preceded by City Development Plans identifying development priorities through stakeholder consultations.⁽⁵⁸⁾ One objective was to gain consensus of the poor in project identification, prioritization, and willingness and ability to pay. An appraisal report on the Ahmedabad City Development Plan by the National Institute of Urban Affairs, however, points to uncertainty that the consultation process ever involved representatives of the poor.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Slum leaders, activists and academics reiterated the exclusionary and tokenistic nature of these consultations. One activist explained that

“Even slum leaders were bypassed in the consultation process. The result being that decisions like identification of project-affected people, location of resettlement sites, dwelling unit size and cost, beneficiary contribution and affordability, and the relocation criteria, which were critical decisions for the affected slum dwellers, were taken without a rigorous understanding of their needs, demands and affordability.”

There is nothing in the BSUP guidelines on the subject of eviction notices and eligibility criteria, and states and local governments were allowed to define these. The consequences in Ahmedabad are discussed below.

Reality: Uncertainty within households about the outcome of displacement was evident prior to actual dispossession, from the unpredictable time between when AMC issued eviction notices and when resettlement was implemented (Table 12). Due to the limited information available, household heads, often the principal earners, spent time and resources consulting with community members, leaders and AMC and pursuing litigation in the High Court to prevent demolition. Our study shows that 29 per cent of households joined such litigation after receiving an eviction notice. AMC practices exacerbated uncertainty. Some households were given both eviction and resettlement notices; others received only an eviction notice, leading to mistrust and division within the communities.

Table 12

Issue of notice prior to demolition and resettlement

Resettlement site	Notice of eviction prior to demolition and resettlement
	(Range in days)	(Average in days)
Interim site	0 to 180	33
Permanent (BSUP) site	1 to 365	82
Interim site (at first)	0 to 180	74
BSUP (after stay on interim site)	7 to 90	42
No resettlement (continued residence on demolished site)	0 to 15	14

Our study shows 40 per cent of the sampled households were informed about stakeholder consultations but only 8 per cent attended them, mostly because of inconvenient venues and times and additional travel costs. Our evidence suggests that limited dissemination of information and the design of the time and venue were intentional on the part of AMC to limit attendance at the consultations. At the very least, AMC has shown little regard for the opportunity costs of attending such consultations. Moreover, AMC practised discriminatory approaches to eligibility, for which households had to present prescribed documents, either survey identity cards issued in 2002 for the SRFD project-affected people or identity cards issued by the slum listing from 1976 for others. Only 10 per cent of surveyed households possessed one of these documents, more in the case of SRFD than others. Desai describes such discriminatory practices as “flexible governing”, aimed to constrain community mobilization and opposition.⁽⁶⁰⁾ These practices could also in part be attributed to a deficit of BSUP units relative to the number of households to be displaced – as few as one to every five households in need, depending on the estimate of those to be displaced. This exacerbated people’s perception of risk and uncertainty.

V. Discussion

Our research shows that all the forms of impoverishment proposed by Cernea have emerged, in varying degrees, in all the four categories of displaced households in Ahmedabad. Many households have also experienced very high levels of “uncertainty”, which we propose should be seen as an additional form of impoverishment, and recognized in risk mitigation plans through promotion of high levels of community participation throughout the entire resettlement process.

Our findings clearly indicate that relocation distance is the most significant cause of post-displacement impoverishment and must be adequately addressed in rehabilitation policy. Most of the impoverishment found amongst Ahmedabad’s displaced populations (i.e. joblessness, lack of access to community facilities, health risks and social disarticulation) derives from displacement distance along with other factors. Similar research on Indore⁽⁶¹⁾ has demonstrated that those resettled on-site were substantially less impoverished than those resettled off-site. Despite a large body of evidence on the impoverishment of displacees, there was little in BSUP policy that specifically acknowledged or targeted the various components of impoverishment. For instance, BSUP policy included only token reference to such impoverishment risks as landlessness or relocation distance, joblessness, homelessness, loss of access to community facilities, health risks and social disarticulation; and food security and social marginalization were completely ignored. In some instances where there was relevant policy, the realities of implementation did not match the rhetoric. This evident gap between the rhetoric and practice of local government has led to impoverishment risks becoming a reality.⁽⁶²⁾ As impoverishment increases on the inhospitable and distant resettlement sites, where people live in abject poverty,⁽⁶³⁾ the displaced defect and return to the old slums or vicinities,⁽⁶⁴⁾ leading to low occupancy levels on BSUP sites across Indian cities⁽⁶⁵⁾ and to higher densities in the vicinity of old slum sites.⁽⁶⁶⁾ In Ahmedabad also, during the time of our field visit in May 2011we found only 35 per cent occupancy of the units constructed, with most of them still unallotted; of those units that had actually been allotted, 83 per cent were occupied.

The failure of resettlement is usually attributed to dysfunctional communication between decision-makers and affected communities and the consequent lack of understanding of the latter’s needs and aspirations, leading to the further impoverishment of displacees. There are clear signs that this is also true for Ahmedabad. Emphasizing the need for community participation, Patel et al. have shown how full community participation and empowerment in critical decision-making underpins a successful resettlement process.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Many of the BSUP programme’s inadequacies and failures in Ahmedabad are undoubtedly partly attributable to the exclusions of the affected communities from all aspects of planning and implementation.

VI. Conclusions

Development-induced displacements and resettlements in the rapidly developing cities of the South are an important socio-political issue. In India, evidence of large-scale displacements of the urban poor in all major cities is emerging, spurred by gentrification and infrastructure projects to create world-class cities. It is critical to focus more attention on research on urban DIDR and its consequences for the urban poor and to search and advocate for more sensitive approaches and mitigation policy measures. Our analysis of DIDR in Ahmedabad has clearly indicated that the current practices of local government have led to impoverishment amongst the dispossessed and the displaced. In the absence of appropriate guidelines, the urban poor are virtually excluded from the design, planning, implementation and management of resettlement processes under BSUP. Although BSUP has come to a close it has paved the way for RAY. Ideally, the lessons learnt from BSUP should contribute to better conceptualization of RAY to avoid, for example, an over-emphasis on off-site resettlement options rather than in situ upgrading, or the adoption of exclusionary practices, all of which lead to impoverishment of the so-called beneficiaries. The price of not building on these lessons will be high, especially for those targeted by DIDR projects and for public funds spent on such subsidized rehabilitation housing programmes.