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Abstract

Japan’s March 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown shattered the country’s nuclear-dependent energy policy. Questions about the long-term consequences of Fukushima still linger, but a political and economic re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of this high-risk technology is long overdue. Concerns about the future role of nuclear power are part of the larger international debate about energy security and climate change. Germany is frequently seen as leading the way toward a clean-energy future with its nuclear exit and renewables expansion, but both Japan and Germany have managed to maintain a secure energy supply with dramatically reduced—or even zero—nuclear power since 2011. A comparison of similarities and differences between Japan and Germany helps to explain each country’s responses to Fukushima and to draw out key lessons for future energy systems. Energy policies that scrutinize vested interests of the industry and allow for more decentralized energy systems, relying on more renewable energy sources and more programs for emissions reductions, are key in shaping the inevitable big shift.

Keywords

energy transition Fukushima Germany Japan nuclear power renewable energy

Japan and Germany differ from each other in many important respects. They have distinct geopolitics, governments, economics, cultures, and energy policies. But in March 2011, when a powerful earthquake and tsunami struck the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Japan and Germany had at least one thing in common: In both countries, about 30 percent of the electricity generated was from nuclear power plants. After the nuclear accident at Fukushima, this percentage dropped precipitously in both countries, but Japan and Germany responded to the crisis in markedly different ways.

Japan shuttered all of its nuclear power plants temporarily or permanently, and initially coped with the power loss through drastic reductions in electricity consumption. Clean-energy activists Justin Guay of the Sierra Club and Lauri Myllyvirta of Greenpeace (Guay and Myllyvirta, 2014) calculated that Japan replaced half the generating capacity lost after Fukushima with voluntary reductions driven by the setsuden (“energy saving”) movement—a campaign promoting simple measures to conserve electricity in everyday life, which helped prevent major blackouts (Kakuchi, 2011). However, Japan replaced the other half of its lost capacity by burning more gas, oil, and coal in conventional thermal power plants. Japan now ranks as the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas and second-largest importer of coal, behind China (US Energy Information Administration, 2013).

In the meantime, Germany accelerated its Energiewende (“energy transition”) efforts to usher in an era of non-nuclear, low-carbon renewable energy. Within six months of the Fukushima meltdowns, eight of Germany’s 17 nuclear reactors had been shut down permanently and new regulations to phase out nuclear energy altogether by 2022 had come into effect. Capitalizing on a broad antinuclear sentiment and policy instruments already in place, the German renewable energy sector has continued to expand quickly since 2011. The electric utility industry has also coped with the loss of nuclear generating capacity by ramping up production from its profitable coal-fired power plants, many of which burn lignite—the dirtiest type of coal. This unintended consequence of the energy transition set a new record for German electricity exports in 2013, and Germany’s carbon dioxide emissions rose in 2012 and again in 2013.

Although both countries have managed to maintain a secure energy supply at reasonable prices with far less nuclear power than before Fukushima, they have done so in unexpected and sometimes contrasting ways. A comparison of the Japanese and German approaches is instructive because it offers important lessons about the impacts of factors such as geopolitics, governments and civil society, energy policies, and economics. The differences between the two countries’ responses highlight the challenges of managing energy supply risks, balancing the interests of industries and consumers, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions while simultaneously replacing nuclear energy partially or totally—but also point to opportunities for both countries and for other nations.

Before Fukushima

A lesson from history is that big shifts are often highly contested. Germany’s nuclear history is indeed characterized by widespread social protest and activism. In 1974, the state government of Baden-Württemberg announced its plan to construct a nuclear reactor in the small village of Wyhl. Within weeks, local protest mounted and citizens’ movements formed, giving rise to mass demonstrations nationwide. Nevertheless, reactor construction continued and, with public interest shifting toward other environmental issues, the antinuclear movement lost momentum in the early 1980s.

In April 1986, Chernobyl shattered the industry’s long-cherished “safety myth” and revived the nuclear debate in Germany. The conservative Christian Democratic Union and Free Democratic Party coalition government remained committed to nuclear power, but appealed for a combined international effort to increase safety standards. The new safety requirements increased the cost of competing in a market where considerably cheaper alternatives were available, thwarting the nuclear industry’s plans for expansion (Paulus, 2000). Phasing out nuclear power became a core project for the first Social Democratic Party and Green Party coalition government after the 1998 federal election. A phase-out agreement with the major electric utilities, the so-called Atomkonsens (“nuclear consensus”) contract, was signed in June 2000. A new Christian Democratic Union–Free Democratic Party government in 2009, however, approved an extended phase-out period in order to allow nuclear electricity generation as a bridging technology on the way to the de-carbonization of the energy system. The decision was highly controversial at the time—and it was quickly reversed after Fukushima, with the reconstitution of the Atomkonsens.

Japan’s nuclear history is a somewhat different story. Rapid industrialization, increasing energy demands, a lack of natural resources, and the oil price shocks of the 1970s together provided the impetus for Japan to invest heavily in nuclear energy. Key players in the notorious “nuclear village” (DeWit, 2011) provided institutionalized financial support for host communities and developed public relations campaigns and educational programs to promote nuclear energy. Japan’s nuclear safety myth was based on public reassurance that nuclear power plants were absolutely benign. The nuclear risk was believed to be acceptable, because emergency management plans and procedures were deemed adequate to mitigate the consequences of any accident.

In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, however, Japan’s long-term commitment to nuclear energy has faltered. The traumatic experience and consequent public pressure caused the government in September 2012 to announce the abandonment of nuclear power by the end of the 2030s. Rikkyo University political economist Andrew DeWit (2012) also highlights the July 2012 introduction of a feed-in tariff scheme—which obliges electric utilities to buy electricity from renewable energy producers at a fixed price—as a major step to encourage the expansion of renewable power capacity. The latest news from the Japanese government, however, contains early signs of another turnaround: The first official national energy strategy since the Fukushima nuclear disaster, approved by the Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on April 11, confirms less—but not zero— nuclear in Japan’s future energy mix (METI, 2014).

A tale of two energy paths

A closer look at the similarities and differences between the energy sector settings of Japan and Germany helps to explain each country’s responses to Fukushima. These settings fall into several categories:

Geopolitics

Germany is favorably located in the center of Europe, and the successful integration of the European Union member states has created unprecedented opportunities for economic development and political stability. Since World War II, Europe has experienced the longest period of peace in its history. Today, the creation of an internal energy market is one of the EU’s top priorities, to safeguard the energy supply at the very foundations of Europe’s prosperity. Following the 1996 European Union Electricity Directive, which was replaced by subsequent related directives, the European Parliament and the Council established common rules for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity aimed at opening up the electricity market. Integration in the emerging European market, which can provide backup power if necessary, as well as policy instruments to support renewable capacity expansion already in place, substantially reduced the uncertainties of the German response to Fukushima. Officially launched in fall 2010, Germany’s ambitious Energiewende goals had already set the country on course to become one of the world’s most energy-efficient and green economies without constructing new nuclear power plants.

For Japan, spatial isolation from neighboring countries means that the island nation is unable to access transnational electricity transmission systems. Because of its very limited natural resource endowment, Japan depends on imports for 80 percent of its primary energy consumption. Before Fukushima, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry had planned to reduce this dependency with the construction of nine new reactors by 2020 and more than 14 new reactors by 2030. After Fukushima, with Japan’s even greater reliance on imported fossil fuels, competition with neighboring countries for access to energy resources has increased. More-effective coordination with international organizations to foster energy integration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as interconnected energy markets, might reduce the risks and uncertainties associated with energy imports. However, effective transnational energy cooperation would require “a clear statement of a shared strategic vision for energy security and how to strengthen it” (Ryan and Gillispie, 2014). This is not in sight, as rising nationalism (NBR, 2011) and territorial disputes are fueling regional conflict and threatening stability and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region. For Japan, facing the burdens of history in its international relations, the initiation and maintenance of regional collaborations in strategic policy areas such as energy security is a difficult endeavor.

Governments and civil society

In Japan, a network of government and private-sector actors known as the “nuclear village” mutually agreed on prioritizing the development of nuclear power to maintain national energy security. “Clientelist” state structures and endemic corruption are part of a larger debate about who rules Japan (Feldhoff, 2002). Collusion, poor regulation, and a lack of transparency and control fueled by vested interests—combined with overconfidence in the controllability of the technology—bred carelessness in the nuclear industry. A 2012 report produced by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission concluded that the power plant’s operator, the industry regulatory bodies, and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry “all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements” (NAIIC, 2012). Labeling Fukushima a “man-made disaster,” however, might well be interpreted as a legitimization for the government to revise safety standards and operating procedures while remaining committed to the technology. Its supporters indeed have gained political backing from recent major election outcomes. Despite the collapse of public support nationwide for nuclear energy, antinuclear parties and candidates performed astonishingly poorly in the 2012 Lower House, 2013 Upper House, and 2014 Tokyo gubernatorial elections (Yoshida, 2014).

The official rationale behind the German decision to phase out nuclear energy was far more fundamental, alluding to the estimation of risks associated with the operation of nuclear facilities as the determining factor: Fukushima has put an entirely new relevance on the term “residual risk,” which remains despite protective measures taken to prevent accidents, said Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening of the Hannover Messe 2011 industrial trade fair. Even countries not directly affected by the fallout from Fukushima cannot ignore the “genuine threat” that now exists, Merkel emphasized (Bundesregierung, 2011). Indeed, this threat existed even before Fukushima, but the residual risk was considered manageable because scientists could calculate the (low) probability of an accident. Scientists could never, however, exactly calculate when the risk event would occur and under what circumstances. This has always been the big uncertainty. As political scientist Scott Sagan argues in his 1993 book The Limits of Safety, “… things that have never happened before happen all the time” (Sagan, 1993: 12). Therefore, the manageable-risk argument caused great indignation within the antinuclear movement in Germany. Looming state-level elections, and fears that voters might overwhelmingly back antinuclear campaigners building on a “Fukushima effect,” may be more rational political explanations for the sudden German policy change than concerns about residual risk. Given the highly contested history of Germany’s nuclear phase-out and the broad public antinuclear consensus, a return to nuclear energy is now beyond any political imagination.

In Japan, the government’s nuclear support programs have, very much in contrast to Germany, successfully prevented the development of a powerful nationwide antinuclear movement. There are some examples of classic “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) activism, but there is no decades-long history of broad protest networks reaching into the spheres of government. After Fukushima, antinuclear protests of a hitherto unimagined scale indicated a new public awareness of nuclear issues. Nevertheless, the new Strategic Energy Plan announced in April 2014 comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with the vested interests of the still-powerful nuclear industry lobby in Japan. It is a major step to revive Japan’s nuclear energy sector—and a heavy setback for citizens and organizations that had hoped for a nuclear exit.

Energy policies

Japan’s new Cabinet-approved Strategic Energy Plan designates nuclear power as an “important base-load power source” for the next 20 years (METI, 2014: 24). However, the plan gives no clear indication of what steps will be taken to continue nuclear energy use, when they will be taken, and to what degree Japan’s dependency on nuclear power will be reduced; how the government will act on the national nuclear fuel reprocessing program that makes separated plutonium available;¹ whether the replacement of aged nuclear reactors with new constructions is a viable option; who has to pay what for post-shutdown decommissioning activities; how the development of renewable energy will be further supported; or what measures will be taken to overcome the fragmented nature of the national grid, which is divided in two halves that cannot directly exchange AC power. The vague wording of the plan leaves much room for interpretation and discretion, but all predictions suggest that renewable energy is expected to play a more important role for Japan in the coming years (Johnston, 2014).

Furthermore, support for enhanced energy efficiency and the promotion of energy-saving behavior will continue. Increased public awareness of potential energy shortages, and campaigns run by government authorities calling for electricity savings, have become a permanent feature of Japan’s energy policy, especially during the summer season. A positive side effect is the avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions at a time when reduction goals have disappeared from the political agenda in Japan.

While Japan is now facing the challenge to provide clear guidance and implement new energy policies favoring renewables, Germany is already facing growing pains from the quick expansion of the renewable energy industry and the increasing cost for this expansion. In the first half of 2014, 27 percent of marketed electricity production in Germany was from non-hydropower renewable energy sources, thanks to massive new installations of wind and solar photovoltaic power in recent years.

The unprecedented growth has been fueled in large part by the so-called Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, or EEG) and the investments made by citizens, cooperatives, and communities owning more than half of the renewable capacity (Greenpeace, 2014). The EEG, enacted in 2000, guarantees a feed-in tariff for renewables for 20 years; gives renewables priority access to the national grid; and exempts owners of renewable energy installations for their own use of electricity (not sold to the grid) from the surcharge paid by consumers to support expansion of the sector. This renewable energy surcharge compensates for the gap between the government-guaranteed tariff rate for renewables and their actual market price. It is important to note that, back in 2001, the European Court of Justice ruled that feed-in tariffs do not constitute “state aid” and therefore are not illegal subsidies. Although there can be no doubt about the necessity of continued financial support to spur further development of renewable installations, paradoxically the astonishing dynamic of the transformation process caused rising electricity prices and now requires careful amendment of regulations.

Economics

In Germany, EEG-based subsidies have stimulated the growth of renewables and driven up household electricity prices, despite falling electricity market prices. This is the consequence of two developments: First, the renewable energy surcharge for households has increased nearly fivefold since 2009 (BEE, 2013) to 6.24 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2014. It is thus well above the limit of 3.5 cents per kilowatt-hour that Chancellor Merkel proposed in June 2011 (Handelsblatt, 2013). Second, a total of 2,098 energy-intensive companies have been exempted from the renewable energy surcharge to protect their international competitiveness. These discounts, which come at the expense of private consumers and other businesses, are worth some 5.1 billion euros in 2014 (Bundesregierung, 2014). In December 2013, the European Commission opened an in-depth inquiry into these exemptions to examine compatibility with EU state aid rules.

Recent revisions of the EEG include the definition of target ranges to make expansion rates more predictable, so that by 2025 renewables will provide 40 to 45 percent of the total electricity consumption, rising to between 55 and 60 percent by 2035 (WFW, 2014; WNN, 2014). Feed-in tariff rates will be reduced to slow the increase in electricity prices; self-consumption will become subject to the surcharge; and energy-intensive industry exemptions will be maintained in accordance with new EU regulations, which is a major success for big-industry interests. Guidelines released by the European Commission on April 9 define a limited number of energy-intensive sectors for the whole EU, and foresee the gradual introduction of competitive bidding processes for allocating entitlements to state aid (EC, 2014). These guidelines may turn out to be a curse for German citizens and community energy projects lacking the organizational and financial resources to compete with large energy companies that are desperately seeking opportunities to increase revenues and reduce costs as their financial situation worsens. The chairperson of the environment committee in the German parliament has expressed worries that this could adversely affect payment obligations for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants (Vasagar, 2014).

In the wake of rising energy imports and electricity prices, a widening trade deficit, and Prime Minister Abe’s pledge to put the economy back on track, Japan is obviously willing to take the political risk of reactor restarts. At the same time, the government is increasingly turning its attention to renewable energy. It launched a national photovoltaic subsidy program back in 1994, but the focus was on small residential installations only. Following the introduction of a surplus electricity purchase system in 2009, the installed photovoltaic generation capacity for residential use has increased rapidly. Overall, the program is estimated to have added about 6 gigawatts of photovoltaic capacity.

With the introduction of the new feed-in tariff scheme for renewables in July 2012, the focus shifted from the residential subsidy program (which ended in March 2014) to the larger non-residential segment—and expanded beyond solar power to also include wind, geothermal, small- and medium-scale hydropower, and biomass. The new tariff program guarantees access to the power grid at a fixed price for a period of 10 to 20 years. Although the generous tariff rates have been slightly reduced in 2013 and 2014, they are still attractive. The government has not defined specific expansion targets for individual renewable energy resources, but photovoltaic systems account for the large majority of new installations (Edahiro, 2013). Government policy is particularly supportive of so-called “mega-solar” projects of more than 1 megawatt in output capacity, but land acquisitions and re-zoning requirements are a major bottleneck. Furthermore, following an investigation by the Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry into hundreds of photovoltaic projects that were given approval but had yet to commence construction—supposedly with developers intentionally delaying projects in anticipation of even more generous tariff rates, or reductions in the cost of components and labor—the government recently decided to impose time restrictions to disqualify such projects (Movellan, 2014).

Shaping the shift

For both Germany and Japan there is too much at stake to fail to meet their energy security needs. Over the past three years, the debate has been too narrowly focused on electricity generation. It must be broadened to look at total energy consumption, which also includes the consumption of heat and transportation fuels. Nuclear energy generates around 11 percent of the world’s electricity but constitutes less than 6 percent of global primary energy consumption. The most important problem is that the use of fossil fuels is expected to decrease only slightly during the next two decades. Taking into account the impact of measures already announced by governments to improve energy efficiency, support renewables, reduce fossil-fuel subsidies, and put a price on carbon, the International Energy Agency last year calculated that energy-related carbon dioxide emissions would still rise by 20 percent to 2035, contributing to a long-term average temperature increase far above the internationally agreed maximum of 2 degrees Celsius (IEA, 2013).

One implication of this alarming prediction is that the increased use of fossil energy resources observed during the past three years should not become a permanent replacement for lost nuclear capacities in Germany and Japan. In Germany, Greenpeace and other environmental organizations are warning that the “coal boom” endangers the country’s credibility on climate protection and undermines the energy transformation. They are asking for a reduction of emissions certificates available through the European Union’s Emissions Trading System in order to substantially increase the price on carbon dioxide emission permits. “Energy transition” also means to scrutinize the vested interests of powerful electric utility companies and to increase awareness of unintended consequences of policy amendments. Predictable integrated energy policies that cover all sources of energy, and address all aspects of energy use and supply, are a key factor in shaping the inevitable shift—and also a key factor for the growth of renewable energy industries, offering significant economic development opportunities and potential for emissions reductions. Advancing the wider adoption of existing technologies and facilitating the development of new technologies are of critical importance. The immediate aftermath of the Japanese disaster has also demonstrated the need for increased attention to energy use patterns and levels, as well as individual commitment to voluntary energy conservation.

A fundamental shift of Japan’s energy policy from nuclear energy to renewable forms of energy production should tie in with the focus on a more decentralized supply structure, lower energy consumption through efficiency and conservation, and reduced carbon dioxide emissions. Research conducted by the Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies provides evidence of support in many regions of Japan for a 100 percent renewable energy scenario. According to data from the institute’s report “Sustainable Zone 2013,” a total of 50 municipalities in Japan were estimated to be fully self-sufficient on the basis of renewable energy and even able to sell surplus electricity to the grid (ISEP et al., 2013). As public opinion in Japan clearly supports renewables, the government should build on the evolving network of local communities, citizens, and nongovernmental organizations to actively support the move from a highly centralized to a more decentralized energy system relying on more renewable energy sources. This would provide opportunities for new jobs sorely needed outside the metropolitan areas, where decline and decay are progressing rapidly. A more critical role for the domestic mass media is essential to more deeply embed nuclear issues into the larger public discourse, to prevent the nuclear industry from returning to business as usual, and to build a broad societal consensus on the way forward.

Japan and Germany have much to learn from each other. An Energiewende-like transition to renewable energy would serve Japan well, and a setsuden-like dedication to energy conservation would help Germany wean itself from dirty coal. Combating climate change and phasing out nuclear power will require the best of both worlds.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Note

Author biography

Thomas Feldhoff is an adjunct professor in the Department of Human Geography and coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian Studies at Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. His academic background is in human geography and East Asian studies with a focus on Japan. His current research focuses on the political economy of energy, energy security, the influences of policy frameworks and institutional structures, public involvement, community empowerment, and conflict management in facility siting processes.

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Post-Fukushima energy paths: Japan and Germany compared