The Black Sea: Center of the nuclear black market

Abstract

The Black Sea region is the center of the world’s nuclear black market, with Russia being the known or suspected source of most nuclear contraband and Turkey the preferred destination. To date, known attempts at nuclear smuggling have been unsuccessful, because the insiders who stole fissile material were not experienced at finding buyers and moving the material across country borders. Recently, however, organized crime appears to have become involved in some nuclear trafficking. Such involvement threatens to change the nuclear terrorism equation, providing the marketing and transportation expertise previously lacking. The US response to nuclear smuggling is handled by the Defense Department and the Energy Department. These agencies have few capabilities for dealing with organized crime, and the countries of the Black Sea region tend not to share nuclear information with one another. Unless international coordination and law enforcement are improved, criminal organizations will likely be able to supply terrorists sufficient fissile material to build an atomic bomb.

The Black Sea region is one of the world’s critical crossroads, a strategic intersection of east–west and north–south corridors that enable the free flow of people, ideas, and goods from Asia to Europe and from former Soviet territory to the Middle East and Africa. It is also the center of the world’s nuclear black market. ¹

The greatest potential sources of nuclear contraband are Russia, Pakistan, and countries that possess nuclear research reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU) (Bunn, 2010). With nearly 11,000 nuclear warheads, Russia owns the largest arsenal in the world and the most weapon-grade material (Kristensen and Norris, 2011a). Countries occupying former Soviet space have about a third of the world’s HEU-fueled research reactors (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2009). Pakistan has 90–100 nuclear warheads, is building new plutonium-manufacturing capacity, and faces a dangerous and growing insider threat to its nuclear stockpiles (Kristensen and Norris, 2011b).

The most pressing danger is not that terrorists will acquire a working atomic bomb in this region. Except for Pakistan, the security of nuclear warheads has improved. Nuclear weapons storage facilities are well guarded, and the chances of a terrorist group gaining access by force of arms are very small. The insider threat in Pakistan is kept in check somewhat by its nation-state status. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen if a nuclear warhead traceable to Pakistan were detonated in a Western city. The threat of retaliation is still effective there.

The real threat of nuclear terrorism stems from the world’s growing stockpiles of plutonium and HEU, both of which can be used to make crude atomic bombs. A recent US–Russian report catalogs nearly 2,000 metric tons of these materials, which are stored in hundreds of buildings in 30 countries under security conditions that range from “excellent to appalling” (Bunn et al., 2011: 18). The combination of fissile material and poor security greatly increases the probability that some of it will end up in terrorist hands.

Until recently, insiders who illicitly obtained fissile material were regularly arrested; they knew what to steal but not how to sell it. Over the past several years, however, organized crime groups in the Black Sea area appear to have become involved in nuclear smuggling. Their knowledge of smuggling tactics and poor coordination among local law enforcement agencies make it likely that—unless the United States significantly steps up its law enforcement efforts in the region—terrorists will eventually be able to buy enough fissile material to make at least a crude atomic device.

Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom has published a comprehensive report on this threat, combining several well-known facts to create an unsettling picture. First, several terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda, have been trying to get their hands on a nuclear weapon for years. Osama bin Laden referred to it as a “religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999) and embraced the idea of an American Hiroshima (Coll, 2005). Al Qaeda operatives have consulted with nuclear experts (Bergen, 2010), tested conventional explosives for use in nuclear bombs (Albright and Higgins, 2002), and attempted to purchase working nuclear devices (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). There is nothing to suggest that bin Laden’s death has ended this quest. Second, the Harvard study notes that if a sophisticated terrorist group acquired sufficient weapon-grade material, it would be able to build at least a crude, gun-type atomic bomb (WMD Commission, 2005). A nuclear device of this type wouldn’t be transported to the target by a sophisticated delivery system; its more likely delivery mode would be a rental truck (Bunn, 2010). Third, although terrorist groups may not be able to manufacture the plutonium or weapon-grade uranium to make a crude bomb, it is not beyond their ability to buy or steal it. And fourth, nuclear smuggling is very difficult to combat. Globalization, huge profit margins, and organized crime have created a multibillion-dollar illicit-trafficking market that is producing ever more sophisticated methods of keeping contraband from being discovered. Nuclear contraband has become a part of that illicit market.

Two important databases that list illicit nuclear-trafficking incidents underscore the Black Sea region’s dark nuclear image. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database reports incidents that have been confirmed by the governments of member states. The University of Salzburg’s Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources lists incidents that have been the subject of investigation and verification by independent proliferation experts and academics. With just one exception, the reports of illicit nuclear trafficking in these two databases identify Russia as the known or suspected source of the contraband (Zaitseva, 2010). They also identify Turkey as the preferred destination, because it is a place where willing sellers can find willing buyers (Kupatadze, 2010; Zaitseva, 2009). As Al Qaeda’s new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, told a Pakistani journalist several years ago: “[I]t is not difficult. If you have $30 million, you can go to the black market in Central Asia, make contact with a disgruntled Russian scientist, and get from him suitcase nuclear weapons” (Bergen, 2010). The point is not whether suitcase nuclear weapons are to be had on the black market (Bunn, 2010; Vergano, 2007). The point is that Al Qaeda’s leadership pointed to the Black Sea region as the place to look. Against this backdrop, one chief concern has arisen: an emerging pattern of involvement by organized criminal groups in nuclear-trafficking cases.

The successful smuggling transaction has three essential components: a way to acquire contraband, the means of contacting potential buyers, and a mode of transporting the ill-gotten goods. In most known attempts to traffic in nuclear material, it was the employees of a country’s nuclear program who stole the nuclear material. In those cases, by and large, the theft was discovered precisely because those insiders were not experienced smugglers with networks of buyers and methods of moving the material across country borders (Zaitseva and Hand, 2003).

A 2006 case in a former Soviet republic, however, illustrates that this pattern is changing. The case began in the expected manner: Georgian police heard of attempts to sell HEU and set up a sting, with police posing as buyers. But when the time for the transaction came, the Russian sellers did not attend, instead sending a courier with a sample. The “buyers” declined to purchase the material because it was unsuitable for building an atomic weapon, and the courier was later arrested.

There have been two other comparable incidents. In May 1999, a Turkish national attempting to enter Moldova was arrested at the Bulgarian border with a sample of HEU. He told investigators that he had been directed to sell the HEU in Turkey. When the buyers failed to meet him, he decided to return to Moldova with the material. He said he had acquired the material from a Ukrainian acquaintance. In March 2010, a similar technique was used by nuclear smugglers to transport a small amount of weapon-grade uranium to Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, in anticipation of a sale. The subsequent arrest and investigation identified a middleman who was convicted of HEU smuggling in 2003. In the 2010 incident, the middleman was given a small amount of HEU to be used in a trial run to Tbilisi. The principal promised that if the trial run was successful, he would supply the middleman with more material. Investigators linked both of these incidents to criminal networks. The tradecraft involved suggests that experienced international traffickers have teamed up with nuclear insiders to create a more secure distribution chain (Butler, 2010).

With the black market price for HEU running at least $10,000 per gram, it appears that organized crime has entered the market and created an unholy alliance. Nuclear insiders steal; organized crime finds the buyer and arranges delivery. This alliance eliminates a critical weakness that had favored the police and allows terrorists to become consumers of nuclear material, much like the buyers of illegal drugs.

Weaknesses in United States counter-proliferation

Globalization and evolving technology have made the knowledge and equipment needed to build an atomic bomb available to anyone with a little time and money. The only missing ingredient is a sufficient quantity of HEU to build a bomb. The historic check against nuclear terrorism—the inability of terrorists to acquire fissile material—appears to be weakening. Because it has not explicitly focused its law enforcement agencies in the Black Sea region, the United States has placed itself at a strategic disadvantage in dealing with the budding alliance between nuclear insiders and organized crime.

To deal with this threat, the United States relies heavily on two agencies with extensive expertise in nuclear weapons: the Energy Department and the Defense Department. These two agencies possess the bulk of the country’s nuclear weapons knowledge, and each plays an important part in US counter-proliferation efforts. The Energy Department has invested heavily in fielding nuclear-detection equipment and training foreign nationals how to use it. This equipment has some deterrent value, but to date it has not done much to uncover actual nuclear smuggling. The Defense Department focuses on sharing information about nuclear proliferation with its military counterparts in other countries. This effort is commendable but of questionable value in regard to nuclear terrorism, because in most countries, as in the United States, responsibility for dealing with organized crime and international trafficking rests with the police, not the military.

The United States is using the wrong agencies to deal with the problem. Databases maintained by the IAEA and the University of Salzburg show that over the past 20 years, local police around the world uncovered the majority of reported nuclear-smuggling cases. It was police officers who discovered the contraband, investigated the circumstances, and arrested the perpetrators. In most instances, police informants—not detection systems or intelligence agencies—provided the information that triggered the investigations.

But in the United States, investigating organized crime and illicit trafficking is not among the core competencies of either the Energy Department or the Defense Department. The expertise to conduct these investigations resides within US law enforcement agencies. Yet US law enforcement is largely absent from the day-to-day work that goes on in the Black Sea region to investigate the international movement of nuclear contraband. As a result, the effort to stop terrorists from acquiring fissile material is borne primarily by the region’s local law enforcement agencies. Whatever help the United States provides comes from departments that have limited experience in and few capabilities for dealing with the main problem: organized crime.

Weaknesses in the IAEA’s counter-proliferation

There’s a counterintuitive reason that nuclear smuggling in the Black Sea region is dangerous: the IAEA’s counter-proliferation work there. For a variety of reasons, the countries of the region don’t share information about nuclear smuggling with one another. But to stay in the good graces of the international community, the countries claim they share such information with international regulators. Countries in the region report nuclear smuggling incidents to the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database, but there is little sharing of information concerning ongoing investigations into illicit trafficking organizations.

The IAEA is the most important and authoritative nuclear security agency in the world. It has a well-deserved reputation as an objective, non-aligned, science-based organization and, therefore, carries much moral authority. Its influence is further enhanced by its willingness to maintain the confidences of member states that cooperate with it.

The IAEA has two distinctly different faces, however. The first is the face that acts pursuant to UN Security Council authority, the well-publicized, powerful IAEA that conducts investigations of potential nuclear misconduct. In this capacity, the IAEA has coercive power. If it is displeased with the cooperation it is getting, it can turn to the Security Council for assistance, which usually takes the form of international sanctions against a recalcitrant member.

The agency has a second face as the world’s center of excellence for nuclear matters writ large, including nuclear safety and security. This is the consensus IAEA that dispenses objective, science-based information on a range of nuclear topics and seeks to build international agreements around important nuclear safety and security protocols. It conducts its activities without the coercive leverage provided by the Security Council. Goodwill and cooperation are important to this consensus IAEA, because its ability to succeed is based on moral suasion. As a fundamental principle, this IAEA places responsibility for safeguarding nuclear weapons, facilities, and material with member states, and the approach largely works. Black Sea countries defer routinely to the IAEA for guidance and procedures to regulate their nuclear communities. ²

The IAEA is important in the region because, in the final analysis, attacking nuclear smuggling requires cooperation—nations working together in a common fight against a common, extreme threat—and the IAEA promotes such cooperation. The security challenges working against cooperation are, however, profound. Within the region are four significant flash points that could produce open warfare at any time. These disputes have been around for so long that they are viewed as an endemic condition—“gray zones” or “frozen zones” of instability where governance is disputed and the rule of law is weak (Japaridze and Lawlor, 2010). The ethnic, economic, and political passions that fuel these hot spots have made sustained cooperation among Black Sea countries very difficult. The IAEA, at least the consensus IAEA, is in a sense hostage to these passions. It is trying to do its work in an environment that is rife with ethnic and cultural tensions, uncertain governance structures, rising nationalism, terrorism, competition for resources, disputed borders, divisive geography, dueling great powers, and open warfare.

In some cases, the IAEA inhibits rather than enhances nuclear security. Because nuclear smuggling is an international enterprise, the key to successful operations against such trafficking is information sharing among law enforcement agencies in different countries. In the atmosphere of mutual hostility that characterizes the Black Sea region, however, sensitive information is generally not shared across borders.

At the same time, being seen by the international community as unwilling to share information related to nuclear smuggling is politically unpalatable, so, in one of the few areas in which they seem to agree, Black Sea countries take a “better” approach: They say they share with the IAEA. Officials from throughout the region make much of their respective governments’ purported links to the IAEA. They claim that providing sensitive information to the IAEA actually works better than cooperating with their neighbors, because, somehow, the IAEA is better at distributing the information than the governments would be.

But there’s an unspoken reality: Very few officials in most of the region’s governments are authorized to communicate with the IAEA, and those who can talk have little to gain by doing so. As a result, little information on nuclear trafficking is conveyed to the IAEA, even as regional officials tout the agency as the center of anti-trafficking cooperation. In this respect, the IAEA provides cover for the countries’ failure to address an enormously dangerous problem. It is an unintended consequence of the IAEA’s work, to be sure, but nevertheless a very damaging one.

The need for US law enforcement

The increasing involvement of organized crime in the nuclear black market strongly suggests that absent real changes in law enforcement activities in the Black Sea region, terrorists will eventually be able to buy enough fissile material there to build an atomic bomb. Improved cross-border information sharing and law enforcement coordination by the various countries of the region might help stem nuclear smuggling. Given the many bitter ethnic and political disputes that have long riven the area, however, such cooperation seems to be a very long-term goal, at best. In the short and medium terms, the United States should better posture itself to combat the emerging trend. Specifically, it should strengthen the existing counter-smuggling authorities of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and provide it with the resources to develop a counter-smuggling network of regional law enforcement agencies to combat illicit nuclear trafficking in the region. Backed up by the Treasury Department’s expertise in financial-crimes investigations, such a move would go a long way toward convincing organized crime groups in the Black Sea region that nuclear smuggling is a difficult, dangerous, and, ultimately, unprofitable business.