Fatwas for fission: Assessing the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets

Abstract

Pakistan’s nuclear assets may be tempting targets for terrorists. Experts are split, however, on the actual threat posed. Some assert that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are on the verge of seizure by terrorists, while others contend that the risk is minimal at best. Because neither side develops robust or holistic threat assessments, however, American decision makers, who wisely include open sources when evaluating possible threats emanating from Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, are not adequately informed. Thus, the author maintains that the real threat assessment is yet to be made—one that goes beyond merely considering assumed terrorist capability and putative vulnerabilities.

Pakistan has long been considered a potential source of nuclear weapons for terrorists, even before it had a full-fledged nuclear program and decades before it demonstrated a yield-bearing nuclear explosive capability. In 1976, distressed by the dissemination of nuclear technologies and expertise to “politically unstable countries,” military intelligence historian Roberta Wohlstetter warned that a nuclear-armed Pakistan increased “the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons considerably” (Wohlstetter, 1976: 100). Thirty-six years later, an international chorus still warns that Pakistan—presently armed with 90 to 110 nuclear weapons (Kristensen and Norris, 2011)—is the epicenter of violent Islamism where terrorist groups actively seek nuclear weapons. But how real is the risk? Two groups of experts stand on opposite ends of the risk spectrum—these “optimists” and “pessimists” consider valid variables but fail to evaluate all the critical factors necessary for a methodologically robust and defensible threat assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

The pessimists contend the risk has grown and “the safety and security of nuclear weapons materials in Pakistan may very well be compromised at some point in the future” (Gregory, 2011: 4). Indeed, for almost a decade there have been calls for US contingency plans to destroy, temporarily secure in place, or “exfiltrate” Pakistani nuclear assets—its nuclear weapons and fissile materials—in the event of widespread civil unrest or a governmental coup empowering Islamist forces (Ali, 2007: 9–10; Blair, 2001; Grossman, 2011; Hersh, 2001; Staff, 2009; Wolfsthal, 2001). In contrast, optimists maintain Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is secure and the threat posed by terrorists is overblown. Optimists say perceptions of vulnerability do not adequately consider the implementation of various technical precautions and advances in Pakistan’s personnel reliability program (e.g., Luongo and Salik, 2007). For example, optimists emphasize that Pakistan likely maintains its nuclear arsenal in a disassembled state: a bifurcated manner where the weapons’ fissile cores are separated from the non-nuclear components (e.g., firing circuitry and conventional explosives) and delivery platforms (Blair, 2009). Pakistani officials maintain that even during times of crisis, the 2001–2 standoff with India for example, these components are not mated (Lavoy, 2006). When handling components or an intact weapon, Pakistan claims to abide by “two-man” or “three-man” rules “and very tight selection [processes] for vetting personnel involved with nuclear weapons—mirroring in many ways, some believe, the US Personnel Reliability Program” (Blair, 2009: 208). Additionally, they downplay the threat posed by violent Islamists and the risks associated with domestic political instability (e.g., an Islamist coup) (e.g., Ali, 2007). In short, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are either on the brink of successful seizure by terrorists or they are secure. Based on unclassified information, neither the optimists’ nor the pessimists’ positions are defensible—in fact, both positions only review assumed terrorist capabilities and putative vulnerabilities of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

Today, few assessments consider whether or not relevant Pakistani groups are motivated to attack these assets and what their operational goals might be. ¹ Because of these gaps in current threat assessments, no definitive determinations can be made with regard to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure (e.g., facilities housing nuclear weapon components, fissile materials, and critical transportation nodes). ²

A holistic threat assessment

Risk assessments typically are comprised of two broad components: chance and consequence. ³ The latter is not relevant here, apart from how the attacker’s perception of consequence management affects his or her motivation and method of attack. Chance is addressed by means of a threat assessment, a process that considers three elements. The first and second are assessments of the value and vulnerability of the asset in question. Likelihood of attack, the third broad element of threat assessment, is dependent on who the attackers might be, their motivations for an attack, and their perceived capabilities. In assessing likelihood of attack, one cannot overemphasize the importance of the attacker’s perception of the target’s value and vulnerability (Ackerman et al., 2007). Figure 1 illustrates these interconnected threat assessment relationships, with the attacker’s perception represented by a dotted line.

Figure 1.

Basic threat assessment. Source: Adapted from Ackerman (2007).

Perceived value and vulnerability of asset

When Wohlstetter cautioned about the dangers of a nuclear Pakistan, she acknowledged “that there has yet been no public indication that terrorist groups are interested” in acquiring nuclear weapons (1976: 100). ⁴ Little has changed. Today, terrorists’ intentions still go unexplored by experts assessing nuclear security. Intent is largely—and erroneously—treated as solely a derivative of a group’s capability and a given target’s vulnerability.

But if we assume Pakistan’s nuclear assets are at risk, what groups might credibly threaten them? Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT) typically generate the most concern (e.g., Gregory, 2009). The former, however, has not yet conducted operationally sophisticated attacks within Pakistan entirely on its own. All of Al Qaeda’s relevant attacks in Pakistan have been closely linked to, if not entirely carried out by, former Kashmiri fighters, foreign jihadists, and tribal militants—all three groups being part of the PNT. ⁵ Moreover, many analysts believe Al Qaeda is unlikely to credibly threaten Pakistan’s nuclear assets any time soon. In short, if Al Qaeda were to conduct operations aimed at Pakistani nuclear assets, it would have to rely on significant numbers of PNT personnel. Therefore, we shall consider the PNT, specifically its largest and most capable constituent, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), “Movement of the Pakistani Taliban,” the most credible threat. The TTP is largely an umbrella organization for dozens of other groups and factions that disagree, often violently, about tactical and, at times, strategic objectives (Blair, 2011).

Although we don’t know the TTP’s perceived value of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, the TTP and its allies likely recognize that both the regional and international security communities view the nation’s nuclear weapons and fissile materials as major elements affecting the region’s geopolitical milieu. In addition to a nuclear asset’s largely tangible value—for example, its role in deterrence, war fighting, etc.—it also has a symbolic value. In the case of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, the former value is determined by the outcome of a successful terrorist attack—one that seizes and removes, or uses in situ, nuclear weapons or materials. ⁶ In contrast, the latter value allows for suboptimal attack outcomes—for example, thwarted attempts. In this case, the asset’s value is not wholly endogenous; rather, it also has a symbolic meaning. Sometimes even credibly threatening to attack symbolic targets carries perceived benefits to an attacker (Renfroe and Smith, 2010). Thus, when determining the value of a given Pakistani nuclear asset, one must consider how the attacker is likely to define success. Similarly, an asset’s vulnerability relates to both measurable objective qualities and the attacker’s perception of asset security. Generally, attack decisions are not influenced by the defender’s perception of the target’s vulnerability (although insiders may be able to provide this information to the attacker); rather, they reflect the attacker’s perception.

Likelihood of attack: The role of intent and perceived capability

The likelihood of attack is a “subjective equation” (Ackerman et al., 2007: 2) calculated in part through understanding a target’s perceived value—instrumental and symbolic—as well as its perceived vulnerability. Likelihood of attack is also critically shaped by the attacker’s intentions—or motivations—and perceived capabilities. Intention is partially regulated by the attacker’s perception of the target’s value and vulnerability. Additionally, the attacker’s motivations are influenced by three other factors: (1) an ideological agenda, (2) operational objectives, and (3) perceived operational capabilities.

Ideological agenda

Studies in nuclear terrorism reveal a disturbing disregard for the cardinal role of ideology in dictating a group’s likelihood to seek nuclear weapons. At most, widely referenced studies on nuclear terrorism devote a small chapter to general motivation; far more common are a few pages or sentences offering a cursory examination of intent. ⁷ This is unfortunate, because ideology is likely the strongest factor in determining why a group might choose to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. ⁸ As terrorist-targeting expert C. J. M. Drake notes, “[T]errorists’ ideology is central … not only because it provides the initial dynamic for the terrorists’ actions, but because it sets out the moral framework within which they operate” (Drake, 1998: 53). A group’s ideology, Drake continues, “is extremely important because [it] identifies the ‘enemies’ of the group by providing a measure against which to assess the ‘innocence’ or ‘guilt’ of people and institutions. This gives rise to the idea that certain people or things are somehow ‘legitimate targets’” (Drake, 1998: 56). Jeffrey Bale, a leading scholar of terrorist ideology, elaborates: “[I]deology is a key—if not the key—behavioral driver of extremist groups. For example, the ideology of certain organizations may explicitly inhibit them, whether for moral or arcane doctrinal reasons, from carrying out attacks that are likely to cause mass, indiscriminate casualties [e.g., nuclear weapon use]” (Bale, 2009: 32). On the other hand, groups that possess an apocalyptic eschatology, seek to serve an otherworldly constituency, or both, may well be drawn to nuclear weapons. As Bale notes, “to the extent that violent extremist groups are absolutely convinced that they are doing God’s bidding, virtually any action that they decide to undertake can be justified, no matter how heinous, since the ‘divine’ ends are thought to justify the means” (Bale and Ackerman, 2005: 29).

Operational objectives

In addition to ideology, a group’s operational objectives are a central element in determining its intent to attack a given asset. These objectives reflect what the group hopes to achieve from an attack. Although other goals may exist, successfully seizing and spiriting away—or using in position—nuclear weapons or fissile materials is arguably the most likely objective of an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Often left unasked, however, is why a group would seek a nuclear capability. In evaluating terrorists’ adoption of new disruptive technologies, terrorism expert Brian Jackson observes: “Organizations … do not innovate for the sake of innovating. Rather a company or terrorist group will choose to pursue a new piece of technology because of the belief that there is something to be gained by doing so” (Jackson, 2001: 189). “The choice to integrate a new technology into a group’s repertoire and use it in operations instead of currently ‘proven’ methods,” Jackson continues, “entails both the risk inherent in learning a new military technology and the operational risks of failure associated with deploying it” (Jackson, 2001: 193). Unclassified sources lack studies exploring why the TTP would possess operational objectives aimed at acquiring a nuclear capability.

When assuming that groups are predisposed to an assault on Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, specifically facilities and platforms perceived to have nuclear weapons, fissile materials, or both, commentators unanimously portray such an attack as having only one objective: the successful seizure or use of nuclear weapons or materials—a largely instrumental attack. However, some experts emphasize that operational objectives can reflect myriad goals—some that may be perceived by observers as less-than-optimal outcomes or even outright failures. These objectives include eliciting a sought-after response from domestic or international authorities, demonstrating the group’s resolve to enemies, rivals, and constituents (especially during times of group factionalization), and, among other possible factors, probing and learning from responses to the attack. ⁹ It is possible that terrorist groups may attack relevant elements of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure believing their attack will fail to acquire nuclear weapons or materials. In such cases, their perception of the target’s vulnerability and instrumental value may not be a decisive component in determining the likelihood of attack.

Perceived operational capabilities

A group’s motivation and likelihood of attack are both influenced by its perceived operational capabilities. If the group’s intention is entirely symbolic rather than instrumental, then belief in moderate operational capabilities may be enough to meet the requirements for an attack. Unless the group’s leadership displays unusually high levels of distorted cognitive and affect-based biases (e.g., the leadership assumes that their “competence is challenged when others criticize their ideas, thus triggering emotional or affective conflict” [Parayitam and Dooley, 2007: 45]), intentions to attain nuclear weapons or fissile materials likely require a perception that the group has high operational capabilities.

An accurate threat assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear materials should measure relevant terrorists’ perceptions of the value and vulnerability of these assets. Critically, terrorists’ motivations—informed by ideology, operational goals, and capabilities—must also be accounted for. Only through such a holistic assessment can the likelihood of an attack aimed at securing or using Pakistan’s nuclear assets be gauged. Unfortunately, extant assessments are fatally uniform regarding the factors they consider and are generally indefensible and incomplete.

Extant threat assessments

Both pessimists and optimists claim an accurate understanding of the threats facing Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. However, pessimists typically employ threat assessment methodologies that infer terrorist motivation and capability while assuming that Pakistan’s nuclear-related safeguards mirror that of its other important military assets. Optimists demonstrate flawed methodologies as well. By arguing that Pakistan’s nuclear command and control is assertive and, hence, its arsenal is immune from unauthorized use, and by asserting that Pakistan’s military is largely free from Islamist threat, optimists offer largely artificial and static assessments and may well ignore recent changes.

Pessimists

Threat assessments concluding Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure is alarmingly insecure typically emphasize three supporting factors. First, observers generally agree that a variety of violent Islamists operating in Pakistan—most notably the TTP—are motivated to acquire a nuclear capability. Groups like the TTP, however, have said little about acquiring nuclear weapons. ¹⁰ Consequently, without statements of nuclear intent from indigenous Pakistani violent Islamists, observers often point to declarations linked to Al Qaeda. ¹¹ In addition to well-publicized comments by Osama bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders (e.g., McNerney, 2009), these pronouncements include the May 2003 fatwa (a legally authoritative opinion issued by Islamic religious scholars) delivered by Saudi shaykh Nasir ibn Hamid al-Fahd allowing the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (al-Fahd, 2003). ¹² The writings of Al Qaeda strategist Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri, moreover, indicate “a clear strategic rationale for the use of weapons of mass destruction by the jihadi movement” (Lia, 2008: 312). In short, since at least 1994, certain jihadist groups, conflated with the TTP, have expressed motivation to acquire CBRN weapons, and, since 2003, such desires have been backed by some religious authorities. ¹³

Second, pessimists argue the TTP is not only motivated but also increasingly capable of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Such conclusions are drawn from the dramatic increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2004 (from 150 reported attacks that year to more than 1,300 in 2009) (Blair, 2011). According to observers, the operational sophistication of some attacks—specifically the October 2009 TTP assault on the Pakistan Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi (“Pakistan’s Pentagon”)—reflect “modalities [that] add up to a virtual blueprint for a successful attack on a nuclear weapons facility” (Gregory, 2011: 6).

Third, commentators warn that critical elements of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure are vulnerable to certain types of terrorist attacks. However, unclassified assessments of such vulnerabilities are largely based on conjecture. Perceived insecurities are usually inferred from the following factors:

Expanding nuclear arsenal. With more nuclear weapon and fissile material production—dispersed at an increasing number of sites—it is assumed that security challenges are rapidly growing in Pakistan. ¹⁴ The qualitative evolution of its arsenal is another concern. Pakistan’s ongoing efforts at warhead miniaturization allow for nuclear warheads that are theoretically easier to seize and transport. ¹⁵

Delegative nuclear command and control. While maintaining an explicit first-use nuclear doctrine and a platform of “minimum credible deterrence,” Pakistan has never issued a formal or detailed declaration about how, when, or why it might use nuclear weapons (Ahmed, 2009). Scott Sagan, a leading expert in nuclear employment doctrines, has argued that Pakistan’s nuclear posture is likely a “disturbing” and complex “flexible nuclear-use [doctrine] that could lead to nuclear weapon use in response to less than imminent threats to national existence” (Sagan, 2009: 220). Indeed, Pakistan’s determination to expand its arsenal, including development of short-range delivery platform systems, suggests it may be augmenting its nuclear posture to include asymmetrical escalation—e.g., a tactical nuclear war-fighting capability—as opposed to pursuing a “catalytic” ¹⁶ posture or the type of retaliatory strategic deterrence found in assured nuclear retribution. ¹⁷ By expanding their delivery systems to favor early use of nuclear weapons against Indian forces within its borders, Pakistan likely needs to disperse warheads and delivery platforms to a growing number of units in the field. Moreover, because such units could employ their nuclear weapons before any strategic exchange, they likely have been predelegated ¹⁸ the authority and capability to use these weapons on their own accord under certain conditions—a “peripheral launch capability” (Seng, 1997: 56). ¹⁹ Experts warn against the dangers of predelegation (specifically, how it grants local commanders the authority to employ nuclear weapons). Terrorists operating in a predelegative environment, they argue, would have an easier time gaining access to and using nuclear weapons not under strict centralized state control.

Likely insider collusion. As Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure grows, more people have access to secure materials, safety codes, and overall sensitive data. Naturally, there is concern about the types of people with access. Insider collusion appeared evident with recent terrorist attacks—most notable the May 2011 attack on Pakistan’s Mehran naval aviation base— and is viewed as a harbinger of nuclear-related machinations between violent Islamists and their ideological confederates working within Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure (e.g., Gregory, 2011).

In short, pessimists assert that groups like the TTP have the motivation, capability, and, because of vulnerabilities, the opportunity to successfully seize or use in situ Pakistani nuclear assets. However, pessimists infer the status of all three factors. Erroneously focusing on Al Qaeda’s intent, these experts leave the TTP’s nuclear aspirations unexplored. In addition, if their goal is to acquire a nuclear capability, no terrorist attack has demonstrated the operational sophistication likely necessary for successful ingress, hold, and egress of nuclear facilities. Finally, pessimists misrepresent alleged Pakistani nuclear infrastructure vulnerabilities by highlighting insecurities of sensitive facilities unrelated to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Vulnerabilities at some military facilities does not necessarily mean that all nuclear facilities are similarly susceptible to attack. These incomplete and erroneous assessments, however, do little to strengthen those made by optimists, whose conclusions rely equally on inference and otherwise incomplete threat assessments.

Optimists

Interestingly, commentators purporting Pakistan’s nuclear asset security agree with pessimists in two key regards. First, they accept that violent Islamists are motivated to acquire Pakistani nuclear assets. Second, optimists tend to agree that groups such as the TTP display a growing capability to conduct sophisticated operations. It is with perceived asset vulnerabilities that opinions differ:

Assertive nuclear posture. When assessing the dangers inherent in nuclear command and control arrangements involving predelegation, optimists counter that Pakistan likely maintains centralized nuclear control for three broad reasons (Durrani, 2004). First, Pakistan’s internal unrest requires close arsenal guardianship and stringent measures to prevent seizure of nuclear weapon components and accidental or unauthorized detonations (Blair, 2011). Second, Pakistan must placate US nuclear command and control concerns to maintain, among other things, generous aid packages. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Pakistan must arguably demonstrate to India that its arsenal is stable in both peacetime and crisis to avoid possible “preventative” conventional or nuclear strikes ²⁰ (if India sensed that internal unrest was reaching a crisis point within Pakistan) or retaliatory strikes in response to unauthorized or accidental Pakistani nuclear use.

Intolerance for violent Islamists within the military. Although optimists acknowledge the presence of Islamists within the military, the threat of an Islamist-led military coup (and subsequent access to nuclear assets by terrorists) is considered extremely unlikely. Even if Islamists within the military succeeded in seizing power, optimists maintain that they would not seek to alter Pakistan’s foreign policy—behavior that would occlude nuclear collaborations with terrorists (e.g., Grare, 2006). With regard to insider collusion, retired Brigadier General Gurmeet Kanwal notes, “[H]ard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from [Pakistan’s] nuclear security detail” (Kanwal, 2008: 4). Attempts at seizure would fail, Kanwal asserts, because “if some rogue elements were to try to gain control over the nuclear warheads, they would have to be prepared to fight their way through several layers of highly motivated personnel who are armed to the teeth” (Kanwal, 2008: 4).

No risk of instability. Optimists maintain, “No Islamic organization has ever been in a position to politically or militarily challenge [e.g., initiate a coup] the role of the one and only center of power in Pakistan: the army” (Grare, 2006: 1). While an Islamist seizure of power through elections is similarly dismissed, optimists nevertheless emphasize that Islamist rule would not necessarily mean instability for Pakistan or the region (e.g., Ali, 2007; Grare, 2006).

Optimists argue that, in addition to Pakistan’s command and control arrangements, terrorists’ threats to nuclear assets are minimal because of the professionalism of the Pakistani military and the relatively non-revisionist nature of Pakistan’s Islamist political actors (with regard to foreign relations). However, Pakistan’s nuclear posture is changing into a configuration that embraces war-fighting and predelegation. Centralized control of nuclear weapons is likely to be partial at best, especially in times of crisis. After a half-decade of civil war, Pakistan’s military is beginning to show signs of renewed terrorist collusion, this time with groups that actively oppose the United States and other Western powers. ²¹

Revisiting value, vulnerability, motivation, and capability

Optimists and pessimists attempt to influence perceptions of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The former endeavor to placate apprehensions about alleged nuclear insecurities; the latter try to alert decision makers to extant and emerging nuclear threats from non-state actors. With no signs of a decline in Pakistan’s civil war, and with the country’s nuclear arsenal rapidly expanding, American decision makers have to consider the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Because neither pessimists nor optimists anchor their assertions to holistic, methodologically robust threat assessments, decision makers who wisely consider unclassified studies are ill-prepared to assess or respond to a Pakistani nuclear terrorism crisis. Relevant US agencies need to allocate greater resources to researchers, analysts, and academics to complete threat assessments of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. The following interrelated areas need exploration:

Terrorist perception of asset values. This involves understanding both the instrumental and symbolic values terrorists assign to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Specifically, the relationship between the ways authorities communicate an asset’s value to Pakistan’s terrorist groups needs to be assessed. For example, do US public statements of concern about Pakistan’s nuclear assets generate terrorist interest in attacks for symbolic gain? Conversely, what, if any, steps can the United States take to diminish the perceived value of Pakistan’s nuclear assets?

Terrorist perception of asset vulnerabilities. The TTP has conducted operations near suspected nuclear weapon assembly and storage facilities (Blair, 2011), but no terrorist group is known to have attacked one directly. Other factors notwithstanding, the perception of vulnerability is key here. Pessimists portray Pakistan’s nuclear asset protection akin to other sensitive Pakistani military facilities (Gregory, 2011). However, apart from high-level Pakistani military officials, it is unlikely anyone completely understands what security measures are in place and whether or not they mirror the protective systems found in non-nuclear facilities. Perhaps insiders have alerted terrorists to these measures and, consequently, the latter have deemed attacks unfeasible.

Terrorist motivations and the likelihood of attack. Strikingly, the contemporary debate regarding Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure security assumes that groups such as the TTP are obsessed with achieving a nuclear capability. When Wohlstetter forewarned of nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan, she noted, “Without exception those who have been predicting such use and announcing their alarm to the press are Western physicists and political scientists—not terrorist organizations” (Wohlstetter, 1976: 103). Indeed, the TTP’s intent to attack Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure is largely based on hypotheses and speculations of journalists and Western observers. Recent official TTP statements claim no interest in attacking any element of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure (Rosenberg and Tohid, 2011). The TTP’s ideology and how it mirrors and differs from groups that seek a nuclear capability must be explored. It can be argued that the TTP’s tactical and strategic objectives are being met with conventional weapon use (Blair, 2011). Although often brazen in their attacks, the TTP is similar to other terrorist groups—i.e., “tactically conservative, preferring the weapons with which they are most familiar” (Cameron, 1999: 156). ²² Researchers need to focus on security shifts that might alter the TTP’s objectives. Finally, decision makers need to know that terrorist attacks might be designed for failure. Indeed, the attackers’ “definition of success” might be to attempt the impossible (e.g., a frontal assault on a facility storing nuclear warheads) with the hopes that the United States or India would be “tricked” into an overreaction, possibly a deadly nuclear escalation. ²³

Terrorist capabilities. Analysts often carelessly lump all of Pakistan’s violent Islamists together as a cohesive, centrally controlled fighting unit. Regional expert Qandeel Siddique observed that the word “Taliban” is used “indiscriminately by the media to describe just about any act of terrorism in Pakistan’s context” (Siddique, 2008: 27). Consequently, it is likely that the TTP’s operational capabilities are more constrained than is commonly assumed. The most spectacular and sophisticated attacks that the TTP is associated with—for example, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, attacks on Pakistan’s military headquarters, and the bombing of CIA forwarding base Camp Chapman—all likely involved assistance from terrorist groups outside the immediate scope of the TTP.

Pakistan’s domestic stability is likely to continue its downward trajectory. Consequently, American decision makers will increasingly need to assess the threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets. During a crisis, US reliance on the extant assessments—and their related flawed methodologies—could lead to unnecessary and calamitous overreaction or tragic inaction. The former could result from utilization of the pessimists’ assessments; a conclusion that a “tipping point” of domestic instability requires seizure and possibly exfiltration of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The latter, a torpid response to dynamic changes in Pakistan’s domestic milieu, could facilitate military collusion with terrorists and a disastrously slow Western reaction to an Islamist seizure of power in Pakistan. Only by means of thorough and robust threat assessments—going beyond the limits of current threat assessments—can American decision makers pursue policies that cogently address the threat posed by Pakistan’s growing nuclear infrastructure.